language is not a game consisting of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where? — Banno
In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order. — RussellA
IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA
Where? — Banno
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein argues that I should know even without clues external to the text, such as tone of voice or expression of face (para 21 of Philosophical Investigations) — RussellA
If language games were real — Metaphysician Undercover
As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language. — RussellA
I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether. — RussellA
If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts. — RussellA
Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them. — RussellA
If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.
The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer. — RussellA
Summary
IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language. — RussellA
We can more or less circumscribe certain activities in order to understand what is happening; that is, we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole. We can look at the sorts of utterances that might occur during some activity. Importantly, such activities do not consist only of language, but involve interaction with stuff in the world. Such examples of language use might be found by observation, or set up by fiat. — Banno
These examples allow us to look at and understand something about the rules that are being use.
Wittgenstein called such examples "language games" with an eye towards three aspects: They involve not just language, but interaction with the things around us; they involve behaviour that can be set out in terms of rules; they are related to each other in ways he spoke of as a family resemblance.
Hence to claim that language games are not real is to misunderstand what they are. — Banno
"language games" — Banno
language games — Metaphysician Undercover
It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". — RussellA
IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples. — RussellA
If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion. — RussellA
IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer. — RussellA
Sure, the rules of language are stated post hoc.
In order for a rule to be made explicit, it must first be. That is, they cannot be explicated unless there is something to be explicated. Hence, there are rules for language use.
The rules of language are not binding in the way the rules of physics are; they are normative. — Banno
To be a self, according to Hegel, involves self-consciousness. And this is not something that an individual can possess independently of others. Instead, self-consciousness depends on our having a sense of ourselves as individuals as distinct from others, which in turn depends on our interacting with other people (i.e., recognizing other people and being recognized by them)
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Hegel’s universal spirit is sometimes used as an example of “ontological holism”—i.e., the claim that social entities are fundamental, independent, or autonomous entities, as opposed to being derived from individuals or non-social entities (Taylor 1975, Rosen 1984).
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As an alternative to ‘compact’ or ‘agreement,’ the legal theorist Samuel Pufendorf, in De Officio Hominis et Civis of 1673, uses the term ‘convention’ as the basis for law and language. He argues that conventions do not need be explicitly formed or agreed to. Instead, we can have tacit conventions—i.e., conventions that we may not even be aware we have. — Blue Book thread
The 'rules' are just structures in the way we talk. Before we develop a complex tradition of studying the ways we talk (like trying to clarify what 'truth' means) we have already been using words like 'truth' successfully enough in ordinary contexts. This is the post hoc.
You mention 'imaginary things' which takes for granted what might be called a vague ontology. You also use the word 'exist.' It's not as if these words have clear, uncontested referents. Nor does 'referent' have some clear, uncontested referent. We simply charge ahead, shooting our ambiguous mouths off, taking a certain intelligibility utterly for granted. We can focus a critical 'eye' on some words only by using other words uncritically. This is why it's a matter of making explicit what's mostly automatic and unnoticed (inexplicit). — j0e
How are you supposed to know what to do without being told what to do? — Metaphysician Undercover
To me, it seems ridiculous to conclude that any time a group of things are behaving in a similar way they are following a normative rule. Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
Social norms, or mores, are the unwritten rules of behavior that are considered acceptable in a group or society. Norms function to provide order and predictability in society.
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https://examples.yourdictionary.com/social-norm-examples.html
— link
https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/11/chimps-have-different-cultural-norms-about-friendliness-too/A paper in PNAS this week explored differences in social behavior between four different populations of chimpanzees, finding that the groups had very different norms when it came to hanging out together and grooming one another. They point out that this means studying one population of chimps might not always be enough for accurate claims about the species as a whole. — link
Unless the rule is explicitly stated and the agent reads and understands it, then there is insufficient evidence to say that consistent behaviour is proof of normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
Such a conclusion leads one to believe that molecules, atoms, and fundamental particles are following normative rules, and panpsychism in general. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you see a swarm of insects, or a flock of birds headed south, would you say that these creatures are following normative rules? Herd mentality ought not be described as following normative rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you simply observe others doing something, and decide to behave in a similar way because it appears to be advantageous, this ought not be described as a normative rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
wholes and parts — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm confident that you mostly learned language just by hanging around. Pronouncing words correctly is not even explicitly taught. — j0e
. When children misbehave they are corrected by parents and peers. — j0e
It would (slightly) violate the norms of intelligibility to use 'norms' for fundamental particulars. — j0e
On the contrary, 'herd mentality' is a good phrase for the kind of linguistic norms I have in mind, if one ignores its connotation. — j0e
If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated. — RussellA
If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.
If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".
However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.
As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts
IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind. — RussellA
We learn how to talk simply by hanging around, not by learning rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
es, and this makes good evidence that these norms do not exist as any sort of rules — Metaphysician Undercover
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