If there is no reality about what the electron is and quantum physics is purely a functional method utilized by technological practice, how can you say that the intelligible form of the phenomenon is more real than the sensible? — Enrique

Obviously, the mathematics (intelligible form) is very reliable. Coming from the other direction, visible observation, we see material objects can be broken into parts, and we see molecules with microscopes, and theorize about atoms as material objects, and the parts of atoms, which are responsible for the bonding between atoms, as material parts. But then we cannot see where these proposed electrons (as material objects) are, so we cannot validate with our senses, that they even exist as material objects.

So the intelligible form of "the electron", is very reliable, and proven in scientific research therefore extremely real. But the "sensible form", as a particle, being a part of an object, cannot even be sensed at all, so we really cannot say that there is any reality to the "material form" of an electron. .

When the past and future interact they are causally unified such that certain events could happen and alternate events couldn't. — Enrique

This leaves out a huge portion of reality. Of the events which "could happen", there is a division between the ones which actually do happen, and the ones which don't happen. We cannot class the ones which don't happen with "events that couldn't happen", because they've already been placed in the other category, of "could happen", and this would effectively negate the category of "could happen", resulting in hard determinism.

Therefore we need a form of causation which is not the same as the causation of determinism, to allow that within the category of "could happen", some events are caused to happen, and some are not.

Another striking difference that ought to be pretty obvious is that Socrates’ philosophy serves a higher purpose which is to attain a vision of the Good, whilst the Stranger’s sophistry is for its own sake. — Apollodorus

This is an important point. Plato came across the importance of "the good" in his attempts to understand the reality of ideas. In The Republic, "the good" is described as that which makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun is what makes visible objects visible. We can say :the good" is the reason for the intelligibility of intelligible objects.

Aristotle then proceeds with a much better definition of "the good". "The good" is that for the sake of which, "the end", as what is intended.

In seeking philosophical knowledge it is of the highest importance that "the good", meaning what is sought, the end, (in Aristotelian terms), or that which illuminates the ideas making them intelligible to the person (in Plato's terms), is real understanding, and truth. Without this true goal of real understanding, any goal, such as financial gain, honour, the pride of vanity, etc., might take the place of the true goal, real understanding, and serve to illuminate ideas as intelligible, instead. And the ideas which serve such goals, though they are highly intelligible to a person who has that goal, will not be intelligible to the person who has the highest, true goal of real understanding.

This is the position of the sophist. The sophist has some goal, a good, which is other than the goal of truth and real understanding. So the principles which the sophist argues appear to be highly intelligible to anyone else who has a similar goal. But these principles are seen as unintelligible to anyone looking for the real good, the true goal of real understanding. Therefore Aristotle proposed a distinction between the real good, and the apparent good.

I regard an ontological proposition that the immaterial is a fundamentally distinct substance from physical matter as fallacy.

If what has traditionally been referred to as immaterial is a distinct substance in some sense, it at least has to have causal principles in common with conventional matter by virtue of interaction, and the entire range of phenomena becomes part of one theoretical edifice modeling a single reality, which will presumably be a revised physical reality of matter in various forms. — Enrique

You seem to be neglecting the reality of time, and the division between past and future. In relation to the past, there is real 'material' truth concerning what has been. In relation to the future, there is real possibility. At any moment, my material arm might move to the right or to the left. There is no determinate truth as to where my arm will be in the next moment. This means that to speak of the material existence of my arm, on that side of the present, the future side, is to speak nonsense. But we can always speak truth about where my arm was on the other side of the present, the last moment.

We exist at the present, but there is a real incompatibility between the material existence of the past, that which has been experienced, and the immateriality of the future, that which cannot be experienced. However, we cannot say that the future is completely without substance, though it cannot be experienced because this would put it into the past. If the future was completely without substance, this would mean that absolutely anything is possible at any moment. So we can conclude that the "substance" of the future, as allowing for real possibility, is distinct, and separate from the "substance" of the past, which does not allow for possibility.

Clearly, the "causal principles" attributable to the substance of the future, which enable the reality of possibility, are not "in common" with the causal principles of the determinate matter of the past. This does not mean that the two do not interact, as they clearly do, at the present. What it means is that the causal principles which are applicable to the substantial existence of the observed past, are completely distinct, and separate from, incompatible with, the causal principles which are applicable to the substantial existence of the unobservable future.

Therefore the dream of "a single reality" where everything behaves according to a single, consistent and coherent, set of causal principles, because it is composed of a single substance, is just that, a dream. And you appear to be living in this illusion, which others have created for you, and impressed upon you, until you accepted it without appropriate scrutiny. Either that or you created the illusion yourself because you are intellectually lazy, and the true nature of reality is too complex for you to grapple with.

I don't understand the basis for calling the Stranger a Sophist. Can you point to one of the arguments he makes by way of example? — Valentinus

Socrates asks the stranger at the beginning, about the difference between engaging others in the discussion, and simply making a long speech. The stranger claims to respect this distinction. But the entire dialogue turns out to be a long speech made by the stranger. Sure, the stranger pretends to engage Theaetetus in the discussion, but it's really only to ask him to agree at certain points, it's never to ask for his opinion. You can read the dialogue without paying any attention to what Theaetetus says, and it reads like a big long speech from the stranger. So this is just a pretense, to engage Theaetetus, and that is one of the things the stranger says a sophist is, an imitator.

Further, there is throughout the dialogue, many subtle indications that Plato (in writing the dialogue) is having the stranger do exactly the things that he says are characteristic of the sophist. For example, at 254, the stranger says "The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not...". Then, by the end of 256 the stranger is talking about "that which is not"... "So it has to be possible for that which is not to be..."

Remember, what is stressed over and over again throughout the dialogue, is that the sophist is hard to catch, appearing just like a philosopher, but really a poser, a pretender. The dialogue has to be read very carefully to see that Plato is portraying the stranger as a sophist, pretending to be a philosopher.

Another indication is that the stranger is not named. The Eleatic school was highly regarded by the Greeks, and respected even by Socrates. Plato could not name a member of the school, and portray him as saying the things which the stranger says, because none of them would have actually said those things the way Plato presented them, so he'd be guilty of libel. The stranger from Elea is presented in a way which is less than flattering, as a sophist, and this is a serious attack on the Eleatic school, so it is disguised. As such, you might say it is itself a work of sophistry. Nevertheless, Aristotle later continued with this attack, more openly.

Is he mistaken in his opinion? If not, then what is the difference? Why is there a dialogue the Sophist and a dialogue the Statesman, but no dialogue the Philosopher. Where is the philosopher? Are they three? — Fooloso4

It's not that he is mistaken in his opinion, but the stranger behaves in a way which he himself says is the way of the sophist. In other words, Plato has the stranger describe what a sophist is like, while the stranger is behaving in the described manner.

Have you noticed how often Socrates' behaves like a sophist? Aristophanes was not simply mistaken when he called Socrates a sophist. — Fooloso4

Yes, as the stranger says, it is very difficult to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist, so just as the sophist appears like a philosopher, the philosopher will appear like a sophist. The way that they differ is that one is a pretender, an imitator.

One of the key differences mentioned is what I said above, that the sophist hides in the concept of "that which is not". It is a common ploy of sophists, mentioned by Aristotle, to produce a dichotomy of being and not being, that which is, and that which is not. Once this dichotomy is produced, there is no place for becoming, which is neither being nor not-being. This is the result of adherence to the law of excluded middle. From this platform, the sophist can "prove" all sorts of absurdities.

What is it about a sophist that you think means he must be wrong? The sophists were not all the same, to simply to be dismissed. Their arguments must be attended to, as Socrates did. It should also be noted how often Socrates incorporates parts of what the sophists he is arguing with say. — Fooloso4

Unlike philosophy which has one goal, described as a true desire to know, sophistry works toward many different ends. That's why "sophists were not all the same". But since it works toward an end, and that end is not true knowledge, as is the case with philosophy, the sophists arguments are designed toward proving whatever is seen as conducive to the end. The end is what Plato called "the good".

He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists. — Fooloso4

That is your opinion. The question is whether it was Plato's opinion or not. Notice my quote above, from 254, where the stranger says that the sophist runs off and hides in "that which is not". Doesn't Parmenides' school have a lot to say about "that which is not"?

In the case of the tree trunk, the distinction between the ideal and the real is easily inspectable with vision, while in the case of subatomic matter, its structure morphs at a rapid rate and in such complex orientation that we are mostly reliant on an indirect process of manipulating ideal concepts for any empirical comprehension we can achieve (though techniques such as electron microscopy give us some direct insight). But subatomic matter is no less material than a tree trunk, we simply don't have sense-perceptual insight at the subatomic scale to make this obvious. — Enrique

What subatomic physics, quantum mechanics, demonstrates, is that the reality of continuous subatomic existence is best represented as immaterial (wave function). There is no reality to where the electron, as a material entity, a particle, is at a specific time, because the evidence indicates that it does not exist as a material particle.

This is the inverse of what you say about the tree trunk. Every attempt to represent the tree trunk as an immaterial form fails, as you say, because the form of the trunk is given to us through our senses. What you are not accounting for though, is that our senses are deficient, as you probably already know, they commonly mislead us. So the form which our senses gives us of the tree trunk is incorrect, due to the deficiencies of the senses. As chemistry and physics show us, the trunk is not really as it appears to our senses. So the fact that the ideal does not match up with the tree trunk, as perceived by the senses, is because the senses misrepresent the tree trunk to us, The senses provide a much more deficient perspective than the intellect does with its ideals, so it is clearly not a case of the ideals being wrong, while the senses are right .

This is exactly the issue of Plato's cave. The common people believe that the world is as it appears to the senses, and if the intelligible principles are not consistent with what the senses give us, the intelligible principles must be wrong.. But what Plato says, is that what the senses are giving us is just a representation of the world, and the senses are far less reliable in representing the world than the intellect is. The real world is completely different from how the senses represent it to us, the sense representations being the shadows referred to in the op. Modern science confirms that Plato was absolutely right. The real world is completely different from how it appears to our senses, and the intellect demonstrates to us that the intelligible forms are far more reliable in giving us the real world, then are the senses.

There is a lot more to the dialogues than Socrates pointing out the weaknesses of the arguments of others.

I do not think it is a case of Plato dismissing the views of others, but of you dismissing the dialogues of Plato. — Fooloso4

In "The Sophist", the stranger, from Parmenides' school, is of the opinion that there is a difference between, a sophist, a philosopher, and a statesman, as three distinct intellectual capacities. What is demonstrated by Plato, is that the stranger, who thinks of himself as a philosopher, really behaves in the way that he describes a sophist. So the stranger is therefore the sophist, the namesake of the dialogue.
Why else is the dialogue called "The Sophist"?. It is clear that Plato is not supporting what the stranger is arguing, as the dialogue is presented as an example of the sophistry coming from the Eleatic school.

Humans are capable of thinking and imagining in extremely versatile ways, especially as it relates to generalized concepts (the universals you guys are talking about), but commonly refuse to or shrink away from doing so. I think this constant, arbitrary stereotyping of conceptual categories shows that rationality is without a doubt material, rooted in the body.

If the so-called immaterial is to be understood, it must be via reconfiguring physical knowledge to account for its material and physiological foundations in novel ways. — Enrique

The problem is, that when we follow "the material" all the way down, to its most fundamental constituents, as we are prone toward doing in scientific reductionist practices, we find that what is there, what supports the material world is the immaterial. So for example physics has found that immaterial wave fields are the foundation of material existence. When we encounter the immaterial at the bottom, as the foundation of all material existence, and our attitude is that the only way to understand the immaterial is as rooted in the body, then the immaterial is rendered as impossible to understand.

When this blockage toward understanding the immaterial is hit, we have no recourse but to reverse this attitude that the immaterial is rooted in the body, to account for the true fact that the body is rooted in the immaterial. When we make this reversal of attitude, all the various features of reality, like free will, and the so-called "hard problem", which are impossible to resolve from the perspective that the immaterial is rooted in the body, become highly intelligible.

But tell me again how your contradiction is a result of "different contexts". — Luke

Why should I have to tell you again? Can't you read? Oh yeah, that's been central to this whole discussion, your inability to read what is written. I see now, that when it comes to metaphysics, you have an attitudinal blockage, which is most likely the cause of your misreading of Wittgenstein.

We are discussing Wittgenstein who says in the same work: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." — Luke

Yes, what Wittgenstein suggests, is itself a form of metaphysics. But unless you take the time and effort required to understand the metaphysical usage of the words, you haven't the means to bring the words back.

This is easily solved. Provide an example of a token of sensation that is not present to the conscious mind. — Luke

I've done this many times already, but you refuse to acknowledge. Any token of pain which is there when I fall asleep, and also there when I wake back up, like a tooth-ache, or the pain in my toe, were the examples already given. That very same "token" of pain exists while I am sleeping and it is not present to my conscious mind. It was there when I went to sleep, and it is there every time when I wake up in the night, just like the chair in the corner of the room, so I can conclude that it must be existing, though I am not sensing it, when I'm asleep. Why would you think that there is some type of magical "token" which magically disappears, and reappears every time I fall asleep and wake back up? Obviously it is the very same tooth-ache, which I have in the morning, as I had the night before, and not a different tooth-ache, so this "token" of pain must exist during the night while it is not present to my conscious mind.

Rather than a distraction, I introduced the type/token distinction intending to help provide clarity for what could be meant by "the same sensation" or "the same chair". But we got bogged down in your continual misunderstanding and argumentation about what is a token. So you go ahead and give your metaphysical reading. — Luke

Obviously, the type/token distinction has only created confusion. We cannot even agree on what a token of a sensation might be. Wittgenstein clearly does not use that distinction, and at the quoted passage (261), he implies that we cannot make such a judgement concerning what is referred to by "S" ("that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said").

Do you accept this, that when he says "that is all that can be said", he is implying that we cannot apply the type/token distinction here?

"One" as unity, in the sense of simple or non-composite, need not be limited. — Apollodorus

Such a sense of "One" is definitely limited. If it was not limited there would be nothing to maintain its status as simple or non-composite. That is a limitation, whatever prevents it from being a mixture.

Indeed, Plato says quite clearly that the One is not a whole consisting of parts and that it is "unlimited" (apeiron). This is precisely why there is nothing else like the One. — Apollodorus

I never saw a clear and coherent definition of "the One" in Plato, perhaps you could show me where this is stated. Nevertheless what I did see stated about the One seemed confused and incoherent, so I tend not to agree with it. I have the same problem with what Plotinus said about the One, though it seems much clearer than what Plato said, it still appears to me to be inconsistent.

The ordinal numbers are orders of numbers. It applies to anything that is ordered in some way as first, second, third.

Eidetic numbers are relations of eidos or Forms. Their order is determined by kind. — Fooloso4

So eidetic numbers look very similar to ordinal numbers to me, as an ordering of Forms. Numbers are Forms, and orders are relations. Differences of "kind" is insufficient for determining an order, because relations between the kinds is what order is.

Rest, Change, and Being are not at the same level of order and so are not counted together. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you can justify this claim. What puts being at a different level from rest and change?

Why would Plato write this long, detailed, difficult dialogue if the point is to just to dismiss the Stranger? — Fooloso4

Have you not read many Platonic dialogues? That's what he did with them. He wrote long difficult dialogues to show the faults of, and dismiss the views expressed by the people taking part in the dialogues.

Not necessarily. There is a difference between "unit" and "unity". The former refers to one among many, the latter to something that is one in the sense of simple or non-composite.

As unit, one is limited. As unity, it can be unlimited. — Apollodorus

Well, I don't accept any of this. I see no reason why a "unit" must be one among many, and not just a defined "whole", without the need for others to validate the definition. And I see no possible way that "unity" could be unlimited, as necessarily limited by that which unites.

Monism posits a One, but a One can only exist in relation to another. So 'one' already implies 'two'. — Wayfarer

As above, in the case of "unit", I do not agree that One implies two. "One", as commonly defined (as distinct from mathematically defined), is a fundamental unity, an individual, a whole. To describe, or define a unity, individual, or whole, does not require reference to others. It is only when "one" is defined as referring to the first, in an order, or succession, that there is a second implied. This is the mathematical way, based on "ordinals". But in this definition the second is not actually necessary, it is implied as possible, the possibility of something following the first. In other words, the position of the first is defined by allowing for the possibility of followers, and it does not require actual followers.

We discussed this issue in another thread on the difference between cardinal numbers and ordinal numbers. Modern mathematical theory derives cardinals from ordinals, so the primary definition of "number" places "one" as having a position in an order, thereby implying others. But this does not make "one" refer to a unit, individual, or whole, because that requires a different definition. It makes "one" refer to a position in an order.

But if this is the case, then "one" is not a unit, or individual, but a place, and we cannot truly derive the cardinal numbers in the way that mathematicians do, because they count these places as if they are objects, when by definition they are not objects but places. In reality therefore, cardinal numbers cannot be derived from ordinal numbers, because the two rely on distinct definitions of "number".

What confusion? — Luke

Your mode of argumentation, as commonly displayed, is to pay no respect for what the other person is saying, and remove phrases from their context to create the appearance of contradiction.

Here is your confusion. In one context I was speaking about instances of sensation of a token. In the other context I was replying to your talk about instances of existence of a token. You conflate these two, continuing to insist that an instance of sensation of a token is an instance of existence of a token, refusing to acknowledge the difference between these two, hence your confusion .

The definition of a token is not “encountering a token”, as you obviously think it is. — Luke

When I've spent a number of days explaining to you, the difference between encountering a token, and the existence of a token, because you ceaselessly insist that a token of sensation can only exists if it is present to the conscious mind, for you to make a statement like this is a clear indication, that you are confused.

I'm sorry if my use of words is confusing to you, but your attitude ("I'm not going to follow you in your metaphysical nonsense"), is the real reason for your confusion. We are discussing a metaphysical issue, so if you refuse to follow the metaphysics of the issue, it is impossible that you will ever understand.

Here's a proposal for another way of looking at this issue, to perhaps iron out the confusion which Wittgenstein has created with his way of writing.

Since we have no point of agreement between us as to whether "S" is supposed by Wittgenstein to stand for a token or a type, Let's start with what Wittgenstein says at 261: "that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said". Do you agree that "S" as employed in Wittgenstein's example refers to neither a type nor a token? .Can we say that "S" refers to "something", and that's all that can be said? To say that it refers to a either a type, or a token of a type, is to jump to a conclusion, because the diarist's use of "S" has not yet been justified. What "S" is supposed to refer to is something completely private. Even to say that the diarist "has something" is a little misleading, as Wittgenstein describes at 261, because these words have meaning in our common language, "has" implying a sort of possession, and "something" implying a sort of thing.

So we can remove all this type/token distinction as a distraction, and get right down to what Wittgenstein is actually saying with the example. S refers to something private and we really can't say whether it's a type or a token, because what S refers to is 'known' only to the diarist. Of course this is a special use of 'known', because it is explained that the diarist has no real criterion of identity.

So I'll repeat what I said before. The ambiguity inherent in your preferred type/token distinction produces the confusion required for your mode of argumentation.

You know what I meant. Your pretense continues to baffle me.

but some Platonic immaterial objects are real insofar as we are affected by them. — Mww

This is an important point, as it implies that the immaterial has causal power over us, as material beings. So even if we take a materialist or physicalist perspective, which see the human being as a physical body, we have to provide the metaphysics required to account for this fact, that the immaterial has causal power over the material body.

We are discussing number which can be understood as being necessarily instantiated in diversity. If you are thinking about the so-called platonic forms of objects, like for example the form of the horse; we can be affected by the empirical form of a horse or the imagined form of a horse. When it comes to a number, say five, we can be affected by the empirical form of five, five apples for example, or we can be affected by thinking about five. When it comes to the form of the good, we can be affected by an empirical form of the good, a good action for example, or we can be affected by thinking about the good. There are diverse instances of horses, instantiation of five and examples of the good, so I'm not seeing the difference you are attempting to refer to? — Janus

Suppose you are hungry, and you move toward getting something to eat. You are affected by this immaterial idea, to get something to eat. It has causal power over your material body. The immaterial ideas of numbers have a very similar causal power over you. For example, if you have a thousand dollars in your bank account, and you need twelve hundred for your rent payment tomorrow, you will be moved toward getting another two hundred into your account. These numbers have causal power over your material body.

This is one token of a chair: “the very same chair”. You are not distinguishing two instances of chair here. — Luke

I'm not talking about two instances of chair, I can't even understand what that might mean. I am talking about two instances of seeing the very same chair. Likewise, a person might have two instances of sensing the very same sensation, or two instance of remembering the same memory, or two instances of using the very same idea of "two", and "four". How is this so difficult for you to understand?

We cannot have different instances of the very same token, by definition. A token is an instance of a type, not an instance of seeing or encountering something. — Luke

I didn't say we can have two different instances of the same token, that doesn't even make sense to me. I said we can have two different instances of encountering, or sensing the same token, like when I see the same chair today, that I saw yesterday..

It is very clear that we can have two different instances of sensing the same token, as exemplified by the token of chair. Why do you think that we cannot have two different instances of sensing the same token of pain?

But when people talk about their inner experiences, we tend to assume they are all numerically distinct, that having "the same feeling" at one time that you had at another means only that you have had two quite similar feelings. Why is that? Is it because we are physical beings, subject to time and chance?

There seems to be no logical barrier to having the same experience or the same sensation twice. But it strikes us as wrong. We believe "I have the exact same feeling I had when ..." is always literally false. What would have to be different for us to consider such a statement, like the unintentional return of the loaned book, literally true? — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is that there is a double standard here with respect to "inner experiences". We commonly believe, due to some sort of intuition, that it is impossible to have the same sensation twice, a sensation being an inner experience. So we are inclined toward believing that inner experiences are merely similar, or of the same type. But when it comes to other inner experiences like memories. we always talk about having the same memory twice. And then there is the logic of mathematics, where a significant logical structure is dependent on the assumption that the idea (another sort of inner experience) is always the same idea. So there is an inconsistency between this notion, that we cannot have the same inner experience twice, and the fundamental axioms of mathematics, which assume that we consistently work with the same mathematical objects.

What Wittgenstein seems to get backward, is that he portrays the private, inner language as naming particulars, and the public as naming types, showing an incompatibility between the two. In reality the private language is inclined toward naming types, as intuition tells us that two distinct sensations cannot be the same. But to make the private types intelligible to the public in general, we must refer to particulars. So the public language inclines us to name particulars while the private language inclines us toward naming types, and there is still the incompatibility between the two, which Wittgenstein demonstrates.

The One is Infinite or Unlimited. — Apollodorus

Isn't "one", by its very definition, a unit and therefore limited?

What is at issue is not that there are different kinds of number, but what is different about the eidetic kind: — Fooloso4

I think that this is just like the modern difference between ordinal numbers and cardinal numbers, ordinals demonstrating an order, while cardinals count a quantity.

The point is that Being belongs to a higher intelligible order. — Fooloso4

Sure but if it's a higher order than rest or motion, how does this make it not simply a third category?

Also, remember that this is the position of "the Stranger" which is being expressed, not the position of Socrates or Plato, and usually Socrates ends up demonstrating how the positions of the others are faulty. So I would not attribute a lot of significance to what the Stranger says, as it's most likely just another form of metaphysics, popular in the day, which Plato is dismissing.

You have acknowledged there is no problem with naming a single token of the sensation. — Luke

This depends on what you call a problem

If the person is naming a single token, it's as Wittgenstein clearly indicates at the end of 258 "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'". There is no such things as correct, in naming a single token, because this cannot be judged. The person has no criterion by which to judge whether one occurrence is the very same as another occurrence. In the case of the chair, on the other hand, we might ask someone else who observed the chair in the interim time period. So there is no problem for the person naming, just no sense in talking about the person is correct.

But the problem arises when the person attempts to justify his use of "S". Since there is no such thing as his correct use of "S", justification of his use is problematic

If it were as you claim, that he was naming a type, then there would be no such thing as him being wrong . A type is created, so whatever he names, is that type, 270. Since the person writes "S" every time, then the sensation has been placed in that class, signified by S, therefore it is of that type, which the person has called "S". The person cannot be wrong.

This difference clearly indicates that the person starts the practice by attempting to name a single instance, (what you call a single token), and it's only upon the attempt to justify his use, that he is forced to demonstrate it as a type. That there is a difference between naming a type, and naming a single object, is where the problem lies.

• The problem is in establishing the name/type of the sensation, 'S'. — Luke

This is not true. There is no problem here, "Sensation" is a term of the public language with a definition, so it is already established, no problem..

261. What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he ha something—and that is all that can be said

So, the question here is what reason do we have for calling the thing which the diarist has labeled with "S", a sensation.? Why is it a token of "sensation"?

This is why the type/token distinction is misleading you. It puts the type as prior to the token. A token is necessarily of a type. But here, Wittgenstein puts the thing, what is referred to by "S", as prior to the type. It is not a token at all, but just something being named. It's just a thing, "he has something---and that is all that can be said". So we cannot call it a token, because its classification, as a token of a sensation has not been justified.

• Your constant repetition that Wittgenstein uses the phrase "the sensation" is no support for your claims. — Luke

I gave you examples of common use, "the chair", "the hammer". Each time we use "the" in common usage it refers to a particular token. You have provided no examples of when we use "the" when referring to a type.

• It is not my claim that he refers to a more general type called "sensation", but that he refers to a type of "certain sensation" called 'S'. — Luke

Your phrase, "type of certain sensation" doesn't even make sense. It would make sense if you said "certain type of sensation", but of course that would be inconsistent with what Wittgenstein said. The simple fact is that he doesn't mention "type" at all, so your attempt to put it in there is completely out of place.

If you assume that the sensation occurs continuously, then what distinguishes one instance from another in Wittgenstein's example is every (different) day. — Luke

Clearly, what distinguishes one instance from another is the coming into the conscious mind, coming to the attention of the conscious mind. Just like when you see the very same chair twice, what distinguishes one instance of seeing it from another, is the coming to the attention of your conscious mind. I don't understand why this is a problem for you. He is giving an example of inner experience, and this is how we commonly talk about inner things like memories and ideas, they come and go from our conscious minds many times, as the same thing recurring many times, many different instances of the very same thing coming into your mind.

. Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD. — Luke

You are refusing to acknowledge that despite the fact that "Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD", we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. Why is this so difficult to you?

How does that follow? It's equivalent to saying that seeing something is a creation of the act of seeing. — Luke

Why can't you understand this either? If the thing (object, or token) exists only at the precise time when it is being sensed in the act of sensation, then it must be the act of sensation which is creating its existence.

On the other hand, if the thing which is being sensed in the act of sensation continues to exist when it is not being sensed in the act of sensation, then the very same thing might be sensed numerous times.

Which part of "it's not about "encountering" something" do you not understand? I'm not going to follow you in your metaphysical nonsense. — Luke

Your refusal to even attempt to grasp some very simple metaphysical principles show me why you have such a difficulty understanding what Wittgenstein said.

That's mot how I see it. I could disagree because I think an alternative view seems the more plausible, without even necessarily being wedded to that alternative view. — Janus

But you would think that you were right to disagree, otherwise you wouldn't disagree.

I think it's way too much of a generalization, and presupposes that there was some absolute ( as opposed to contextual) truth understood in the ancient world which is beyond our understanding today, — Janus

There is something very important which has been lost. It's the way that we relate to time, summed up very well by Einstein when he says that time is an illusion. We've lost the perspective which apprehends the reality of time. That's why questions about the eternal are so important, they bring us face to face with the reality of time, when that reality has been lost to illusion.

thus one which we cannot fully understand no matter how hard we try, because we simply cannot put ourselves into the ancient mindset since we are not ancients. — Janus

This is the closed minded perspective. It's nothing more than I cannot fully understand you, because I cannot put myself in your mindset, on a larger scale. I cannot become you, and I cannot become an ancient person, but that does not mean that I cannot put myself in your mindset, or in an ancient person's mindset, to understand.

I think I understand Wayfarer's position very well and all the more so since I actually used to inhabit it. — Janus

Coming from the person who just said wayfarer's position (putting oneself into the ancient mindset) is impossible.

I think we should always be open to the possibility that we have it wrong; — Janus

But if you didn't think you were right, you wouldn't disagree. To be open to changing your mind is another matter, related to how determined you are in your belief, certitude. And if you're very open minded, then you just don't tend to disagree.

And actually what I should have said is "you act as though you think those who disagree with you must not understand," as that would be even more accurate to the situation as I see it. — Janus

Now that's a better way of putting it. But isn't it the case that when two people disagree it's mostly likely that they misunderstand each other? So there's nothing wrong with assuming that the other misunderstands. The reason for presenting arguments is to aid the other in understanding. That's what changing one's mind is, coming to understand what wasn't understood before.

You act as though you think those who disagree with you must be wrong. — Janus

Doesn't it go without saying, that when someone disagrees with you, you think the other person must be wrong? Isn't that precisely what disagreement is, a case of thinking that the other is wrong?

The problem is with number, but it is with number as understood by the Greeks, which is not the way we treat number.

Aristotle identifies three kinds of number: — Fooloso4

We have a multitude of different kinds of numbers as well, natural numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, to name a few.

To count rest, change, and being as three would be mistaken. Being is a higher order than rest and change. It is not a third thing to be counted alongside them. — Fooloso4

I don't see your point

That is nothing but your own mistaken and unnecessary assumption. — Luke

The assumption is that a type is a human creation, artificial. And, since only human beings know humanly created types, then to be be a member, token, of a type is a human judgement. Of course it might be a mistaken assumption,

'S' is the type of sensation. The recurrence of particular instantiations of 'S' had by the diarist are supposed to be the tokens of that type of "certain sensation". That's why the diarist is said to write 'S' every time the sensation recurs. — Luke

Back to square one, Luke demonstrates that he doesn't know how to read. How is "the sensation", as used four times in 258, in Wittgenstein's description of what it might mean to "name" a sensation, supposed to refer to a type, called "sensation", rather than to a particular sensation?

"The sensation" refers to both the type and its tokens. "Each different instance of sensation" is a token (that's what "token" means), despite you just having claimed that "the sensation itself cannot be the token". — Luke

You're missing the point Luke. If each instance of sensation was actually the token itself, then there would be nothing which differentiates one instance from another, and we'd have no basis for a claim that they are distinct tokens. Imagine if each instance of seeing is itself a token. Then each is an instance of seeing, and nothing more than seeing, and they are all identical, the same, as simply instances of seeing. It is the object, the thing described as seen, which forms the difference between distinct instances of seeing.

Now imagine if each instance of pain is itself a token. Then each instance of pain is exactly identical to every other instance of pain, as merely "pain", It is the described object, 'pain in my tooth', 'pain in my toe' etc., which provides the basis for a difference. Therefore the pain itself cannot be a token, as pain is a type, which is a judgement of the mind. So if there is a difference between one pain and another, the difference must be attributable to the source of the pain (just like in an instance of seeing), and this is something other than the pain itself. Differences within a type are attributable to distinct tokens. Therefore the token of pain must be something other than the pain itself (which is a type), and this is what is referred to in philosophy as "the object". If pain itself is a token, then there is no type/token distinction.

According to that logic, the same must also be true of external objects. — Luke

Yes, it's a conclusion which would hold for external objects as well, but it's only the result of the assumption that each encounter with the object, is an encounter with a different object (token), as you assume with sensations. This assumption of yours, implies that the object of the sensation, the token, only exists when it is being sensed. Therefore the object, the token, must be a creation of the act of sensing. (Unless it's due to some extremely improbable coincidence, which gives these objects existence precisely for the time that they are being sensed making it impossible to sense them at two distinct times).

But we do not commonly make this assumption with external objects. We assume that we encounter the same objects (tokens) multiple times, and they continue to exist while not being encountered. So it's not an issue for most common metaphysics. It only becomes an issue in a metaphysics like a "process" ontology, which sees things as constantly changing, therefore we do not ever encounter the same object twice: Heraclitus: you cannot step into the same river twice. In this type of ontology even the supposed "external object" is something created by the mind each time it is encountered.

Your argument is both that all tokens must be encountered and apprehended, but also that encountering and apprehending tokens implies that the mind creates them. — Luke

That the mind creates the token is the logical conclusion from your premise that each instance of sensation necessarily involves a distinct token. I have been arguing that the mind may encounter numerous instances of the same token of sensation. Therefore it is not implied from what I am arguing, that the mind creates the tokens. This is a straw man.

Why not then tests for voter competency? — tim wood

It's a move in the wrong direction. The issue which you are looking at is not a matter of uneducated people voting, it is a matter of apathy, which results in a significant portion of the population not voting.
The block of non-voters plays a much more significant role in any American election than the group of uneducated voters, who do not vote as a block. Any move to increase such a block, like your proposal, is anti-democratic and will not be well received. But a move to decrease the block can get oneself elected. The role of the non-voting block is an unobserved role, so it tends to go unnoticed.

You asked for proof regarding the type/token distinction. I can only refer you to the definition, otherwise I don't know what sort of proof you mean. — Luke

I didn't ask for proof regarding the type/token distinction, I asked for proof of your assumption that a person cannot experience the same token of a sensation on numerous different occasions, like we do with tokens of other types.

Yes, a duration of time is "more than one different time"; it is a period of time. A single token of a sensation also lasts for a period of time. What I am saying is that you cannot have the same token of a sensation twice (unless you can time travel and relive some period of time over again). — Luke

As I explained this is a problematic assumption. If a token of a sensation has temporal extension, and an inner experience can come and go from the conscious mind like a memory does, then why can't the the token of a sensation recur to the conscious mind numerous times, just like a memory does?

Since this claim of yours is so clearly problematic, I asked for justification. But you just kept reasserting it over and over again. Now you appear to have offered an attempt at justification, so I'll get on toward analyzing that.

Instantiations of sensations necessarily depend on our experience; instantitations of chairs do not. There are many chairs that exist without you ever encountering them, but there are no sensations that you can have without sensing them. This is why a token of a sensation is different. The instantiation of a chair does not require you to "encounter" or "experience" it. However, as I noted before, what they have in common is that chairs and sensations both have particular life spans of their existence/instantiation. — Luke

I think this expresses an ontological misunderstanding inherent in direct realism. A token of a chair is not a token of a chair without being encountered and classed as such. It was your choice to bring us away from Wittgenstein's words of particular things, to use the type/token terminology, now you cannot simply slip back without suffering the consequences. If both, the particular chair, and the particular sensation have been judged to be of a specific type, making them "tokens", then it's nonsensical to say that one of them might not have been encountered.

In case the preceding didn't make sense to you, here is the inverted argument, which may make more sense to you. For any occurrence of a "sensation" there is a thing sensed by the conscious mind, or else there would be nothing to qualify as "the token". The sensation itself cannot be the token because sensation is a type, and if we allow that there is variance in sensation, differences in sensation, then there must be an object of sensation at each different instance of sensation, to account for the differences, and this object is what we can call the token.

Now, your claim is that the objects of sensation, the tokens, cannot exist without being apprehended by the conscious mind (what you call sensing them). But if this is true, then the objects, or tokens, only have existence if they are being apprehended by the conscious mind, and this implies that the conscious mind itself, and only the conscious mind, creates these object, or tokens. They only exist because they are being sensed. This negates the characteristics of "a token", as the representative of a class or type, by allowing it to be any type. So you now propose a token "the sensation", which represents no specific type, because the conscious mind creates it every time that the mind encounters it, (as it is not really something found or encountered, it is something only existing when present to the mind, produced by the mind's presence), therefore the mind can make it of any type whatsoever. it is not a token of any type.

Such a thing, the object which can represent any type whatsoever, is not a token at all. And when you say "This is why a token of a sensation is different." , it is because you have described the "token of a sensation" as something other than a token. Are you ready to leave this type/token distinction as inapplicable to Wittgenstein's example of the private language, and proceed without it, or are you still insistent on using it as a crutch, which misleads you?

If the person is not consciously aware of the pain during some time, then they are not having any pain (not in pain), so there is no pain during that time. — Luke

Right, because "pain" here refers to what occurs to the conscious mind, having classed the object of sensation (the token) as that type, pain. But just because the mind is not actively classifying the object as a type, "pain" (i.e. the pain is present to the mind as pain), this does not mean that the token, the object itself, which gets classed as pain, is nonexistent. If the object (token) were nonexistent at this time, then that object would be completely created by the mind, as imaginary, or fictional, when present to the mind, and it could not be a real object, or a token at all, not having the necessity of representing a type, as explained above.

I suppose, but now you are no longer talking about "inner experiences" (and their instantiations) like we are with sensations. — Luke

What? You are going backward here. If anything, a memory is more properly an "inner experience" than a sensation is. Remembering something requires nothing external, it is a completely internal process, pulling something from the internal memory banks, and recollecting. It is as much purely internal as is possible. The "sensation" always involves something external to the conscious experience, the object of sensation, and this is why the act of sensation is so difficult to grasp, or understand. It straddles the supposed internal/external divide, Wittgenstein specifically, and intentionally, choose "sensation" as his example because it elicits that difficulty, through the ambiguity displayed by our disagreement. The object of recollection, memory, is clearly and unequivocally, something internal, when we remember something, we pull a token from the internal memory banks. But the object of sensation may be of the external type, as I've been arguing, or it may be of the internal type, as you've been arguing.

That's right, this is what tokens are about. Tokens of "inner experiences" are each unique instantiations that can be timestamped. This is why you are wrong to speak of there being more than one of "the same token". — Luke

I don't ever speak of there being more than one of the same token. That is your straw man. I speak of encountering, or experiencing the same token more than one time, as in the example of the chair. It seems to me, that since you believe that it is impossible for the same internal tokens to come and go from the conscious mind, each one maintaining its identity as the very same token each time it recurs to the mind, you represent this talk as if it is a case of talking about more than one of the same token.

But a person can simply name them as "the same token", too, and that is also sufficient criteria. — Luke

No, we cannot do that. Each token, by the fact that it is designated as a "token", is necessarily a token of all the types that it is a token of. So we cannot arbitrarily declare that it is "the same token" because there is correctness (criteria) implied by the fact that you are calling it a token. If we remove this criteria, the type/token distinction which you've been insisting on, we can get to the point Wittgenstein is making in the PLA. There can be no judgement of correctness to the diarist's use of "S". But "S" does not refer to a token, it refers to a particular thing which is judged to be the same thing each time it is encountered or experienced, and thereby named "S".

One place is at 987b:

Accordingly the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the the One.

.. it is peculiar to him to posit a duality instead of the single Unlimited, and to make the Unlimited consist of the "Great and Small." — Fooloso4

At this point Aristotle explains how Plato differs from the Pythagoreans. Plato assumed a duality (dyad), of sensible objects, and ideas, as two distinct types. The Pythagoreans, Aristotle says, believed that all sensible things were composed of numbers, ideas,

Also:

For number is from one and the indeterminate dyad. (1081a through 1082a) — Fooloso4

Here is an argument against the notion that a number is an object. If two is an object, it must be a distinct type of object from the two units which make up the two parts of the two. This makes two a different type of thing from one, and three would be a different type of thing from two, etc.. But in mathematical numbers, each number must be the same type of thing. This makes two, if it is an object, and the rest of the numbers if they are objects, something different from what mathematical numbers are supposed to be.

I think it is important to note that these are Aristotle's arguments against various proposals as to what kind of existence numbers have. There is no direct reference to Plato here, and the points listed by Aristotle, which he argues against, could very well be straw man points.

Again, it must also be true that 4 is not composed of chance 2's. For according to them the indeterminate dyad, receiving the determinate dyad, made two dyads; for it was capable of duplicating that which it received (Meta. 1082a)

There is a good point made here by Aristotle. If a two is composed of two units, a three composed of three units, and four composed of four units, then these are all determinate, mathematical numbers. But fi two is itself a unit, then when four is composed of two twos, these two units are not mathematical units, because the four is only made up of two. And we cannot say what value these units have, so they are indeterminate. Two of these units together (these units could be numbers of any value) could produce any number whatsoever, hence two as an object is termed an indeterminate dyad.

Description can only go so far in providing for prediction. It used to be the case, that prediction was the means of validating the hypothesis (description), as the scientific method. Now, prediction itself is what brings in the money, so no one really cares about the description (hypothesis). And, the mathematics of probability is what enables prediction, so that's where the focus is.

Yeah, right, that would be ideal. We really should have done that right from the start, locked down all the infectious people, allowing all the healthy people to run where they please, and congregate freely. Then the virus would be confined, and soon eradicated as the infectious people either died or became noninfectious. But the disease is insidious, so we have to play the odds.

So why would you restrict their behavior but not the others? — NOS4A2

Aren't the unvaccinated about four times more likely to get infected? Whatever the statistics show exactly, it's just math and probabilities.

1.science has now been invaded by probability because it strayed away from causality. The probability coming from QM and relativity. — Caldwell

The invasion of probability is due to the reliance on mathematics rather than description.

Perhaps you could provide a reference as to where Aristotle refers to Plato's metaphysics as being concerned with an "indeterminate" dyad. "Indeterminate dyad " appears oxymoronic to me, as a "dyad" consists of two defined terms, and therefore cannot be indeterminate. I haven't come across anywhere where Aristotle refers to Plato's metaphysics as concerning an indefinite dyad. Maybe you can point me in that direction.

The term indeterminate dyad is Aristotle's. — Fooloso4

OK, if you want to switch to Aristotle's metaphysics, let's do that then. But why title the thread "Plato's Metaphysics"?

It is not that it cannot be determined to exist. The intelligible world of Forms is fixed and determinate. What is unlimited cannot be determinate. It is without boundaries. — Fooloso4

Aristotle demonstrated that "the unlimited", as prime matter, is physically impossible.

Something has been forgotten so thoroughly that we've forgotten that it's been forgotten. — Wayfarer

Hahaha. Once you forget it, there is no such thing as forgetting that you forgot it, because that would require remembering it, to remember that you forgot it, which is impossible if you've forgotten it. Talking about forgetting that you forgot it, is even sillier than talking about knowing that you know it, which is pretty silly in itself.

This is exactly what I am arguing cannot be done. There is no theoretical framework for a world that is indeterminate. — Fooloso4

That the world is indeterminate is not a Platonic principle.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate. — Fooloso4

I will take issue with the term "indeterminate" used here. As Socrates describes in The Philebus, The combination of the two parts of what you call a "dyad", such as the limited and the unlimited, produces a balance, an equality, which constitutes an existing thing, a particular. I don't think there is good reason to believe that this equality is "indeterminate". Further, Socrates insists that there must be a cause of these instances of balance, or equality, and it doesn't make sense to say that a caused thing is indeterminate. Once a thing has been caused, it has a determined existence as the thing which it is.

Needless to say, they aren't going to get very far .... :smile: — Apollodorus

That though, is debatable. All that is required to dispel the nonsense is an extensive reading of Plato's material. However, this is not an effortless task, and the majority of people in our society approach with a prejudice that ancient writings are outdated, unscientific, irrelevant and unimportant. So, there is no inclination to make that effort, and these people (the majority of people in our society) will simply accept what others say as an appropriate representation. And those who say things which are consistent with that prejudice, which frees one from making the effort, will be the ones who are listened to.

Given that what separates the individual mind from the universal mind is the experience based on identification with the physical body and the thoughts etc. associated with it, we can see why Socrates (or Plato) advises philosophers to intellectually and emotionally detach themselves from the physical body and appurtenances, and inquire into the Forms with the pure unalloyed reason alone, when the soul is undisturbed, “itself by itself” and in the company of realities like itself (Phaedo 65c ff.). — Apollodorus

There is a distinct difference between the hierarchical priority described by you, and the one accepted by modern western culture. In western culture, we see material existence as first, prior, and from this, emerges a living body, and finally a human mind. The Neo-Platonist metaphysics places the universal Soul as first, prior, then the individual living soul, then the material body. So the modern western culture has completely reversed the hierarchy. The difference is that the Neo-Platonist metaphysics is based in solid principles, the metaphysics of modern western culture, by which the hierarchy is reversed, is not.

Look up the type/token distinction. It doesn't have a private meaning. — Luke

I didn't say anything about a "private meaning". I don't know what you're talking about here, and can only assume that you misunderstood what was said, unless you are back to your way of intentionally misunderstanding (straw man).

What do you mean by "the same token"? — Luke

I already went through this, when you accused me of changing the subject to talk about memories, and I replied to tell you that Wittgenstein is talking about "inner experiences" in general, and sensation is used as an example. Here; I'll reproduce it for you..

You appear to be missing the point Luke. If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? One comes from ,and goes to; an external source which is outside my conscious experience, and the other comes from and goes to an internal source which is outside my conscious experience How could your memory work, if it wasn't the same token coming and going, to and from your mind, each time that you remember the same event? A memory of an event comes and goes from your conscious experience, coming from and going to some internal place. Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? If it was a different token, you would not remember it as the same event, it would occur to you as a different event each time. And if each time the idea of two came into your mind, that is the number two not the symbol, it was a different token, how could you do any mathematics? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not basing it on an internal/external division; I'm basing it on types (classes) and tokens (instances of those classes). You are incorrectly basing it on instances of "encountering". — Luke

I fully understand the type/token distinction. I don't understand the basis of your claim that a single token of a sensation cannot be experienced (since you do not like "encountered") by a person more than one different time. Isn't any duration of time "more than one different time"? Obviously we experience the same token of chair many different times, and as I described the other day, it appears like we must experience the same token of memory, and the same token of idea, many different times. I do not understand why you think a token of sensation is different.

No, I'm saying you have sensations as an "inner experience". — Luke

If a sensation is an inner experience, just like memories and ideas are inner experiences, how is it that we appear to experience the same token of a memory many different times, and the same token of an idea many different times, yet you still insist that we cannot experience the same token of sensation a multitude of times.

Consider this Luke. You agree that a token of sensation has a temporal extension.

I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. — Luke

Why do you think that it's not possible for the person not to be consciously aware of that token of pain during some period of its existence? So that particular token of pain could be existing somewhere in the subconscious, while the conscious mind is not at that time aware of it. Isn't this what we say about memories? The memory is 'stored' somewhere so that it is not always present to the conscious mind throughout the entirety of its temporal existence. Yet it must exist somewhere as that particular memory, or else the conscious mind would not be able to access it.

However, it may actually be the case, that each time a person remembers, or accesses the memory of the same event, the mind recreates the so-called token of memory. If this is the case, then it is not really truthful to say that it is the same memory, because it's really a new scenario created each time. Likewise with ideas, the idea of 'two' for example. If the mind must recreate the idea of two, instead of pulling that token of idea from a stored memory bank, then it is not really the same particular idea. Nevertheless, our language is such that we speak as if these tokens of idea and memory are the very same tokens, and this is the type of language use which Wittgenstein is bringing to our attention as something which renders "what a mathematician is inclined to say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts" in need of philosophical treatment, as the treatment of an illness.

I don't see why you say this is incorrect. As I said in my last post, it could be considered to be the same "particular" or token of the sensation both before and after one has slept or been unconscious. The problem is in remembering it correctly after waking up or regaining consciousness. Therefore, the problem can equally apply to tokens. That is, if you prefer to define a token, or a particular instance of a sensation, such that it includes a discontinuity in your awareness of it. We commonly refer to some pains in this way. — Luke

It is incorrect for the reasons I explained. If the person wants to say that it is the very same particular, a criterion as to what qualifies as "the same" is required in order that such naming can be correct. But if the person wants to name two distinct things as the same type, simply naming them as "the same type" is sufficient criteria for them to actually be the same type (270). That is because "type" is an artificial classification, we make the type and we name the tokens of the type, but particularity is not something we create.

The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes it being the same token both before and after the discontinuity. — Luke

But just like the chair, there is a reality, or truth to whether or not it is the same token, therefore a correctness to the matter. The point being that there is a valid question, is it the same chair or is it not the same chair, and we believe that there is a true answer. The true answer is establish by some criteria like temporal continuity, and the fact that someone could point to the whereabouts of that particular chair for the entire time period, to confirm that it is the same. If the diarist "can make up any criteria whatsoever", then the truth or falsity is circumvented, and as Wittgenstein says, " we can't talk about
'right'."(258)

On the other hand, if the diarist is naming distinct tokens of a type, he cannot ne wrong because he is creating the type: and it can be as he wants: "the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show."(270)

You seem to be confusing modality and temporality; not everything that is possible occurs in the future, but that is what is implied by your post. So I don't see what you propose hee as clarifying, so much as misleading. — Banno

You are conflating two distinct forms of possibility, and misleading yourself.

It depends on the token/type. In terms of sensations, "encountering a token" is a particular instance of having the sensation. Unless you can time travel and live that moment over again, then you cannot have the same token of a sensation more than once. — Luke

As I've repeated numerous times now, you've provided nothing to support this assertion. You are claiming two distinct types of tokens, ones which can be encountered numerous times and ones which cannot. But such a distinction needs to be justified, and as I explained many inner experiences like memories and ideas seem to involve encountering the same token numerous different times. So the distinction cannot be based in an internal/external division. You seem to be putting "sensations" in a category other than "inner experience", and other than "external object". And that doesn't make any sense.

I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. Whether we call it a different token or not makes little difference, however, because the problem remains: how can you be sure that you are remembering it correctly as the same sensation after you have stopped sensing it for a while (e.g. after you have slept or lost consciousness)? In other words, are you correct to still call it 'S'? — Luke

OK, I'm glad we're finally getting to the point. Whether or not you believe it is possible to have the same token of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, is not what is at issue. What is at issue is that the private diarist is claiming this, and is claiming to mark down S every time the very same token of sensation occurs, "a particular sensation". Whether it is possible for the person to actual have the same particular sensation is not the issue.

The question Wittgenstein asks, is if the person might be correct in judging that a present instance is the same as a prior instance. And, he concludes that since there is no criteria which will tell the diarist whether it truly is the same or not, it doesn't make sense to even talk about the possibility of being correct. Again, the question of whether it's possible for the person to have the very same sensation on numerous occasions is not relevant, because what Wittgenstein has concluded is that it is impossible for the person to know whether or not it is the very same sensation anyway. So even if it is possible that it is the same, and it actually is the same, the person would not know whether it is the same, because the person does not have what is required to make that judgement.

It's the same problem if it were a different token. If you didn't have the sensation for a day or more and then it apparently returned, you could not be sure that you were remembering it correctly as the same sensation. — Luke

I think you need to rethink this, because it is not correct. If the diarist is judging the distinct instances, as distinct particulars, rather than as one and the same particular, the problem of a criterion of identity evapourates. The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes "the type". He can even say that they are the same type because he named them both S. The diarist may create the type. Simply naming them as the same type is sufficient criteria for making them the same type. This is what comes up at 270, once the diarist switches from trying to identify the same particular to identifying instances of the same type, there's no such thing as naming it wrong, because the type is determined by the particulars (tokens) which are named as being of that type.

May we say for the sake of accuracy if not sense itself that you are opposed to prejudicial discrimination? Or do you take your car for service to the tea shoppe, have your legal problems resolved by your house-cleaner, and your medical care handled by the boys loitering on your street-corner? Of course you discriminate. We all have to. And when the focus is properly turned to the prejudicial, then we have a different discussion. — tim wood

Those are examples of getting service from the place where that service is made available. They are not examples of discrimination based on education.

On the contrary, I see it as a diversionary tactic deployed by anti-Platonists who have run out of arguments against Plato and who insist on construing his teachings as somehow logically "incoherent" or "problematic". — Apollodorus

Yes, I think this is similar to what I was getting at. Casting Plato as someone who has made a pledge of secrecy to some sort of Pythagorean cult, is such a diversionary tactic, meant to to cast a shadow of ill repute.