Trump is being used as a patsy to carry through some harsh but necessary foreign policy decisions. An exit from Ukraine is one of them, just like Trump facilitated the ugly but much-needed exit from Afghanistan.

I see a lot of Americans putting all the blame on Trump, and then on Putin who must have blackmailed him, trying to exculpate their country from this utterly blatant act of Machiavallianism. — Tzeentch

I believe Trump sees himself and Putin, united, as capable of creating one superpower of world dominance. However, they both know, that ultimately there's only room for one at the top, so even within their partnership they are each strategizing and maneuvering to gain the upper hand.

The way I read it is that Putin has something disgusting on Trump and when he realised that he was going to have to push harder against Putin if he’s going to get a deal. He immediately went to the plausible deniability that it was a set up orchestrated by the Biden’s and that he isn’t as depraved as he appears in the video. He might even claim it’s a deepfake. — Punshhh

Russia put a significant amount of effort, over a long period of time, into providing for Trump, the presidency, in the first place. There was most likely significant strategizing and collaboration, much of which is probably documented somewhere (the proverbial "laptop"). On the other hand, many MAGAs refuse to believe that the movement which they are a part of, is nothing more than a plot hatched by some wily Russians. Disillusionment can be devastating, so is is resisted as long as possible. Release of that information ("laptop") at the appropriate time, could be devasting to MAGA, as well as Trump himself, and possibly the US in general. So Trump is in a position where he needs to ensure that Putin still needs him for as long as possible, to avoid that devastation, and Putin seeks the time of highest impact.

What I see on that page is the following:
"In 2023, just over 50 percent of Americans had an annual household income that was less than 75,000 U.S. dollars. The median household income was 80,610 U.S. dollars in 2023."

It then says:
"Preliminary estimates show that the average poverty threshold for a family of four people was 26,500 U.S. dollars in 2021, which is around 100 U.S. dollars less than the previous year. There were an estimated 37.9 million people in poverty across the United States in 2021, which was around 11.6 percent of the population."

There is simply nothing there to support your claim that the average American is struggling to make ends meet. It appears like you are trying to create that illusion with disinformation. Why would you be doing this? Having to budget one's finances is basic household economics, it is not struggling to make ends meet.

"Well, if 'a frequency passing into a designated range' is not a standard understanding of what pitch is . . . then what would you suggest?" — J

I noticed in your reply to Banno, that you accept the idea that the wave would have to hold that frequency for a period of time to be recognizable as the designated pitch. So, wouldn't it be necessary that the source maintain a spcified frequency of vibration for a duration of time, in order for us to have a "pitch"?

Now take the example of the slide. Suppose that throughout the duration of the slide, there is an even, and continuous changing of frequency. From this premise we wouldn't have any pitches at all, because each moment would provide a new frequency, and there would be no duration of any specific frequency, therefore no "pitches" as defined.

However, notice that I spoke of a "designated range". Having a range of frequency which provide the criteria for any specific "pitch", adds another parameter. This allows that the machine could detect some pitches, because the frequency of vibration could be within the designated "range" for the designated period of time. Then, the breadth of the range, and the speed of the slide, become important factors.

So we have three very important factors, the specified range, the required length of time within the range, and the speed of the slide. Two of these are very clearly completely arbitrary, the range, and the required duration within the range. These would be programed into the machine through some arbitrary choice. The third factor, the speed of the slide, appears to be somewhat objective, because it is the object being analyzed, but it's really not. The described slide is simply artificially created from the purpose of the thought experiment, and not representative of anything real. We assumed something unrealistic in the first place, a perfectly even, continuous slide.

Isn't sensing via impressions, and the matching ideas for thoughts, reasoning and reflective analysis in Hume? So, there is a clear division between the live sensation and knowing, thinking, reflecting, remembering in Hume. The former are via impressions, and the latter by the matching ideas. — Corvus

The point being that ideas and perceptions are not properly separated or distinguished.

Doesn't it depend on how fast the movement was? — Corvus

No I don't think so. The fact that some motions are too fast to sense doesn't affect the fact that we sense motions.

How to isolate an instant? Take a photo. — jgill

As I've explained above, that is an arbitrarily created "instant". So it provides nothing toward proving that real time consists of a succession of instants.

Only 15.7% of Americans make that much. 57% of Americans make that or less. — frank

The page you referred does not show what you claim here at all. That's just more misinformation.

I wish you all the best in your attempts to help Banno to resist the bad habit of equivocation, but I'm afraid it will be fruitless.

But I think you're questioning whether even the most sophisticated software can "hear the pitches." That is, you're wondering if "discrete pitches" is something a perceiver brings to the auditory stream, rather than locating or identifying them there. — J

The issue, is that the software will definitely hear "the pitches", but only because it is designed to pick those designated pitches out. So the hearing of distinct pitches is a feature of the software, and that's not necessarily a feature of our sense apparatus. The device would be set to distinguish specific frequencies as they occur, and it would record "hearing that pitch". The problem is that the machine would not be distinguishing that as a distinct and separate note, it would just be registering the time when the transmitted frequency passes the designated range. So it's an artificial and arbitrary creation of "a pitch".

A fair question, but then there would be nothing special about this question as applied to music. It would be the huge, overhanging question of the extent to which our subjectivity creates the reality it seems to encounter — J

That's right, I see nothing special about this question as applied to music. The same issue, in a more general sense, is what I am discussing with Corvus. That is the question of whether we sense distinct and discrete perceptions, impressions, or ideas, (as described by Hume), or whether we sense a continuity of changing information.

Nobody was talking about working for a living. Ssu was saying America is rich because of its global influence. I was saying the average American isn't rich. — frank

Now you're contradicting yourself. You said:

"The average American struggles to make ends meet. They worry about how they're going to afford to retire."

That is intentional misinformation, unless by "struggles to make ends meet" you really mean "has to work to make a living". The average American has to work to make a living. And, the average American manages a comfortable lifestyle on the average American income which is around $65,000 annually.
https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/average-salary-in-us/

Furthermore, if they pay their taxes they automatically pay into social security so "worry about how they're going to afford to retire", is completely unfounded. Unless the acting president has indicated that he may sign an executive order ending the social security program, such worry is irrational.

But in Hume, reflection and inspection on perceived ideas are also perceptions. Every mental event is perception. — Corvus

This is indicative of the problem I am talking about. Hume does not acknowledge the difference between sensing (simple observation as time passes), and the analysis of what has already been sensed. By saying that for Hume "every mental state is a perception", you confirm that Hume does not recognize the difference.

What I am arguing is that sensation consists of a continuous flow of change and motion, whereas the analysis consists of representing this continuity as distinct states, perceptions, impressions, or ideas. There is a fundamental difference between these two, the continuous flow of sensation, and the succession of discrete impressions. This difference implies that this type of analysis is fundamentally flawed. It's based in the false premise, or assumption, that a continuous activity can be truthfully represented as a succession of discrete states.

The problem is demonstrated by the example of a movie being a succession of still frames. It may be the case that what appears through sensation to be continuous activity, is really a succession of still frames. But to justify the claim that the apparent continuity really is a succession of frames, requires that we determine the stops and starts, the distinct frames themselves, exposing the mechanism by which the distinct frames are changed and displayed to us one at a time. When in analysis, we simply apply arbitrary stops and starts, we do not base that division into distinct frames on anything real, the frames are arbitrarily assumed and projected onto the apparent continuity. Therefore the whole assumption of a "succession of discrete impressions" is completely ungrounded, because the frames are mental constructs arbitrarily created, and this renders the premise that what appears through sensation as continuous activity is really a succession of discrete moments, as completely unsound.

Think of a security camera monitoring a set space in your garden.  When it detects a movement via infrared lighting, the sensor in the camera triggers recording.  When the motion ends, or goes out of sight, the detection operation switches off, ending the recording of the image of the object which triggered the recording. — Corvus

The sensitivity of the trigger is set at an arbitrary value, and the range of possible values has physical limitations. Also the detector has a limited spatial range. The start and end of the motion are determined relative to these arbitrary features.

Living paycheck to paycheck is pretty common. — frank

Even if that is representative of "the average American", how is it anything other than having to work for a living?

It often comes from a heroin deficiency. — frank

I do not believe that is representative of "the average American".



What do you think Trump means when he said:

"I have determined that president Zelenskyy is not ready for Peace if America is involved, because he feels our involvement gives him a big advantage in negotiations."

Why would he not want American involvement in "Peace" if he feels American involvement in "Peace" gives him a big advantage?

Terminology again . . . we do hear a series of tones, we just can't recognize them. A software program can. — J

As I said, there is only a series of tones in conception, and when that conception is applied. That's what the software program does, applies the conception. We do not hear a series of tones, evidenced by what you say, we "can't recognize them".

So sound is not a physical thing. I give up. — Banno

OED: Sound 1) "a sensation caused in the ear by the vibration...". Sensations are not physical things. Therefore sounds are not physical things, just like colours are not physical things. Get with the program!

As I said previously, we can perform the operation of inspecting a single impression or ideas in our reflecting operations by mind after the perception. — Corvus

The point though is that the creation of "a single impression", is a product of that act of reflecting. It is not the direct product of sensation, so it is not an accurate description of perception, it is a description of how perception appears when revisited in the memory. This makes the "single impression" a mental abstraction rather than a sense perception.

Is continuity a single movement of smooth, undisturbed and conjoined movement from start to the end of the movement? Or is it an illusory appearance of the many instances of the sliced images? What is your own idea on this? — Corvus

There is no real start and end. The start and end are arbitrarily assigned by the sensing being, for whatever purpose.



Here's someone at Oxford who's as crazy as I am, Frank Arntzenius: https://philpapers.org/rec/ARNATR

I argue that, despite the fact that there have been interesting and relevant developments in mathematics and physics since the time of Zeno, each of these views still has serious drawbacks. — Are there really Instantaneous Velocities?

We watch the finger with the slide move up the guitar string. This is certainly "movement" if anything is. What do we hear? A series of tones that change pitch, at intervals that are in fact specifiable acoustically, but indistinguishable to the human ear. — J

Actually, we do not hear a series of tones, we here a slide, which is a sound of changing pitch, consisting of no distinct tones. That's the point of my discussion of Hume's misrepresentation of sense perception. Hume describes sensation as a succession of impressions, which is consistent with "a series of tones". But that's not what we actually sense, which is a continuity of change, a slide. It is only when we apply the conception of distinct tones, to the sound which is heard, that we conclude there is a series of tones.

That it is not a series of tones which is heard, is demonstrable through the Zeno process. If a person was hearing a series of tones in a slide, we'd be able to say which distinct tones the person hears. Since we can't we have to conclude an infinite number of tones, as the slide is infinitely divisible.

Not Banno. Physics and mathematics. — Banno

Yes, it's Banno's conception. You present it, and claim that it's justified by physics and mathematics.

Is the slide or the portamento a physical entity? If not, then I am not sure what else it might be... Calling it a perception is wrong. — Banno

We are discussing what is heard, and that is the perception. The point is that there is no "phyiscal entity" which corresponds with what is heard, because what is heard is a changing sound which is not a physical thing.

Notice that the move can be counted as a unit, and that it is distinct to the individual notes. — Banno

By what principles do you count a move as a unit?

The physical world does not care whether we choose continuous or discrete mathematics to best describe it. — Banno

A philosopher who is seeking truth does care. That is the difference between you and I. You don't care what we say about how things are, so long as what is said serves the purpose at hand. And language has evolved to facilitate common purposes. I want to be able to speak the truth about how things are, and that requires a much more thoughtful and deliberate use of language.

The phenomena of the movement is captured by perception at the moment when it happens. — Corvus

The point though, is that there is no such thing as "the moment when it happened". Movement requires time, duration, temporal extension, whereas "the moment" implies a point in time with no extension. This means that there is no such thing as the moment when a movement happened.

That's why @Banno's conception of "instantaneous velocity" is self-contradicting nonsense.

Taking out a slice of the movement out of the continuity is only possible in the course of reflection of the ideas.  Human mind can achieve this, because it has memory and reasoning which can recall the perceived ideas and analyze them with the rational investigation. — Corvus

The problem is that there is more than one way to take "a slice of the movement".

In one way, we can assume two distinct states, at t1 and at t2, each with a corresponding description (the room is green, and the room is red, or object is at point A and object is at point B). From this we can infer that a change from A to B occurred during that time period. We can make all kinds of assumptions about what happened between A and B (the room was painted, the particle took every possible path), what caused this change, etc.. But these would just be assumptions without the empirical evidence required to support them.

In another way, we can describe the activity which occurred between t1 and t2 (the room was being painted, the object was moving, the wave function). In this way we are actually describing the continuity between t1 and t2, what happened in that duration of time.

The important point is that the two are very different types of descriptions. And, if we take the first way, the description of two distinct states at t1 and t2, and assume that this way provides a description of the activity which occurs in the duration of time between t1 and t2, we are accepting a false assumption. It does not provide that description.

I don't believe that Hume meant we perceive the movement slice by slice as the broken images. — Corvus

Yes he did clearly mean that. He described a "succession of impressions", rather than the continuity of change which we actually sense.

Hume was explaining how human mind works especially on perception. He was not talking about the reality itself. — Corvus

He falsely described perception as a succession of impressions, rather than as a continuity of activity.

The average American struggles to make ends meet. — frank

Does "struggles" mean that they have to go to work five days a week?

They worry about... — frank

Worrying is self-inflicted anxiety.

This article https://news.mit.edu/2024/study-reveals-universal-pattern-brain-wave-frequencies-0118 describes how scientists have determined distinct layers in the brain, with different frequency brain waves associated with the distinct layers.

High frequency oscillations occur in the upper layers, and this is where new data is received and processes. The information is maintained in the lower layers through low frequency activity. A balance is required between the high frequency and low frequency, with the middle layers acting to accomplish this. The balance is required so that one does not overpower the other, causing "neuropsychiatric disorders". It is suggested that ADHT is when higher frequencies dominate, and schizophrenia is when lower frequencies are too strong.

A balance between top-down and bottom-up activity is required for everything which we do, but you can see how it is necessary for the balance to tip one way or the other, depending on what a person is doing.

The high-level implication is that the cortex has multiple mechanisms involving both anatomy and oscillations to separate ‘external’ from ‘internal’ information.

The phenomenon comes in via perception in the form of impressions and ideas. Hence we are not really seeing the reality, but the phenomenon. — Corvus

The point though, is that Hume represents sense perception as a succession of distinct perceptions. But in reality sense perception consists of continuous activity, because it has temporal duration. And what is actually sensed is the activities which occur in time. The distinct "impressions and ideas" are only created when we impose breaks into the continuity of perception.

So for example, the wall is described as "green" at t1, and as "red" at t2, and these are distinct impressions or ideas. However, sense perception has provided a continuous activity, during which the wall was painted. Whenever we break down sense perception into distinct impressions or distinct states (the colour of the wall was green, then the colour of the wall was red), we completely avoid describing the temporal aspect of change (the colour of the wall was changing). So we intentionally remove the temporal aspect from the phenomenon, to work with a less accurate representation, because it is easier to work with.

Because they we are perceiving the phenomenon in impressions and ideas, we can analyze them with reasoning. We can stop them, rewind them and even predict them too. You seem be talking about the reality which is not accessible via perception totally disregarding the way our perception works. — Corvus

So if we do this, analyze the phenomena as distinct impressions or ideas, we have already imposed those breaks onto the continuity of the phenomenon of sense perception, to divide that continuity into a multitude of distinct impressions. Therefore this analysis is not giving us a true representation of sense perception, as continuous phenomenon, because it is analyzing distinct impressions which have been artificially created by breaking the continuity down.

The first "tone" is an individual, the second an attribute. The attribute of that individual changed - perhaps in pitch, perhaps in timbre, perhaps in volume. — Banno

Looks like equivocation to me.

The colour of that wall is still the colour of that wall, even if it moves from red to green — Banno

Again , equivocation. Consider the difference in the meaning of "colour" in the follow two phrases. "The colour of the wall is green", and "the colour of the wall".

One of the interesting things you can do with language, equivocate.

Did you know that the conscious mind has limited memory so-called working memory? At any given time, it can access only three to five items. — MoK

Trying anything more than that would probably cause a migraine.

Yes, and so perhaps the mind spatializes the succession as well as the continuity — PoeticUniverse

I think that this is the point. The mind spatializes the thing which we sense as a temporal continuity, and it is the spatialization which creates distinct frames in succession. But the spatialization of time does not provide an accurate representation.

Yes, that's it. Yet the illusion is extremely strong. — J

Sense perception is the only means we have for understanding the world around us. If the understanding of the world which sense perception produces, is an illusion, then the illusion is bound to be a strong one. As philosophers, we take on the task of getting beyond the illusion. This is illustrated by the famous allegory of the cave. The illusion is so strong that most will not even understand that it's an illusion.

Why shouldn't a tone move? — Banno

If a tone changes, up or down, it becomes a different tone. The same thing happens to colour.

We perceive motion as continuous because it appears as continuous. If continuity means without stopping, then it is not deceiving our senses at all. There are two points on continuity. — Corvus

If what appears as a continuity is really a succession of distinct locations, then the senses are deceiving us.

What seems to be clear is that continuous movement is the result of our perception. Without perception, continuity doesn't arise in the movement, or even the movement itself. — Corvus

Then it appears like you would say that perception is deception.

Whatever the case, time is not needed for the motion logically. — Corvus

I don't understand this claim. How would the ball's existence at one location be distinguished from its existence at another location, other than on the basis of this being at two different times? Or would the ball just be everywhere all at once?

We describe a melody as "moving from start to finish"; we say the pitches "go up" or "go down"; we say that a tune is "slow" or "fast". In fact nothing like this happens -- there is no physical entity doing any "moving". — J

The ear is very complex, and it's parts are moving, so there are physical entities which are moving. It's just that description, that the tones are moving, which is inaccurate. In reality if there was a physical entity called the melody, it is an arrangement of parts, which can't really be moving because that would mess up the arrangement.

Thanks for your input Mijin. "Brainwave states" provides a different perspective. Maybe there is some real science here, instead of the stuff that Christoffer is offering. I assume the higher brainwave states, gamma, beta, represent higher mental activity, and the lower states theta, delta, represent lower activity.

Can we correlate more active brainwaves, higher frequency, with more focused brain activity, therefore stable, rational, thought, and also correlate lower frequency with less focused brain activity, unstable, irrational, fluctuating, like dreams. If so, how do you think it is possible that higher frequency brain activity (rapid change), corresponds with focused, stable thinking?

But are the continuous movements possible without perception? — Corvus

The issue is whether continuous movement is even possible at all. Since we understand and conceptualize movement as as a succession of instants in time, continuous motion is outside our ability to understand. That's what Zeno demonstrated. This produces the issue of whether our senses deceive us when we perceive motion as continuous.

nteresting point.   But think of the old movies shot by 8mm camera with the roll films.  The movement in the film is made of each single still image.  When the single images are run through the projector with the light, it gives us continuous moving motion.  The continuous movement and motion is recreated in our brain by the latent memory.  In actuality, they are just single still images running continuously in fast speed in order to recreate the recorded motions.

Hume is seeing our visual perception in the same way.  His idea of perception is that we have the single impressions and the matching ideas of perceived objects coming into our senses continuously creating the perception just like the old movies made of 8mm films. — Corvus

The point though, is that sense perception is as a continuous movement. So, when Hume represents it as a succession of still frames, he already applies the conceptualized version of motion, across this gap of inconsistency, to represent sense perception in a way which is not true. In doing this, the reality of time is lost to him.

If we take your film example, the sense perception is "continuous moving motion". We have good reason to believe that the reality of the situation is a succession of still frames, because the still frames are produced, and run through the machine. We can stop the machine and look at them. Therefore we have all the evidential backing required to support this conceptualization of a succession of frames as true.

In the case of Hume's succession of perceptions, we have not got the required evidence to support this conceptualization. It is conjecture, speculation. Then, he turns this speculative representation back onto sense experience, to describe sensation this way, with only arbitrary separation between distinct still frames.

Now, the true or real passing of time (when actual change occurs) happens between the distinct still frames, with the film moving from one to another. This is what happens when one frame replaces another. But since the distinct frames are arbitrarily assumed by speculative theory in Hume's representation, the reality of this process whereby on frame replaces another, is completely left out. Therefore we lose the reality of time, which would be the true principles whereby the distinct frames (or moments in time) are identified, and the changing of one to another could be represented.

At any chance, we can stop the perception, and pick the single impression and ideas to investigate its contents. — Corvus

We can do this with the "movie". We can take the film out of the projector and show the distinct frames. However, we cannot do this with sense perception. We cannot remove a distinct frame. We produce an arbitrary frame, by applying the conceptual precepts of description onto the active sense perception. So any distinct impression analyzed is an arbitrarily created object, produced for the purpose of analysis. It it is not a true stopping of the perception, nor is it analogous with stopping the projector and looking at the distinct frames, because of that arbitrariness. And it is that arbitrariness which causes us to lose the reality of time. That time is not real, is a conclusion produced by the incorrect thinking, that arbitrarily created still frames are real.

Also, this is a feature of relativity theory. If we take arbitrarily created reference frames, and arbitrary rest frames as "real", we similarly deny the reality of time. So taking relativity theory as "true", rather than simply a useful way of representing motion, is a denial that time is real.

This demonstrates that it is a very complex issue. Essentially we choose, and are genetically inclined, to empathize with some and not with others. The tendencies may be somewhat unique to the individual, but they are readily shaped and modified by ideology. The limits to the "goodness" of empathy is a complex issue.

So, the synapses change accordingly to allow for memorizing things in time. — MoK

Don't you think so?

Do you disagree that memorizing requires synapse plasticity? — MoK

I think I was arguing the opposite. What I was saying is that despite talking about memories as if they are fixed objects, stored somewhere, they are never truly fixed. The plasticity means that they are always changing with each recollection.

Hume was also saying time doesn't exist. Could then time be the quality of ideas of objects perceived by mind in Hume? — Corvus

Hume has a mistaken premise, that sense perception consists of a "succession" of distinct perceptions. This is not consistent with experience, which demonstrates that we actually perceive continuous motion and change with our senses. This renders the quoted argument from Hume as unsound.

Consider, that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the observed continuity of movement and our conceptual representation of it, as demonstrated by Zeno. Hume describes our conceptual representation of motion as a "succession of changeable objects". He negates the Zeno inconsistency by describing sense perception as distinct perceptions. Then the continuity of movement is left out of the representation, as completely unreal. However, this is done by denying the reality that sense perception actually consists of continuous change rather than as a succession of objects. Accordingly, it also rids us of the fundamental Platonic principle of skepticism, that the senses deceive us. But it does this through his false premise, describing sensation as a succession of distinct perceptions. This false premise also produces the conclusion that time is not real, in a way related to how Zeno proved that motion is not real.

allowing people to understand deeply and care about the feelings of others — Rob J Kennedy

Is that what empathy is? I don't know about that.

The synapses only change when a new thing is memorized or learned. — MoK

Things are being learned and memorized at every moment in time.

Well, without synapse plasticity we just cannot memorize a new thing. — MoK

Memorizing is not a one time thing. Each time a person recollects, and memorizes, one does this in a new situation, under new conditions, therefore a new thing is memorized each time. Notice that to memorize something requires repeating the same thing over and over in the mind. The strength of the memory is dependent on the quality of the repetition. Whenever repetition is done under different conditions it is not really "the same thing" which is repeated. because of the new conditions. Plasticity allows that the memory can be strengthened or altered depending on the conditions of the repetition.

The memories are stored in the synapses. — MoK

I don't think that's accurate. Memory is attributed to synapse regulation, which works through synapse plasticity. So memory is a feature of this plasticity, which is a feature of synapse regulation, not the synapse itself. To understand memory is to understand how synapse plasticity is regulated.

What do you mean with the mind here? If by the mind you mean a substance, rather than physical, that ideas, such as thoughts, feelings, psychological time, etc. are present to it then I have to say there is a mind with the ability to experience the ideas. The ideas are however the manifestation of the neutrals' activities. — MoK

No, I don't think of the mind as a substance, I think of it as a cause of activity.

IMO, the boat amazing part of it is that, in my dreams, I am entirely surprised by everything. The scenery. What I find when I walk into a room. Who I run into. What others do. Events like the weather. I, obviously, created everything in my dream. Yet I chose to hide things from myself, and am somehow sble to do so. How do I make a character in my dream do and say everything it does and says, and still be surprised by everything it does and says? — Patterner

This is the real feature of dreams, the reality of dreams, which Christoffer is busily denying by reducing dreams to predictive coding.

But if memories are simply neural activity, then they are not "held" anywhere. They are something which happens, and it happens only when the memory is present to the mind.

If it is the case, then memories are not things stored in the subconscious, and your post is pretty much irrelevant.

I said that all memories stored in the subconscious mind are present to it at once. If not, then there must be many subconscious minds each knowing a certain memory at once. There are however two problems here which depend on how the memories are stored in the brain: 1) Either the memories are stored in different subconscious minds independently or 2) The memories are stored in different subconscious minds hierarchically, tree likes. — MoK

What if memory is like I suggested, a pattern of neural activity which is repeated?

It becomes impossible to even show you why you are wrong, where you are wrong and how, — Christoffer

That's the obvious consequence of a person being right. Accept the reality.

You aren't just calling what I argue about, pseudo-science, you actively point at these studies I've referenced and the science overall, calling it pseudo-science. — Christoffer

That's right, its pseudo-science. The final sentence in the passage confirms this. The author says, "the brain will jump from one prediction to another". Where's the verification in this? What actually occurs is not recognizable as prediction, so the author just claims, it's jumping around. The author is just assuming this to be some sort of predictive operation, so when the appearance is inconsistent with prediction, the claim is that it's jumping around.. The proper conclusion, the "bizarre, fragmented, and discontinuous dream narratives with vague, uncertain perceptual qualities" are not predictions at all.
The author makes the same mistake as you do, and provides the same pseudo science.

The author then supports this pseudo-science with what you call "anecdotal evidence", an example of a dream analyzed. How do we even know whether it's the report of an actual dream, and not just an example made up by the author?

And in what way does any evidence of that argue against what I'm saying? — Christoffer

I conclude that you are not very good with basic logic or critical thinling.

What I argue for is aligned with this; that when sleeping, sensory input is cut off, but the predictive operation continues, forming predictions from long term memory to test against experiences in our short term memory. — Christoffer

Then it's not predictive coding anymore, as the adversarial model indicates. That the two models are consistent with each other but applicable at different times, sleeping and awake, is not at all surprising, it is to be expected.

The adversarial process is just a layer that grounds this experience through virtual sensations. — Christoffer

The big issue though, is that the internal sensations, what you call "virtual sensations" are completely different from external sensations, as the difference between top-down and bottom-up. And this is the difference which makes verification irrelevant. And since verification is irrelevant the predictive coding model is not applicable.

In the article you quoted above, the author makes a half-ass attempt to show verification in the anecdotal evidence of the example dream, but it's clearly contrived and most likely fabricated evidence.

And for imagination and creativity when we are awake, it's the same thing, a decoupling of sensory verification using virtual verification to direct predictions from merely operating on reality. — Christoffer

"Virtual verification" is nonsense. It's a self-contradicting concept, fabricated in an attempt to apply the theory where it is not applicable.

None of this is a rejection of predictive coding, it's just expanding on details. — Christoffer

As I said, the adversarial model does not reject the predictive coding model. Nor did I ever reject the predictive coding model. I accept that it has its areas of application. However, the adversarial model is not an "expanding on details" of predictive coding. It is a representation of a distinct activity.

What I'd like to point out to you is that the two models are very distinct, modeling two distinct types of brain activity, one known as top-down, the other as bottom-up. They each have there place in the brain of a living human being, one taking priority when we are awake, the other when we are asleep. That these two are distinct is the reason for the op.

I'm constantly mentioning how the senses are cut off or scrambled and how it's this very fact that makes predictions unreliable and responsible for the surreal experience. I don't know why you don't get this simple fact and constantly try to change what I say to being that the process is relying on the senses and "have to include it". It's only relying on sense input for us to operating normally when we are awake through grounding the mental predictions. But I've said, numerous times, and it's the damn main point in my argument, that distortion of sense input or a complete lack of it scrambles the prediction ability; generating an experience we can either have as hallucinations or dreams. Just because the grounding data is distorted or gone doesn't mean the brain stops trying to predict in order to reach a state of normal operation. — Christoffer

I see you still refuse to differentiate between hallucinations which involve an input of sense data, and dreams, which do not. You do this intentionally so that you do not have to distinguish between a brain process which relies on sense input, and one which does not. This allows you to argue that predictive coding is applicable to dream activity.

Do you not recognize that being asleep is completely different from being awake? If you understand this, and recognize this difference, why wouldn't you also accept that the principal brain process when a person is asleep, is different from the principal brain process when a person is awake?

All three parts are essential for the normal operation when we are awake. — Christoffer

This is true if "normal operation" is restricted to predictive coding. That restriction however, is your mistake. Since dreaming is not explainable as predictive coding, this restriction leaves dreaming outside the category of "normal operation".

When our sense data is scrambled through drugs, or during sleep... — Christoffer

Sense input is not "scrambled" in sleep, it is absent. See you keep clutching at straws in your attempt to apply predictive coding where it is not suited.

so it grounds it in something else; the stored experiences in our short term memory as that's where our conscious experience has been stored when awake. — Christoffer

This is pure speculation, and it really makes no sense. If the predictive operation relies on sense input, how could it suddenly switch this reliance to memory instead? Even if it did, it wouldn't be predictive coding anymore, it would be a different process.

That you say that it can't be called predictive coding if one part isn't working, is just some odd straw-man attempt to render the theory invalid because what exactly? — Christoffer

When an essential aspect of a theory is missing from the thing which the theory is being consider to be applied to, the theory is not applicable. That's simple logic, it's not a straw man.

While when we sleep they're cut off or effectively subdued, and predictions must rely on something else for grounding. — Christoffer

If it's grounded in something else, then it's not consistent with predictive coding theory. The obvious conclusion, is that predictive coding is not applicable, as the supposed jumbled "predictions" are not really predictions at all, and there is no point in even looking for the "something else", because it's a completely distinct process.

IF you say the keys are in your pocket when they are in the door, then you are wrong. — Banno

As I said, that's a judgement. Do you dispute the obvious?

Second, how is it that someone can be wrong? To be wrong is to have a belief that is different to how the world is, but if the world is their creation, that would require someone to create a world different to how they believe the world to be. How can we make sense of this? — Banno

That someone is wrong is a judgement. There is no necessary relation between a judgement of "wrong", and how the world is. This is because a judgement is always a matter of choice. Therefore the question of "how is it that someone can be wrong?" is answered with "because we have the power of choice to judge someone as wrong".

The error that I’m pointing to, is taking the mind-independence assumed by naturalism as a metaphysical axiom or a statement about the actual nature of reality. — Wayfarer

Taking mind-independence for granted, as a metaphysical axiom, is completely pointless because it provides no ontological principles through which one could understand the assumed mind-independence. Without any such principles, we have nothing to base judgement of truth or falsity about mind-independence, and these judgements are therefore based in persuasive rhetoric, such as claims like "it's science".

This is why Aristotle proposed the law of identity, 'a thing is the same as itself'. This is meant as a first principle of mind-independence. As a metaphysical axiom it can be debated, accepted, or denied. But since it is the traditional first principle of mind-independence, denial of it prevents understanding of mind-independence, without an alternative proposal.

The law of identity is derived from, or based in, the observed temporal continuity of things, the tendency for things to remain as they are through a duration of time. approached this issue much earlier in the thread.

I don't think that is the case. The subconscious mind is a part of the brain, that part is a neural net, therefore the subconscious mind is intelligent. I also think that all the memories stored in the subconscious mind are present to it at once otherwise we are dealing with a regress when we try to recall something. — MoK

How could it be that all memories which a person has could be present to a mind (subconsciously) at the same time? Wouldn't this be amazingly confusing for that subconscious mind?

The rest of the memories are stored in the subconscious mind. — MoK

Do you think that the memories are actually "stored" in the subconscious? Or is it a subconscious activity which brings the memories to the attention of the conscious mind, and the memory itself is not actually stored anywhere?

An argument needs support in evidence, otherwise an argument is just an opinion. — Christoffer

I provided the evidence. Were you not paying attention?

You reject the actual science because it doesn't align with what you believe and therefore you believe that your own argument is more accurate than an argument based in the actual science. It's impossible to argue with someone who is so fundamentally entrenched in their own belief. — Christoffer

I have no problem with the science of predictive coding, I think it's fine in its application to the mental activity of an awake human being. But since an essential aspect of that theory is sensation, and this does not occur when we are asleep and dreaming, I reject, as pseudo-science, your attempt to apply the theory to dream activity.

And what empirical evidence do you have that rejects predictive coding? — Christoffer

The evidence is clear and obvious, sensing does not occur in the dream state. Further, sensing is an essential feature of predictive coding. Those two premises are well supported by evidence. Therefore the conclusion, that predictive coding is not applicable to dream activity is well supported by evidence.

You don't understand what predictive coding is and how it works. You invent your own interpretation of it and then argue against it. — Christoffer

Look, this is a direct quote from the link which you provided:

In neuroscience, predictive coding (also known as predictive processing) is a theory of brain function which postulates that the brain is constantly generating and updating a "mental model" of the environment. According to the theory, such a mental model is used to predict input signals from the senses that are then compared with the actual input signals from those senses. Predictive coding is member of a wider set of theories that follow the Bayesian brain hypothesis. — Wikipedia

Notice that the "model is used to predict input signals from the senses that are then compared with the actual input signals from those senses." If you really believe that the theory has been scientifically proven to apply to the dream state, then please explain the science. And don't simply refer to supposed chaotic and erroneous predictions that occur without sense input. These chaotic and erroneous "predictions" are not predictions at all, but acts of creativity.

What science are you drawing upon to make this counter-argument? — Christoffer

Are you familiar with theories of adversarial dreaming? Such theories use the concept of general adversarial networks, they focus on the creative capacity of dreams, and are completely distinct from predictive coding theory:

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9071267

Predictive processing theories propose that these representations emerge from predicting or reconstructing sensory inputs. However, brains are known to generate virtual experiences, such as during imagination and dreaming, that go beyond previously experienced inputs. Here, we suggest that virtual experiences may be just as relevant as actual sensory inputs in shaping cortical representations.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38097096/

Where's your foundation? What are the corner stones of your logic? — Christoffer

See above please.

And since the brain is active during sleep, so is the predictive coding process. — Christoffer

According to your referenced material, the predictive coding process operates with the use of "signals from the senses", which are noticeably absent from the dreaming process. Therefore, predictive coding is absent from the brain process occurring during sleep.

On what basis do you form that conclusion? In what way does not the science support what I say? Please provide that in order to reject it, your opinion of it is totally irrelevant. — Christoffer

See above please.

A system of individual parts operating with each other does not mean that if one of the systems fails then all other systems immediately fail as well. — Christoffer

Sure, but the way you describe predictive coding all three parts are required for it, as essential aspects. If one part is missing, then the process cannot be called predictive coding. Clearly, "signals from the senses" is an essential aspect of predictive coding, which is missing from the dream activity. Therefore the dream activity cannot be represented as predictive coding.

If you distort one of the systems, the experience will alter, but it wouldn't shut off the entire system. — Christoffer

This is not a case of distorting one of the systems, it is a case of one being absent. That's why I very intentionally stressed the point that hallucinating is not the same as dreaming, when you first engaged me.

If sense information is disrupted or cut off, the mental model is still trying to predict, but getting no input signals and when comparing, is biased towards the prediction. — Christoffer

If you are so convinced by "the science", then I assume you can produce the science which shows that the predictive coding model is applicable to brain activity which occurs, with no signals from the senses. I'll be waiting.

I should have said: The conscious mind owes most of its experiences to the subconscious mind". This is now an accurate statement. — MoK

Now, all you need to do is notice that the conscious mind has some causal power over the subconscious, and we'd be in agreement. From this agreement we could proceed to discuss the effect of this causal power, and the extent of it. Would you agree that what we call "will power" is an example of this causal power.

The subconscious mind is intelligent because it knows what sort of input the conscious mind requires when the conscious mind focuses on a topic. — MoK

How do you know that this is not just an automatic type of action, like a computer? Maybe the conscious indicates to the subconscious what to do, and the subconscious does it, like machine. You say that the conscious mind's access to memories is limited, and that's obvious from the fact that memory is not perfect, and degrades with time, but I think that this is generally a degradation of the subconscious part.

The subconscious mind can create thoughts as well. It occurred to me on several occasions in my life that I was thinking about something very hard without reaching a conclusion. — MoK

This is obvious, in dreams, and that is the point of the op. It is the subconscious which creates those thoughts. And we must call them "thoughts", because they are not memories, but imaginative fictional experiences. But what I was arguing, is that in these instances where the subconscious is "thinking", without being directed by the conscious, the thoughts are very random and not logically consistent.

But I do not agree that you could have been "thinking about something very hard" with only the subconscious part of your mind, because "very hard" implies conscious effort. And whether you reached a conclusion or not is irrelevant to whether you were thinking consciously or subconsciously.

The conscious mind does not receive any sense data when the person is asleep. It however receives hallucinations so-called dreams when the person is asleep. The situation is different when the person is awake. — MoK

Dreams are not hallucinations. The two are completely different because the hallucinating person is awake. There my be a blurred boundary between the two, such as when the hallucinating person passes out, or goes into a coma. Also, the lucid dreaming discussed earlier takes advantage of a similar blurred boundary between sleeping and being awake.

But you provide no support for that explanation. I'm referring to predictive coding which has experimental verification. — Christoffer

I provided you a very good argument demonstrating that dreaming cannot possibly be a predictive process. This leaves verification, which is related to predictive process, as totally irrelevant. That was my support.

"My" predictive coding theory? Sorry, but if you're to reject an actual scientific theory that has experimental proof behind it, then I'm sorry, but you're not operating on a level enough for critical thinking around this subject. — Christoffer

So-called "scientific theory" is rejected when it is not consistent with empirical evidence. That is the nature of one form of critical thinking.

If you are to object to it, provide references to other experimental data and theories that criticize it. There are some that do this, all thought today they're in a minority due to the experimental evidence backing predictive coding. — Christoffer

I've provided you the argument which eliminates the possibility that dreaming is a predictive process. To reiterate, a "prediction" consists of extending the immediate past into the future, to predict what will happen. Without any sense data there is no immediate past upon which to base a prediction for the future, therefore prediction is impossible. A dream is not a predictive process. "Predictive process" theory applies only to a brain which is actively sensing

Further, I provided personal evidence, of when I have dreamed about falling. In these dreams I awaken at the precise instance that prediction enters the experience. These dreams flow by, as experience at the present, with absolutely no predictive process, and when I start falling, the awakening is simultaneous with the prediction of hitting the ground. This clearly indicates to me, that prediction is a part of the awake mind, but not a part of the dreaming mind. That is my "experimental data".

Predictions are based on past experiences, that's what I'm saying, but these predictions are similar to generative computation in which the generated predictions are chaotic and filled with errors. Sense data grounds this and verifies it in real-time. — Christoffer

It seems that you have no rigorous criteria for what constitutes a "prediction". For you, a random generation would qualify as a prediction. And then instead of recognizing that a specific type of thinking is not a form of prediction at all, you look at that form of thinking which is not a form of prediction, as a prediction which is "chaotic and filled with errors". This is just sophistry, which allows you to include into a category, things which are not of that category at all, by saying that they are erroneous aspects of that category.

My "experimental data", explained above, demonstrates that prediction is actually excluded from the dreaming process. Whenever prediction attempts to infiltrate the dreaming process, the dreaming person is plunged into awakeness. This shows that the dream is not a prediction which is chaotic and filled with errors due to a lack of data from past experience. The dream actually consists of an exclusion of the predictive process. When prediction tries to force its way into the dream, the dreamer awakens.

And, when you look at the dream from the premise that thinking is fundamentally a predictive process, the dream appears to consist of predictions which are chaotic and filled with errors. But that's simply because the dream is not a predictive process, and the premise that thinking is fundamentally a predictive process is therefore proven to be false.

No, you are using "the dreaming mind" as a elemental object in your rhetoric as if it was an object in support of your conclusions. The "dreaming mind" means nothing without the facts on how it operates and function and why we dream in the first place. I'm speaking of the mechanics behind it, which then informs the reason why we experience the belief in our dreams as they happen. You can't just say "the dreaming mind" as some illusive part of your argument and ignore the reasons why we dream. — Christoffer

It is you who is making "the dreaming mind" into an elemental object, through your false premise. You premise that thinking is fundamentally a predictive process, and then you view all mental activity from this perspective. This gives you a significantly biased perspective.

Instead of viewing predictive capacity as a higher aspect proper only to a highly developed consciousness, with a highly developed intellectual capacity, you view predictive capacity as a fundamental aspect of any form of thinking. So when you look at the more base aspects of thinking, such as those demonstrated by dreaming, you improperly impose this highly developed aspect, predictive capacity, onto that base aspect, and conclude that the base aspect is carrying out the higher aspect to a lesser degree, which is chaotic and full of error. This robs you of the ability to properly understand the base capacity, for what it really is, and how it allowed for the development of the higher capacity, because all you can see is a lack of the higher capacity (chaotic and filled with errors), and you have no principles by which to understand what the base capacity really is.

Because it is part of understanding why it happens. When sensory verification gets cut off, people still believe the reality that is scrambled in their experience. Because there's no other system in the mind that operates as a form of separate perception of the experience able to deduce its validity or not, it's a holistic system in which the distortion of reality and the belief in that reality depends on how well the whole system is able to operate. A gradual process that at a certain point of distortion, distorts the whole process and in turn the ability to discern what's real and what's not based on our experience of verified reality.

It's hard to explain this when you seem to get lost in even the most basic explanation. — Christoffer

I agree that this is hard for you to explain to me. Your false premise makes "verification" irrelevant. So you'll never get through to me in this way. It's like you are saying that you can explain how the different shades of red are different degrees of sweetness, and you are going on about these different shades of sweetness, when I am insisting that your basic premise, "red is sweet" is false.

That's what I'm doing, I'm claiming that your basic premise "thinking is a predictive process" is false. So you'll never get through to me by talking about verification, because I've already excluded verification as irrelevant by denying your basic premise.

For the second time, it's not "my" theory, it's a scientific theory with experimental evidence. — Christoffer

It is your theory. You have adopted it, and support it. Therefore it is your theory, and it forms your bias, regardless of who invented it.

While this process is constantly happening, it's when we sleep that we consolidate and flush our short term memory and produce stronger neurological pathways. — Christoffer

OK, let's look at this. Would you agree, that when we sleep, and we "consolidate and flush our short term memory and produce stronger neurological pathways", that this is not a predictive process? If so, then why would you think that dreaming, which is also what occurs when we sleep, is a predictive process?

Predictive operation happens through the interplay between short term memory, long term memory and sense verification. Cutting out one of these out or distort it, will scramble the entire process, making the experience jarring for us, as we experience in hallucinations and dreams. — Christoffer

This is completely wrong, and misrepresentative. You are just making it up.

If "predictive operation" requires three aspects, and one of them is removed, then we no longer have "predictive operation". That is simple logic. If three parts are required to make a specific whole, and one is missing, then we do not have that specific whole. Taking one part out does not "scramble the entire process", it denies the possibility of that process.

You do not visit long term memory. It's not a damn book store. — Christoffer

It appears like you are so wrapped up in your pseudo-science, and deceptive false premises, that you do not even consider your own personal experiences, and how they would easily refute what you appear to believe. When I want to think about something which occurred years ago, I "visit long term memory", just like if it was a conveniently located book store.

Wrong, memory consolidation and the processes of the mind are proven to be "on" even when we sleep. You are denying the science here, making shit up to support your own ideas. — Christoffer

This demonstrates clearly what your problem is. You characterize "the processes of the mind" as fundamentally predictive, and you take this as a primary premise. Then you admit evidence which demonstrates that the mind is active even when we are asleep. But instead of admitting the evidence which demonstrates that the activity while asleep is not predictive, thereby disproving your primary premise, you wrongly assert that the activity while one is asleep is predictive.

Your experience is not evidence and proof of what you say. — Christoffer

If experience is not evidence then you are not doing science. This is more evidence that what you present is pseudo-science.

Predictive coding at its core is not about you "consciously" predicting anything. What does this have to do with predictive coding? You're just confused. I recommend you read up on what you're arguing against before making up odd interpretations of what the prediction aspect is about. — Christoffer

Why don't you read up on actual sleep science and neuroscience instead? — Christoffer

I think it's you who needs to read up on "predictive coding". You are wrongly applying the science of the neurological activity which depends on sense perception (awake), to the neurological activity which occurs without sense perception (asleep). This has gotten you totally confused.

Your belief is irrelevant when the science says otherwise. — Christoffer

Personal experience is irrelevant to you, because you are a pseudo-scientist. A true scientist knows that verification relies on experience.

No, as I repeatably have been saying, hallucinations and being under the influence, inflicts a disruption to the interplay in predictive coding, primarily sense perception verification, which makes our brain predicting unreliable and producing distortions to our experience. — Christoffer

Maybe we can get somewhere if you'll seriously consider this statement of yours. What do you think constitutes this "disruption"? Since predictive coding requires sense perception, difficulties in sense perception, evidenced as hallucinations, are responsible for the stated unreliability. Now, I ask you to remove all sense perception, like in the case of sleeping. Do you not see that there is no predictive coding at all? Therefore dreaming cannot be described by predictive coding theory.

Fundamentally, you ignore the science behind all of this. — Christoffer

What I ignore is the pseudo-science which you are professing.

Drawing on these, forming a holistic theory of what happens when the chain of operation is disrupted, either through chemical psychedelics and when we sleep. — Christoffer

I am waiting for you to respect the fact that when the disruption is complete, as in the case of sleeping, the operation, which is the predictive coding process, no longer occurs. Therefore we cannot apply predictive coding theory to the dreaming mind.

Russia has only conquered Russian speaking, ethnically Russian, and also Russian identifying (to a large extent), regions in Ukraine (large extent being defined here as enough to render pacification easy).

Russia is simply not conquering, nor shows any signs of intending to conquer, anyone who is not fundamentally cool with being conquered. — boethius

I would call this bullshit. Do you think that speaking a specific language means that you identify with, as belonging to, and wanting to be a citizen of, i.e. "conquered by", that mother country where the language derives? For example, do you think that Americans would be "fundamentally cool" with being conquered by England because they speak English?

Furthermore, it's very evident that many expatriates are expatriates because they disavow the governance of the homeland. But when the disgruntled ex-citizens are perceived as congregating and conspiring against the government of the homeland, by members of that government, they might feel compelled to take action against them.

(I recall, but can’t re-find, a remark by a Republican, dismissing concern, along the lines of ‘some kid crying because he didn’t get his milk bottle’.) — Wayfarer

The poor baby, it doesn't get fed and it starts crying. Best to just walk away and ignore it.

The difference is that when a person is awake, his conscious mind experiences a simulation of reality that is the result of sensory inputs -- he also experiences thoughts, feelings, etc., whereas when he is asleep, he only experiences a simulation constructed by the subconscious mind. — MoK

This does not address the problem. You said: "The conscious mind owes all its experiences to the subconscious mind". This implies that in both dreaming and awake, the consciousness "only experiences a simulation constructed by the subconscious mind".

Now you have simply asserted that in the awake condition the simulation is the result of sensory inputs, thoughts and feelings. But these are things experienced in the consciousness. And, you have in no way answered my question, which was how do you account for this difference. If the conscious mind owes all of its experiences to the subconscious, why, and how, would the subconscious be creating these two very distinct types of experience for the consciousness, the asleep experience, and the awake experience?

The difference between the two is that the conscious mind can only function properly when a person is awake, while the subconscious mind is always active. The conscious mind is also responsible for creating new thoughts based on what it perceives from the subconscious mind. These new thoughts then are registered in the subconscious mind's memory for further analysis in the future. — MoK

You are being inconsistent. If the consciousness owes all of its experience to the subconscious, as you claim, then it is inconsistent to say that the conscious mind can create something itself (new thoughts). And if we allow that the conscious mind has such a creative capacity, then we need principles to distinguish between what is created by the conscious and what is created by the subconscious. Without such principles, one could argue, as Cartesian skeptics do, that everything supposedly presented from the subconscious, along with sense data, are a creation of the conscious.

Becoming awake is partly due to senses (from Google): People wake up at a certain time in the morning primarily due to their "circadian rhythm," which is essentially the body's internal clock located in the brain's hypothalamus, that regulates sleep-wake cycles by releasing hormones like melatonin based on light exposure, causing us to feel sleepy at night and alert in the morning when light hits our eyes; essentially signaling the body to wake up. — MoK

I don't understand what you are saying. You explain the circadian rhythm as something completely independent from the senses, yet you claim that being awake is partly due to the senses.

As I mentioned, the subconscious mind is always active otherwise it could not construct dreams. — MoK

Again, this doesn't address the issue, which is the following. If the subconscious is always active, therefore always providing something for the consciousness, why would it at sometimes provide sense data, and at other times not? If things are as you say, that the subconscious is always in complete control over what the consciousness receives, and the consciousness has no causal influence over this, then how does the subconscious turn off and on the sense input, when it appears to be the opposite, because it is actually the consciousness which goes to sleep and wakes up? Since the consciousness is what goes to sleep and wakes up, it appears obvious that the consciousness itself turns off and on the sense data.

That is not what I was saying. I said that the similarities are in how it disconnects or scramble the verification process in the brain. Making the brain trying to predict something it does not get a verification to ground the predictions into an easily navigational space. — Christoffer

I explained to you why "verification" is irrelevant.

It's part of predictive coding theory which is the current dominant theory in the science of consciousness. If you don't agree, you need to provide something else that explains how the predictions are structured into a consistent experience. — Christoffer

No, I do not have to provide something else. I demonstrated logically, from sound premises, why your "predictive coding theory" is false in its application to dreams. There is no need for me to provide an alternative. In fact, the reason for starting this thread, was to ask others for theories. I simply reject yours, for the reasons given.

Why are you concluding it to be something else rather than unbound predictions based on the flow of memories? As I mentioned, in predictive coding, it's already stated that our sensory data grounds the predictive process, so you're simply wrong against the dominating theory. — Christoffer

Unless there is something experienced as "the past", there is no grounds for any prediction of "the future". Anything predicted of the future must be derived from something already experienced of the past. When you say that predictions are based on the flow of memories you admit to this. So unless you provide another source for memories, you have not any principles to deny that prediction is based in, and requires sensation.

Short term memory is a form of RAM memory bridge that is constantly feeding experiences into long term memory to restructure it for better predictions. — Christoffer

You have provided no principles to support this speculation that the purpose of this "memory bridge" is "better predictions". You simply assume "prediction" as your principle, and you see that this "bridge" could produce better predictions, so you conclude therefore it's purpose is better predictions. That is not a valid conclusion.

When we dream, it's our experience of this stream of sequences being consolidated into a restructuring of our predictive model. We experience our brain trying to predict reality based on the stream of sequences from our short term memory, but there's no sensory perception to ground that stream of experiences that's flushed out of our short term memory. So it predicts without solid footing and we experience this interplay between old and new memories as they're being consolidated into long term memories to later be used for future predictions when we wake up. — Christoffer

This makes no sense at all. If there is no sensory perception then there is no short term memory. Therefore the "stream of sequences" within a dream, when there is no sensory perception, is not "from our short term memory". It's very clear, from what a dream actually is, often involving relations from the distant past, that a dream is not a "stream of sequences from our short term memory". And since it is clearly not short term memories involved in a dream, it is equally ridiculous to claim that a dream is some sort of predictive process.

What is this "dreaming mind"? You're not describing an actual process here, just referring to some elusive conjecture called "the dreaming mind". — Christoffer

The "dreaming mind" is a mind which is dreaming. Have you never actually had a dream before? If you have, then I'm sure you've experienced your mind to be dreaming, and you know exactly what I mean by "the dreaming mind".

Our awareness of what is real and what is not has nothing to do with the prediction and verification process. — Christoffer

Then why present me with this theory of prediction and verification, if it has no bearing on what is expressed in the op? Are you admitting that your prediction theory is irrelevant here?

If your read what I'm saying, that's what I'm saying. Even though you're a bit off on the role of the sensory data (the sum experience of interplay between long term memory predictions and sensory data verifying it - is the thing that feeds the long term memory with alterations for how to predict the next moment), the concept is that without the sensory data to ground the prediction model, it can only use the short term memory's stored sequences from the last awaken state as its verification, which scrambles the experience as it's not raw data constantly grounding the predictions. — Christoffer

This is clear evidence that your prediction model is incapable of accurately representing the reality of the situation. First, there is no separation between sensory data and short term memory, as. Sensory data is short term memory, as the thing sensed is in the past by the time sensation of it is recognized. So, without sensory data (short term memory) the mind must rely on long term memory. This is why dreams often consist of long ago acquaintances. Next, long term memory does not predict the next moment. That's nonsensical, the next moment must be predicted from the last moment, i.e. short term memory. Finally, when we visit long term memories we are reflecting, or trying to learn some general principles, we are not predicting. Predicting is when we apply such principles.

So the dreaming mind, which is drawing on the long term memory, because the short term is incapacitated by sleep, is not predicting at all. Let me present you with an example, my childhood recurring dream of falling. My dreams would progress through many stages, until they'd reach the point when I am falling. Then, with the "prediction" of hitting the ground, I would wake up instantaneously. Waking up was simultaneous with predicting. So we can see that there was no predicting within the dream itself, and the occurrence of prediction coincided with waking up, as being a feature of the mind in its awake condition, not its dreaming condition.

But this wouldn't really account for the behavior of dreams combining experiences of both present day and long term stored memories. That there's an interplay between new experiences we just had and memories we might consciously have forgotten about. The interplay between them is the brain looking for connections, neural paths that combine into a solid prediction before the next day. — Christoffer

I do not think that this is representative of common dreaming at all. My dreams practically never have present day experiences within them. They are almost always completely removed and distinct from what I was doing that day, having no relationship to that whatsoever.

You essentially counter-argue with the same conclusion I've already made. Which implies you don't really understand what I'm talking about. And you're not really explaining anything, you're saying an opinion and then use that to form a conclusion. You need actual science and theories behind what you conclude, not just what you agree or don't agree with, otherwise it's just opiniated conjecture. — Christoffer

Again, all I need to show is the evidence to support my premises, and logic, which demonstrates that your predictive coding theory is not applicable to dreams. Then I have a sound conclusion, and I need no science, or other theories, because I have sound premises and valid logic.

I think you need to read up on predictive coding and what that implies for this topic. Otherwise you're getting lost in what I'm talking about. — Christoffer

As I said last post, I have no problem recognizing the importance of prediction in the workings of the mind. However, for the reason explained, and the logical argument I presented, I believe that Predictive coding is not applicable to the dreaming mind (activity of a mind in the dreaming condition).

I think that what is misleading you is that predictive coding is somewhat applicable to a mind under the influence of hallucinogens, and you seem to think that hallucinating is the same as dreaming. This is why I was very quick to tell you that being under the influence of psychedelics is completely different from being asleep and dreaming.

I don't think that the conscious mind has such a causal power at all. The conscious mind owes all its experiences to the subconscious mind. — MoK

Then how would you account for the difference between awake experiences, and dream experiences? If each is the subconscious presenting experience to the conscious, in the exact same way, why is there a difference between the two? We can't simply say that the senses are active in one case, and inactive in the other, because we need to account for whatever it is which activates the senses. The senses do noy activate themselves. Nor does it appear like the subconscious activates the senses, or else they would be activated in dreams. But in most cases, when a sense is activated (a loud sound for instance), it coincides with waking up.

The short version is that it involves using a nightmare scenario as a proxy for someone's total freedom and then using risk as a proxy for percentage to weigh various freedoms as a percentage of that total. — Dan

By "various freedoms", you really mean various constraints don't you? This is how "total freedom" is broken down into individual "freedoms", by imposing moral restrictions on any aspect of the total freedom which falls outside the boundaries of each individual freedom. So what you would really be weighing is the value of those restrictions, each set of restrictions designed to produce a different specific "freedom" from the base, total freedom.