I'm just a little unclear on how the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A. That is, how does "often act[ing] in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules" not fulfil the stated requirement of "act[ing] within the confines of [a] rule"? — Luke

Obviously, going outside the boundaries contradicts staying within the boundaries, therefore going outside the boundaries does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries.

Do we assume that conventions and unspoken rules are rules and, therefore, that people not following conventions and unspoken rules are not following rules? — Luke

No, we conclude that so-called "unspoken rules" are really not instances of rules being followed.

If the second premise were instead that "People often act in ways within conventions and unspoken rules", would the conclusion then be that the act of following a convention is the act of following a rule? — Luke

No, because acting sometimes within the bounds of a rule, and sometimes outside the bounds, does not constitute (fulfill the requirements of) following the rule, as defined by the first premise.

How many times do I have to repeat the same thing Luke? A is an action, the action of following a rule. The first premise defines this action. It does not define "rule". The argument concerns actions, what type of actions qualify as "following a rule". That is what we were discussing. I may not have stated the conclusion clearly when I first posted the argument, but I clarified later, the conclusion is that the actions referred to as customs, traditions, conventions, unspoken rules, do not qualify as rule following actions.

The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe it is possible that when a man says “We’re going walk down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators, and congressmen and women”, he means this and not mean insurrection? — NOS4A2

I believe it is possible for a man to mean that, as you are suggesting. But what is possible for "a man" to mean with those words is not the question here. The question is what that man meant in that particular context.

So when we put Mr. Trump's speech in context we can see very clearly that it isn't possible that he meant what you are suggesting he may have meant. It isn't possible, because that man had been speaking for months to those very same people, about a very obvious landslide election win he, and they had, which had been stolen from them, through fraud. And now he says they have to fight like hell to get their country back.

See, he was in a fight for two months to battle the publicized outcome of the election, and he intentionally brought those supporters into that battle with him. How can you possibly believe that he meant anything other than insurrection? He didn't tell them to show up at the court houses to help with the legal fight. Yet he was fighting against the outcome of the election, and getting his supporters to join the battle with him. What other option could he have been thinking of, when he was inviting those people to join his battle against the thieves who stole the election, other than insurrection?

When one is proving that B is not an A, then what is required to be an A is stated (definition), and the description of B is stated. If the description of B does not fulfil the stated requirement for being an A, then the conclusion follows that B is not an A. It does not matter that B is a completely unrelated thing, it might be a theatre, or a broken heart, or anything, so long as it does not fulfill the condition required to be an A, then the conclusion follows, that it is not an A.

If "animal" is a stated defining feature of "human", then anything mentioned which does not fulfill that condition of "animal" can be ruled out as not being human. It doesn't matter what is mentioned, it could be a plant, a rock, a car, so long as the mentioned thing is not described as an animal, we can conclude that it is not human.

But can you incite someone to commit a crime while explicitly telling them to do the opposite? That’s the magical power Trump has. — NOS4A2

That magical power is called contradiction. It's not hard to tell someone to do one thing one minute, and the opposite thing the next minute. Choose to hear what you want to hear.

I think you'd have a better chance arguing that inciting is not a crime.

Come on NOS, I can incite someone to commit a crime, and if the police arrest, and therefore prevent that person from carrying out the crime, it doesn't mean that I am any less guilty.

What I don't see from your argument is how P2 concerns the act of rule-following. — Luke

What is described in P2, conventions and unspoken rules, do not concern the act of rule-following, that's whole the point of the argument. to show that you were wrong in assuming that they did. I'm glad you now understand that this type of activity does not concern rule-following

So, let's forget about that argument, and move on to your definition of "rule" now. Do you agree with the following from my last post:

OK, now let's follow your definition.

Do you see that a custom, or tradition, is not a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of action, because such things as customs and traditions have no capacity to govern our conduct?

And so the OED has a distinction between def #1, which is consistent with your definition, and def #2,: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things". Do you agree that a prevailing custom is not a "rule" by your definition because it has no capacity for governance? It is a "rule" by def #2, but we ought not equivocate. And do you acknowledge that our ways of talking, our ways of using words, in ordinary language use, are customs, rather than rules by your definition (which require regulations or principles governing conduct)? — Metaphysician Undercover

The only evidence needed is Trump's speech on January 6th. Specifically, what part of it was inciting violence? — Harry Hindu

That's not true at all. All of Trump's actions following the election, especially his incessant claims that the election was "stolen", ought to be considered as evidence. The event of January 6th was planned long in advance, so it is not just a matter of looking at what happened on that particular date.

If the election wasn't really stolen from him, then the inciting of his followers to protest, is a matter of fraudulent behaviour. And wherever there is fraud there is the intent of wrongful gain. Therefore we need to ask what did Trump intend to gain by inciting his followers to protest at that particular place, on that particular date.

but the dynamics of wavicles are real, as amorphous field contours, and so are of course valid as fodder for empiricism. — Enrique

Are you sure that these "amorphous field contours" are not just theoretical? What physicists know as a "field" is just a map of something they don't really understand. Any "amorphous field contours" are part of the map, which is a map of probabilities, so they are only as real as a probability is real.

The only possible connection between P1 and P2 that I can see are the words "act" and "outside of". — Luke

Right, the argument concerns a type of action, what we were calling "rule-following". That's why P1 and P2 have "act" in common. I believe you've graduated from kindergarten to grade one, in your effort to understand the argument, but I don't think you'll ever obtain a full understanding in my lifetime. In fact, I think that if you don't understand by now you never will, because you seem to be unwilling to make the effort, and I can't see that changing at all.

Certainly. A rule is one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity. — Luke

OK, now let's follow your definition.

Do you see that a custom, or tradition, is not a regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of action, because such things as customs and traditions have no capacity to govern our conduct?

And so the OED has a distinction between def #1, which is consistent with your definition, and def #2,: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things". Do you agree that a prevailing custom is not a "rule" by your definition because it has no capacity for governance? It is a "rule" by def #2, but we ought not equivocate. And do you acknowledge that our ways of talking, our ways of using words, in ordinary language use, are customs, rather than rules by your definition (which require regulations or principles governing conduct)?

The conclusion does not follow, since P2 has no relation to P1. The conclusion is not inferred from the argument; it's an assumption or definition that is required by the premises at the outset. — Luke

P2 is related to P1 through the concept of what it means to follow a rule. That's what the argument is about, what we were discussing, the concept of what it means to follow a rule, and whether traditional, customary, or conventional activities qualify as activities of following a rule. That's what the argument is about, the activity called following a rule.

P! is intended as a definition of "to follow a rule". P2 is intended to state that activities related to conventions ( call them conventional activities) are often outside that definition. The conclusion is supposed to state that we cannot claim the conventional activities to be rule following activities. That's what was meant by the argument, perhaps I didn't state the conclusion clearly, but now that you've addressed the argument appropriately, I'll make it clearer for you.

The argument is not meant to prove anything about the nature of "a rule", because this would be begging the question. That there are distinct referents for "rule" is taken for granted. It is premised that there is "rule" as in def #1, and "rule" as in def #2, and that the two are different. The argument is meant to show that the activities described, or referred to by "rules", def#2, what you call unspoken rules, or conventions, do not qualify as activities called "following a rule", as dictated by def#1.

See my quote at the top of this post and my stipulation that I agree to your distinction between explicit and non-explicit, but that the OED definitions do not ditinguish between def#1 and def#2 along the same lines. — Luke

As I explained already, a few times, the difference is def#1: a principle of conformity, def #2: a custom or tradition. What I want from you is to accept that a custom or tradition def#2, is not a principle of conformity, i.e. not a rule being followed, nor a rule to be followed.

I'm arguing (or just reading the dictionary) that rules can either be explicitly stated or not. — Luke

Just so that we have clarity, can you define "rules" for me? Are we talking about rules which people follow, def#1, a principle of conformity, or are we talking about "rules" in some other sense? After we have a clear definition of what a "rule" is, which we both agree on, then we can proceed to determine whether rules must be stated or not.

I think that all interactions between physical objects are carried out by means of fields. This is revealed trough the concept of potential energy. Physical objects do not directly interact with each other, because the kinetic energy which is attributable to one, is related to the other as potential energy, and the two 'energies' are not the same, but equivalent. The difference between the kinetic energy of one object and the kinetic energy of the other object, in the same respect, is represented as field which shows the potential energy. So there is no particle or "wavicle" which moves from one object to another, only interactions between the fields, and the resulting change to the objects which are interacting with each other. We can say that the change to one object is equivalent to the change in the other object, when they interact, but there is really nothing which moves from one to the other, only an interaction of fields.

But science does account for subjectivity - admittedly, as an obstacle to understanding to be accounted for and subtracted from the objective, but there's observer bias, the Hawthorne effect, the placebo effect - all sorts of ways in which subjectivity is accounted for in science. — counterpunch

The problem with this idea, that subjectivity is accounted for by subtracting from, is that to be able to subtract the appropriate thing, we need to be able to accurately determine what subjectivity has added. Since what ought to be subtracted must be determined by some sort of process, and that process might itself be somewhat subjective, then the wrong thing might be subtracted. If the wrong thing is subtracted, then the proposed accounting for, is actually making the subjectivity worse, by subtracting the wrong thing.

This means that we need a good method to determine, in each application of the scientific method, what is being added in that particular instance, by subjectivity. If we use a scientific method to make that determination then there is subjectivity within that method, and it is very likely that we are actually adding to the subjectivity, rather than properly subtracting it.

Now that I think of it gravity is proven to affect space, classicaly depicted with massive objects producing dips and dimples in the fabric of space and it's also scientifically proven that mass can cause time dilation and it seems plausible that time dilations can be explicated as mass bending/curving time but that's only a hunch. — TheMadFool

Gravity affects spacetime not ""space". When you are talking about things like this within that conceptual framework, it is not appropriate to speak of space and time separately. That is because there is no real method to separate what time is doing, from what space is doing.

What do you mean it "changes what the argument is about"? Let's remind ourselves of the original purpose of your argument: — Luke

When you change the subject, you change what the argument is about. Don't you think?

I thought we were making progress when you said that you'd respect a difference between OED def #1, and OED def #2.

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke

However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you.

Did you need to go to all the effort of a deductive argument simply to draw a distinction between explicit- and non-explicit rules? — Luke

Yes, I did need to go to that extent, because you continually refused to look at the difference between those two, assuming that customs and traditions (def#2) are "principles" of conformity (def#1).. Now I thought you had finally agreed to accept that difference, such that we could analyze these two as distinct, but then you went right back to acting as if there is no difference between the two. Within a logical procedure, acting as if there is no difference is called equivocation.

Conventions, as you use the term, are not explicitly stated rules. So doing that switch, changes what the argument is about, while maintaining the structure. You might switch "books" in there, or whatever you want. The switch makes it so that we're talking about something different.

So do you agree with the conclusion that “Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed” or were you only humouring me? In your last post you said “I have no problem with that conclusion” and went on to detail why you had no problem with it. — Luke

Yes I agree with that conclusion, for the reasons stated already.

I didn’t change the structure of your argument in any way. The same argument applies equally to both #1 and #2. — Luke

Many deductive arguments have the same structure. You changed the content, so that what you presented was not even similar to my argument.

You accused me of equivocation earlier because you thought your argument applied only to conventions and not to explicitly stated rules. It seems you've changed your mind. — Luke

That's not my argument, it's yours. You took mine, changed it to suit your purpose, and asked if I was OK with the conclusion. I'm ok with it, because I told you I would go along with your substitution just to humour you. But I haven't changed my mind.

In all cases? Or are you just going to continue to ignore this question? You did not even engage the problem I pointed out with your argument: that you make a conclusion about all cases from a premise about some cases. — Luke

I don't make a conclusion about all cases, I make a conclusion which contradicts a general statement which is intended to apply to all cases. So there's no such problem, as I explained, some cases contrary to a general descriptive statement concerning all cases, is all that's required to disprove it. "Grass is green" is disproven by some cases of grass that is not green. "Human beings follow rules" is disproven by instances of human beings not following rules.

My argument is just an example of how we utilize deduction to disprove faulty inductive reasoning.
You've been looking for excuses to reject the deduction, in order to cling to your faulty inductive conclusion, that human beings can be described as rule followers.

Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language? — Luke

We discussed this already, the difference between the prescriptive and descriptive sense of "following rules". We are now discussing whether human beings can be described as rule followers. This is the result of the changes you made to my argument, the difference caused by switching my use of "rule", (def#1), for yours, (def#2). Your obtuseness never ceases to amaze me Luke.

Kant said time can only be represented by a single line. He might be wrong. — Gregory

Not even a line can represent time. It's non-dimensional, simply order.

This is a defeated, humiliated... — ssu

Not until he's in jail.

I didn’t think so, which is why I posted this quote. You’re interpreting QM with a linear concept of time as a given, but it’s possible (and arguably more accurate) to interpret QM without time: from the perspective of the world consisting of events (rather than objects) that change in relation to each other. Because the idea that we can “keep the conception of time separate from the conception of space” is an attempt to cling to the continuity of ‘time’ despite General Relativity. — Possibility

As pointed out by the op, "events" implies time. (1. Change implies time). So interpreting QM from the perspective of "events" does not remove time from the interpretation. This interpretation simply fails in its analytical extent, because it does not separate an activity (which is a description of what things do) from the thing which is engaged in the proposed activity. A proper analysis recognizes that an event cannot be fundamental because of this conflation of the description with the thing being described. The description (activity), is a product of human understanding and cannot be fundamental. That's why I said we need a proper separation between the features of space and time, regardless of what general relativity gives us.

The passage of time is like the fire of Heraclitus. For him, ordering the fire was the Logos of opposites, kinda a dialectical yin and yang thing. — Gregory

i think this is backward. The passing of time is what orders the opposites, not vise versa. The fundamental opposites are past and future, and without the passing of time there is no such order.

I have not altered your original argument in any way, other than by replacing "conventions and unspoken rules" with "explicitly stated rules". Do you not find this conclusion to be problematic? — Luke

No, I have no problem with that conclusion, and I've already explained more than once why. Rules are broken, even explicitly stated rules. That's the nature of free willing beings. So if we are given the option for a general description of human activity as either rules are followed, or rules are not followed, we must conclude rules are not followed. That's the simple fact which observation gives us. And this is the difference we can observe between human beings and inanimate matter, we do not necessarily follow rules, as does inanimate matter.

Learning a rule is not a "theory", and neither is language. Language is a practice. Games, sports and other explicitly-stated-rule-bound activities are simply codified practices. You can refer to the rules if you are in doubt, but if you know how to a play a game or sport, you usually don't need to. Even if you don't know how to play, you can join in the practice until you break a rule, and then others can make you aware of it, and you learn it. — Luke

I don't see how a rule is anything other than theory. So if language is practice, and if this practice involves the application of theory, then we have a divide to cross. How does theory get into the practice? If we say that practice always involves the application of theory (rules in this case), then we have either infinite regress, or Platonism in which theory precedes practice in an absolute sense. To avoid this problem we need to assume a practice which is not an application of theory. This is where we first engaged on this thread and we have not progressed at all.

But I will point out one thing with your comment: in declaring this a contradiction, you seem to be equating ‘duration’ with ‘change’. — Possibility

No I don't equate duration with change, that's why I suggested a short duration of time when no physical change occurs.

The issue is to separate spatial existence from temporal existence. I believe it is the features of spatial existence which lead to the assumption of discontinuity, quantum jumps. But if we keep the conception of time separate from the conception of space, we can maintain a continuous time, while spatial existence jumps. This would mean that spatial existence is static for that extremely short period of time, then it jumps to a new frame for an extremely short period of time, jumps again, and so on.

What I said is contradictory is the notion that time is discontinuous, along with the notion of a "ceaseless process of change'. "Discontinuous" implies a stopping and starting, which is contradicted by "ceaseless".

He is the only thing with force in the universe. — Gregory

Mr. Sole Principle is the passing of time, it is responsible for all the force in the universe.

Now the idea in this section of the PI is that you have a cube, a number of things of which can be pointed out with the word's options ("uses" or "senses" Witt calls them), one of which is the fact that it is a prism, similar in that way to a triangular prism. The point being it is not whatever you have in mind that provides the meaning, but the public concept (of prisms and cubes). You are expressing one of those "uses" (not "using words") rather than there being something like a mental picture that gives the word a "meaning". — Antony Nickles

I don't think you have this quite right Antony. What Witt is showing is that the particular application gives the word "a meaning", just as much as the mental picture, which is attributed to what you call "the public concept", gives the word "a meaning". The mental picture is produced from what the person has learned, it is what you call the public concept. But a judgement has to be made as to whether this picture "fits" the particular application. That's why he concludes 140 with the possibility of a difference between these two. "Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not."

Notice that neither one, nor the other, is "the meaning". Each is a different meaning. So we cannot, at this point, assign "the meaning" to either one of them. Then at 141, the particular application (method of projection) is shown to be more important than the picture which comes to one's mind from the mention of the word (the public concept). And, because there can be an inconsistency between these two he distinguishes between a "normal" application and an "abnormal" application, at the end of 141. So we might say that in the abnormal application the word has a meaning (by method of projection) which is not consistent with the public concept.

Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can,
inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, because people
in general apply this picture like this.
I want to say: we have here a normal case, and abnormal cases.

If we could measure the duration of an interval with the most precise clock imaginable, we should find that the time measured takes only certain discrete, special values. It is not possible to think of duration as continuous. We must think of it as discontinuous: not as something which flows uniformly but as something which in a certain sense jumps, kangaroo-like, from one value to another. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

I see this as a baseless assertion. Since we have no indication of exactly what time is, there is no reason to considered it to be discontinuous rather than continuous. And if we conceive it as continuous, despite the fact that Rovelli says this is not possible (it is possible because we have no indication of what time is, therefore there are no such restrictions on how we conceive it), then there is no such "jumps" as described.

But this does not alter the fact that the world is in a ceaseless process of change. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

See, Rovelli even contradicts himself now, talking about "a ceaseless process of change", which would be continuous, rather than what he says above "discontinuous".

Also a lot of players are just playing to have fun or pass time, not necessarily to win money. — BitconnectCarlos

I agree with this, and I think it's somewhat related to that emotionally euphoria I referred to. That is an emotional volatility, like a mania in an extreme case. The emotions must be stabilized in one way or another, to make a good player. So if the person is not playing for money, this would be beneficial toward stabilizing the emotions. Therefore if you're not playing for money, you'd be a more stable player. They say that the well fed cat makes a better hunter than the hungry one.

I would think that the best poker players are not playing for money, they're playing to be the best they can. This would really be not much different from any athlete playing any sport. The athletes are not playing for the money, they're working on being the best they can. The millions of dollars just comes naturally if they do well at it. But if they went into the gym with the goal of making lots of money, they most likely wouldn't have what it takes to become a good athlete, and so they wouldn't make it.

This I would question. Traders can make money either way. Insane amounts of money are made when markets are doing well. — BitconnectCarlos

I agree that traders make money either way, but this is why I think more money is made for them on the down swing. The first premise is that the money is actually received from the sale. The second is that the trader will most likely continue in the occupation of trading, so there will always be the need for a purchase after a sale. So if the market is in a generalized upswing, the purchase after the sale will likely be higher relative to the sale price, then if the market is in a generalized downswing, thus more money is actually pocketed in the downswing. On top of that there is the issue of numerous people buying on margins which I mentioned earlier in the thread. I believe that margin calls make the downturns a little more predictable than the upswings, another reason that more money can be made from the downswing.

Right! :ok: but imagine an infinitely durable material is, there's no logical contradiction, is there? — TheMadFool

As a logical demonstration, it may be acceptable, but then you need to show how what is logically possible has any bearing on physical reality. So you go on to discuss the perspective that this unchangeable thing has of physical reality. But this is a false perspective to begin with, because the unchangeable thing is really impossible, so your discussion cannot really get of the ground. And that it ends in a "contradiction" is really irrelevant, because this is what would be expected when you start with an impossibility.

For there are cases when no change occurs but time still passes by. — TheMadFool

To avoid that problem, of assuming an impossible situation (the unchangeable thing) as your example case of "when no change occurs but time still passes", I prefer to look toward an extremely short period of time, around a Planck length of time. Since we can keep on dividing time into shorter periods, yet we have a length of duration of time which is necessary for a physical change to occur, we can conclude that in the shorter period of time no change occurs. Therefore we have a very short period of time during which no change occurs.

Fallacy of ambiguity, hasty generalisation. — Luke

There's no hasty generalization, you're just refusing to accept the premises which are true and widely supported by the evidence we see all around us.

Judging by the history of this discussion, you started out arguing for the former, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. but you've recently switched to the latter, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are rules but they're not followed. — Luke

Bull shit Luke. I switched only at your insistence, that I make the substitution, and look at the argument from the perspective which the substitution provided.

Simply substitute the word "rules" for "conventions" in the above. — Luke

But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Making that substitution results in the conclusion that rules are not followed. The thing is, that when we make a generalization to describe a certain type of thing, it must apply to all of the things in that class, or else it is a faulty generalization. "Swans are white" means that all swans are white, and if we find something which appears to be a swan, and is black, we need to either exclude it from the class, or reject the generalization as false. In this case, we started way back, with the generalization: "human beings follow rules". You want to make "convention" equivalent to "rule", when the evidence is clear that many conventions are not being followed by many people. That leaves us with the choice of either rejecting the generalization "human beings follow rules, or taking conventions outside the class of "rules". I argue for the latter, conventions are not necessarily rules. But you insisted on the equivalence, which leads to the necessity of rejecting the generalization.

So what'll it be? Are you going to stick with your new game plan where you strongly imply that rules are not followed in all cases, or are you going to return to your old strategy where you argue that conventions are not "true" rules? Make up your mind, dude. — Luke

Obviously, the choice is yours. Are you going to stick with your insistence that conventions are rules, in which case we must conclude that human beings do not follow the rules, or are you going to come over to my side, and allow that conventions are fundamentally not rules, thereby allowing that rules are a special sort of convention which human beings use conscious effort to follow.

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke

OK, so here is the difference between def #1 and def #2. In def#1 there is a "principle" to which an action conforms. In def #2 there is simply a custom, or tradition, and no talk of any "principle" or conformity. So, if there are "non-explicit rules", customs, or traditions (def#2), these do not exist as principles of conformity, because this would be to equivocate with def #1. However, we might observe such a "non-explicit rule" and state it explicitly, the statement intended to express a principle of conformity. If you are ready to accept the distinction between def #1, and def #2, can you also adhere to the standard of non-equivocation, and accept that to be a "rule" under def #2 is not sufficient to be a "rule" under def #1? This is because there is no necessary principle of conformity in def #2, which is the defining feature of def #1. And when we talk about following a rule, we are using def #1, referring to a principle of conformity.

Now here's the difficult part. Do you recognize that a principle of conformity, def #1, must have some type of existence somewhere, somehow, or else the principle could never be found, identified, or interpreted, and no judgement of conformity could ever be made. We can see that such a principle only exists as a statement in language. This is why I interpret def #1 as explicit rules, and def #2 as non-explicit, and only explicit rules, def #1, are rules which are followed, principles of conformity.

If a rule is followed once, then we can say that it is being followed. — Luke

Not if we're following Wittgenstein's principles, he's very explicit that to act according to a rule once does not constitute following a rule.

It is not consistent with the OED. The OED def #1 you quoted earlier - "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform" - does not exclude unspoken rules. — Luke

Yes it does exclude unspoken rules, because it is only through language that we refer to a "principle". Without the act of speaking there is no principle being referred to, therefore no rule in the sense of def #1. This is how Wittgenstein refutes Platonism. The Platonist will insist that the principle, Idea, or Form, exists independently of the words which refer to it, in some eternal realm inaccessible to our senses. But Wittgenstein shows that the "principle" is what is created by word use, and therefore does not exist separate from it, nor prior to it.

Just a note here to avoid confusion. I suggested a different use of "principle" earlier in the thread, one half way between the Platonist, and the one described above. In that suggestion I requested a separation between "rule" and "principle", such that a "rule" is created by word use, but "principles" are prior to rules, as private. But Wittgenstein appears to want to reject private principles.

I've seen it in the movies, and you hear it on the news once in a while, pension fund managers seem to be prone to doing immoral things. Ever see "The Irishman", about Jimmy Hoffa?

By the way, I am forced to contribute to a pension fund, it's just like taxation. I never freely chose this so I am not willfully contributing to whatever immoral acts the managers might be involved in. One might even argue that forcing me to contribute is itself immoral. I don't think traders are forced to trade.

2. Time implies change: There are issues with this. For instance, imagine a red ball R, made of, for the sake of argument, an infinitely durable material. R at time T1 would be the same as R at time Tn where n > 1. In other words, R didn't change even as time flew by. In short, that there's time doesn't mean that change should occur. — TheMadFool

The problem here is that an "infinitely durable material" is not physical possible. So how is an example which asks us to assume something impossible, of any use for demonstrating something about the reality of time?

I think what pension mangers do is often very immoral.

The player that is using better strategy could (and often does) still lose though. Edges can be quite small and only expose themselves over thousands of hands. — BitconnectCarlos

This is exactly the emotional issue which I tried to bring up. The lesser skilled can and does win, because poker is to a large degree a game of chance. This little bit of winning produces a euphoria in the player making the person more oblivious to the facts, which are that the probabilities ensure the more skilled will win in the long run, just like the probabilities are slanted for the house in the casinos. That's the emotional weakness, similar to dreaming about winning the lottery. The skill in poker is to a large degree in the betting strategy. The skilled win the big pots and lose small ones. As a trader you might see something similar with the intelligent use of stop orders.

If you look at a game like pool though, there's a much higher degree of skill than poker. The pool sharks might use a slightly different strategy, actually letting the lesser skilled win for two bits, and not revealing one's true skill level until the bet is significant. And as a trader you would know that the small money is made when the market rises, and the big money is made when the market drops.

Fair point. Also, Metaphysician Undercover, where do you draw the line between trading and investing? Seems you could apply the same logic you've used to condemn anyone who puts money into a market with the intention of later taking it out at a profit (and note that markets aren't zero sum games when they are expanding). — Baden

I would say that investing is to put money into an enterprise with the goal of making a return. The terms of return ought to be clearly stipulated in advance, similar to what we do with the interest on a loan. I believe there is a degree of greed which brings about the idea that we can invest without stipulating the terms of return, allowing one to think that returns could be unlimited. But it is also a deceptive idea, which facilitates the negative return.

The exception is a given because lifeguards are there to save lives. Just as there are various contexts in which to use some word, there are various contexts in which to apply some rule. — Harry Hindu

So if you're somewhere to save lives, rules don't apply to you? Is that why an ambulance might go through a red light? I suppose the paramedics are allowed to take all the belongings from the helpless person as well. That's ridiculous. And what's equally ridiculous is the idea that one can claim exceptions based on context.

What you don't seem to realize is that I am agreeing with you and you are contradicting yourself. If words can be used without rules, then why are you bending over backwards in trying to apply strict and rigid rules for how you use the word, "rule"? — Harry Hindu

You haven't been reading enough of this thread Harry. I already explained this. Rules are introduced into language for the purpose of logic and reasoning, as a means for understanding. Misunderstanding is actually quite common in natural language use. This is a philosophy forum, the goal is to understand, therefore I see the benefit of bending over backward trying to apply strict and rigid rules for that purpose. Equivocation leads to misunderstanding.

Once you learn something well enough, whether it be walking, riding a bike, driving or a language, it can become automatic. The steps, or rules, are no longer routed through conscious memory. That isn't to say that they aren't still there. — Harry Hindu

This is actually what is absurd. I didn't I learn rules to learn how to talk. It became what you call "automatic" simply by doing it, trying, having success, and practicing. My conscious mind wasn't routed through rules, it was focused on trying to learn how to talk. There was something to do, which I tried to do until I could do it. The basic aspect of learning how to do something is fundamentally different from learning a rule. Do you recognize a difference between theory and practice?

I'm sure you can remember going to grade school and learning how words are spelled and the basic rules of grammar. — Harry Hindu

As I said before, writing is a higher form of language, with logic involved, and there are rules involved in writing.

It's not even comparable with a poker game. With a trade there's a willing buyer and a willing seller who trade precisely because they are getting out of the trade what they want. It's win-win. — Benkei

When poker players are betting on what they are holding, they are all willing, and getting what they want, at that time. They all think it's win-win, until "later" when it's decided who really wins. That "later" is when some don't get what they want. How is this different from trading?

Don't trade on margin then, which is basically borrowing money. People who complain about margin calls or close outs shouldn't be trading at margin anyways. Comes with the territory. — Benkei

Yes, and tell that to the gambler too, you shouldn't gamble, the table's slanted to the house, you "probably" will not win, this comes with the territory. You can't even stop people from buying lottery tickets when the odds are millions against them, by trying to reason with them in this way. The fact that a reasonable person would not do that, does not stop people from doing it nevertheless.

That's the problem with this type of vise. The "evil" consequences appear minimal, or completely nonexistent. So what if I lose a little bit of money, I've got some to spare, and if I lose it, no one gets hurt but me. But when some of us get a taste of winning our emotions overwhelm our capacity to reason and we throw caution to the wind. Then "a little bit of money" has no bounds.

It may be easy for someone like you to say, "those people should not be playing that game". However, those people are the suckers, and if they weren't playing the game, the rest of you wouldn't be making the easy money. This just requires that you adhere to some fundamental principles while letting the emotional ones make the mistakes. So it's clearly a matter of the reasonable people taking advantage of the unreasonable, where "unreasonable" is defined by an emotional weakness.

As I said, your argument is invalid. — Luke

You haven't shown any fallacy. You're rendition just changes the conclusion so that it is the same as P2, which is to make it appear to be be begging the question. I already acknowledged that you might interpret it as an instance of begging the question. But that's obviously a misinterpretation because it requires that you alter the conclusion, when there is no need to alter the conclusion because mine is valid. Accepting my conclusion as valid, rather than altering the conclusion as you propose, avoids the charge of begging the question.

This is ambiguous. — Luke

Right, your proposed substitution results in ambiguity because there is no longer the distinction between "rules" in the sense of what people follow (def#1), and "rules" in the sense of unspoken rules (def#2). That's the point of my argument. I've been requesting that you uphold this distinction to avoid such ambiguity and the equivocation which follows. You refused, and substituted "unspoken rules" (#2) with simply "rules", creating ambiguity by dissolving my requested distinction between "rules" (def#1) and "unspoken rules" (def#2), so your equivocation of my requested distinction created that ambiguity.

If you weren't so stubborn in your request to allow equivocation into the deductive argument, because you want to hide the valid conclusion, you wouldn't have such ambiguity in the conclusion. In other words, the ambiguity you refer to is the product of your substitution which is an act of equivocation.

You want to draw the conclusion that people don't follow rules, laws or conventions because it sometimes happens that people don't. However, people also do follow rules, laws and conventions in many cases. I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed. The conventions of language use are no exception. — Luke

We must adhere to some fundamental principles in this judgement as to whether a rule is followed or not. If a rule is broken once, then we cannot say that it is being followed. That's fundamental to the descriptive (inductive) principles of scientific method. And, since people often break rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people follow rules. Observation tells us that people break rules and this means that rules are not being followed. Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that it's far more likely that rules are followed than not. And since you want to extend the definition of "rule" to include all sorts of unspoken rules, traditions, customs, and norms, which differ throughout the world, and are actively evolving as we speak, being broken time after time, you are simply bringing more evidence against yourself. So the evidence is clear, it is more likely that rules are not followed than followed.

I proposed a distinction between a type of rule which people consciously try to follow (rules expressed in language), and a type of rule which has no expression in language (unspoken rules), such that it cannot be identified or formulated in any way which would allow a conscious mind to attempt to follow it. And this is consistent with def #1, and def #2 of my OED. My proposal is that for the purpose of this philosophical inquiry, and logical proceeding, we only use "rule" to refer to the first, so that we can avoid ambiguity and equivocation. Then we can proceed to examine the actions of #2 without the inclination of confusing those actions with rule following in accordance with #1.

You steadfastly refuse to acknowledge this common distinction, and so you continue to equivocate between #1 and #2. This stubbornness on your part forces the conclusion on you, that "rules" are not followed, producing that dilemma which is specific to your ambiguous interpretation of "rule". If you simply would allow the distinction between rules which we consciously attempt to follow #1, and "rules" in the sense of some descriptive similarity of actions without conscious effort to "follow", #2, you would not be faced with making this glaringly false claim: "I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed."

I haven't made any argument concerning the law yet. I simply don't equate winning with taking advantage of. Do you not see any distinction? — Baden

Without the money in the game, winning might not be taking advantage. But if you're playing for money, and one has a skill level which clearly exceeds the other, then winning is a matter of the one taking advantage of the other. And if the skilled player creates the illusion of a fair playing field, like they used to do in the pool halls, or when the skilled poker player allows the less skilled to get a little ahead at the beginning, to get a taste of winning, only to turn things around when it counts, it's surely immoral, regardless of the consent. There's no end to the little tricks which winners can do to increase what they take from the losers. Betting is half the game in poker. So the game becomes a game of trying to take as much as possible from the losers.

I think that's why activities like this are generally considered to be immoral. Wen you have a contest of skill, and you're playing for money, there's no way to avoid the reality that people will take advantage of others. Isn't that the goal of the game, to win as much as you can? How can win as much money as you can, be consistent with, don't take advantage of the others? So that goal of winning money always turns into a matter of taking advantage of, as the means to the end.

If your general conclusion is that "no rules are followed", this must mean that humans are not free to follow rules. So it's probably a good thing that your argument is invalid. "Rules are not rules" just seems off somehow. — Luke

That's the conclusion which comes about from your proposed substitution. My conclusion was "conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. " The proposed substitution yields "rules are not rules which are followed". Since all it takes is for a rule to be violated one time by one person, for us to say that the rule has not been followed, I think that conclusion is very true. And as I said, this simply says something about the free willing nature of human beings, we are not rule-following beings. Whether or not we have the capacity to follow rules is irrelevant, the true description is that we do not, we break rules. Therefore, "rules are not rules which are followed".

I didn't pay attention to your arguments 2 and 3 because they are not even related. Rather than a simple substitution, you completely alter premise 2, so what's the point? We're not even talking anything remotely similar at that point.

"No running at the pool" is a generalization of actions to be taken in a particular circumstance. That isn't to say that the lifeguard can't run to the pool and dive in (even though there is also a rule stating that there is no diving) to save a drowning person. The rules at the pool are meant to be a guideline for being safe at the pool. That doesn't mean that following the rules will keep you safe in all circumstances, or that running at the pool is prohibitive in all circumstances. — Harry Hindu

That's surely false. If the rule says no running or diving, this applies to the life guard as well, unless it's stipulated that there are exceptions. If the lifeguard runs and dives, then clearly the rule has been broken by that action if there are no stipulated exceptions.

And if your argument is that rules are just guidelines, and meant to be broken, then we're not talking about following rules anymore. We're talking about looking at suggestions for action, or something like that, not following rules.

What you are actually talking about here is simply reasoning. Applying knowledge of prior actions taken in prior situations similar to situations in the present moment is how we reason. — Harry Hindu

It might be similar to how we reason, but it isn't reasoning, because it's dome habitually without recalling memories. We know which words to use in a particular situation without recalling similar situations in the past, to figure out which words to use.

Rules are only followed if they are enforced in some way, either by gunpoint, or by recalling what action worked in similar situations. — Harry Hindu

I don't think that your appeal to "similar situations" is the answer. So many of the situations I find myself in are completely new, not really similar to anything I've already experienced at all, but this doesn't leave me at a loss for words. So i don't think my choice of words comes from recalling similar situations.
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