.....except those two, not three for one was repetitive, are precisely examples of a single unit.....one thing to pull, one joke not heard.
There may be demonstrations that successfully counter my assertion; those are not them. — Mww
A rule is a generalization of actions that should be taken in a particular instance, or circumstance based on prior observations of those actions working in similar instances or circumstances.A rule is not "an action". It is a generalization which may apply to numerous actions. If you say that a particular action should be carried out in a specified set of circumstances, then to justify the "should" you might refer to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
What you are actually talking about here is simply reasoning. Applying knowledge of prior actions taken in prior situations similar to situations in the present moment is how we reason. Judges have the power to interpret law/rules. Not every rule is applicable to every situation. They are only meant to be a guide. I think we are talking about the same thing here and it's just a disagreement on terms.You'd have to go back and read the thread, but I don't argue that there's no guidance, I argued that in the majority of instances of natural language use, we do not refer to any such rules. So I argued that rules are not fundamental to language use, they exist as part of specialized language use like math, logic, and writing. Therefore it's wrong to characterize language as a rule following activity. I discussed with Josh at one point, what type of guidance is employed at the fundamental level of language use, since it ought not be called a form of rule following. But this was just speculation, there is no real understanding here. What we can say though, is that it's not a matter of rule following. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand this part.I avert it because I see it as an oversimplification which is simply wrong. And using such words which create "a picture", model, or representation, which is actually wrong, is misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
Rules are only followed if they are enforced in some way, either by gunpoint, or by recalling what action worked in similar situations. Reasoning is the act of providing reasons, or rules, for your actions. Knowledge itself is a set of rules for interpretting sensory data. The rules can change, but there will always be some rule (reason) for why you acted some way in some situation.Actually, the misconception is in thinking that such a situation can be described as rule following. If rules are not being rigidly applied, say they exist there to be consulted, and the person looks at the rules and decides whether or not to follow them at each individual instance of judgement, then we cannot say that rules are being followed, because the person often decides not to follow. We cannot even say that such a rule would serve as "a guide", because when the person decides not to follow, it provides no guidance.
What is glaringly obvious, is that there are no such rules which we consult during natural language use. When we speak in most ordinary circumstances, we speak the words which rapidly come to our minds, designed for the particularities of the circumstances, without consulting general rules. So this whole conception, that language use is based in some sort of rule following activity is a misconception.. — Metaphysician Undercover
If your general conclusion is that "no rules are followed", this must mean that humans are not free to follow rules. So it's probably a good thing that your argument is invalid. "Rules are not rules" just seems off somehow. — Luke
"No running at the pool" is a generalization of actions to be taken in a particular circumstance. That isn't to say that the lifeguard can't run to the pool and dive in (even though there is also a rule stating that there is no diving) to save a drowning person. The rules at the pool are meant to be a guideline for being safe at the pool. That doesn't mean that following the rules will keep you safe in all circumstances, or that running at the pool is prohibitive in all circumstances. — Harry Hindu
What you are actually talking about here is simply reasoning. Applying knowledge of prior actions taken in prior situations similar to situations in the present moment is how we reason. — Harry Hindu
Rules are only followed if they are enforced in some way, either by gunpoint, or by recalling what action worked in similar situations. — Harry Hindu
My conclusion was "conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. " — Metaphysician Undercover
The proposed substitution yields "rules are not rules which are followed". — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, your argument is invalid. — Luke
This is ambiguous. — Luke
You want to draw the conclusion that people don't follow rules, laws or conventions because it sometimes happens that people don't. However, people also do follow rules, laws and conventions in many cases. I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed. The conventions of language use are no exception. — Luke
The exception is a given because lifeguards are there to save lives. Just as there are various contexts in which to use some word, there are various contexts in which to apply some rule.That's surely false. If the rule says no running or diving, this applies to the life guard as well, unless it's stipulated that there are exceptions. If the lifeguard runs and dives, then clearly the rule has been broken by that action if there are no stipulated exceptions.
And if your argument is that rules are just guidelines, and meant to be broken, then we're not talking about following rules anymore. We're talking about looking at suggestions for action, or something like that, not following rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
It might be similar to how we reason, but it isn't reasoning, because it's dome habitually without recalling memories. We know which words to use in a particular situation without recalling similar situations in the past, to figure out which words to use. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is patently absurd.I don't think that your appeal to "similar situations" is the answer. So many of the situations I find myself in are completely new, not really similar to anything I've already experienced at all, but this doesn't leave me at a loss for words. So i don't think my choice of words comes from recalling similar situations. — Metaphysician Undercover
And here there will be certain things we can imagine and those we can't within the criteria of a cube because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. I investigate above what we imply when we say "I imagine" or "I see an image". — Antony Nickles
because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. — Antony Nickles
No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate — Wittgenstein, PI
The exception is a given because lifeguards are there to save lives. Just as there are various contexts in which to use some word, there are various contexts in which to apply some rule. — Harry Hindu
What you don't seem to realize is that I am agreeing with you and you are contradicting yourself. If words can be used without rules, then why are you bending over backwards in trying to apply strict and rigid rules for how you use the word, "rule"? — Harry Hindu
Once you learn something well enough, whether it be walking, riding a bike, driving or a language, it can become automatic. The steps, or rules, are no longer routed through conscious memory. That isn't to say that they aren't still there. — Harry Hindu
I'm sure you can remember going to grade school and learning how words are spelled and the basic rules of grammar. — Harry Hindu
You know we can imagine anything we like, any time we like? — Mww
because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities.
— Antony Nickles
Isn’t naming the source of words? — Mww
Language doesn't go with [activities]; it comes after it. — Mww
No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate
— Wittgenstein, PI
I’m guessing the part left off “Something that etc”, is “comes before the mind”, which transforms the quote into, “the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not show the existence of a something that comes before the mind”. Yet, it does exactly that, for otherwise it must be the case there is something named or nameable, that does not exist as coming before the mind, which is absurd. — Mww
You haven't shown any fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover
You're rendition just changes the conclusion so that it is the same as P2, which is to make it appear to be be begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, your proposed substitution results in ambiguity because there is no longer the distinction between "rules" in the sense of what people follow (def#1), and "rules" in the sense of unspoken rules (def#2). That's the point of my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
You refused, and substituted "unspoken rules" (#2) with simply "rules", creating ambiguity by dissolving my requested distinction between "rules" (def#1) and "unspoken rules" (def#2), so your equivocation of my requested distinction created that ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover
If a rule is broken once, then we cannot say that it is being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, since people often break rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people follow rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
Observation tells us that people break rules and this means that rules are not being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that it's far more likely that rules are followed than not. — Metaphysician Undercover
And since you want to extend the definition of "rule" to include all sorts of unspoken rules, traditions, customs, and norms, which differ throughout the world, and are actively evolving as we speak, being broken time after time, you are simply bringing more evidence against yourself. So the evidence is clear, it is more likely that rules are not followed than followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
I proposed a distinction between a type of rule which people consciously try to follow (rules expressed in language), and a type of rule which has no expression in language (unspoken rules), such that it cannot be identified or formulated in any way which would allow a conscious mind to attempt to follow it. And this is consistent with def #1, and def #2 of my OED. — Metaphysician Undercover
My proposal is that for the purpose of this philosophical inquiry, and logical proceeding, we only use "rule" to refer to the first, so that we can avoid ambiguity and equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover
This stubbornness on your part forces the conclusion on you, that "rules" are not followed, producing that dilemma which is specific to your ambiguous interpretation of "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover
Fallacy of ambiguity, hasty generalisation. — Luke
Judging by the history of this discussion, you started out arguing for the former, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. but you've recently switched to the latter, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are rules but they're not followed. — Luke
Simply substitute the word "rules" for "conventions" in the above. — Luke
But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. — Metaphysician Undercover
So what'll it be? Are you going to stick with your new game plan where you strongly imply that rules are not followed in all cases, or are you going to return to your old strategy where you argue that conventions are not "true" rules? Make up your mind, dude. — Luke
I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke
If a rule is followed once, then we can say that it is being followed. — Luke
It is not consistent with the OED. The OED def #1 you quoted earlier - "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform" - does not exclude unspoken rules. — Luke
What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept. — Antony Nickles
So Witt's point is that the picturing of something is not "meaning" something exact, i.e., when we picture the cube are we "picturing" its squareness? its edges? that it's a prism? — Antony Nickles
What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works. — Antony Nickles
What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept.
— Antony Nickles
Yes, we do that. Isn’t it then a matter of what options are available in a concept? If the thought is that there is only one option available in a concept, that being its relation to something, what other options can there be? All that’s left is that to which a concept does not relate, or, a plethora of somethings to which a concept can relate. — Mww
What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works.
— Antony Nickles
* * * So my framework can account for how language works, even if sometimes it doesn’t, but we cannot say it never does, so the claim we cannot, is false. Or....I’m not right in what Witt is saying. — Mww
Now the idea in this section of the PI is that you have a cube, a number of things of which can be pointed out with the word's options ("uses" or "senses" Witt calls them), one of which is the fact that it is a prism, similar in that way to a triangular prism. The point being it is not whatever you have in mind that provides the meaning, but the public concept (of prisms and cubes). You are expressing one of those "uses" (not "using words") rather than there being something like a mental picture that gives the word a "meaning". — Antony Nickles
Can there be a collision between picture and application? There can,
inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, because people
in general apply this picture like this.
I want to say: we have here a normal case, and abnormal cases.
There's no hasty generalization, you're just refusing to accept the premises which are true and widely supported by the evidence we see all around us. — Metaphysician Undercover
Bull shit Luke. I switched only at your insistence, that I make the substitution, and look at the argument from the perspective which the substitution provided. — Metaphysician Undercover
Making that substitution results in the conclusion that rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The thing is, that when we make a generalization to describe a certain type of thing, it must apply to all of the things in that class, or else it is a faulty generalization. — Metaphysician Undercover
You want to make "convention" equivalent to "rule", when the evidence is clear that many conventions are not being followed by many people. — Metaphysician Undercover
That leaves us with the choice of either rejecting the generalization "human beings follow rules, or taking conventions outside the class of "rules". — Metaphysician Undercover
Obviously, the choice is yours. Are you going to stick with your insistence that conventions are rules, in which case we must conclude that human beings do not follow the rules, or are you going to come over to my side, and allow that conventions are fundamentally not rules, thereby allowing that rules are a special sort of convention which human beings use conscious effort to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover
The basic aspect of learning how to do something is fundamentally different from learning a rule. Do you recognize a difference between theory and practice? — Metaphysician Undercover
I have not altered your original argument in any way, other than by replacing "conventions and unspoken rules" with "explicitly stated rules". Do you not find this conclusion to be problematic? — Luke
Learning a rule is not a "theory", and neither is language. Language is a practice. Games, sports and other explicitly-stated-rule-bound activities are simply codified practices. You can refer to the rules if you are in doubt, but if you know how to a play a game or sport, you usually don't need to. Even if you don't know how to play, you can join in the practice until you break a rule, and then others can make you aware of it, and you learn it. — Luke
No, I have no problem with that conclusion, and I've already explained more than once why. Rules are broken, even explicitly stated rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if we are given the option for a general description of human activity as either rules are followed, or rules are not followed, we must conclude rules are not followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's the simple fact which observation gives us. — Metaphysician Undercover
And this is the difference we can observe between human beings and inanimate matter, we do not necessarily follow rules, as does inanimate matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
You accused me of equivocation earlier because you thought your argument applied only to conventions and not to explicitly stated rules. It seems you've changed your mind. — Luke
In all cases? Or are you just going to continue to ignore this question? You did not even engage the problem I pointed out with your argument: that you make a conclusion about all cases from a premise about some cases. — Luke
Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language? — Luke
You took mine, changed it to suit your purpose, and asked if I was OK with the conclusion. I'm ok with it, because I told you I would go along with your substitution just to humour you — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't make a conclusion about all cases, — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't make a conclusion about all cases, I make a conclusion which contradicts a general statement which is intended to apply to all cases — Metaphysician Undercover
Isn't your position that one needs to learn language before one can learn and follow rules? How can inanimate matter do this, and how does it learn a language?
— Luke
We discussed this already, the difference between the prescriptive and descriptive sense of "following rules". We are now discussing whether human beings can be described as rule followers. This is the result of the changes you made to my argument, the difference caused by switching my use of "rule", (def#1), for yours, (def#2). Your obtuseness never ceases to amaze me Luke. — Metaphysician Undercover
So do you agree with the conclusion that “Explicitly stated rules are not rules which are followed” or were you only humouring me? In your last post you said “I have no problem with that conclusion” and went on to detail why you had no problem with it. — Luke
I didn’t change the structure of your argument in any way. The same argument applies equally to both #1 and #2. — Luke
You changed the content, so that what you presented was not even similar to my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
Conventions, as you use the term, are not explicitly stated rules. So doing that switch, changes what the argument is about, while maintaining the structure. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion.
— Metaphysician Undercover
Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules.
— Luke
Since you're having so much difficulty understanding this simple matter, I'll spell it out for you in the form of a simple deductive argument. First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean it "changes what the argument is about"? Let's remind ourselves of the original purpose of your argument: — Luke
I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction. — Luke
Did you need to go to all the effort of a deductive argument simply to draw a distinction between explicit- and non-explicit rules? — Luke
I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction.
— Luke
However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you. — Metaphysician Undercover
However you continue acting as if there is no difference. That's hypocrisy. You say 'I'll play by that rule', but then your actions violate the rule. I will not play that game with you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I did need to go to that extent, because you continually refused to look at the difference between those two, assuming that customs and traditions (def#2) are "principles" of conformity (def#1).. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think what is happening is you are adamantly defending something you think I (or Witt) is trying to take away. — Antony Nickles
Witt is trying to allow the interlocutor the "picture" of meaning that they want--the philosophical theory that when we see a cube or say cube, there is an image in our mind (our meaning). — Antony Nickles
We might be getting tripped up on Witt's term "concept", but, as I laid out above, the concept of, say, "knowing" has a number of different options in which it can be used (a skill, information, acknowledgement). And these don't "relate" to anything, they just are how we use the concept of knowing, how knowing is in our lives. — Antony Nickles
The conclusion does not follow, since P2 has no relation to P1. The conclusion is not inferred from the argument; it's an assumption or definition that is required by the premises at the outset. — Luke
See my quote at the top of this post and my stipulation that I agree to your distinction between explicit and non-explicit, but that the OED definitions do not ditinguish between def#1 and def#2 along the same lines. — Luke
I'm arguing (or just reading the dictionary) that rules can either be explicitly stated or not. — Luke
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