What examples? Where? Quote them. — Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. — Luke

He calls "S" a sign, and "sensation" a word. Then he says the use of this word stands in need of justification. You really can't read.

The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either. — Luke

This makes no sense at all.

"S", the private sign, is supposed to represent something which has been called "a sensation", public word. That "sensation" is the appropriate word to call whatever it is which the sign "S" represents is what needs to be justified

It is not the case that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, because S is part of a private language. What is the case is that if "S" is to be said to refer to "a sensation", this must be justified. There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word".

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private.

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language.

So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"? — Luke

I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. You seem to be having a similar problem with Wittgenstein's example of the private language. No matter how many times and different ways I try to explain it to you, you just don't get it.

At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"? — Luke

There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes.

If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings. — Luke

The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way.

But now I really don't know what you're talking about.

I believe that what is demonstrated by Parmenides, in the Parmenides, is that the concept of, "the One" is logically incoherent. No matter how it is presented the result is contradiction. That is why I say Parmenides is represented as a sophist, providing a logical demonstration which makes the Form of "the One" appear to be full of contradictions. It makes no sense that you assign "the One" a "pivotal position" in Platonic ontology.

I think Plato reject this nonsensical sophistry concerning "the One" and moved on to a much more intuitive principle, "the good".

You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type? — Luke

Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here

So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).

I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar. — Luke

If meaning is given by the way a word is used, then very clearly, two distinct things can be the same. Whether or not this is a proper, "rule abiding" use of "same", is not the question here. But then the question is what exactly is meant when we say that two things are the same.. But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. And that appears to be why you do not understand Wittgenstein's example, the so-called "private language argument", where the individual person names two occurrences as the same without a criterion of identity (rule).

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words. — Luke

Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". "

For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.——And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said.

Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same. — Luke

Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided.

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — PI 148

But I think, as I said to Banno, that Wittgenstein proceeds to demonstrate that misunderstanding cannot be avoided, as is evident from your misunderstanding, and the common misunderstanding in general, of the so-called private language argument

I find the so-called "cosmological argument" to be compelling and significant, as refuting both Platonic Realism and Materialism.

I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i). — Luke

Question #1 was never answered. I gave an opinion and you gave an opinion, they differed, so the question was left as unanswered, inconclusive, and we moved on. Now I'm trying to explain to you what that inconclusiveness entails.

You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe. — Luke

No, I never said it means both a type and a token. I am saying that both of those, though they are possible interpretations, are incorrect interpretations, because they do not reflect what Wittgenstein intended, what he was actually doing. They each assign a determinate meaning to "the sensation" which is signified by "S", when he intended that the named sensation has an indeterminate referent.

I'm still saying that "the sensation" refers to neither a type nor a token. That's what I've been arguing since the beginning. The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle.

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ".

By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same. — Luke

This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same".

This justifies my accusation that you misread Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein explicitly says at 261, that we cannot say anything about whatever it is that "S" refers to, you have already concluded that it must refer to a type, because this is the only thing which makes sense to you. So you completely ignore what Wittgenstein actually said, opting for what you think he must have meant instead. Then you present what you think he must have meant, as what he said, like in this clear example above.

You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"? — Luke

There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. But you refuse to even accept this as a possibility because it is unintelligible from your perspective of the model of a type/token dichotomy. But the referent is neither a type nor a token. That's what Wittgenstein indicates at 261 when he says " he has something—and that is all that can be said". I am quite confident that there are other possible meanings as well, but to find more, we'd have to look at the interpretations made by others.

Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. It seems the evidence of two was insufficient to convince you of the possibility of more. Of course this insufficiency is just a function of your type/token dichotomy. If it's not one, then it's the other, and there is no reason to believe in the real possibility of a multitude. But the possibility of a multitude is already a third option, and denying it doesn't make it unreal.

I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar. — Luke

I think that you are spluttering nonsense here. I gave you the reason why I would judge two things as the same, it's just what Wittgenstein mentions at 253, they are perceived as being exactly the same as each other. And I gave you an example, when I see someone with a hat exactly like mine. This does not mean that I judge it as the same type, a fedora or something like that, I might not even know what type my hat is. I simply see all the features as being the same, and judge it as exactly the same. Imagine seeing two cars on the street which look exactly the same. You do not need to know the type (make, model etc.), to judge the two as being exactly the same.

I brought up "similar" because it is a comparable judgement, and I thought it might help you to understand. We judge two things as similar without classifying them by type, in the same way that we would judge two things as exactly the same (identical), without classifying then by type. Judging two things as exactly the same is just a stronger form of judging two things as similar.

There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs. — Luke

You're really spluttering nonsense now, saying that two very different dogs are "the same". That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same.

Notice the difference between "these two things are the same type" which means in this case that they are both dogs, and "those two hats are the same". In the latter case, we are not saying that the type is the same, that's already given by calling them both hats. Saying "these two hats" tells us that the type is the same. So "the same" would just be redundant if it referred to type. However, "the same" is not redundant, it means that beyond them being the same type, they are also judged as being exactly the same, identical. And it makes no sense to say that it refers to a further type, fedora, because then we would just say "these two fedoras are the same". And if you say the type is "black fedora", so we now say "these two black fedoras are the same", it is still implied that other features are the same. "Same" in this context always refers to something further than the type.

Yes. Seen to be good, brought into existence, caused to be, etc. by the same one Reality that acts as efficient, material, formal, and final causes. There is nothing else apart from that one Reality. Referring to the One as “formal cause” does not preclude the possibility of its being the other causes, including the ultimate cause. — Apollodorus

But these are different things. These distinct causes are described, and named, as distinct and different things, To say that different things are one, requires a principle of unity. It's like if you say the One is a house, but being a house doesn't preclude the possibility of it being a car as well.

You create that unity with "Reality". You claim there is one reality, and all these different causes are unity within that one reality. But I don't see how this claim, that reality is one, and not itself a multitude, is supported.

The journey has six stages:

1. Love of one beautiful body.
2. Love of all beautiful bodies.
3. Love of beauty in souls.
4. Love of beauty in institutions and laws.
5. Love of beauty in sciences.
6. Love of beauty in one single knowledge. — Apollodorus

I would differ with #6. I would say: Love of one single Beauty (the Form), rather than "one single knowledge". But this just shows that "one" is ambiguous, and it's not clear what its role is. Then Beauty is one of many Forms. Now if we are to unite this multitude of Forms within one Knowledge, we would be inclined to make Knowledge itself a Form. But if Knowledge is a Form, then it is just one of the many. Therefore the thing which unites the Forms as one, must be something other than a Form.

However, it is important to understand that the Greek word “beautiful” (kalos) also means “good”. The Greek ideal of human perfection is “good and beautiful” or, rather “beautiful and good” (kaloskagathos). Beauty is inseparably connected with Good and Good is inseparably connected with Knowledge. Beauty leads to the Good and the Good is Knowledge or Truth. — Apollodorus

I don't agree. I believe Plato recognized a distinction between good and beautiful, even if they were sometimes expressed by the same word. This is why you say "good and beautiful", which wouldn't make sense if they were both the same word with the same meaning.

There is an old metaphysical division between aesthetics and ethics, which I believe Plato had some understanding of. In one way, we place beauty at the top of the hierarchy, in another, we place good at the top. Beauty can be given a higher place than the good because it is desired simply for the sake of itself, whereas, as Aristotle demonstrated, we always find that the good is desired for the sake of something else, until we reach the final end, which is simply stipulated. He stipulated happiness as the final good.

I think that Plato worked more to create a separation between the two than to dissolve the separation. He clearly worked toward a separation between pleasure and good, but it may be the case that good is a special type of pleasure. Then good might be a special type of beauty. But this would divide the unity of Beauty.

And Knowledge has the Good as its source (as has Beauty). — Apollodorus

Knowledge has the Good as its source, but I don't think that we can say that Beauty has the Good as its source. If pleasure is derived from the actuality of beauty, and there are pleasures which are not good, then Beauty cannot be sourced from the Good. This is why some metaphysicians place beauty as higher than the good, it's desired for its own sake, as pleasure is, whereas Good must be supported by reason.

But this points to an ambiguity, division, in the Good. If knowledge is derived from the Good, then the Good must be higher than knowledge and to say that the Good must be supported by reason would be contrary to that. So the Good, which serves as the source for all knowledge cannot be supported by any knowledge, or reason, and it becomes more like a simple desire for Beauty, or pleasure. The other sense of Good, the one supported by knowledge and reason cannot be the source of knowledge. This is the distinction between the apparent good, and the real good first formulated by Aristotle.. The real good is supported by reason and knowledge, whereas the apparent good is what actually inclines us to act, being what moves the will. The separation between the two is the reason why we can, and often do, what we know is bad.

We can say that the goal of moral philosophy is to create consistency between the two forms of "Good". We are taught that the Good which is supported by knowledge and reason, the real good, is the highest principle, and the apparent good, which moves the will must be shaped to conform with the real good. However, we can see from Plato's principles, that the truly highest Good, the one which is the source of knowledge, must be what is called "the apparent good", being what is prior to knowledge. So the true goal of the moral philosopher is to shape and conform the real good, so that it conforms with the higher, apparent good.

This inversion is the result of the fact that the will truly is free. So the free will cannot be made to conform to principles of "good" which it does not agree with. So the individual will continue to do what one knows is wrong, or incorrect according to the laws and rules of the community, when one believes oneself to hold higher principles. Therefore we must structure the hierarchy to reflect this reality, that what we call "the apparent good", supported by beauty, pleasure, and desire, as sought for the sake of itself, is truly higher than what we call "the real good", as supported by reason and knowledge.

Contemplation or knowledge of Beauty itself enables the accomplished philosopher to know the Good. And knowing the Good itself in the absolute sense means being the Good. By being good as much as humanly possible, the philosopher “touches” or “grasps” the truth (cf. Timaeus 90c). He becomes good, real, and true, and everything he does from now on is by participation in the truth which is the Good. — Apollodorus

I think that this "knowing the Good" which you refer to is an understanding of the reality of the free will. It is to recognize that what moves the individual self, person, or soul, to act is what one believes to be good, not what is said by others to be good. So the true Good is found within, not in the conventions of the culture. As you say:

This happiness that derives from our own goodness is more direct, more powerful, and more real than happiness that is derived from any external things (i.e. things other than ourselves) such as material possessions. — Apollodorus

When Plato says that the Good is the “source of all knowledge”, or “above essence”, etc., this cannot be taken to mean that the Good is above the One, given that the One is not knowledge but pure, objectless Awareness, and as we have seen, the One is unlimited, without beginning or end, and without it nothing can exist (Parm. 137d, 166c). — Apollodorus

Here is where you and I have disagreement, as to Plato's positioning of "the One". I believe Plato rejects the One as a true first principle, subjugating it to mathematics (as Aristotle described Met. 987b), being a first principle of epistemology, not metaphysics. The quotes you bring up represent the position of sophists who are trying raise the logically necessary "One", to metaphysical relevance. However, you can see that with Beauty and Good, we are dealing with principles prior to any knowledge, as the source of knowledge, whereas the need to assume "One", is derived from the imperfections of knowledge. So "the One" is not basic, fundamental, or foundational to knowledge, as there is knowledge which necessarily precedes it, the knowledge required for the individuation of particulars.

This is also evident from the fact that One and Being are inseparable and that everything that has being participates in both Being and One, which includes all the Forms, even the Form of the Good. — Apollodorus

See, Being and not-Being, from which the One is derived, is a Parmenidean logical structure. If One and Being are inseparable as you say, then One is also inseparable from not-One, as Being is inseparable from not-Being, being defined one by the other in that logical structure. To proceed from here to the Good, which is supposed to be prior to any logic, therefore prior to such logical structures, we must see all as unindividuated, therefore no such thing as One. You might insist that this means seeing all as "One", but that is not true. "One" comes about from individuation, and does not exist prior to that individuation, which might be a sort of first act of intellection. But One does not exist prior to that first act of intellection, though Beauty and Good are relevant here.

That infinite mass of luminous awareness must first become aware of itself. This is what produces the first subject-object dichotomy, or the One and the Dyad, where subject and object are experienced as one yet “distinct”. — Apollodorus

Do you see that Beauty and Good, as the motivation for action, exist prior to this first becoming aware of itself? And this is why Beauty and Good are prior to One.

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario. — Luke

We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity. But you ignore the obvious, "the..." almost always refers to a particular, and rarely, if ever, is used to refer to a type. That's why I say, you just don't get it.

Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same? — Luke

I don't think it is by "a principle". You are the one who insists that language requires rules, I do not agree. I agree with what Wittgenstein says at 258, there is no criterion of identity here. I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement.

Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type.

You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context". — Luke

Right "what the word means" implies that it has a determinate meaning. What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. A multitude of possible meanings is not compatible with one determinate meaning. Therefore, if there is a multitude of possible meanings in this context, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context..

You do not seem to understand what ambiguity is. Can you not see that if an author intentionally uses a word in an ambiguous way, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context? It is not the case that the phrase in which the word is uttered will be devoid of meaning, or nonsensical, the phrase may be very rich in meaning, as metaphors are commonly like this. But it is the case that there is no such things as what the word means. This indicates that "what the word means" is a faulty way of looking at language.

Do you appreciate abstract art? Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? If you accept that the meaning which a piece of art has, is distinct from what is supposedly represented by the individual aspects of the piece of art, then you will see that a phrase can have meaning without the particular words being used, having any specific meaning.

You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning

It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context. — Luke

I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". Do you not see a difference between the possibility which is explicitly stated with "possible meaning", and the actuality implied by "what the word means". You seem to jump across the logical gap between 'there is the possibility of meaning' to 'there is an actual meaning'.

We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same" — Luke

Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it.

Gotta hand it to you, too, Meta, your grasp of logic is quite disconcerting. — Banno

Your grasp of the English language is a bit disconcerting (but nothing unusual there, it's common place in our society). It seems you've taken principles of logic and attempted to apply them to language use in general, exactly what Wittgenstein warns against. And you accuse me of adhering to principles of essentialism! You say possible is what is not necessary, and necessary is what is not possible, concluding that you have said something about "necessary" and something about "possible", by saying what each is not, therefore nothing about each of them. Saying what something is not, says nothing about what it is, because that does not qualify as a description.



Your question of the relationship between God and time demonstrates that we have a faulty conception of time. We tend to associate time with physical change. Furthermore, some even equate the two. But really, the relationship between time and physical change can be proposed in numerous ways. We can say that physical change is required for time, which puts physical change as prior to time, we can say that the two are equivalent, which is to assign no priority, or we can say that time is required for physical change.

The latter, that time is required for physical change, is unacceptable in modern physics, because it allows that time could be passing without any physical change (no way to measure it), but it is the most intuitively coherent proposal. This proposition allows that observable physical change is the result of time passing, and that there could be time passing, prior to physical change (at which time God creates the physical world). But in relation to our conventional conception of time, which ties time to physical change, this would put the activities of God outside of "time" (eternal), rendering such "activities" as unintelligible.

This is why we ought to reject that conception of time, because it makes activity outside the realm of physical activity impossible, as unintelligibly incoherent. Activity is temporal, so if we want to understand the activity which is the cause of physical existence, we need to allow that whatever exists when there is no physical existence, which could act as the cause of physical existence, is really temporal, and therefore not eternal.

I didn't realize this until now of course but I think we need to dig deeper into irrational numbers. What are they? Does it have to do with the continuous as opposed to discrete nature of reality? Geometry seems, in a certain sense, more physical than arithmetic. I'm not as certain about this as I'd like to be. — TheMadFool

I believe that what is the case is that there is always an incommensurability between two dimensions. This is demonstrated by the irrationality of the square root of two, and of pi. What it indicates, is that as dimensions, is a faulty way of representing space. Space being represented by distinct dimensions is a convenient fiction.

Now that means that necessity and possibility are different ways of saying the very same thing. — Banno

That looks like a very bad conclusion. You've just separated necessity and possibility such that they are completely distinct, one having no part of the other. Necessarily means "not possibly...". And possibly means "not necessarily...". Now you say that they are different ways of saying the same thing. I don't think so.

I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there? — Luke

I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. — Luke

No, I think I know how he is using the word, he is intentionally creating ambiguity with it.

You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words? — Luke

No, again that's not the case. I do understand his use of words; It's you who doesn't understand what he is doing with the words, if you do not recognize that he is intentionally using them ambiguously.

The same in what respect? — Luke

Why must "same". be qualified with "in what respect" for you? When we say that two things are the same, we simply say that they are the same (e.g. I know someone who has the same hat as me). if we qualified that with some respect, we would not be saying they are the same, we'd be saying they are the same in that respect.

I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens. — Luke

Why did you say that then? You said that we learn types, and now you say that's not what you meant, then what did you mean?

No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type. — Luke

They are not "classed" as the same, they are just judged to be the same. Whether or not they are the same type, is irrelevant, because they are not judged to be the same type. They are judged to be the same. When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. And many other things I judge as the same in this way. I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types.

On the other hand, if I learn what an oak tree looks like, I learn that type or classification, I might see a tree and judge it as that type. Do you see the difference between judging things as "the same", or even as "similar", and judging things as being of the same type? These are two distinctly different forms of judgement.

How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here? — Luke

Because I know how "sensation" is being used. This is why "use" is a better way of understanding words than "meaning". There are ways of using words which do not give the word a meaning.

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke

To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed.

How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"? — Luke

Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. He demonstrates that words do not necessarily have what you call "a meaning", that meaning is complex, and not a simple thing.

No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. — Luke

You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. You simply insist that two instances are necessarily two distinct tokens. But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. And you readily admit this but you change the meaning of "instance" to say that they are not the same "instance" of chair.

What does it refer to then? — Luke

I explained that. In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same

We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. — Luke

This is exactly the idea which Wittgenstein is dispelling with the so-called private language argument. We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". That is a misrepresentation, it is false. We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. A "type" is a complicated concept, which we do not learn until after we get proficient at using words, so it is impossible that we learn how to use words by learning the names of types. We learn to use words by judging things as "the same", in the sense demonstrated by Wittgenstein, which means something other than the same token, and other than the same type.

When learning to use words we learn to judge things as "the same" in this sense, having common features, without learning anything about types. Nor are we learning to judge things by type. Learning types is a complex feature of abstract thought which a child learning language is incapable of.

If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym). — Luke

OK, I'll use other terms like "common features". Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type.

When all the features of the two things appear to match each other, we say that the two things are "the same". We are not saying they are the same type, simply that they are the same. We do not refer to criteria. This is what Wittgenstein is describing at 253. when he uses "exactly the same as". In this sense, two chairs are the same as each other (not being said to be the sane type, but being said to be "the same"), and two people might be said to have "the same pain". And Wittgenstein proceeds at 258 to discuss the same sensation. "The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, It is two occurrences which are simply judged to be "the same" as each other.

That's why he proceeds at 261 to ask what reason do we have for calling S the sign of a "sensation". The person judging the two occurrences as 'the same" has not produced a "type classification" he has simply judged them as 'the same".

"Final cause" simply means the purpose for which something is caused. — Apollodorus

No, it's distinctly called "a cause". So a purpose acts as a cause, through intention and free will. Do you understand, and believe in, the reality of free will? If so, you'll see that purpose, as intention is, a cause. This is what Plato meant by "the good", what Aristotle called final cause, the reason why things are brought into being, from not-being. Some potential is seen to be good, so it is brought into existence, caused to be. And this applies not only to material things, but Forms as well. This is why the good is prior to all Forms, as their cause, including One, and Dyad.

I think the easiest way to understand Plato and Platonism is to look at Creation as a diversification or “multiplification” of what is absolutely one. — Apollodorus

We obviously have very different understandings of Plato.

The literal meaning of arche is “beginning” or “origin”. To obtain true knowledge of anything, the philosopher must rise above assumptions or hypotheses to the first principle itself. In relation to knowledge, the philosopher must rise to its very origin or source.

Hence we are told that the Good is the source of all knowledge: — Apollodorus

Right, we are in agreement here. and "the Good" is not only the source of all knowledge, but of all being, and beings, Forms and everything, as the cause, final cause of their existence. Things have been caused to exits because their existence is good.

According to your translation, what comes after the question? — Luke

The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."

My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction. — Luke

Obviously, the example I made would be analogous only to a case where the particular sense cannot be conclusively determined. That is the situation we have with Wittgenstein's use of "a sensation". We disagree on the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. We cannot establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word, so how do we proceed toward applying the type/token distinction?

In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word? — Luke

I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. You seem to see a particular sense/use/meaning, and so you proceed toward applying a type/token distinction. Of course that is a misreading, because Wittgenstein intended that the meaning of "sensation" be left as ambiguous.

It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"? — Luke

Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token?
— Metaphysician Undercover

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". You say they are not the same token, and I say they are not the same type, so what makes them "the same"?

I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity. — Luke

The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. You apply a type/token dichotomy, and refuse to grasp the fact that many times when we use the word "same", such as "the same word" exemplified above, there is neither a type nor a token implied by "same". So your introduction of the type/token dichotomy does not produce clarity, because if it's adhered to, it produces misunderstanding.

You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"? — Luke

I mean exactly as I said, what Wittgenstein explains at 253. There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same".

ntil you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means. — Luke

I don't think you will ever understand, because you refuse to release yourself from the grips of that type/token dichotomy. To me it's like you are adhering to the law of excluded middle, to say, it must mean one or the other, and cannot be both, nor can it be neither. But you seem to refuse to accept the reality of ambiguity, and that an author can intentionally mean both, and you refuse to accept the reality of a meaning of "the same" which is neither.

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading. — Luke

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb".

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means? — Luke

It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. That's not my answer. I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word".

So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree?

The way I see it, in Plato’s metaphysics everything is secondary to intelligence and knowledge which presupposes a subject. Starting with the dictum “Know thyself”, Plato proceeds from the philosopher’s own individual intelligence to that intelligence which encompasses everything and is the cause and source of all knowledge and all intelligence. And this ultimate source and cause must be one. If it isn’t one, the philosopher must carry on his quest until he discovers that which is the ultimate one. — Apollodorus

In The Republic, the good is compared to the sun, in the sense that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Since intelligence is dependent on intelligible objects, and the intelligibility of intelligible objects, we ought to conclude that in Plato's metaphysics, intelligence and knowledge are secondary to the good.

I think that recognizing this is key to understanding Socrates' and Plato's approach to the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. Plato demonstrated that knowing what is good or right, will not ensure that a person will do it, as people commonly choose to do what they know is bad, or wrong. So the old adage, "virtue is knowledge", along with the claims of the sophists, to teach virtue, are proven wrong. This problem was dealt with in great depth by St. Augustine, but the reality of it, demonstrates that the good is higher than, and distinct from, knowledge. I believe that this is the most important lesson to be learned from Plato, and it is central to a number of the dialogues. How is it that knowing what is good, is insufficient to inspire one to actually do what is good? But Plato's recognition of this reality means that he placed knowledge and intelligence as secondary to the good.

Socrates (Plato):
You are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power (Rep. 6.509b) — Apollodorus

See, the subject here, is "the Good", not "the One". And "the Good" transcends both essence and existence. The One is always reducible to an essence.

Further evidence is provided by the Parmenides:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d) — Apollodorus

See, it is proposed here that the One is the essence of "unlimited".

The discussion eventually turns to the One and comes to the following conclusion:

It is impossible to conceive of many without one.”
“True, it is impossible.”
“Then if One does not exist, the Others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”
“No so it seems.”
“The Others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the One does not exist.”
“True.”
“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the One is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”
“Most assuredly.” (Parm. 166b)

So Plato, through Parmenides, is saying that nothing can exist without the One. — Apollodorus

Please reread the quoted passage and pay extra attention to the first line: "It is impossible to conceive of many with one". So what is shown is that "One" is first in conception, it is the first "form", but this does not demonstrate that it is the first in existence. "The Good", as required for, and cause of, conception, is prior to "the One" which is the result of conception.

As stated by Aristotle, the One is the essence and formal cause and “the Others” are the material cause. — Apollodorus

"The good" is the final cause in Aristotle, and is prior to all the other causes. That you relate "the One" to formal cause is further evidence that the One is distinct from the Good. The good is the final cause.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say". — Luke

Another example of your misreading.

How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"? — Luke

A multitude of things is not a thing. Sorry, I should have wrote "no thing", instead of "nothing" which is a bit ambiguous. But it should have been obvious because we were talking about the existence of things, and what I was claiming is that types have no real existence because they are not things and are imaginary. Your misreading appears intentional.

I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead. — Luke

It makes no sense at all to me to see a word as a concept. It's a physical thing, written on a page, or screen, or spoken. If you want me to be able to see a word as a concept, you'll really need to elaborate on this idea.

Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? This demonstrates the problem with saying that a word is itself a noun. What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. Therefore we have to refer to the context of the instance of use to see "the type" (verb or noun) which the word is a token of. Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. Each instance of use must be a different word, if we adhere to your proposed type-token distinction.

The alternative, to forget the type-token distinction is what I've been trying to get you to do since you introduced it. So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". Further, he talks about the possibility of pointing to this thing, "the sensation" to give it an ostensive definition, but declares that this is not possible.

That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. — Luke

Utter nonsense, as is your habit. You've fallen back into that habit of intentionally misreading to create a straw man.

The way I see it, not just Platonism but philosophy in general as inquiry into truth, must lead to an ultimate first principle or arche which, by definition, is one. Therefore, it is not incorrect to call the first principle “the One”, in the same way it is not incorrect to call the Good “one” or “the One”. — Apollodorus

Aristotle says philosophy is an inquiry into first principles. And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle".

I think it might be incorrect to call the good "one", because the good is defined by what is sought, desired, and this is always a complexity rather than something simple. So the good is complex rather than simple.

"[With respect to ethics and religion] we cannot express what we want to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense. ... My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk ethics or religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless. – Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it".

This appears to be distinctly inconsistent with what Wittgenstein says about language and boundaries at PI 68-70, though he does seem self-contradicting within this passage here. He says that he deeply respects, and would not ridicule such "nonsense". It makes one wonder what is meant by "nonsense".

The boundaries of language are created for specific purposes, like when we create a definition for a logical proceeding. But language use, and consequently meaning, is not restricted by such boundaries. Therefore going outside "the boundaries of language" does not leave one in a world of meaningless nonsense.

Understanding this principle is key to understanding the role of freewill, and 'private language', in the creation and evolution of language in general. Claiming that the boundaries of language are "the walls of our cage", is a misrepresentation which leaves one within Plato's cave, looking at the reflections and believing them to be the reality. .

I think the resolution to our disagreement is to see that "the good" as described by Plato, chiefly in The Republic, is not a Form. This places it in another category from the One, which is a Form. If we make the good a Form, we are talking about the Form of Good, and this is something distinctly different from the good itself. But the One cannot be anything other than a Form.

Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary. — Banno

Yes I see that, but if you read carefully you'll see the reason for the conclusion, that there are no ultimate simples. The idea is logically incoherent. What 48 shows is that what you call an "ultimate simple" exists as a part of a proposal, a proposition, as a feature of a description. Therefore it could not be a thing named, because it would only exist as a proposed part of a complex. It's existence is relative to the proposal. So there would be a description of the complex, which includes "ultimate simples", but there could be no real name for the proposed simples which compose the complex, because they are only proposed, not observed and named. There is only a description of the role, or function which they are supposed to play in the complex.

Then the problem of differentiating between one proposed ultimate simple and another is exposed at the end of 48. Is each element named by the same letter the same element, or are they different elements of the same type, bearing the same name by being of the same type? Well, as Wittgenstein says, and Banno says, it doesn't matter, so long as we can avoid misunderstandings. So, we'd say "no problem", they are different elements of the same type.

Well, at 49 it is shown that misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Those who propose ultimate simples, propose them as elements which can only be named, and cannot be described. To be describable would imply that they are themselves composed of parts, and therefore could not be ultimate simples. If they are not describable, we cannot judge them as the same type. So the idea of an ultimate simple turns out to be logically incoherent, because they can only be named, not described, but each and every one would all have the very same name, because they are supposed to be of the same type. But they really cannot be of the same type, because they cannot be described as such, nor can they be distinguished one from another. So they cannot be named, nor can they be described, and it's an incoherent proposal.

To perhaps get a clearer picture of my interpretation of this, refer to the PI reading group, p12 in my pagination, (I'd provide a link but I don't know how). There I describe how Wittgenstein demonstrates that the idea of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because it is as I describe there, simply an attempt to circumvent the law of identity, the proposal of a thing which cannot have any sort of identity.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato. — Apollodorus

The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good".

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies. — Apollodorus

To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa.
.

But as Aristotle demonstrated it makes no sense to talk of a being (existent) without a form (essence). so if Plato thought of particulars as beings (existence) without form or essence, Aristotle cleared this up. Matter without form is unintelligible, but form without matter is logically coherent.

You overlooked my quote of PI 241. — Luke

You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection.

Does the English language have real existence? — Luke

No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to.

Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one type or token. — Luke

That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. You just don't seem to grasp the meaning of "naming", that naming is to relate a word directly to an object, as we do with proper nouns.

However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary. — Luke

I really don't see how you draw this conclusion. Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way.

There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed. — Luke

The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does.

258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about. — Luke

That is not true, and again demonstrates that your preconceived ideas influence your reading. At 257 Wittgenstein proposes a sort of private language, where he questions "So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?" But by the end of 257 he concludes with "And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed."

I request that you consider the conclusion of 257 very closely. When we say that the person has given a name to one's pain we are already using "pain" to reference the thing which the person has named. In other words, since we are describing what the person is doing, with words of our common language, it is already impossible that what the person is doing can be called a 'private language' such as proposed earlier in 257. What the person is doing is already in the context of being public, because it is being described. Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. That would be an incoherency, because to describe what the person is doing, makes it necessarily public already.

Then he proceeds to 258. So, the conclusion of 257 ensures that it is impossible that he is describing a private language at 258. He has already excluded that as impossible due to the described incoherency at the end of 257. The diarist at 258 is naming a sensation with "S", and as explained at 261 "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, just like "pain" at the end of 257. And Wittgenstein is not talking about a private language at all here. He is talking about the problems involved with naming a sensation. It is impossible that he is describing a private language, because he has already demonstrated that it is impossible to describe a private language.

es, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still. — Luke

You, explicitly claimed that the existence of something, "a type" is constituted by conventional usage.

What is specific about us is our ability to wield negation, and with it, the practice of symbolic, rather than indexical and iconic, uses of language. — StreetlightX

Negation is the way to certainty. In a world of possibilities, we cannot say what necessarily "is", though we can exclude what is impossible as "is not". This forms the process of elimination.

I should have known better than to engage. — Banno

Yes, you should have. And please, if you can, refrain from blurting out ridiculous things about me, such as that I am "convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings". That simply could not be further from the truth, and only demonstrates that you are incapable of engaging with what I actually say. When you do not have the capacity to do something it's best not to try to do it, that's called getting in over your head.

Why are you introducing truth and falsity? — Luke

Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality, and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A. Remember the point I made, that your argument was proven wrong by the possibility of lying.

Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns? — Luke

No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence.

Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile. — Luke

Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause?

f the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244? — Luke

I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. That's what you claimed, that Wittgenstein said at 244 that there is no problem with naming a sensation. This is very clearly a misreading. What he really says is "There doesn't seem to be any problem here... But how is the connexion between the name and the thing set up?". He then proceeds to investigate what follows the "but.". So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. Did you reread 244 yet, to see what I mean?

Who claimed that it did? — Luke

Luke! How short is your memory?

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". — Luke

Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type. Why bother replying to what was written if you are not even trying to follow the conversation? You take a few days to reply, and all your responses are completely off track from what was being discussed.

tTat's just not what is being claimed. — Banno

Well I know it's not what's being claimed, that's obvious. I didn't say it was being claimed, those words are my means of explanation.

You are convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings, in this case arguing that identity has something to do with location. But this is the very ting that has been dismissed in the argument you so tortuously mis-comprehend. — Banno

I really don't know where you get this idea from. You do not seem to ever be capable of reading what I write because you have some preconceived notion of what I am "convinced of". That's probably the real reason you do not like to reply, because you cannot understand what I say, as what I say is always inconsistent with what you think I am convinced of..

Notice, that what I said is that spatial-temporal positioning is a type of description, therefore it does not provide for a true sense of "naming". That's why I said "in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning". I had already said that spatial-temporal position is a description, and therefore it cannot be the basis for a true "naming".

So you replied with "I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no 'principal criterion of identity"'. But he really hasn't shown anything about any criterion of identity at this section. He has simply shown exactly what I said, "naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible". And as I explained (in my own words), this is because any attempt to name is reduced to a description. as the result of any application of a criterion of identity, which is a requirement for naming.

It's not the case that there cannot be a criterion of identity, what's the case, is that whatever criterion of identity we choose, it will not give us what Wittgenstein requires for a true naming.

What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. — Banno

This is obvious, it's everywhere in the text..

We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, — Banno

Yes we do decide this, quite commonly actually. It's an important legal matter of ownership and possession, for instance. If someone steals my possessions, and I see you with some things which appear to be exactly the same as mine, I might accuse you of theft. .We need to determine conclusively whether the things are or are not mine.

And, if that does not convince you, we could look at the methods of scientific experimentation, and the need to determine whether the object observed at a later time is the same object which was observed at an earlier time.

I really do not know how to put this any clearer, but you are being very foolish to claim that "We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing,"

Aristotle himself refers to Plato at 988a25.

Aristotle says that Plato recognizes only two basic causes:

1. The cause of essence which is the One.
2. The material cause which is the “Great and the Small”, a.k.a. the “Indefinite Dyad”. — Apollodorus

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. You also ignore the fact that at the lead in to 988a, Aristotle states without logical support, "Yet what happens is the contrary...". Then he proceeds to state what you say he says about Plato at 988a, which is contrary to what he says Plato said at 987b. This is simply Aristotle's unsupported conclusion of "what happens" according to Aristotle, if we follow Plato's principles. But there is no logical support for this claim of "what happens".

Why? — Banno

This is how we decide conclusively whether two temporally separated instances of what appears to be the very same thing, actually are two instances of the very same thing, rather than two different but identical things, by referring to a spatial-temporal continuity. Think of what Wittgenstein says of the chair at 253. How would you determine conclusively that the chair in front of you is the same chair as was there yesterday, rather than another chair which is exactly the same? You'd look to determine the spatial-temporal continuity of the chair between yesterday and today. Hence spatial-temporal positioning is the principal criterion of identity.

As I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no "principal criterion of identity". — Banno

Wittgenstein presents us with the pieces of a puzzle, that is his way of writing the Philosophical Investigations. You, and "pretty much everyone else", are inclined to say that he presents us with a puzzle which cannot be solved. I am inclined to look for the resolution.

The reason for my insertion is the translator's (Hugh Tredennick's) own note:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some 5
....
5 Plato; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10.

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 14, section 1091b

Tredennick actually says "Plato". — Apollodorus

You'll see that your footnote refers to your previous reference. And here, Aristotle discusses the difference between the Pythagoreans, and Plato. When Aristotle says "some", and Tredennick refers back to this part of the text, we must take this "some" to refer to the Pythagoreans rather than Plato, because it is explained that Plato distinguished Numbers from Forms, whereas the Pythagoreans did not. Also, it is explained that for Plato the One is the first principle of Number. Therefore it is clearly a mistake of Tredennick to say that "some" here refers to Plato, because it was the Pythagoreans, not Plato, who did not separate Numbers from Forms, thereby equating the Number "One" with "the good".

Furthermore, consider that "some" is plural, and Plato is an individual. Plato excluded himself from "the Pythagoreans" by proposing a very unique and distinct perspective, so it is impossible that "some" refers to the unique Plato. Your previous proposal, "the Platonists", allows for the reality of "some", but the "Platonists" at that time, taught by Pseusippus, were closer to the Pythagoreans than Plato.

. According to Plato the One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms the cause of everything else. — Apollodorus

Let's get this straight. At 987b, Aristotle very explicitly says that Plato placed Number as intermediary between Forms and sensible things. Further, Forms are the causes of all things, and from the Form of "One" come the numbers. Then Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things.

The key to understanding Plato's real position is the way that he treats Number, as explained by Aristotle. The infinite is not "one" as a number (Pythagorean), but a multitude, as "great and small". That's how Aristotle explains the important difference. This perspective is a product of Plato's analysis of definition, his dialectics, which the others did not use.


Notice now, that under Plato's dialectical principles, "the infinite" is a Form which transcends "the One", as referring to the multitude of great and small, rather than a unity "one", or "one as a principle of number. Plato then uses the difference between the dyad and the One, to demonstrate that not all things can be produced from Number, "one" for the Greeks was not a number. This places Forms as prior to numbers.

Then Aristotle proceeds at 988a with "Yet what happens is the contrary...", and he proceeds to discuss the problem of creating a multitude of individuals from one Form. But this is a misrepresentation of what he has already stated that Plato said. Plato has placed Forms, represented by "infinite", into the category of the multitude, great and small, not into the category of One. So there is no such problem of creating a multitude out of one Form, because One is not the first principle of Forms, great and small is, which implies a multitude rather than One.

Aristotle then states what you claimed, Forms are the causes of all things, and the One is the cause of Forms. But this is clearly inconsistent with what he has painstakingly described as Plato's position.

Additionally, Plato himself says that the One is without beginning nor end and unlimited:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d) — Apollodorus

You are making the mistake which Fooloso4 made earlier with The Sophist. Fooloso4 presented the argument of the visitor as if it were Plato's argument, when in reality Plato was demonstrating the deficiencies of the visitor's argument, as sophistry. Here, you present the argument of Parmenides as if it is Plato's argument, when in reality Plato is demonstrating the deficiencies of such a sophistic argument.

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are). — Luke

Consider: pain definition1, unpleasant bodily feeling, and pain definition.2, suffering of the mind. Each of these two have distinct subtypes, which do not cross from 1 to 2 because 1 is distinct from 2. If we were to say that 1 and 2 are both types of a further category "pain" in general, then we'd have to have a third definition, "pain" in general. a definition which included both 1 and 2. We might propose "unpleasantness", and suggest that pain is unpleasantness, of which there are two types. However, there are other types of unpleasantness which do not qualify as "pain", so the class of "unpleasantness" contains things other than pain, so we cannot define "pain" in general this way. Therefore 1 and 2 are different ways to define pain, not different types of pain. Plato made a very thorough demonstration (in the Gorgias, or Protagoras, I can't remember which one now), showing that pain is not the opposite of pleasure, therefore pleasure is not simple a release from pain.. Likewise, we cannot simply say that anything unpleasant is pain.

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets. — Luke

Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. That's why there's a difference between justified and true.

So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. We might say that imagination, as as a mental activity is real, and existing, but it is incorrect to say that the things imagined (in this case the "type") are real and existing.

Therefore, if anyone such as yourself, claims that a "type" has existence, and this claim of "existence" is supported by, or justified by an appeal to conventional usage, we must conclude that this is an invalid attempt at justification. That is because common, or conventional usage is insufficient to necessitate truth. Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things.

What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named. — Luke

This is false. If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types.. But that's not how you use "token", nor is it the common or conventional use of "token", to talk about a type as a token of another type.

And, if we were to be very strict in our usage, and enforce that the distinction is just classificatory, then we could not apply "token" to any thing whatsoever, because a token would always be a type, and a "thing" is not a type.

He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations? — Luke

Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations..

You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...? — Luke

Exactly. We use words all the time without justifying our usage. There is no problem with such usage. Likewise there is no problem with the private language, which names sensations privately without justification. Justifying one's usage though is a completely different matter altogether. So the private language is shown to be useless in the public sphere, because justification requires translation from private to public.

As explained above, we talk about "types" all the time, no problem whatsoever, but when we are asked to justify such use, demonstrate what sort of thing we are referring to when we say "type", then there is a problem. You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. This is a very real and epistemologically significant issue, despite your assumption that it's metaphysical nonsense, and your subsequent refusal to consider such nonsense.

So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. The problem is in making the private language compatible with the public language. Here, the private language will necessarily be negated, annihilated, because there is no such thing as altering the public language to make it private, yet the private may be altered to make it public. But upon such alterations, it cannot be called a private language. Ever watch a baby learn how to talk? The entire process is a matter of trial and error, the baby producing and annihilating the private language, because it is incorrect.

Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.

...All stated in a public language. — Luke

Obviously you misunderstand. That the assignment of a specific name to a particular object cannot be logically justified, does not make public language impossible. It just means that our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner. That I name the vessel which contains my coffee today, a "cup", rather than a "mug", is not justified. It's a habit. As stated above, we use language all the time without justifying our usage, and this does not make communication impossible. It is your implied requirement, that the naming of an object must be justified for language use to be intelligible and communication to be successful, that is what would make public language impossible.

One thing of note in your posts is their mercurial nature. — Banno

I think I just tend to reflect back what gets thrown at me. Maybe it goes back with more force than it comes at me though.

Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not. — Banno

Try this Banno. If something is composite, then we ought to be able to name its parts. But when we go to name the parts, the parts derive their identity from their position (order) within the the thing which they are parts of, as per the demonstration (48). In this case, the name doesn't really name a thing, it names the thing's position as a part of that larger complexity. But this is not really a naming of these things (the parts), it is a description of the complex thing which the parts are a part of.

So, if we distinguish between naming and describing (49), then true "naming" would seem to be prior to all description, names for the things, a requirement for the description of them. We'd need to identify and name the objects, or elements, so that the names would be fixed to them, independently of any context, any description, and this would be true naming, allowing us to proceed in describing them.

However, in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning. So we cannot get away from our reliance on description for naming, and description appears to be prior to naming, as naming is nothing more than describing, because we have no true criterion of identity.

In the context of what has been discussed, he does make some important statements, e.g.:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some [i.e., the Platonists] say that the One itself is the Good itself (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13) — Apollodorus

There is no reason for you to insert "the Platonists" here. I see footnotes mentioning Pseusippus in this section, but it's well known that he was not consistent with Plato.

If you read what Aristotle says about this idea, the equivalence of the One and the Good at this part of the text, and also what Aristotle says about how Plato related the One to Number, and to the Forms at other places (like your previous reference), you ought to come to the understanding that this is not a position held by Plato.

For example, the word “one” (hen) can have many meanings. The most important of these is “One in the sense of ultimate principle beyond being”. The second-most important is “One in the sense of Monad as a principle of Number”. The third is “one as a number”, etc. — Apollodorus

It is evident from what Aristotle says, and also from what Plato wrote, that Plato held "One" in the second sense, a principle of number.

Numbers may, indeed, be said to be “between Forms and sensibles” but only in the sense of abstract mathematical ideas, i.e., in the domain of reason, which is certainly not what the One as ultimate principle is. — Apollodorus

Do you see the problem which you are developing here? Plato clearly used "One" in the sense of a principle of number, ("abstract mathematical idea"). And, "ultimate principle" clearly refers to "the good", for Plato. Nowhere do we find Plato using "One" in the sense of "ultimate principle".

Plato is a very complex writer who uses metaphor, allegory, myth, logic, mathematics, astrology, harmony theory, and even humor to convey a message. But his personality and life show that he also is a writer who is dead serious about his overarching philosophical project. And I think those who take him seriously have more to gain than those who don’t. — Apollodorus

This is definitely true.

This is the principal feature of the difference between Luke's interpretation of the so-called private language argument, and mine. Luke believes that a word's meaning is based in rules, therefore Luke is drawn toward the reality of essentialism. So Luke thinks that Wittgenstein demonstrates that a private word cannot have meaning. As Luke says above: "The problem is with the putative private word/sign 'S'".

But I see he so-called PLA as involved with the problem of naming an object, rather than being involved with the meaning of a word. What 258 indicates directly is a problem in naming supposed private objects. You seem to agree with me on this point. But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. This is the criterion of identity, as referenced by the example of the chair at 253. This means that the demonstration presented by Wittgenstein is not a "private language" argument at all, it is misrepresented as that.

However, I think you are absolutely on the right track to refer us back to 48. What is demonstrated here is the apparently unbridgeable gap between naming an object, and describing an order. This points to a huge discrepancy in metaphysical world-views. which manifests as differences in language use. What I propose is that the so-called private language argument (253-270) is intended to demonstrate a problem inherent in "naming" an object.

You are the one who brought in God in the first place. — baker

Yes, and "God" is a subject of philosophy and religion. But "God" is not the subject of the spiritual experience, so the mistake is yours.

I always do that. — baker

Some people never learn.

If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. — Janus

A "reasonable distinction" does not constitute a criterion of identity, which is what Wittgenstein is talking about.

All those pages about tokens and types miss the point. — Banno

Agreed, this is what I kept telling Luke, who insisted on this type/token dichotomy, it's irrelevant and misses the point.

I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me. — Srap Tasmaner

Not a bad guess, but Banno seems unable to even manage a reasonable guess.

but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence. — Banno

Why would you think that I'm focused on essentialism? That's been part of Luke's side of the argument. Didn't Luke just claim:

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

To which I said "this is clearly false".

However, this is not the whole story. There is something missing there and this is that aspect of the soul that is responsible for the five sensory faculties of sight, smell, taste, hearing, and feeling by touch.

There is an additional aspect responsible for motor faculties such as locomotion, etc. But the relevant part here is the sensory or sensual aspect that we may provisionally call “aisthetikon” (from aesthesis, sensation). — Apollodorus

Why do these need to be "aspects" of the soul, and not simply the soul itself which is responsible for these things? Otherwise, we could start naming every activity of a living body, like the heartbeat for example, and ask what is the aspect of the soul which is responsible for this. That's how Aristotle greatly simplified this type of description, in On the Soul, by naming these activities as potencies of the soul. So he lists some of them, self-nutritive, self-movement, sensation, intellection. He argues that the powers of the soul are each one, a potentiality, because each one is not active all the time. Since they are potentialities which need to be actualized, he claims the soul itself as the first principle of actuality, which is responsible for actualizing the various potencies.

Aristotle says:

From this account it is clear that he [Plato] only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14) — Apollodorus

Yes, I saw this, and it is inconsistent with what he said about Plato the very page before, what I quoted. It makes me wonder how accurate this account of Plato's metaphysics, which Aristotle presents, really is. Aristotle presented it to refute it, so it's likely a bit of a straw man.

If we take Aristotle’s statement, “the Forms are the causes of everything else” in an absolute sense, then they will be the cause of the Good, not only of the One. — Apollodorus

Since Aristotle's statement directly contradicts what he said just the page before, I don't think these statements are reliable in any sense.