If someone believed in the existence of God then they had a Truth to their life. Otherwise why would you believe it? If and when someone begins to doubt the existence of God and eventually repudiates that existence with what do they replace that Truth they had? — Brett

Wouldn't there necessarily be a reason for the person to doubt and then reject "God"? Wouldn't this reason be the person's new Truth? However, the person might just become extremely doubtful and skeptical of Truth altogether. Some people argue that this type of doubt constitutes the person's new Truth, "there is no Truth". But I do not see it that way. I think it's a very naive way of viewing this situation. In reality, to have faith in Truth, and to be skeptical are two very distinct attitudes, and one cannot be reduced to a form of the other.

Therefore I would describe your example as a change in attitude, one type of attitude is replaced with another. The change might go the opposite way as well. Also, I firmly believe that a person cannot go directly from having faith in one Truth, to having faith in an incompatible Truth without going through a transition period of skepticism, having no faith. If this is true, it means that we must firmly reject one faith, by switching to an attitude of skepticism, before we are capable of accepting a new faith.

This I think, is the reason why many arguments in this forum are fruitless. Instead of sowing the seed of skepticism in the mind of a person with an opposing faith, whereby the person would be induced to doubt what one currently believes, most posters in this forum simply try to convince others that their view is the correct one. Arguing one's own perspective is ineffective toward changing the attitude of another. What is required is to change the person's attitude, to instill doubt, releasing the person from the binds of certitude toward what one believes. This is to produce an open mind on the subject.

The book is merely a symbol representing the meaning involved within the act of giving the book. It means that the master has chosen the successor, or something like that, like an act of anointment. So the book itself is actually meaningless, and might well be burned. However, at the same time, the book is a necessary part of that act and without it that same act with the same meaning cannot be carried out anymore.

I imagine it’s possible with someone with schizophrenia to apply their reason to their problems, and it would make sense to them, one step leading logically to the next, but it’s based on irrationality, so it could no longer be called reason. — Brett

The point though, is on what basis would you deem it irrational? You cannot judge it as irrational relative to the conventional logic, because the conventional logic might really be the one that's off the rails. Therefore we must assume something else, God's logic or something like that, and say that it could be judged relative to God's logic, which would validate the conclusion that the person's logic might be irrational.

I as trying to think of some way of demonstrating how religion, philosophy and science are equal to each other in addressing the world. — Brett

I don't think we can say that they are equal. Some will value one more than the other. And, since one human convention may be incompatible with another, and the only way to assume that there is a real solution is an appeal to God, then religion which recognizes this must be higher than the others.

The point of Zen is 'transmission outside words and letters'. It's an esoteric tradition so what is 'transmitted' is strictly speaking indescribable, certainly not a written text, even though Zen has them. — Wayfarer

The way I described it, the thing transmitted is not the written text. What is transmitted from one person to the other, is the meaning within the act of giving the book. That is the nature of meaning. The physical object is actually irrelevant, and the meaning is within the act. Yet the physical object is still necessary to perform and complete the act.

So for example, when we speak, the thing transmitted is not the physical words, just like in the story, the thing transmitted is not the book. There is meaning within the act of passing the book, which the book itself, as a physical object is irrelevant toward, just like there is meaning in the act of giving a present at Christmas, which the actual physical object given is irrelevant toward.

No I don’t accept their logic because I don’t believe they proved God did not exist. I’m saying it’s an assumption on their part that they’ve proven this. — Brett

OK, that clarifies that, because the way you had said it implied that you believed they had proven it.

But you still don’t think I’m correct in thinking that philosophy is structured on reason and that to go off the rails is irrational and therefore to be discarded as being of no use except to put us back on track? — Brett

Well it depends on what you mean by "reason". If you allow that reason is other than structured formal logic, like mathematics and deduction, then we find that personal, idiosyncratic forms of logic like different types of abduction are still reasonable. Then a person's own form of idiosyncratic logic might bring one to conclusions inconsistent with conventional conclusions of science or religion, etc.. You might describe the person as "off the rails", but that person is still following some idiosyncratic form of logic and so can't be said to be irrational. Furthermore, it is possible that the reason why the person's conclusions are inconsistent with conventional conclusions is that the conventional conclusions are actually "off the rails". Therefore that person who uses some idiosyncratic form of abduction, who appears to be "off the rails", might really be the one required to put us back on track.

But I’m saying though they might have proved that God doesn’t exist doesn’t make it so for me, so I would not be part of your thoughts on going against logic. — Brett

If you say that they "proved God doesn't exist", then you accept their logic. And to believe otherwise would therefore be illogical. You didn't say that they attempted to prove that God doesn't exist, or that they failed to prove God doesn't exist, you said that they did prove it.

Mrna produces viral "spikes" to identify the "other". The body's immune system attacks the "other", produced in the body, which is tah-dah! an injected autoimmune disease. The body, no longer able to effectively identify "other" elects to focus on sperm and ova as an "other" as well as the virus. Poof! sterile population and immune to Covid. Version 2. — Book273

You haven't explained how use of the vaccine could suddenly cause an autoimmune disease. There's no reason to believe that the body would suddenly lose the ability to identify the "other". By your logic, me catching the common cold might cause my body to suddenly lose the ability to identify the "other", and trigger an autoimmune disease.

An odd sort of reasoning it might be but it’s still reasoning and you can’t go against what are logical inferences otherwise it’s unreasonable to claim so. — Brett

But we very often do go against reason and logical inference, it's in our nature to do just that. That's the point I made in my post above, with '"Good moral judgement' is insufficient for good moral actions." We often know "I ought not do this", yet do it anyway. We don't necessarily act according to our logical inferences. It's best known as hypocrisy.

The fact that philosophy and science might have “proved” God doesn’t exist doesn’t make it so. — Brett

Here you actually demonstrate an instance of going against logic, being illogical or irrational. If you believe that philosophy and science have proven that God does not exist, then you'd be going against logical inferences to still believe in God. See, logic does not have the power to make us believe any particular logical inference, nor does it have the power to make us act in the way that we see as the reasonable or logical way.

Oh sorry Wayfarer, I got carried away by the words, and posted the post before reading the rest of yours.

I think this is one of the seminal texts which differentiates Buddhism from the Biblical religions, and religion generally - even many ritual forms of Buddhism itself - as they do indeed 'put the raft on a pedestal'. (Note also the image of 'the raft' being makeshift, hastily constructed with whatever is at hand. Nothing mass-produced or pre-planned!) — Wayfarer

This is very similar to what I described above. The particular nature of the physical thing, which is the means, is fundamentally irrelevant. Here it is the makeshift raft, it might be the book, or the words in communication, or the present in my example. However, while the particular nature is irrelevant, the thing itself, is at the same time necessary. What is necessary is that there be something, some physical thing, what is irrelevant is the particular nature of that physical thing. You can look at it both ways. As necessary, put the physical thing on a pedestal. But since the particular nature of that physical thing is irrelevant, then portray it as a ramshackle, makeshift, hastily constructed raft or whatever.

But that doesn't allow for the fact that in Zen/Ch'an Buddhism the basic principle of the practice is 'special transmission outside the scriptures'. — Wayfarer

What about the value of the "special transmission" which is the act of passing down the book? That is, the act itself. Obviously there is value in this act or it would not have been practiced by one after the other of the chain of masters. But the value is not within the book itself, it's in the act of passing down the book. At Christmas, we tend to give each other gifts, often meaningless things that no one really wants. We say that it is "the thought that counts". And so it is the act of giving which is significant, not the physical thing given.

This act of passing the book, is the 'special transmission outside the scriptures'. If the book is gone, then there will no longer be the act of passing down the thing which has no value, and this particular act of "special transmission" which does have value as an act of special transmission, will cease to be, because an essential part of the act, is the thing given, the book, and it is missing.

What is represented is that in the meaningful interaction between human beings, which is communication, the value, or meaning of the interaction, is not in the physical thing being transmitted (such as words), but it is in the act itself. The physical thing being transmitted, such as words, is absolutely worthless. Nevertheless, the act is dependent on, and cannot proceed without that worthless physical thing, the words, or in that story, the book.

This is the value of "the present". At Christmas, we tend to give each other gifts, "presents", often meaningless things that no one really wants. We sometimes say that it is "the thought that counts". And so it is the act of giving "the present" which is significant, not the actual physical thing which is given. However, without the physical thing there is no present, and no act of giving.

I think that since the successor had no desire to keep the book he hadn't learned everything which the master had to teach. If he had learned everything, then just like those before him, he would have learned the value of the book. But I don't think the master chose an appropriate way to introduce the successor to the book, so it was really the master's fault for failing in teaching.

Why would anyone be rendered sterile? I don't see the connection, you're just making up an imaginary scenario. What's the point? God might strike me dead with a lightning bolt when I walk out the door, as punishment for not believing in Him. Do you think that's going to make me believe in Him, or stay inside? Such scenarios are absolutely pointless unless you can demonstrate why the claimed result, sterility, is at all likely.

That is, anyone can make models based on assumptions, and for their respective purposes some of those models work pretty well and are productive. — tim wood

As you said, it's a "mighty fine assumption", and that's because it's based in true experience. That's what distinguishes it from many other metaphysical assumptions which tend to be purely speculative conjectures based in some fantasy.

Question: when do the models become real? My point that models are never other than models and thus are never real (except as models), and that it is a mistake to confuse or conflate models with the world itself. — tim wood

Of course, everyone knows that a model is a model, and that it's reality is as a model. I think that's sort of obvious. And this is fundamental to substance dualism. What substantiates the model as something real, it's dependence on a mind, is completely different from what substantiates the reality of the thing being modeled, as not necessarily dependent on a mind. Hence substance dualism.

Literally everyone who gets the vaccine could get cancer and we'd have no way of knowing at this point. — boethius

OK, that seems like a good reason for you to refrain from getting vaccinated, the possibility of unknown, unforeseen consequences potentially caused by the vaccine. But I think that the possibility of unknown, unforeseen consequences potentially caused by the virus present an even larger risk. And in fact, we can add to that all the known and documented consequences caused by the virus and conclude that the risks involved with getting the virus are much higher than the risks of getting vaccinated. So, it's obvious to me that the risks from not taking the vaccine are far higher than the risks from taking it, therefore it's not a good reason to refrain from getting vaccinated, to me.

Of course the measurement doesn't determine the state of the object. I never said that it did. What is measured determines the state of the object. — Harry Hindu

No, what is measured, in the case of measuring the heat, does not determine the state of the object. As I explained, further deductive logic is required. You point the thermometer at the object and it gives you the temperature. It does not tell you whether it is frozen or liquid.

The fact that you find them interesting has no bearing on whether or not they are ontologically fundamental. — Harry Hindu

What I meant is that they are interesting to me because they are ontologically fundamental. if you want to dispute that, as not evident to you, then that is your prerogative. But so far you are quibbling over nonsensical strawman representations, refusing to go anywhere near that subject.

In fact, your interest implies that they are epistemological in nature rather than ontological. You need to define "substance" to explain why only two things qualify as a substance and not all the other things that interact. — Harry Hindu

Actually, it is you who is trying to turn this from an ontological issue into an epistemological issue, by insisting on a definition. In metaphysics we take the term, and attempt to determine what it refers to, through the usage presented, to determine the actual reality, or unreality (in the case of misunderstanding) of that thing referred to. To start with a definition would only prejudice the inquiry, misleading us, as Plato demonstrated in the case of "knowledge" in his "Theaetetus".

So, in this case, we are starting with the assumption that there are two fundamental substances, and we are inquiring whether there is an interaction problem between them. My argument is that the supposed interaction problem is only the result of defining "substance" in a prejudicial way, which creates the illusion of an interaction problem. If we adhere to normal usage of "substance" there is no such interaction problem.

Your objection appears to be why is there supposed to be two fundamental substances rather than a different number. This is the result of previous metaphysics, which sees the need for a distinction between material substance and immaterial. And as I explained, it is supported by modern physics with wave (immaterial), particle (material) duality. Clearly, the physics of waves is distinct from the physics of particles, as the substance of each is different, yet there is some form of interaction.

How do you know that there are two fundamental substances when all you know about one substance is by the way it appears in the other? Are material objects in your immaterial mind? Is the material world represented immaterially? — Harry Hindu

I don't quite get this question, but I'll try to answer what I apprehend that you are asking. There is immaterial substance within my mind. And, I infer that there is immaterial substance in your mind. But there is something which separates our minds, a medium between us, which is evidently material substance. You might wish to call it something else, but I think it's acceptable and customary to refer to this medium which separates our minds as material substance. Do you not agree that it is also acceptable and customary to refer to the ideas and concepts within your mind and my mind as immaterial substance? If not, I think that you are attempting to force a definition of "substance" which is unacceptable. What are your epistemic standards for "substance" then?

It wasn't just that question you skipped over. But if you are just going to cite some long-dead human without acknowledging that they would probably not say the same thing if they were alive today knowing what we know now, then I'm not going to find your reply very interesting. — Harry Hindu

Doesn't the fact that the words of some "long-dead human" still exist, and are still respected by many as authoritative mean anything to you? I suppose that you could just reject the idea that there is any importance to those words, and assume that this is all a random coincidence, that the words still exist and are accepted by many as authoritative. But since the words of billions of other human beings who have lived in the time period between then and now, are not respected as authoritative, and are therefore not still existing, I think it is only a fool who would make such an assumption.

Then why use 1 in 1000 in your example, if your other parameter is problems with no immediate symptoms? Why not propose 1 in 100, 1 in 10, or just propose that there is some problem which everyone will have, and it's impossible to detect in the trial because the symptoms will only develop much later. That is a much better representation of your proposal.

You know, a vaccine is basically a one time thing, it's not the same as taking the same drug every day, over and over again for years, which produces a likelihood for things like cancer to develop from long term use.

It was just to contrast signal strength. A person dying is a strong signal. — boethius

My point was, that by the time they're trying 40'000 human beings, they're way beyond your "strong signal" criteria.

40 cases in 40 000 that aren't clear what they are is a weak signal. You can only find what you're looking for. Obviously we're looking for people dying right away, so 40 people dying right away would be a strong signal and we're looking for that. — boethius

When looking for side effects in a drug trial, they are looking for "weird" consequences, they are not expecting people to be dying. I think that by the time they are using 40,000 people they are pretty sure that people are not going to be dying.

40 000 seems like a lot of people, but if there are lot's of weird 1 in 1000 consequences it's far from sufficient quantity to find these things, even if there are symptoms (doctors will not be able to make a causal inference to the vaccine, and many 1 in 1000 events will simply not appear anyways, just from statistics, not to mention the populations not even represented, or not in any statistically significant way, within the 40 000). — boethius

If my math is correct, 1 in 1000 over 40,000 results in 40 cases. If it could "simply not appear" in those 40,000 as you suggest, then clearly it cannot be called a 1 in a 1000 consequence. And since these consequences are described as "weird", I think it's very unlikely that no inference would be drawn from the appearance of 40 weird consequences in a case study of 40,000. Therefore I think your proposal of what could be possible from "1 in 1000 consequences" is completely unrealistic. You could boost it up to 1 in 100,000, or 1 in 1,000,000 consequences, but then you're getting into a range of insignificance, which is exactly what the trials aim to do. So I believe that this particular concern of yours is unfounded.

I am not denigrating philosophy. But since we have this specialization and division of labor, philosophers should be using scientific results and ideas where it is appropriate - for example, when discussing the metaphysics of space and time (e.g. The Ontology of Spacetime ed. D. Dieks.) — SophistiCat

However, the inverse needs to be respected as well. When scientists are discussing the metaphysics of space and time, they ought to have respect for established ontological principles.

I didn't read the book referred, but judging from the table of contents, it looks like it completely ignores the principal ontological feature of time, and that is the important difference between future and past. When we respect the empirical fact that the past consists of events which have actually already occurred, and the future consists of the possibility for events, it becomes evident that we need a conception of space which is radically different from anything employed by physicists.

Please leave me alone, I beg you. While the going is bad, but not horrible. — god must be atheist

OK, please do not reply. This conversation is finished. Thank you.

Listen, you person: chemical compounds don't acquire knowledge. I am running out of patience with you. If you only listened to your grade 11 chemistry teacher, you wouldn't ask increibly stupid questions like this. — god must be atheist

I did not use the word "knowledge".

You spoke of "level 1 symbolism", for lack of better words, as "a biochemically driven reaction that was precipitated by DNA functionality".

Now, DNA are highly complex molecules, consisting of huge numbers of atoms. If DNA has the capacity to precipitate level 1 symbolism, don't you think that they must have acquired this capacity somehow. Or are you thinking that level 1 symbolism just magically appeared? Why would it be that other levels of symbol use must be learnt, while level 1 magically appeared?

I don't think we should discuss this any further, MetaUnder. It's not going to end happily. Let's pull out while we can. — god must be atheist

Well, ending the discussion right now would be an unhappy ending, so if an unhappy ending is what you're afraid of then don't end it. But I really do not understand your refusal to explain or discuss these points. You put forward some thoughts and ideas, then you simply refuse to justify or even elucidate those ideas. It's as if you are afraid, or incapable, of elucidating what you are trying to say.

This is the sort of statement because of which I have a strong suspicion you don't understand evolutionary theory. — god must be atheist

OK, so there are actions which "are precipitated by DNA". I don't think evolutionary theory explains to you how DNA learned how to cause these actions. So I'll repeat, " don't you think that the DNA must have acquired it somehow?" If DNA acquired this ability through evolution, then maybe I am as ignorant about evolution as you think, and you might enlighten me with some principles here.

Which religion would that be? What are the important truths? — Athena

I believe that all religions attempt to culture an attitude of self-honesty. Whether they have an efficient method, or are successful, is another thing.

On the other hand, there is a liberal education and learning the higher-order thinking skills. That education leads to science AND good moral judgment. — Athena

"Good moral judgement" is insufficient for good moral actions. We all know that an individual might judge an action as wrong, yet still go through with it. This is why we need more than just to be educated in good moral principles, because such education does not necessitate good behaviour. That's what Socrates and Plato demonstrated in their refutation of the sophists who claimed to teach virtue for large sums of money.

Personally, I think we have two extremely important truths right now and that religion is a very serious problem right now because too many people are living a fantasy, and their fantasy could destroy life on the only planet we have. — Athena

I think the fantasy is the idea that science can give us morality. Sure, science might show us a lot of things which are wrong, and in many cases, it can even tell us what we ought to do, but it doesn't actually inspire us to do it.

Truth, stop filling the air with carbon and destroying the planet. — Athena

This is a good example. We all know that we ought to stop filling the air with carbon dioxide, but only a small portion of the people are actually doing anything significant to that end. How can a person honestly say "I ought not drive my car everyday", yet continue to drive the car everyday. Where is the self-honesty here?

What does this mean? The amount if heat determines the state of some object. — Harry Hindu

No, the amount of heat is a measurement, and all that is determined with this measurement is the object's temperature. That measurement does not determine the state of the object. You could apply some logic though, to say if it's H2O, and it's below 0 degrees Celsius it's likely in a solid state, but the amount of heat does not determine the object's state.

There are many substances that interact, so why focus on only two types? — Harry Hindu

These are the two types of substance which are philosophically interesting, as ontologically fundamental, that's why I focus on them.

This doesn't address my question. What is the distinction between immaterial and material? — Harry Hindu

Sorry I didn't see that question. If you're really interested, then study some philosophy. Plato is a good place to start. But learning that distinction is a long process and I'm not a paid professor. So, sorry again, but I won't oblige.

I may have infinite differences with you, becasue I beleive in the evolutionary theory. — god must be atheist

You don't think I believe in evolution? Do you know that there is more than one evolutionary theory? So I think that reducing to "the evolutionary theory" is a mistake.

level one (this is the main thrust of your questioning, as I see it) is not a worked-out or acquired or experiencially-learned or a priori learned process. It is simply a biochemically driven reaction that was precipitated by DNA functionality. — god must be atheist

OK, let's say that it is caused by DNA. Don't you think that the DNA must have acquired it somehow? I believe that that sort of proposition leads to a dead end. You are saying that there is some sort of underlying cause which is innate, but then you get to DNA as that underlying cause, and we are left with the question of what caused the DNA.

You are a very smart person, so I shan't go farther in this explanation. You just have to put yourself in my shoes, sort of pretend-wise, and this will become obvious to you.

I don't mean to convince you; I just mean to make you see how I see the whole thing unfold to Level 1. — god must be atheist

I can see what you are saying, but I find it unacceptable, because when I proceed through the unfolding and get to level 1, it's unsupported. This tells me that it must be wrong, because if I follow the steps down to the bottom step, and find that there is nothing underneath that bottom step, I see the whole ladder as fundamentally wrong, imaginary.

In the beginning I don’t think that’s necessarily true. It’s definitely become structured and as a consequence a little irrelevant. But don’t you think that despite philosophy’s openness to questioning it largely falls back on logic and reason, which is about as structured as you can get. And the same with science. — Brett

Well I don't really agree, because philosophy addresses issues which fall out of the reach of formal logic.
So what it "falls back on" is an odd sort of reasoning, like abductive, which is better described as intuition rather than structured logic. This is what makes philosophers and philosophies unique and distinct in their reasoning. Scientists use very structured forms of deductive and inductive logic. However, we can see that scientists do think outside the box when proposing hypotheses, and I would say that this is where science relies on philosophy, but in verifying the hypotheses through the use of experimentation and observation, they are supposed to adhere to more strict formal logic.

I certainly value the need for making informed judgements or choices. But it seems to me that some choices can only be made on the basis of either religion, philosophy or science. Are all philosophical choices correct? Or science? Or religion? What was the decision to drop a bomb on Hiroshima based on? — Brett

I would say that the decision to drop the bomb was a philosophical choice. It's a decision which required going beyond a direct application of scientific principles, and also beyond the direct application of religious principles. So the decision relies on some further intuition. Notice that the vast majority of any seemingly important decisions which we make on a day to day basis are like this. That's why philosophy is important. And the reason why these important decisions are so difficult to make is that we cannot appeal to either science, or religion, for decisive guidance as to what is correct.

We commonly make decisions to do things which would have huge import if we went another way, (like not to kill the person I am mad at for example) but we are already so culturally ingrained to recognize what we are doing as correct, through either the principles of religion, or science, that we don't even think about, or consider any alternatives. It is only when the choice is not obvious, that we must think and use philosophy in an attempt to access relevant principles which at a first glance would not seem evident, or relevant. Having to think before making the decision creates the appearance that the decision is important, but it's not necessarily so, as people can get really stressed out over relatively insignificant decisions. And on the other side, we rush through all sorts of important decisions without even thinking about them because of that cultural indoctrination.

The question of what constitutes a correct choice, and whether a philosophical choice is necessarily correct, is another issue altogether. We could define "correct" along the lines of what is justified by cultural norms. But you'll see that different norms will produce conflicting decisions of "correct", as is evident sometimes in the clash of science and religion, and clashes between various religions and cultures. This indicates that "correct" cannot be adequately defined in this way. That is the issue which Plato ran into in trying to define "just" in "The Republic". This implies that we need to look for a true definition of "correct" rather than a justified definition, in the way that "true" has been defined by Jack Cummins and I earlier in the thread, which relates "true" to honest.

So if an individual acts according to what one truly and honestly believes, this could constitute a "correct" decision. The problem is that a "correct" decision, when "correct" is defined in this way, might still be mistaken. The person might not properly consider the evidence, or judge what is relevant, or have deficient capacity of judgement in some other way. Since an honest decision does not necessarily exclude the possibility of mistake, we cannot truthfully define "correct" in this way. Therefore we are inclined to look for a definition of "correct" which transcends the individual's own personal capacity, to take into account all possible relevant information, and define it according to the decision which some omniscient, omnibenevolent being like God would make, to validate a real definition of "correct".

Why do we need "thawing" to explain how a glass of liquid behaves when ice cubes are dropped inside it. — Harry Hindu

Duh, the thawing ice adds to the quantity of liquid.

I have a better example that we can use. How does software interact with hardware? Do we need to assert the existence of spirits to account for how software and hardware interact in your computer? — Harry Hindu

Electricity?

All you are saying here is that dualism is actually monism. — Harry Hindu

Well, I think if monists are ready to accept that there are two distinct substances, material and immaterial, which are not completely incompatible because they are both actual substances, and interact, then I think the better description is that monism is actually dualism.

What is the point of asserting two "substances" if you aren't asserting that there are only two fundamental substances that are distinct from each other? What properties do these "substances" share. What properties differ? What percentage of properties differ versus what percentage they share? At what point do we say that the substances differ enough to qualify as dualism being the case vs. monism? — Harry Hindu

The "point" is that these questions remain unanswered, and they need to be answered in order for us to have an adequate understanding of reality, like wave/particle duality in physics for example. There is no point in pretending that the two substances are actually one and the same, and insisting that we can understand reality without representing them as distinct, and thereby forcing the need to answer these questions.

I'm not sure I'm getting what you're saying. Are you saying that spirit is the medium that this interaction takes place? Wouldn't that already be covered by the actual substance? I'm just not seeing a need to complicate things by adding more to the mix. — Harry Hindu

I can't see your point Harry. If we have liquid water and solid ice, and someone argues that ice is never liquid, and liquid is never ice, therefore the two can never interact, we must explain freezing and thawing in order to understand the interaction. It's just the way that reality is. Sometimes adding more to the mix is the only way to understand. Reality is complicated, and denying the complications is not the way to understand.

You're the one that used the term, "substances". I was merely reiterating your point that it is faulty to think of the two "substances" in such a way that makes them incompatible. That is precisely what dualism does. Monism is more like an endeavor to do exactly what you were proposing - in understanding that: — Harry Hindu

Why do you think that dualism makes the two substances incompatible? That's the strawman representation which allows the monist to insist that the two substances cannot interact. But clearly they do interact, and dualism respects that fact. In another sense of the word "substance" for example, iron and gold are distinct substances, but they both have protons, neutrons, and electrons, so they are not incompatible. Why would you suppose that in substance dualism "substance" is used to represent two incompatible things? As I implied in my last post, the fact that the two are both called by the same name, "substance" indicates that they are not incompatible.

Its just a paraphrasing of my assertion that dualism creates the problem of interaction by representing mind and body as distinct - one being passive and eternal, and the other temporal - unless I'm just not getting what you're trying to say. — Harry Hindu

I think you're just not getting what I'm saying. We can represent two things as distinct, hydrogen and oxygen for example, but the fact that they are described as distinct does not create a problem of interaction. There is only a problem of interaction if the two distinct things are represented as incapable of interacting with each other. This is the strawman type of representation which monists project onto substance dualism, to create the illusion of an interaction problem. But of course it's just a strawman because substance dualists do not represent the two substances as incapable of interacting with each other, as I've explained. They represent them as interacting. The fact that explaining the interaction requires adding more to the mix is just a feature of the complexities of reality.

Good luck with the reading. I'm sure you'll find it very interesting.

In my highschool years I figured that learning a new language is level 2/a symbolic communication, and math is level 3. Pure math, where number manipulation is divorced from quantities. (A quantity is a number combined with a unit of measure. 1 Km, 34.3 miles, 4 hours, 33 minutes, etc.) — god must be atheist

Can we say that level 3 is an operation of symbols, logic, which is totally divorced from the meaning of the symbols? The operations are universal, and the meaning which is involved with the operation appears to be a completely different type of meaning from the meaning which is involved with having the symbol represent something. In this case, the case of logical operations, the meaning is involved with the way that relations between symbols can be manipulated. So some instances of moving symbols around are valid, meaningful, and others are not. Therefore we appear to have two distinct types of meaning, the meaning involved with what a particular symbol represents, and the meaning involved with how a symbol is related to other symbols.

So at the other end, is level 1, where a symbol is automatically related to something particular. But isn't that thing which the symbol is related to, really just another symbol? The dog understands another dog's wagging tail by relating it to something else, like a memory, but this thing is just another symbol of something else. So the "inborn" "symbolism" you refer to here is just a fixed form of relating one symbol to another. The higher level, logic, allows symbols to be moved around freely, and one symbol to replace another by stipulating specific valid relationships, but it is really just a more free form of the lower level. The second level is somewhere in between, the relations are to an extent fixed, but fixed by cultural practices which change over time, so there is some degree of freedom.

Can you explain to me how you view level 1? How do you get beyond the idea that meaning is just a relation of one symbol to another. Do you see the symbol as relating directly to an activity? What else could the symbol relate to, which is not essentially just another symbol? How can we get out of the infinite regress of symbols, to understand the concept directly as you do? What is a concept if it is not just a structure of symbols related to each other in specific way?

Once in a while. The misses seem very randomly scattered, and it's been going on for quite some time.

The principles of religion, and for my point it’s Christianity, were and still are, if chosen, still as relevant as philosophy is in its relationship to science. I guess I’m saying I still see religion and philosophy as one compared to science. — Brett

I don't think it is correct to class religion and philosophy together, and separate science from these two. What separates religion from philosophy, is that religion is always structured, as an institution. And in this sense science and religion ought to be classed together, because science is structured as an institution. This allows that philosophy, being the quest for knowledge, might be free from adhering to any specific methods of a particular institution. I believe that this type of classification is necessary because we need to allow philosophy to get beyond both science and religion, to enable us to make judgements if there is an incompatibility between these institutions. Philosophy, being the quest for knowledge, is what actually gives us knowledge, wisdom, and the capacity to make sound judgements.

The institutions (conventions) of science will and do clash with the institutions of religion. Each will compete for recognition from the general public, for funding, etc., and acceptance in general. The general public, being made up of individuals, requires the means for making such judgements. The individual will need to turn to philosophy in order to develop the means for making an informed judgement. This is similar in principle to the judgement we are asked to make in a democracy for an election. We can vote along the lines of these conventions, or those conventions, being the ones which we naturally accept through the institutions which we are familiar with from our social environment, or we can make the effort, to take the time, and put the power of philosophy to work, and make a truly informed decision.

BTW, does anyone know exactly what Greek word is getting translated as "habit"? — Xtrix

If I remember correctly, in Aristotle, a habit is described as a sort of property, what something has. So the word used is similar to "having", and in Latin this is associated with the verb "to have", then in English we have "habit". You can see that if a habit is a property, it is special type of property, involving a propensity toward acting in a specific way.

Thomas Aquinas had a lot to say about habits, and wrote many pages on the subject, especially intellectual habits which are very important in learning. Using the Aristotelian principles of potential and actual, he tried to determine where exactly the habit exists, within the potential, or within the act itself. I believe he concluded that the habit resides in the potential, as a sort of property of the potential. This is a difficult concept to grasp, because properties are commonly features of the form, and it is not well explained how a potential could have a property.

Another person who wrote extensively about habits is Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Lamarck explored the relationship between habits and evolution. He was a little bit earlier than Darwin in his theorizing, and his ideas that habits were the cause of variations, which lead to different species, was replaced by Darwin's hypothesis of random variations.

Of course, views may change at different times in our lives depending on how the facts present themselves to us. — Jack Cummins

I think that this is a very significant part of being human, to be open to changing your mind, and to actually change in that way, is an important part of honesty and authenticity. When you hold a belief, and it becomes evident through some demonstration, or whatever, that your belief is not acceptable, you ought to release that belief. But for some reason, some people are not like this, they'll cling to some belief even though it's been conclusively demonstrated to be irrational.

But in my own authentic understanding I often look at matters, especially in the area of religion and can see the arguments on both sides, with my own opinions tipping from one direction to another from time to time. The question on which I hover on the point of uncertainty most is the subject of my previous thread, the question of life after death. I tend to go around in circles. Most people tend to think yes, or no, but in this respect, there must be a real answer, so obviously some are wrong, but perhaps it doesn't matter really. — Jack Cummins

In many instances, when persuasive evidence is not forthcoming, it is best to keep an open mind. To suspend judgement is a type of skepticism. I don't think there is anything dishonest with that, and if there is nothing pressing you, which needs a decision, then leave it that way for now. Maybe the question will end up being unimportant in the long run, even if it seems quite important now.

I think one other issue can sway subjective truth is what we wish the truth to be. It is easy to filter beliefs according to what we wish the truth to be.
Or, in my case, I sometimes think of the worst possibilities, especially if I am in a negative state of mind. Then, building up my fears, I then have to convince myself that is not true. — Jack Cummins

This, being swayed by what we wish for, is difficult to understand because it's a type of irrationality. It's sort of like buying lottery tickets when you know the odds are far against you. I think that this type of irrationality is closely related to the reason why people cling to a belief when it has been conclusively demonstrated to be false. It's a type of dishonesty, as a self-deception, when I tell myself that it's OK to believe this even though I know it is irrational. The inclination toward wanting to believe it is some emotion like a desire or want.

In the past, we had myth and religion to process the justification for what we believe. While knowing the truth has always been important, only in modern times has that meant science. The US never did develop a strong relationship with philosophy because of reliance on religion, and perhaps today that is a problem? — Athena

The problem is that science doesn't really give us truth, as per my discussion with Jack above. What gives us truth is a particular attitude of honesty, and it is probably the case that religion would be better suited toward culturing this attitude. Science gives us useful principles, hypotheses, but truth being associated with correspondence, involves how we employ those principles.

The point I want to get to, it that the notion of physicalism is still important for how we make sense of the world. The physical came first, and life grew out of that. In fact life developed this ability precisely to be able to affect the physical for its goals... to extend its physical life and reproduce physical life. — ChatteringMonkey

The problem with this is that idealism, and theology in general, dispute this claim that "the physical came first". They believe that the immaterial came first. If you take the time to follow the logical process outlined by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, the argument that the immaterial was first is actually quite strong.

I thought it was more because intellect, nous, is what grasps the forms and the final cause, the senses receive the material impression as per sensible and intelligible form. — Wayfarer

The tinted glass analogy is that if the intellect is not completely immaterial it could not properly know all material things, just like if we were looking through a tinted glass, we could not properly see the colours of things.

The problem with the idea that the intellect grasps the forms of things, as in Aristotle's description, is that then the intellect must have a passive aspect, in order to be a receptacle for forms. But this is the characteristic of matter, it is the receptacle which receives forms in the creation of material objects. This produces the difficult problem of what exactly is the passive intellect. If on the other hand, the intellect is understood as completely active, then it does not receive the forms of things, it creates forms. But now we have a separation between the senses, which must be passive receptacles of forms, and the intellect which is a creator of forms. So unless we allow passivity (the characteristic of matter) into the intellect, so that the intellect can receive forms from the senses, we have no way to reconcile the forms of the intellect with the forms of the senses.

Yesterday, I was reading a book, 'The Death of Truth,' by Michiko Katutani(2018). He argues that relativism has been rising since the 1960s, originally adopted by the left wing, and later by some right wing ones, leading to the idea 'that there are no universal truths, only smaller personal truths_ perceptions shaped by the cultural and social forces of one's day. — Jack Cummins

Here's something you might want to consider, Jack. There's an epistemological standard which proposes that knowledge is justified true belief. And there is supposed to be a difference between "justified" and "true". Justification is what one might call objectification. It is the cultural process whereby we demonstrate or prove to each other our reasons for believing what we believe. Notice that "objective" in this context of epistemology, does not mean "of the object", referring to the object which is supposedly known, it means intersubjective. This means that the group who supposedly know, are the object, in "objective" here. What is "of the object" known, is supposedly the truth. But we do not really have access to "truth" in this sense, we only have how we perceive the object, and how others perceive the object, and the so-called "objective" or culturally justified perception. So "truth" in that sense, of "what is of the object", is rendered completely irrelevant to knowledge.

This would leave "truth", in that sense of what is "of the object" as right outside of any possible knowledge. And objectivity in knowledge is what is justified. Now we need to look for another sense of "true" to see how truth could be any part of, or play any role in knowledge. We find another sense which relates to honesty. This is a subjective sense of truth, as "of the subject". But we can see that honesty plays a very important role in knowledge. Justification is the means by which beliefs are objectified, but if an individual justifies a belief which one does not truly believe (dishonestly), then we have a deception, which produces a justified, but untrue belief.

So it may turn out that when people commonly seek an "objective truth" there is really no such thing. Real truth is subjective, as authenticity, what a person truly believes,

Introducing another substance just adds fuel to the fire. — Harry Hindu

The third named thing is not another substance though, it's more like a name for the zone of interaction.

What this is basically saying is that two substances are more similar than dissimilar, something that leans more towards monism. The point being is that you have to represent the substances as being more similar in order to explain how they interact. — Harry Hindu

That's not what I meant. All you are saying, is that by naming them both as "substance", they are therefore more similar than dissimilar. But that does not follow logically at all. Placing two things in the same category doesn't mean that they are necessarily more similar than dissimilar. All I did was find some principle of similarity, such that the two could be placed in the same category. In no way does this indicate that they are more similar than dissimilar. "Substance dualism" does not imply that the two proposed substances are more similar than dissimilar because they are both called substance.

If we deny absolute passivity as impossible, unreal, because it is not in any possible way actual, then it is excluded from our discussion, and our two opposing extremes are both forms of activity, they are actual. One could be extremely fast and the other extremely slow for example, but they are opposing extremes, and it makes no sense to say that they are more similar than dissimilar. Now, if we want to validate these two as acceptable extremes we need to substantiate them. Since they are opposing extremes each will be substantiated by a different demonstration, hence distinct substances.

So instead of introducing the supernatural (the eternal) to account for the natural. It's all natural, including gods and where they live, if they were to exist. — Harry Hindu

I think it's a fool who equates the supernatural with the eternal. We do not need to apprehend "eternal" to apprehend "supernatural". What I've been trying to say, is that the dichotomy which pits the eternal as opposed to the temporal, resulting in the interaction problem, is not a fair representation of classical dualism. It's a strawman.

I have thought of something to say. It is that Wheeler’s ‘participatory universe’ challenges materialism, because it places ‘the observer’ in the picture (‘the observer’ being the participant in question.) So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’. — Wayfarer

If you read my post, I go further than describing the observer as an active participant, to the point of arguing that "the observation", any observation, is a creation of this act of the observer. This produces the need for sound principles whereby we might distinguish a scientifically valid observation from a fabrication.

So this introduces ‘mind’ as fundamental, but not as an objective factor. It is fundamental because of its participation. But you can’t get behind that, or outside of that, so as to see what it is; it is not a ‘that’, an object of analysis, because it is always ‘what is analysing’. — Wayfarer

This describes the need to respect the tinted glass analogy. The reason why the mind must be immaterial, posited by ancient philosophers like Aquinas, is that only by being completely separate from the material, can the mind know all material existence. If any aspect of the mind is material, it will taint our understanding of the material, as looking through a tinted glass taints our ability to see the true colour of things.

Now there is a problem, and that is that following Aristotle's biology, "On the Soul", Aquinas describes the intellect as being dependent on the body, as all the various and distinct powers of the soul reside in the material aspect, the physical body. The human intellect itself is nothing other than an extension of the other described powers, self-nutrition, self-movement, and sensation. This is why the human intellect is deficient when compared to a completely free intellect like God. The human intellect is deficient because of that power's dependence on the body.

This implies that the tinted glass problem is inherent, or intrinsic to the human mind. The intellect is not completely immaterial (hence the divide between active and passive intellect), and this fact cannot be avoided. The human mind has material aspects which will necessarily taint its understanding of the material world, as the tint of the glass does to vision. However, we can learn from the tinted glass analogy, that the tinting does not necessarily incapacitate the understanding. What is required is that we determine the nature of the tint, through comparative methods, and then we may account for the tinting in the observations. The tinting itself can be found represented in Kant's critique as the a priori intuitions of space and time. These are the fundamental intuitions which form or structure "sensibility". The way that the world appears to us through sensation is fundamentally structured by these a priori intuitions, so they constitute the lens through which we naturally observe the world. The task for the metaphysician is to determine how the lens is constituted such that its contributions to the observations might be accounted for.

That's quite a philosophy. Right there. — god must be atheist

Yes, quite. Metaphysician Undercover's ontology, in a nutshell