The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole. — RussellA

The law of identity stipulates that there are things independent of the mind, and these things have an identity proper to themselves. The true identity of the things might be completely different form how we conceptualize things. The thing itself is what Kant called noumenon. Of course, that there are independent things, and that they have an identity, are simply assumptions. And Berkeley makes very valid points, that we know things as forms, and a thing's identity is its form, therefore there is no need to assume the existence of matter at all. But when we deny the reality of matter then we need a mind to support the existence of the forms. So the recourse to Berkeley's arguments is to deny that there are any forms, things with identity, in the independent world, and assume that all is matter. Now we have your position, "that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind". There is matter outside the mind, but no things.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated. — RussellA

I agree, the question of existence of a "whole", as a form, or a thing with identity, is the issue here. We can assume that there are such things in the world, wholes which have an identity as a thing, but this is just an assumption which remains unproven. Furthermore, wholes are by their very nature organized structures, and it appears evident that only minds have the capacity to organize disorganized parts into a whole. So the question of a true whole, with organized parts, existing independently of all minds is very difficult.

Where you and I seem to disagree is on this issue of spatial separation in the independent world. I believe that if parts are united as a whole, there cannot be spatial separation between the parts. Space is what is external to a whole, and within the whole there cannot be "space" in the same sense of the word, because that is where the whole is. So whatever it is which unites the parts into a whole, it is existing in this area which is the internal of the whole, such that we cannot say that there is spatial separation between those parts.

But what kind of "revolt" from bionconservatives do you anticipate beyond simply opting to have babies in the cruel, time-honoured manner? No doubt the revolution will be messy. That said, I predict opposition will eventually wither. — David Pearce

Because the transhumans would be superhuman in some ways, they would be seen as a threat to the naturalists (or whatever you want to call them), and the God-fearers. And, as artificially produced, the naturalists would look at them as emotionless computers or robots, and feel the same threat that some people today feel about robots taking over the world and wiping out human existence. So they'd want to protect their children from this scourge of artificial beings, by doing whatever they possibly could to prevent them from being created.

'Rules' is just a metaphor to be interpreted in context. — j0e

Yes that's what I've been trying to explain, "rules" is just a metaphor. That's exactly the point I'm making. So "language games" is just a metaphor as well. And it's only through looking at these metaphors as if they are literal descriptions, that we come to the conclusion of "hinge propositions". If we maintain that "rules" and "language games" are just metaphors, then we respect the fact that the similarity of the simile must break down at some point, and we see that there is no point to insisting on the incoherent notion of "hinge propositions". This idea is just produced by the belief that "rules" and "language games" provides a true description.

Who told you that this is the only acceptable use of the word "rule"? — Luke

No one told me that there is only one way to use "rule", but that's the point,. There is no rule (used my way) for the use of "rule". And that's the fundamental nature of language, it does not consist of rules for usage. If you want to argue that there is a type of normative "rule" which does not explicitly state what we ought or ought not do, (and guides us through our interpretation and understanding of that rule), and that this type of "rule" which you propose, compels us to do what we ought to do, and not to do what we ought not do, through some hidden or secret method of application, you can go ahead and use "rule" in that way. It's a free world, and there are no rules (my use) as to how you ought to use that word. But there are "rules" (your way) as to how you ought to use that word. However, please do not conflate your idiosyncratic way of using "rule" with the philosophically respected way, or you'll be charged with equivocation. Equivocation renders logic invalid, and it is a stated rule. Rules are introduced into language for specific purposes, like logical proceedings. Notice the contradiction which arises between your way and my way, that's why logic requires a rule against equivocation.

Biologists define a species as a group of organisms that can reproduce with one another in their natural habitat and produce fertile offspring. We can envisage a future world where most babies are base-edited "designer babies". At some stage, the notional coupling of a gene-edited, AI-augmented transhuman and an archaic human on a reservation would presumably not produce a viable child. — David Pearce

Wouldn't there be a vast portion of the human population which for one reason or another would not engage in this designer baby process? I would think that they might even revolt against it. In any case, I can see a divide where each, the designer and the natural would look at each other as different. And in these cases we don't usually look at the other as better.

As humans progressively conquer the aging process later this century and beyond, procreative freedom as traditionally understood will eventually be impossible – whether the carrying capacity of Earth is 15 billion or 150 billion. — David Pearce

Judging by the way that human beings have given themselves control over the Covid19 virus I don't have much faith in their capacity to conquer any natural processes which produce death. I tend to think that making a living thing resistant to a specific fatal process only leaves it more vulnerable to another fatal process. Life is a very delicate balance, and "the aging process" is an illusion because there is no one simple process which constitutes "aging". The fountain of youth is a myth.

Possibly you have a more figurative sense of "superhuman" in mind. My definition of the transition from human to transhuman life is conventional but not arbitrary. In The Hedonistic Imperative (1995) I predicted, tentatively, that the world's last experience below hedonic zero in our forward light-cone would be a precisely datable event a few centuries from now. The Darwinian era will have ended. A world without mental and physical pain isn't the same as a mature posthuman civilisation of superintelligence, superlongevity and superhappiness. But the end of suffering will still be a momentous watershed in the evolutionary development of life. I'd argue it's the most ethically important. — David Pearce

I noticed you are also concerned about nuclear war. Aren't you a little worried that the movement toward designer babies could actually trigger a nuclear war as a revolution against this sort of human manipulation? Also, there are countless other things which could foil this process, like biological warfare. I would think that your desired human transformation would require the entirety of the human population working together towards that one goal. And, as I indicated above, I believe that is extremely unlikely because many will reject this as unnatural, or as in opposition to God. Do you see how many people in the world reject something so simple as a Covid19 vaccination? Both atheist and theist moralists have reason to reject your proposal. Therefore I think you proposal would only create a division between those in favour, and those against, and if those in favour persisted as if they were starting to proceed into the project without unanimous consent, they might be exterminated as a threat.

Right, so long as we posit the real existence of those unobservables, dark energy and dark matter, to account for the discrepancies between what is observed and what relativity theory predicts, relativity works just fine.

But at what large-scale does it break down? — tim wood

The scale of galaxies, where what is called spatial expansion has an impact, with the requirement for dark energy, dark matter, etc..

According to you to, relativity doesn't work? — tim wood

Within the universe there is a wide range of existents, from very large to very small. Relativity works in the middle area.

I'm confident that you mostly learned language just by hanging around. Pronouncing words correctly is not even explicitly taught. — j0e

Right, that's my point. We learn how to talk simply by hanging around, not by learning rules.

. When children misbehave they are corrected by parents and peers. — j0e

Yes, when children misbehave the rule is made explicit. Prior to it being made explicit, the children do not know the rule, and cannot follow it, hence they are prone to what the adults call misbehaving.

It would (slightly) violate the norms of intelligibility to use 'norms' for fundamental particulars. — j0e

But how would you differentiate between these two? People behave in ways similar to each other, without following explicit rules. Fundamental particles behave in ways similar to each other without following explicit rules. On what basis do you claim that the people are following normative rules, and the particles are not, when there is no physical evidence of any such rules in both cases, only common behaviour in both cases?

So I think it is you who is violating the norms of intelligibility, with your case of special pleading, to say that some things which behave in common ways are following normative rules, while other things are not, when there is no evidence of any such rules in both cases.

On the contrary, 'herd mentality' is a good phrase for the kind of linguistic norms I have in mind, if one ignores its connotation. — j0e

Yes, and this makes good evidence that these norms do not exist as any sort of rules

If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated. — RussellA

This presents an ontological problem. If the thing is a whole, then it is fundamentally a unity. We use the concept of spatial separation to refer to a measurable distance between distinct unities, separate wholes. If we assume spatial separation within the supposed thing, then we deny the unity which is required to make it a thing, a whole.

So in reality, the opposite of what you say is what is true. If a thing has true ontological status, then it is impossible that the parts are spatially separated because this would deny the unity of the thing, making it just a group of things (its parts) instead.

This is the issue of divisibility. We say that a thing is divisible. But divisible means possible to be divided, it does not mean actually divided. If we actually divide the thing, to produce the required spatial separation between its parts, then the thing loses its ontological status as the thing it was, because it has been divided. So the relationship between parts and whole is actually very complex, because a thing cannot be at the same time, a whole, as the unity required to make it a thing, and also a group of parts, even though we commonly say that a thing is composed of parts. It's contradictory to give the thing existence as a whole, and the parts existence as individual things, at the same time.

Take the solar system for an example. Let's assume that it is a whole, a unity. The inclination is to say that each planet is a distinct part, with spatial separation. In reality though the planets are all within the electromagnetic and gravitational fields of the sun, and there is no real spatial separation between them, as the fields occupy the entire area. So representing each planet as a separate part with space between them, is not a true representation.

If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.

If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".

However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.

As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts

IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind. — RussellA

Now you are talking about concepts here? I agree that they only exist in minds, and as such the type of existence they have is completely different from things. That's why I had a hard time understanding you when you were talking about wholes and parts, and simples, in the context of meaning. These ideas, wholes and parts are applied to the divisibility of things, but I do not see how a concept is divisible.

Well, I really don't see how there could be such a thing as a normative rule which is not explicit. That seems to be a self-contradicting idea. It's easy for people like you and Luke to insist that there must be such things, but if you think about it, it really doesn't make any sense. How are you supposed to know what to do without being told what to do? If you simply observe others doing something, and decide to behave in a similar way because it appears to be advantageous, this ought not be described as a normative rule.

Take your example of driving on the right or left. Suppose no one tells you which side of the road to drive on. You observe, and decide that you'd better drive on a certain side of the road if you want to avoid a crash and stay alive. How is that a normative rule? You have simply chosen not to go against the flow, decided that it is in your best interest to do things in a way which is consistent with others. I would not call this a "normative rule", because I think what makes a rule a rule, is to be explicitly stated.

To me, it seems ridiculous to conclude that any time a group of things are behaving in a similar way they are following a normative rule. Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. Such a conclusion leads one to believe that molecules, atoms, and fundamental particles are following normative rules, and panpsychism in general. Denying this, as I do, allows us to see that consistency in behaviour which is common in inanimate particles, and also common in human beings, is not properly described as following a normative rule.

So I think it is fundamentally wrong to conclude that when people are acting in a way which is consistent with the way others act, that this is a matter of following a normative rule. That is an oversimplification which upon analysis turns out to be false, or else gives "normative rule" a very odd sense which is not at all conducive to good philosophical inquiry. So this idea is simply misleading. When you see a swarm of insects, or a flock of birds headed south, would you say that these creatures are following normative rules? Herd mentality ought not be described as following normative rules.

Whether Banno's statement is acceptable or not depends on one's ontology. If rules are imaginary things, and imaginary things do not exist, then it makes no sense to say that rules must exist before being made explicit. This is like saying that God must exist in order for us to talk about Him. And if rules are not imaginary things, then what existence do they have other than as written statements? In this case being explicit is the existence of the rule. I don't see any other options for how a rule might exist, other than within the imaginations of human beings, or in the words written in the physical medium. Neither one implies that a rule exists before being made explicit. Do you know of any ontology which would support Banno's claim? Platonism and natural laws perhaps?

I've no credible conception of what guises that bliss will take. — David Pearce

I suppose that would require that you're already superhuman.

At what point do you think we might cross the threshold between human and superhuman? Could there be a distinguishing feature which would mark a difference of species? Or, would making such a distinction amount to racism?

It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". — RussellA

This would only be the case if the word is being used to refer to a particular thing. We could see that "dog" was the name of that particular thing. But since 'dog" is used to refer to numerous things, as it indicates a species of animals, then we cannot understand the meaning of the word in this way.

Actually "dog" is a complex abstract word, because it is debatable whether wolfs and coyotes and other doglike creatures are varieties of dogs.

IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples. — RussellA

I'm sorry RusselA, but I really cannot understand your description of wholes and parts, and your use of "simple". It is completely foreign to me and is not at all consistent with how I would normally use these words. You'd have to lay out a whole structure, and answer many questions from me, to make this at all intelligible to me.

For instance, I see no reason why a part is necessarily a simple, because even parts are composed of parts. So when you speak of the parts in meaning, like "sun", even this word, to be intelligible must be understood through composite parts of meaning. And since any aspect of meaning which appears to be a simple, really is not a simple, it really does not make sense to speak about meaning in these terms. I don't see what a "simple" could actually be. If to understand a simple requires understanding others, then how is it in anyway a simple? In conclusion, I don't know if you're trying to support the idea of "simples", or to dismiss it as inadequate.

If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion. — RussellA

Yes, I believe that all things have an ontological status. That is what makes a thing a thing, and by the law of identity a thing has an identity proper to itself regardless of how we as human beings might attempt to identify it.

The issue of the relationship between two things is different though. This is because relationships are understood by us through abstract concepts, which are generalizations based in quantitative assessments, applicable in numerous different situations. If a relationship between two things could be understood in terms other than generalizations, such as mathematical quantities, and scientific laws, then there might be relations which are purely unique, and distinct, just like things are distinct and unique. But this is not how we understand relations, so relations, as we understand them, do not have the same ontological existence that things have.

What I think, is that things have ontological existence. But since the relations between things is perspective dependent (dependent on the frame of reference in relativity theory), what is referred to by "relation" does not have ontological existence. But we might assume that since things have ontological existence, there must be some sort of ontological relation between them, and this would be to an extent true, but the word "relation" is not adequate here because it implies that our human abstractions of relations which are extremely deficient, are what is ontological.

IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer. — RussellA

Yes, I can see that. The ontological thing, which is the picture, could be said to be both a duck and a rabbit. By the law of identity, the true identity is within the thing itself, and is unrelated to what one might call it. As human beings we might say that there is both a duck there and a rabbit there, and there is a relation between these two. But any determination of such a relationship is somewhat arbitrary and simply dependent on one's perspective. The true identity is within the thing itself.

However, since the thing was created with intention, as one united whole, with a split personality, and this was the intent behind its creation, the issue is even more complex.

Does 2 + 2 = green have meaning? — fishfry

Yes, "2+2=green" has meaning. But I would reject this statement as inconsistent with the principles that I already understand and accept.

If they don't refer to anything, how do you know they have meaning and what that meaning is? — fishfry

I don't know, the answer to these questions. "Meaning" is not an easy topic. That's why there's so many philosophical debates about it. I really do not know what meaning is, or how I know that something has meaning. Those are questions yet to be answered.

Yes. And you assert that it only applies to "things." So that Joe Biden = Joe Biden is an instance of the law of identity; but 4 = 4 is not. — fishfry

By asking this question you indicate that you paid not attention to my explanation of what "=" signifies, or means in common mathematical usage, and what "is the same as" signifies or means in the law of identity. Since you still cannot see the difference here, after I've explained it countless times to you, it seems pointless to explain it again. It's actually a very simple difference, and very easy to understand.

Well now you have introduced a brand new term, "value." What does it mean? If 4 does not refer to anything, how do I know what it's value is? If fglfdkjgldj does not refer to anything, how can I determine what its value is? — fishfry

We learn values in school. If you still haven't learned the value of 4 yet, you could talk to a primary school teacher, or look it up on the web. You'll find there's a lot of educational stuff like that if you google it .

Isn't that circular? The law of identity only applies to things. And how do we know if an entity (if I may use that word to mean something that might or might not have thinghood) has thinghood? It does if the law of identity applies to it. That's circular! — fishfry

Yes, that's a very real problem. We often do not know whether a word signifies something with thinghood or not. That is the case with quantum physics and wave/particle duality. Physicists cannot determine the "thinghood" of the described phenomena.

But I'm not arguing against it. I'm asking you to give me a coherent account of your idea that 4 = 4 is not an instance of the law of identity, yet 4 = 4 has "meaning" by virtue of the "value" of 4. If 4 doesn't refer to anything, how can it have a value? — fishfry

Since you seem to have no idea of what "value" means I suggest you do some research into this topic, and come back to me when you get above the primary school level.

You're just flat out wrong about that. In math, = means "the same as" as dictated by the law of identity. As I've been telling you for three years. — fishfry

Obviously you never looked into this, and haven't looked beyond your own nose to see what others say about what "=" signifies. The following is the opening paragraph from the Wikipedia entry

The equals sign (British English, Unicode Consortium[1]) or equal sign (American English), formerly known as the equality sign, is the mathematical symbol =, which is used to indicate equality in some well-defined sense.[2][3] In an equation, it is placed between two expressions that have the same value, or for which one studies the conditions under which they have the same value. — Wikipedia: equals sign

Notice the mention of "the same value".

But then 4 = 4 is not an instance of the law of identity, yet you say it has MEANING by virtue of the VALUE of 4. That's where your thesis is in need of support. — fishfry

Do you accept that there is a difference between "is the same as" and "has the same value as"? The former phrase is the phrase used by the law of identity. The latter phrase is what is signified by "=", as the Wikipedia entry indicates.

Until you accept that there is a difference here, further discussion is pointless.

As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language. — RussellA

Are you distinguishing between ordinary language (whatever that means), and language games? How would you distinguish between ordinary language and non-ordinary? If all language is in some sense "ordinary", and language games are in some way different from this, then doesn't this just indicate what I said, that language games are not real?

I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether. — RussellA

I don't see how you escape from the reality that all language is ordinary, to get yourself into this unreal type of language which you call a language game, and is supposed to be some sort of language that is not ordinary.

If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts. — RussellA

I think this is an oversimplification, to say that falsity consists of a false relation between parts. How does correspondence fit into this?

Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them. — RussellA

I don't see this as a matter of relationships between parts. I think of it as each person sees one thing, but they each see that one thing in a different way. Since they are each seeing one thing, and not composing something out of parts, there is no issue of seeing relationships between parts in a different way. If it is composed of parts, they might be seeing the exact same relationships, but seeing a different whole.

If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.

The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer. — RussellA

It appears to me, like "language games" is a faulty analogy here, inapplicable. You do realize that a statement has an author, or do you not? So the relations between parts must exist independently of the observer, because they were put there by the author. Otherwise the observer could not read what was written by the author. Isn't the goal of the observer to determine what was intended by the author? Why would the observer look to possible language games, rather than seeking the intent of the author?

Summary

IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language. — RussellA

Didn't you start off by making a separation between ordinary language and language games? So if hinge propositions are a part of language games, and language games are different from ordinary language, how can hinge propositions give valuable insight about ordinary language?

We can more or less circumscribe certain activities in order to understand what is happening; that is, we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole. We can look at the sorts of utterances that might occur during some activity. Importantly, such activities do not consist only of language, but involve interaction with stuff in the world. Such examples of language use might be found by observation, or set up by fiat. — Banno

The problem with this perspective, is that as RussellA has pointed out above, meaning is attributed to the whole. And since this is the case, the meaning which any part has is somewhat dependent on the interpretation of the whole. So if we set out parts of our language use, as you describe, without setting out the whole, we will not get a true determination of meaning, just like we cannot get a true determination of the meaning of a word without considering the rest of the statement..

These examples allow us to look at and understand something about the rules that are being use.

Wittgenstein called such examples "language games" with an eye towards three aspects: They involve not just language, but interaction with the things around us; they involve behaviour that can be set out in terms of rules; they are related to each other in ways he spoke of as a family resemblance.

Hence to claim that language games are not real is to misunderstand what they are. — Banno

According to what I just said then, referring to distinct language games, as parts of language as a whole, cannot adequately provide us with the meaning in language. This becomes more evident when you consider what Wittgenstein says about family resemblances. The same word has different meanings which you might speak of as attributable to different language games. However, the different meanings, or supposedly different games, are actually similar, related as members of a family. So the supposed language games cannot be separated as distinct games, because they are all tied together as a family, and one doesn't ever really exist independently of the others.

This is why equivocation is extremely difficult to identify and even harder to avoid. Each word is associated with a whole group of different uses, and despite efforts to assign a very unique and particular meaning to a word for a specific purpose, the associated similar meanings cannot be exclude from the mind because all these associations occur in habitual ways. So we never isolate one so-called language game from another, and the meaning of the word remains a sort of vague conglomeration of multiple supposed games, until the word is finally assigned meaning according to the context of the particular whole, the statement in which it is actually being used.

That is why language games are not real. There is no such thing as an overall game which refers to all of language, and distinct language games cannot be isolated, therefore there is no place in reality for language games. It's just a faulty model.

No that wasn't the conclusion I was going with. Rather, no one exists prior to birth to even balance a lesser harm with a greater harm. Thus it is purely creating the conditions for harm for someone else (and the good created doesn't matter here as not creating good is not a "bad" when "nothing" exists in the first place). — schopenhauer1

I can't see your point. Your premise that no one exists prior to birth is wrong, because it ought to state that no one person exists prior to one's own birth. Therefore your conclusion that nothing exists prior to one's birth is also wrong.

As I said already, we ought to judge morality on the basis of doing good, not preventing bad, for the reasons I explained. The principal result of this reasoning is that "not creating good", (inactivity, which is contrary to living nature), is then actually rendered as bad. Stipulating what is good, which renders what is not stipulated as good, bad, allows us to avoid the loopholes which result from having to stipulate what is bad. The loopholes are in the form of 'if it is not stipulated as bad, then it is not bad'.

Ok, so this then would be degrees and threshold.. see analogy I used with preventing suffering. Persuading someone with words vs. physically forcing an intractable game, let's say is a huge degree of difference. — schopenhauer1

It's not like that. You can physically force a person with love and affection. So I'm totally dismissing the degree thing as relevant to good or bad. What I am saying is that one can use force in a good way or force in a bad way, no matter what degree of force is being used. Force on its own is neutral, whether it's a huge force or a small force, and it's how the force is used which is good or bad.

Okay, so let's split then reasons vs. causes. Person A caused Person B to fall down the stairs by Person A pushing Person B. Person A's reason was not to help Person B but some reason that was not to save from a greater harm. The reason Person C pushed Person A down the stairs is because there was a bullet, presumably a greater harm. — schopenhauer1

So person A did a bad thing and person C did a good thing? How does that relate to procreation? Some people don't care about their children, so it's bad for them to procreate? But others do, so it's good for them to procreate?

I think we get a slippery slope here anytime forcing a situation is used, even for the good. If I was to kidnap someone to go to the awesome school of "Metaphysician Uncover" to learn Plato, that would still be wrong, in my opinion as someone's autonomy was limited. In procreation, this is always happening, because though the game of life is the only "game in town" so-to-say, it is still a forced game. — schopenhauer1

I don't think you're quite grasping my use of "force". Force is anything external to the will of the free agent, so it includes all the natural forces described by physics, gravity, energy, etc.. When we act, as free willing agents we use these forces toward our ends. So even speaking to another, giving gifts to another, and other forms of persuasion like this, are instances of using force.

This is why it doesn't make sense to use the blanket assumption that using force to persuade another, is wrong. Then we'd have to discern all the instances of using force in a good way, and somehow describe these as something other than using force. In reality, saying "if you do that I'll kill you", and "if you love me don't do that" are equal in the sense of "using force", because each is a simple statement. However, it is the meaning of what is said which makes one of these a threat, and therefore much worse than the other.

So there is nothing inherently wrong with using force in our interactions with others, and nothing wrong with a "forced game" if this is how you wish to describe procreation, because a forced game might just as well be good as bad. That force might be the force of love.

Thus if I push someone down a flight of stairs for no reason... — schopenhauer1

I don't believe that there is ever such a thing. If you willfully pushed someone down the stairs, then you decided to do that, so you have a reason for having done it. If you have no reason, then it was not willful, and it was an accident. So when you say "procreation is more like the first", the first has been eliminated as not a real possibility. Therefore your characterization of procreation, as like the first, is not acceptable, because the first is not real, and procreation if it is compared with pushing someone down the stairs, is not carried out without a reason unless it is accidental.

Yeah correct. I just think intuition as it relates to negative ethics are obligatory than ones related to positive ethics because without the negative, you don't have room for everyone's different positives. More likely your positives aren't mine, but our negatives are closely aligned so we can have our versions of positives intact. — schopenhauer1

I see this as a somewhat backward approach. As living beings, we are inclined to act. This is our nature, and we will do so regardless of obligation. So if we take this as a starting premise, and proceed toward listing everything which we ought not do, we could keep listing forever, and keep coming up with more things forever, as people keep finding new things to do which they ought not do. To list all the things which we ought not do is a futile task. If we look the other way, toward what we ought to do, then all we need is general guidance, in broad terms of types of activities which are good, and this will incline us toward the avoidance of numerous bad acts.

This is a simple feature of the difference between the universal and the particular. Consistency between the universal (general law) and the particular is what defines correctness. So if we strive to make the universals consistent with what is morally good, then we have a reasonable argument whenever an act is outside of the universals, that the act is bad. But if the universals describe what is bad, then we lose the capacity to say that an act which escapes the universal is a bad act. This is what gives people the capacity to exploit "loopholes", when the universals dictate what is bad. And people will always find an endless supply of loopholes.

Right, but all of these "de facto" forces you mention only come about from the original force in the first place. This essentially makes my point that the original force is making people "play the game" of all these other de facto forces. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but we cannot characterize any "force" as either good or bad. This is what Plato demonstrated, power on its own is neither good nor bad, it is only how power is used which can be judged in this way. Force is simply what the free will must cope with as a given restriction to one's capacities. We cannot categorize it as either good or bad because it can just as easily be used to support and assist one's actions of bringing about the desired end (good), as it might sometimes act against the desired end. So force on its own must be treated as neutral, even though it restricts one's capacities, it equally enables capacities.

So it is true that procreation is a use of force to bring about the existence of others, but we cannot judge this action as good or bad, just on the merits of "using force", because force is used for both moral and immoral actions. All human acts involve the use of force and we must accept the fact that human beings, as living beings, are inclined to act, and this is not bad. You wouldn't argue that human beings ought not act at all would you? Likewise you ought not assume that the use of force is immoral, because all human acts involve use of force.

Unnecessary suffering I define here (in terms of the person who will experience this suffering) because unless is trying to lessen a greater harm with a lesser one, there is no need to cause suffering in the first place. — schopenhauer1

It's not realistic to attempt to distinguish necessary suffering from unnecessary suffering. Let's assume for the sake of argument, that all suffering is brought about by force, it is not willed by the individual, but imposed by external force. Whether that force is imposed by another (artificially directed at another), or is natural, might be a distinction we could make. We can say that the individual will attempt to avoid natural forces which would bring about suffering, and such suffering brought about by natural forces would be due to a deficiency in the individual's capacities. Now we can direct our attention at the artificial use of force by ourselves, and other human beings, in carrying out actions. Would you agree on two categories of inflicting suffering on others, intentionally acting in a way known to inflict suffering, and accidentally inflicting suffering? Neither of these can be properly classified as "unnecessary", because the accidental would have been avoided if avoidance would have been foreseen as possible, and the intentional is seen as necessary for the sake of some end. So it doesn't make sense to propose a category of "unnecessary suffering" because this would just be defined by arbitrary criteria.

Let me say this back to you. In the past I thought you were saying that 2 + 2 and 4 refer to different things. But what you are saying in fact is that 2 + 2 and 4 don't refer to anything at all. Because they are properties, or attributes. 4 is a property of a string quartet, for example. There is no number 4 by itself as an object. So it's wrong to say that 4 refers to anything at all. — fishfry

Right, "2+2=4" has meaning without referring to anything, just like "green is a colour", and "the acceleration of gravity is 9.8 metres per second per second" have meaning without referring to anything. These are generalizations, abstract rules or laws, which have a broad application without referring to any particular thing. But even though they don't refer to any particular thing, they still have meaning.

Ok! I understand you. The law of identity x = x only applies to "true things," things that are deserving of thinghood; and not properties, which can apply to things, but are not themselves things. A green house is green, but green by itself is not a thing. Therefore green = green is meaningless. Is that your point? I wish you had said this earlier, and I suppose you'll say you did. But I understand you now. Green is not a thing and 4 is not a thing. 4 does not refer to anything at all. It's a property. 4 = 4 is therefore meaningless.

Do you assert that 4 = 4 is meaningless? Can you please explicitly confirm this and don't skip over it?

You assert that 4 = 4 is meaningless because 4 does not refer to a "true thing."

May I ask, who decides what is a true thing. But nevermind, I said I'd defer my objections to later. — fishfry

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. So when it is expressed using = then "=" signifies is the same as. So if the law of identity is expressed as "A=A", then A=A is supposed to signify that an object is the same as itself. I wouldn't say "4=4" is necessarily meaningless though, because "=" in mathematics signifies "has equal value to". Do you recognize the difference between "the same as" and "equivalent to"?

As for your question of who decides what a true thing is, that's what the law of identity is the criteria for. If it has its own identity as unique particular, it is a thing. Of course you do not have to agree with the law of identity, many philosophers have argued against it.

Can you point me to a discussion of the law of identity that explicitly confers thinghood on some symbols and not others? Do you call them symbols? There are "true things" and "false things," by what word do you call things in general? Entities perhaps? An entity can be a true thing or a property? What is your terminology? — fishfry

The law of identity is not about symbols, it is about things. That's why it is quite difficult to grasp, and also why many argue against it. The intuitive response to "identity" is to think of the name of the thing as the thing's identity. But this is not what the law says, it says that the identity of the thing is the thing itself. This creates a separation between the identity which we assign to the thing, (it's name, description, or whatever we say about it to identify it), and its true identity, which is itself.

You might say then, that to have "thinghood", is to have independent existence, separate from whatever we might say about the thing. This is to have an identity, to be something.

Yes I get that. So green = green is meaningless; and 4 = 4 is meaningless; and 2 + 2 = 4 is meaningless. Is this the proposition you're prepared to go forward defending? — fishfry

No, this is not what I am saying at all. What I say, is that "=", when used in mathematics, does not mean "the same as", as dictated by the law of identity. So these uses of "=" have meaning, but the meaning is not "the same as", as dictated by the law of identity.

You do know you're kind of out of step with pretty much everyone, right? Not that this is an argument against your idea. You could be right and everyone else wrong. But you do agree that virtually all philosophers and mathematicians believe in abstract numbers as "true things." — fishfry

I don't agree with this. Many philosophers argue against platonic realism. Saying that "4" refers to an object which is a number is nothing other than platonic realism.

Tell me, do you believe that "4 is an even number," or "4 represents an even number," have truth values? If so, what would you say the truth values are? — fishfry

No, philosophically I believe in a correspondence type of truth, so strictly speaking these statements are valid within a logical system, but it doesn't make sense to talk about truth here. I might in common speaking, say that such things are true, but I would be using "true" in a less rigorous way.

* 2 + 2 = 4 is meaningless because neither 2 + 2 nor 4 refers to anything. — fishfry

No, "=" as it is used in mathematics means to have the same value. It does not mean "the same as" as dictated by the law of identity. This has always been the heart of our disagreement. So "2+2=4" has meaning, it just does not mean that "2+2" refers to the same thing as "4", it means that they have equal value.

* 4 = 4 is meaningless because the law of identity only applies to "true things" and not to properties, and 4 is a property and not a "true thing."

* You would NOT agree that 4 represents an even number, because you don't think 4 represents anything at all.

* You do understand that you haven't got much if any agreement in the math or philosophy communities, yes?

* Who is the arbiter of "true thingness?"

Ok very interesting. I eagerly await your comments. — fishfry

These I think I've already addressed.

Can you tell me (I've asked this before) where you came up with these ideas? Are they written down somewhere? I've never heard it said that abstract numbers are not "true things" deserving of being equal to themselves. The Wiki page on the law of identity does not mention any distinction between "true things" and properties. — fishfry

I've studied philosophy for many years. Have you not heard of platonic realism, and that some philosophers are opposed to it?

In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order. — RussellA

I don't deny that there are rules in language, that's what formal logic is all about. The thing is that it's not an essential aspect of language, because communication with langue existed before there was such rules, and rules emerged from language use. It's that backward order, that some sort of rules are foundational which leaves us looking for things like hinge propositions.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

See, this is that backward idea, that there is some sort of logical form at the foundation of language or knowledge. In reality language came into existence and evolved according to human necessity. To have a logical form and therefore rules, is one need which was developed, but it's not the most basic need driving the evolution of language. So looking for some sort of logical form, as hinge propositions, at the base is a misguided endeavour.

That's why it's much more commonplace, and philosophically acceptable, to ground meaning with intention, rather than some imaginary hinge propositions. But since one's words are not always true to one's intentions, there are no statements which are free from the doubt of skepticism.

If language games were real, then in a religious language game "God exists" would be a hinge proposition. But it's ridiculous to say that it's unreasonable to doubt this, either inside or outside the religious circle, because it's something held on faith. And it's very reasonable to doubt one's faith. The idea of hinge propositions as something foundational which we do not doubt, completely distracts us from the reality that faith is the foundation, and we ought to doubt it as much as possible. It is only by doubting our faith that it is reaffirmed and strengthened, or exposed as misplaced.

However as I understand it, you are on record as saying that 2 +2 and 4 do not REFER to the same thing. And in this, you are wrong. You're wrong mathematically, and you're wrong according to Frege. — fishfry

Look at what you say above, "2+2" says something about 4. What is 4? It is a quantity, or a value, it is not a thing. Remember, my argument is only applied to a strict definition of "thing", in which a thing has an identity according to the law of identity.

If for example, you assume that green is a thing, you might say yellow and blue make green, so that you might argue that "yellow and blue" refer to the same thing as "green". But this is what I deny. "Yellow and blue", might as you say above, say something about green, but neither "yellow and blue" nor "green" refer to a thing. Green is a property, something we attribute to a thing. Likewise 4 is a property, something we attribute to a group of things.

The intent of the law of identity is to distinguish true things, which have a real identity, from concepts, platonic ideas, which have no true identity and are therefore not things. So it makes no sense to say that "4" refers to a thing, or "an object" in any sense, as 4 has no true identity. It has an infinite number of representations, 2+2, 3+1, etc., and none can be said to be the true representation. If we affirm that 4 is the true representation, then the others must refer to other true objects, represented by 1 and by 2 and by 3.

Is it possible for you to clarify your thinking here? Are you saying that 2 + 2 and 4 don't refer to the same thing, in which case you're wrong; or rather that 2 + 2 and 4 tell you different things about 4, in which case Frege would say you're right, and I myself am still on the fence. — fishfry

Yes, this is exactly what I am saying, 2+2 does not refer to the same thing as 4 because neither refers to a thing. They refer to properties, which are not things, by the law of identity. So, take my example, "blue and yellow" does not refer to the same thing as "green", because neither refers to a thing. Notice that there can be many green things in the world, just like there are many groups of 4. But through the application of the law of identity we see that "green" itself does not refer to a thing, otherwise all the distinct instances of green would be the very same thing in violation of that law. Likewise "4" does not refer to a thing.

But regardless, 2 + 2 and 4 do REFER to the same object, namely the number that we call 4. So if you are saying they refer differently, you're wrong about that. Can you please clarify your intent? — fishfry

To make up an imaginary object, a platonic idea, called a number, and say that this is the object referred to by "4" does not resolve the problem, as I've explained to you already. Then, "2" must also refer to such an imagunary object. So, when you write "2+2", you denote the object, the number two twice. By what principle do you say that this object, the number two, when denoted twice actually refers to the number four? That's completely nonsensical, to say that two instances of occurrence of this object which we call the number two, magically becomes the object called the number four. You must respect the object actually referred to by "2", just like if you say that the colours are this type of platonic object you must respect the colours actually referred to by "blue" and "yellow", and not falsely conclude that "green" is being referred to when someone says "blue and yellow".

Compare these two statements:

True, I do think that distinction should be made as well. However, when I say "obligatory", I don't mean, liable by state prosecution. It's more following one's own intuitions to alleviate acute suffering when one sees it- a drowning child, a person in danger, etc. — schopenhauer1

This I don't really understand because I can show you many cases where what people seek are any number of things and define those things as "good". — schopenhauer1

You describe "obligatory" as following one's own intuition. But then you do not understand "good" in the sense of what one wants. Aren't they essentially the same thing? When you follow your own intuition you are doing what you want to do.

So if I was to kidnap you and "force" you to follow a character-building life, that would be wrong. It overrides my good will to want to see what I think is best for you. Procreation is the same thing. The parents have a preference for the game of life, yet they presume that their preference should be enough justification to create more people who must follow this game of life (lest they die of immediate suicide or slow death of starvation/neglect). I call this de facto situation of having to play the game of life being "forced", because the only alternative is violent self-harm. — schopenhauer1

Sorry, I just don't see it. If a person wants to have children, and follows one's own intuition, into this endeavour, then the person is doing what one feels obliged to do, or what one believes is good. I don't see how you can characterize this as force. If what you are saying is that the coming into being of a person is not something chosen by that person, therefore the person is forced into being, then I have no problem with this. There are many things about this existence which are beyond our capacity to choose, and are forced upon us. That's just reality, and like birth, death is forced on us as well. But there are very many things which are forced on us in between, because our powers of freedom to choose are very limited.

Rather, what is a deeper ethic is not messing with other people unnecessarily, and preventing situations of unnecessary suffering if one can help it. — schopenhauer1

I have a real problem with this sort of negative ethics, (don't do this, and don't do that), because it requires all sorts of definitions and criteria. How can you even speak of these matters in terms of "unnecessarily", and "unnecessary suffering"? We are talking about acts of free choice here, so everything chosen is unnecessary. But then we can't avoid "messing with other people" because we exist in relationships, and we can't avoid suffering because of that great magnitude of force which is beyond one's very limited capacity of free choice.

Language game is a metaphor for having rules, and rules are needed in order to cope with the raging white-water confusion of the world. People literally need some kind of bedrock, some set of working assumptions, axioms, rules, hinge propositions, etc. — RussellA

The problem, is that if "game", and "having rules" is just speaking metaphorically, then there is not any rules, literally speaking. That's just a metaphor. But if we ignore that this is just a metaphor, and we infer that language literally consists of rules, then we start looking for things like "hinge propositions", which is really an incoherent concept because language is not a game consisting of rules.

Are you saying time is measure of motion or that it is a dynamic aspect of space? Aristotle said the first, Einstein the second — Gregory

Aristotle identified two senses of "time", the primary one as a measure, and the secondary as something which is measured. Einstein treats time as a measure, that's why whenever we speak of the passage of time (which would indicate "time" as what is measured) within the precepts of special and general relativity, it, meaning the passage of time, is always relative to the system of measurement, frame of reference. So time is a measure, and whenever we try to derive a real "passage of time" we come up with something different depending on the system of measurement.

I see no reason that actuality has to be centered and combined in one entity prior to the world since potentiality, the might of substance, time, and motion operate as a organic whole following the laws of relativity to produce a dynamic experience of time — Gregory

This makes no sense. How could there be an organic whole prior to the existence of life?

I've been saying that time, near infinite potentiality, and limited material actuality move by the laws of physics to produce life and the experience of phenomena. — Gregory

By the laws of physics, time does not move. It is a principle of measurement, and is therefore moved by the measurer. This is the great advancement of Einstein's relativity, the overruling of absolute time, as something which moves independently from a frame of reference. This provides the capacity for the measurer to move time in a way which facilitates measurement.

My problem in the realm of ethics here is that it is forced on autonomous adults. — schopenhauer1

I think you ought to distinguish ethics from law. Law is enforced, but law is not properly "ethics". Ethics is a code of principles for moral behaviour, and adhering to that code is a matter of choice. You might have people criticize you for being unethical, but so long as you break no laws in your unethical behaviour, ethics will not be forced on you. I believe it is fundamental to western ethics, that ethical behaviour is a matter of choice.

I think it more properly belongs under a larger axiology though because it has to do with "value". — schopenhauer1

I think you are moving in the wrong direction here, to make "value" the broader term than "moral". But that's my opinion, and this is a matter for debate. I place morality as the highest possible value, and all other values must fall in line behind this. This is the Platonic tradition of "the good". The modern trend however, is to place quantitative value (mathematics) as the highest value. Then morality is segregated as a distinct form of value which is fundamentally incommensurable with quantitative value. Now we are left with at least two distinct and in some ways incompatible and competing hierarchies of value.

While it might be something we might recommend, to others, the negative ethics of preventing suffering when one clearly sees it, seems more obligatory. Once one gets into the realm of unnecesasry "force" onto autonomous beings (adults with usual faculties let's say) we are treading on not just amoral (yet axiological grounds), but actually unethical grounds. — schopenhauer1

I agree, this is a fundamental problem with negative ethics, enforcement is required. As I see it, in the western world moral principles have evolved in a positive direction, away from the negative. The Old Testament has ten commandments, negative. The New Testament has one principle, love your neighbour, positive. I believe the transition to positive is a Platonic influence, identification of "the good" as the first principle. Guiding people towards the good, as a general principle discourages them from the bad, such that a listing and outlawing of every bad thing is not of foremost importance.

Thus, ethics proper (not just axiological pursuits of "the good") if it is based on what is obligatory, seem to be balancing preventing harm/suffering while balancing not unreasonably forcing others into one's own agenda. — schopenhauer1

The principle of "the good" is based in what is natural, not in some form of obligation. As living beings we have needs and wants, so we naturally seek what is apprehended as "good". Obligation is a result of relations with others, and we are required to adjust our perception of "good" accordingly.

Force being the key here. Thus for example, procreation is definitely a force because life itself is the agenda of the challenge/overcoming-challenge (you may spin it as a chance for character-building). That doesn't matter what you call it, it is a forced program that others have to follow. If that person doesn't feel this program was something they wanted, you have have now assumed an agenda that violated their own autonomous attitudes, feelings, experiences, etc. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what you mean by "force" here. Could you expound? I don't see how procreation is a force. But I would see two distinct types of force, an internal force which inclines one to act, which I would associate with "the good" as described above, and an external type of force, which if it isn't consistent with the internal force is a hinderance to action. The difficulty in moral philosophy is the effort required to create consistency between these two types of forces. Consistency facilitates good actions.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

This conclusion is clear evidence of how the metaphor of "language games" leads us astray if we take it seriously, as a literal description rather than a metaphor. The concept imposed as "language games" produces the need for hinge propositions as foundations for the games. But what is required from "hinge propositions" dictates that they are neither formalities (rules of a game) nor foundational content (subject matter). Upon analysis, the concept of "hinge propositions" turns out to be a logical impossibility, a fundamental incoherency produced from the assumption that "language games" provides a literal description, rather than a metaphor. In other words, Wittgenstein proposed language games as a metaphor, then took himself too seriously and had to look for hinge propositions as required to support the literal interpretation.

This little illustration helps us see that time is potentiality and exists only so far as motion is happening, — Gregory

Potentiality is a requirement for motion and is therefore prior to it. So is time a requirement for motion and is prior to it. How would you support your claim that potentiality only exists if motion is happening?

Things exist in between Aristotelian actuality and potentiality, and move by virtue of their material constitutions. — Gregory

In Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, the potentiality of a thing is its matter, and the actuality of a thing is its form.

Well, in my defence, I do find you verging on the incomprehensible. — Banno

Ten days ago it was more than just "verging on".

Meta does not see that he is writing nonsense. — Banno

Why pretend that you can understand what I'm saying? Is this what your form of anti-skepticism gives you, confidence that you know what another is saying when what the other is saying is incomprehensible to you?

A little more on this. I think the concept of 'hinge propositions' has a certain utility. As we use the sign 'hinge propositions,' its fuzzy public meaning will float and drift like a cloud. This semantic drift seems to be slow enough so that we can understand one another well enough to keep the conversation going. (Now we can say the same thing about 'semantic drift' and so on. We all depend on our ('blind') skill of navigating the rapids of language. ) — j0e

I think there is a problem with accepting a proposition or a premise on the basis of its utility, when it is known to be a falsity. This is what deception is made of, the utility of falsity.

Hinge propositions cannot be questioned within a language game - that's what they are. In order to doubt them we must change the way the game works - change the nature of the game itself. — Banno

The real solution is to recognize that language is not a sort of game at all, nor is it analogous to game playing. When we see that "game" when applied to language is just a metaphor, and not a description, then we can grasp the fact that there is no such thing as language games, and we do not need to step outside the language to doubt its terms.

Meta (in so far as he can be understood) apparently accepts a referential theory of meaning - the meaning of a word is the thing it names. After the Linguistic Turn, vey few philosophers would accept this. But that view has the result that Meta thinks a proposition can be compared to the world directly; that is, without considering how the proposition fits in to what we are doing with the words in which it occurs. So it is not the individual hinge proposition that can be doubted, but the entire game. Compare this to Quine's epistemology. So I think your critique of Meta hits the mark. — Banno

This is so far from what I've been expressing. Where did I say that a word refers to a thing? Just because I do not agree with you about the nature of meaning, doesn't mean that you can choose randomly, a theory of meaning which you do not agree with, and say that this is a theory I accept.

Preventing/reducing suffering seems to be the only ethical stance that avoids assuming others should deal with X thing, even if you yourself thinks it is valuable. It is much harder for people to eschew the idea of preventing suffering than it would be almost any other value (including the oft-praised "character-building" trope and "flourishing" when discussing virtue theories). — schopenhauer1

I don't think that this is a true claim. As Plato demonstrated pain and pleasure are categorical distinct. They are not simply the opposite of one another, such that pleasure is only derived by means of a delivery from pain. There are pleasures which do not have an opposing pain. Ethics may focus on bringing about such pleasures, and this would be completely distinct from preventing suffering.

So in a truly ethical (and not mixed with some other concern such as political decision-making), one must ask, "Is this going to reduce or prevent harm to someone without unreasonably assuming what is "best" for another person"? Procreation, for example fails this test, because it does the opposite of prevent harm, and at the same time, thinks what is best for someone else. — schopenhauer1

Preventing harm, whether it's to oneself or another ought not be the primary focus of ethics. The primary focus ought to be bringing about what is good. When we look at the future, we move toward what is designated as the "best" course of action, we do not make our decisions based on avoiding the worst. It is only when an extremely bad circumstance is imposing itself, that we must focus on avoiding it, but in most ordinary situations we are focused on bringing about the good. This is the same principle which Plato demonstrated, the good is not diametrically opposed to the bad. So avoiding the bad does not produce the good.

Why not doubt then this need for subjecting the system to doubt? — j0e

Sure, why not? But be careful not to categorize this doubt as a form of certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain as to yes or no. So to doubt whether or not the system ought to be subjected to doubt, is not to be certain in one way or the other.

This is the problem with the way that many here categorize doubt, as a form of certainty. Doubt is what prevents one from proceeding in action, whereas certainty is what induces action. So the doubters of skepticism, and there are many here in the forum, represent skepticism and doubt as the act of subjecting a belief, or beliefs, to doubt, thereby making the category mistake of representing doubt as an act supported by some form of certainty, rather than an unwillingness to act, supported by uncertainty. This is to incorrectly represent doubt by failing to see it as categorically distinct from certainty, thereby presenting it as the polar opposite within the same category. In reality certainty inclines us to act, while doubt inclines us to be unwilling to act, and they coexist as categorically distinct rather than being the extremes of the same category, and cancelling each other out as hot and cold would.

Instead the system is a big, baggy monster of ways that people do things, things that people 'know,' without having to think about it. — j0e

But then it is incorrect to call this a "system", that's the whole point. If we move away from the "system" representation, to the "big, baggy monster of ways that people do things" representation, then the idea of hinge propositions makes no sense at all, because there is no system for them to be supporting. If there are systems, then the systems themselves must be coherent, so to doubt any aspect of the system implies a doubt of the entire system, including any supposed hinge propositions. Either way, the notion of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is fundamentally incorrect. That's why Kuhnian paradigm shifts are a reality, the entire system along with its foundations must be dismissed.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? To what extra-systematic authority do you appeal? This 'system' is not intended as some philosopher's pet system but as something like a shared system of meanings and taken-for-granted quasi-facts. — j0e

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. This is like taking a deductive argument, and saying that the logic is valid, the conclusion is dubious, but the premises are beyond doubt. If the logic is valid, we cannot doubt the conclusion without doubting the premises.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? — j0e

I'm not really arguing that hinge propositions ought to be doubted. I am arguing that the concept of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is itself incoherent. So my point is not that hinge propositions ought to be doubted, but that there is no such thing as hinge propositions.

I say 'quasi-facts' because worldviews change. — j0e

If you allow that worldviews change, then how can you subscribe to hinge propositions which are beyond doubt?

IMO, all concepts are more or less disputed and more or less unclear. — j0e

So I assume that you do not believe in hinge propositions either.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality. — RussellA

Without any reference to "external reality" we can assume that one language game might have expressions, statements, or propositions which contradict those of another language game. Since this is the case, then we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. This is why it is unreasonable to designate beliefs which are seen as foundational to any particular language game as beyond doubt.

Zev Bechler, whom I quote briefly in my op, does indeed assume two kinds of potentiality.

The German philosopher Trendelenburg dealt with this topic:

"There is a problem, it seems, in ascribing such importance to Aristotle’s influence on Trendelenburg. For when he does comment on Aristotle’s explicit definition of motion, Trendelenburg explicitly rejects it. In Physics III,1 Aristotle had defined motion as “The actualization of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially.” (201a) Trendelenburg took issue with this definition in the Logische Untersuchungen on the grounds that the concepts of actuality and potentiality are less primitive than motion itself, and indeed need to be defined through it (I, 153). Potentiality made no sense, for example, unless it was understood as a direction toward something, and so as a motion." (Frederick C. Beiser - Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze) — spirit-salamander

This criticism by Trendelenburg is not altogether truthful of Aristotle's concept of "potential", because it does not pay attention to the second usage of the term which you mention above. Aristotle not only assigns "potential" to the possibility of motion, but also to the possibility of substantial being itself, through the concept of "matter". It is this sense of potential which is more primitive than motion, because motion implies something which is moving, an object, thing, or being, and we see that the potential for existence of that object necessarily precedes its actual existence. This necessity, that the potential for an object is prior to its actual existence, is produced as a principle by inductive reasoning.

The cosmological argument deals with this sense of potential, the potential for existence of a thing, as a being, or an object, and this potential is given the name of matter by Aristotle. The argument shows how it is necessary to assume a form of actuality which is prior in time to the potential for an object or being (matter), in an absolute sense. Since motion is a thing, object, or being, changing place, this form of actuality which is prior to the existence of such a thing, cannot be classed as a motion.

There is a also distinction between "energy" as "potential" and "kinetic" made by physics. With "potential energy" only the "rest energy" is meant in contrast to the "kinetic energy". However, both are essentially an "actual" energy. So the actual "potential" energy can also be actualized. — spirit-salamander

I think you characterize energy wrongly here. Since energy is defined as the capacity to do work, it is inherently a potential, the potential for work to be done. We might say that energy has taken the place of Aristotle's "matter" in modern physics, as the fundamental potential. "Energy" represents the potential for work to be done, whereas "matter" represents the potential for the existence of an object. You can see the similarity So it is somewhat misleading to say that both kinetic and potential energy are "actual" energy, because "energy" by definition is potential.

But you run into a viscious circle justifying why "strength of character" matters other than Aristotle said it. — schopenhauer1

It's not a circle, but there is the possibility of an infinite regress. Why is A good? For the sake of B. Why is B good? For the sake of C. Etc.. That's why Aristotle posited happiness as the ultimate end, to curtail that possibility of infinite regress.

In my discussion with Mr. Pearce, the question is whether agony and despair are ever good, in the sense of valuable. In my examples, we value these in some relations with others, as we inflict them onto others and it helps us to get what we want from them. Intentionally inflicting agony and despair is a pressure tactic. It was evident in President Trump's so-called great deal making ability.

But in a much more subtle way, these feelings are a natural part of our relations with others, (not intentionally inflicted on others, as my examples bring out the extremes), and they form a large part of what we call empathy. So for example, (another extreme), if a good buddy is suddenly killed accidently, one feels great agony and despair. This is part of the empathy we have, we feel another's pain. And when the other is the victim of circumstances beyond our control, there is an immense feeling of agony and despair.

The issue I see is that it appears to be the wrong approach, to rid ourselves of the internal cause of such painful emotions, rather than addressing the external conditions which are conducive to these feelings. The real wrong, bad, or evil in the world, is the external conditions which induce within us those painful feelings, it is not the feelings themselves. So moving to rid ourselves of those feelings is nothing more than addressing the symptoms rather than the illness itself. And if we could succeed in removing such emotions, it would just render us oblivious to the real evil in the world.

In other words, these goals proposed, provide us only with an illusion of a better life, because what is really necessary for that better life, more power over the external world (omnipotence), is not addressed. But this is an extremely difficult issue because it involves human relations.

But short of radical scepticism, the claim that agony and despair are disvaluable by their very nature is compelling. If you have any doubt, put your hand in a flame. — David Pearce

I don't agree with this. As much as you apprehend it as compelling, it is not the truth. The point I made is that agony and despair are often seen as valuable when they are inflicted upon others. The extreme case is torture, but the common practice is the more subtle application of agony and despair in the pressure tactics of negotiating. So you cannot remove the value from these so easily. And if you look closely, you'll see that agony and despair play an integral role in most all human relationships. Without these feelings we'd be emotionless robots.

Now I really think it is a bad idea to turn human beings into emotionless robots no matter how strong your own personal opinion on this issue is. Perhaps you might compromise, and look at some types of agony and despair as inherently bad, or some intense forms of these as inherently bad, but I hope you don't really think that you can throw a blanket over them all like this. That is what Chattering Monkey has been trying to tell you. Some forms of pain are necessary to build strength. And not only is exposure to certain types of pain necessary to build physical strength, exposure to different types of agony and despair are necessary to build strength of character.

You could look at Aristotle's ethics for an example. Virtue does not consist of negating the bad for the sake of its opposite, it is to be found in the mean between the two opposing extremes. That is what we call moderation. We really cannot approach ethics with the attitude that such and such feelings are bad, let's annihilate all these bad feelings and we'll be left only with good feelings. So you might instead propose a way to take the edge off our feelings, eliminate the extremes. And I think the medical profession already works toward this end with medications. But even this is not completely accepted in our society because it dulls the emotions.

I don't know if you will find it better, but there are alternatives. Every object has potential to be painted, burned, thrown in the air, and lots of other things. But it is actual. All objects are like this and have always been this way. — Gregory

Here, you are assuming the existence of objects. The point of the cosmological argument though, is that every object comes into existence, and before it can actually exist there must be the potential for it. But that potential need not be actualized. This is why objects are said to be contingent. Since objects are contingent, each one's existence requires the appropriate cause, or causes, necessary for its existence. Therefore it is wrong to take the actual existence of objects for granted, as you do here.

Your idea of seinsfrage ("what is being") in terms of potency and actuality, to use the terminology of Heidegger, leads to a very strange notion of zeitlichkeit (the here and now as "this very presence"). "The sense of the world must lie outside the world" says Wittgenstein. If you don't want to read a Hegel book from to cover and really try to understand it (which is the best way to get past Thomism), then maybe try Being and Nothingness by Sartre, who tries in a very subtle way to cure Aristotle's horror of nothing — Gregory

Sorry to disappoint you, but I've read a lot of Hegel's material, and also a good portion of Being and Nothingness. And I really cannot even see how you might relate any of these to Thomism. They are worlds apart, and you don't seem to know what you are talking about. "Aristotle's horror of nothing"?

Did I ever say, or imply that my reasoning is infallible? If you can show me a way to understand the concepts of potential and actual which you think is better than the one I've derived from the Aristotelian tradition, then I'd be happy to discuss it with you. But all you seem to do is make oddball off the wall, or incoherent, assertions.

I will not accept the proposition that a distinction between potential and actual is not required, because the nature of time, and the evident division between future and past necessitates such a distinction as a first step toward understanding reality.

What if the system is not perfect? — j0e

Perfection is a requirement of logic, that is how logic works. Following the rules to the degree of perfection is necessary. If you propose a part of a logical system which does not follow the rules of that system, we must exclude it as not being part of the system. Otherwise logic loses its effectiveness because invalidities are acceptable.

It seems to me that you are thinking of some philosophical system when the issue is rather what 'reasonable' people take for granted, some of which the 'reasonable' people of the future will find absurd or cruel. — j0e

I think reasonable people will see the need to have logic rule over any system of beliefs. If you are proposing that beliefs ought to be ruled by a system which is not a logical system, it is rather an imperfect system, then you rob yourself of the capacity to exclude doubt. The exclusion of doubt requires perfection in the logical system.

This is the point I made, which Banno scoffed at. Allowing that a system of beliefs may be imperfect means that the entire system needs to be subjected to doubt. This is proof that the idea of hinge propositions, which it is unreasonable to doubt, is fundamentally flawed.

If we make an analytical separation between the rules of the system (formal aspect), and the subject matter, and adhere to perfection in the rules, as the means to exclude doubt, then the subject matter, content becomes the source of mistake. Since the subject matter comes from outside the system and therefore has not been subjected to the rules of the system, doubting of the subject matter is a requirement, if certainty is the goal. The proposed hinge propositions are subject matter, content, and therefore need to be doubted, just like any other portion of the subject matter.

209. The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me.

...

211. Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. — OC

Wittgenstein misuses the word "form" here. Such ideas like "the existence of the earth" do not form starting points, nor do they give our way of looking at things, a form. Form is principles of formulae, definition, logical rules, etc.. The "existence of the earth" is not such a principle, because "existence" is a complicated and very much disputed concept. That the earth must in some way "exist" comes about as a conclusion, as a requirement when we seek to justify other beliefs. And the way that we seek to justify these beliefs shapes the concept of "existence". That's why "existence" is a disputed and unclear concept. The basic beliefs roll around in people's heads, and off their tongues and pens, for many years as a the subject matter of thinking, with an inherent rule or form (such a bud belongs to a specific type of tree for example), without asking to be justified by "the existence of the earth".

But when we seek to extend the rules, the formal structures, uniting them such that all of our beliefs must maintain coherency within a single system, each itself justified by others, then we approach the need to conclude "the existence of the earth". But this idea, "the existence of the earth", does not give our way of looking at things their form, it is a conclusion derived from our way of looking at things, deemed as necessary to give that way of looking at things a place within a larger unity. The larger unity is an attempt at completion, logical perfection within the distinct belief systems. So it is derived from the form of our way of looking at things, it does not give our way of looking at things its form.

You're say in response to the question "how many parts does a tree have": "our minds are fallible"

You're response to the question of whether a lamp or a street sign have one form or many: "our minds are fallible"

Yet you think you have fully figured out that there is deity based on two petty ideas? — Gregory

What?