Here's a couple things to consider.

Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics

Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
logical possibility as sufficient reason

Logical possibility causes physics — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "logical possibility".

The present tense of time is best represented as an area of parallel lines: — ucarr

I would not say it is best represented this way. That was just "the best" proposal I could think of at the time..

Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information — ucarr

As I explained, observation does not resolve "the trajectory" of an elementary particle. That's why it's commonly said that the particle takes every possible path. You are still talking about the particle as if it has a trajectory. It does not.

It's logically possible that the "matter hypothesis" is false, but why would we abandon it - unless we had a superior hypothesis? — Relativist

In yor mid, what is the "matter hypothesis"?

I was responding to your contradictory claim ... — Harry Hindu

No wonder I didn't understand. There was no contradictory claim.

So, IS the brain itself a material thing, or is science that reveals the nature of material things misleading us? — Harry Hindu

Both.

The distinction between lying and misleading does not take away from the main point I was making:
Seeing a bent straw in a glass of water is exactly what you would expect to see given the nature of light and that we see light, not objects. Our senses are not misleading us. Our interpretations of what our senses are telling us is misleading us. — Harry Hindu

I have no idea how your example is supposed to demonstrate the point you claim.

You get at the external world by inspecting yourself? — Harry Hindu

Yes, it's the only true way, due to the fact that the senses are misleading.

If we use our ideas to accomplish some task successfully, then it can be safely said that the way we perceived the world at that time was accurate (I'm not really sure the term, "true" is useful here). — Harry Hindu

Again, I don't see how your conclusion follows from your premise. Premise: I can be successful at some task. Conclusion: therefore the way I perceived the world at that time was accurate. Do you see the problem? I set a task for myself, and I make the judgement myself, that I was successful at that task. Then I conclude that because I was successful, the way I perceived the world was accurate.

Unless the task was exclusively designed to be, (and realistically representative in that design), an accurate representation of the world, the conclusion is invalid. If that conclusion was valid, I could define "accurate perception of the world" in any way I wanted, so long as I could complete the designated task which represents this. Obviously, the task represents a very small aspect of the world, and being successful at that task doesn't indicate that my perception of "the world is accurate". Success at self-designated tasks really just demonstrates that I have some degree of understanding of my capabilities, not that I accurately perceive the world. Success at a task doesn't even prove that I know what I am doing. Socrates demonstrated this principle thousands of years ago, and the principle hasn't changed.

Things moving is what causes time to pass. — Arne

I don't think so. I think time passing is what causes things to move.

Time is the measure of change/motion. — Arne

I'm talking about time as the thing which is measured. A clock for example, consists of change/motion, and it is used to measure the passing of time.

Then the very foundation of science is called into question as science relies on observations. Science has pulled the rug out from under itself and doesn't have any ground to stand on. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think that is the endeavour of skepticism, to call into question the very foundation of science. And, the skeptic will reveal that science does pull the rug out from under itself. It always proceeds from some fundamental assumptions, and progresses as far as it can go based on those assumptions. At this time problems are revealed, and skepticism is required to demonstrate how these problems show how science has pulled the rug out from under itself. This is what is revealed by Kuhn's conception of paradigm shift. The paradigm shift is an essential feature of science, and it is exemplative of knowledge itself. Knowledge proceeds according to a designed method (science in this case), and progresses to the point where it reveals that the method has exhausted itself, and must be replaced.

The fact is that science has not shown that our senses mislead us. It is our interpretations that mislead us. In providing a more accurate explanation of mirages and "bent" straws in a glass of water given the nature of light, we find that mirages and bent straws are exactly what we would expect to see. Our senses aren't lying. Light is bent when it travels through different mediums and is why we experience these things the way we do. It wasn't our senses that were lying, it was our interpretation of our experience without the understanding of how light behaves, and it is light we see, not "material" objects. — Harry Hindu

As I said, our senses don't lie to us, they mislead us. Lying implies that it is done intentionally, the senses do not intentionally mislead us. It's simply the case that the sense organs are product of evolution, and so they are organized toward specific forms of utility. Human beings have now developed a mind which is inclined toward knowledge and truth, but the senses evolved before this inclination of human beings. So the utility of the senses is not knowledge and truth. That is why they mislead us.

Is there any type of perception, either human or not (animals, mad scientists, advanced life forms that create simulations, etc.) that gets at the world directly? — Harry Hindu

I would say introspection does this. But it is not really a type of perception.

It seems to me that the answers lie somewhere between extreme skepticism and extreme (naïve) realism, in that we can trust what our senses tell us given an accurate interpretation, which takes more than one observation and reason integrating these multiple observations into a consistent explanation. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. The senses were not designed to provide us with truth, so why should we think that they do.

It only seems to question whether we can trust our senses in a material world of brains in vats. The thought experiment still implies that brains requires sensory input from outside of itself. The brain in a vat needs to receive input through its sensory interfaces and would still be connect to the outside world in some way. — Harry Hindu

Well, if you want to get fussy, a brain itself is a material thing, so by that premise alone, it doesn't make sense to think of a brain in a nonmaterial world, whether or not it is in a vat.

I don't believe that our senses lie. They provide information about the world and it is our interpretation of what the senses are telling us that is either accurate or not. — Harry Hindu

I think it's obvious from what science has revealed, that our senses grossly mislead us concerning the nature of reality. I wouldn't say that senses lie though.

If we were brains in vats, what would be the purpose of us experiencing illusions, hallucinations or dreams? What would be the purpose of the experiment, or the reason why our brain is in a vat? Who put the brain in a vat - some entities that do see the world as it is? How would they know that they are not brains in vats? In the same way the "this is a simulation" thought experiment creates an infinite regress of how the simulators don't know they are in a simulation, etc., how do the mad scientists that put our brains in vats know that they are not themselves brains in vats? Why would the mad scientists allow us to even conceive that we might be brains in vats if the point was to fool us? — Harry Hindu

I don't see that this sort of questioning is at all useful. It's like asking if God created the world, who created God. How is this type of question useful? Unless we identify and understand God, we have no way of knowing what created God. Likewise, until we locate the "mad scientists", and interrogate them, we have no way of knowing what their intentions were. So how can a question like this be useful?

So I don't see how the thought experiment is useful. It seems simpler to just say that we interpret our sensory input incorrectly when we make knee-jerk assumptions about what it is we are experiencing, but when we use both observation and reason over time (scientific method) we are able to get at the world with more accuracy. — Harry Hindu

I think the thought experiment demonstrates that the scientific method may be incapable of giving us an accurate understanding. Since it can only validate through sense observation, it cannot validate any part of reality which is inherently unobservable.

Unfettered skepticism that leads to questioning how, or even if, we experience an external world would create all sorts of problems for the brain in a vat idea. Brains and vats are material objects that are experienced, so if you're questioning the reality of your experience then that would include the ontological existence of brains and vats. It makes no sense to question the existence of the material world using a thought experiment involving material objects. By invoking the idea of the existence of the material objects of brains and vats, you're automatically implying that material objects exist and we can perceive them as they are - as brains and vats. — Harry Hindu

That's true, but I think the issue of skepticism is better represented as questioning whether things are as they seem to be. The conception of "matter" involves specific spatiotemporal references in relation to our perceptions. The "brain in a vat" scenario is just an example of how reality could be radically different from the way that we perceive it. So the example serves its purpose regardless of whether we conceive the "brain in a vat" as material, it still demonstrates that this entire conception of "material world", along with the brain in a vat aspect, could be completely wrong.

I don’t find the justification for the given “alters position with time”, with your “fourth dimension of space”. — Mww

To be more specific, it is Einstein's principle of the "relativity of simultaneity", which allows time to be the fourth dimension of space. This provides for "spacetime" where time is the fourth dimension of space.

By conceiving "temporal position" as relative rather than absolute, the conceived flow of time is dependent on spatial references. This allows an equivalence between spatial distance and temporal distance enabling transformations. The need, or purpose, of the "relativity of simultaneity" is to establish light speed as a constant within the conceptual framework of relativity.

My spidey sense is tingling, something evil is underway here.

Your senses don't tell you "I'm picking up a cat", that is a form of interpretation, done by your mind or your brain, something other than the sense organs.

The "brain in a vat", or other explanations appear like alternative explanations, but they all involve problems. For instance, if it's a brain in a vat, where do the senses fit in? They are not part of the brain, and not part of the thing sensed, how do they fit into the brain in a vat scenario? There is a type of interaction problem which occurs if we try to make the brain the sole source of the sensations. In other words, we still have to account for how sensations are caused to appear to that brain. If the brain was creating its own sensations, wouldn't it know that it was doing this? Self deception appears impossible from this perspective, because there is only a brain and nothing else, therefore an evil demon is require. But how does the evil demon get the sensations into the brain without any senses?

So the issue I pointed to, is that there is an "interaction" between the person (self, mind, consciousness, or whatever), and the proposed separate world. Placing "the cause" as completely on one side or the other, solely outside the self, or solely inside the self, are both, each in its own way, deficient ways of looking at things.

We see and hear what we believe is occurring on, say, a loading dock. But we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room, so we have no way of verifying the sights and sounds are coming from an actual, real, existing loading dock. — Art48

This is why we do scientific experiments. We poke and prod the thing and see how it responds. But this raises the following question. If it is true that "we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room", then what gives us the capacity to poke and prod the thing?

So I think that premise, that we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room is not true. We do interact with that world which is explained by "matter". And from our interactions we produce the explanations. But this raises a number of further questions, like how do we judge our explanations, and what inclined you to separate yourself from what you experience, in the first place. Why do you believe that your self is something more than your experience, so that the explanation is proper to your self, and what you experience is something other? What happens if the explanation itself is part of the experience?

So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary? — Mww

Spatial movements are what make 'the concept' of time necessary. But don't you believe that there is something real which the concept represents? This would be what we know as "the passing of time". Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time". The primary sense is "time" as a measurement, a number assigned to a motion in measurement. This would be 'the concept' of time. But he also explained how in another sense, "time" refers to the thing measured.

So for example, "it took an hour for me to drive to work today" would indicate the primary sense, a measurement. But "an hour past while I was driving to work today" indicates the secondary. Notice the difference? In the first there is a measurement and this measurement assigns "an hour" as the duration of that act. In the second, there is a chunk of time which passed, measured, and this is called "an hour". In the first, the thing measured completely drops out of the picture as irrelevant, because all that matters is the measurement.

Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space? — Mww

This is relativity theory. It's known as spacetime, in which time becomes the fourth dimension of space.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime

Where does Berkeley lay out an alternative theory of matter? I mostly recall him being fairly adamant about wholly eliminating matter ("immaterialism"), even for non-representationalists (in the Dialogues).

In any event, I was thinking of the "matter" of those he spends most of his time criticizing (e.g. Locke). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't say that he lays out a new theory. I said that by adhering to the Aristotelian (traditional) principles, for understanding "matter", he shows how the divergent conception of matter, what you called "subsistent substrate", is misdirected. "Matter" in this sense is conceived as necessary, while the traditional conception classed it as potential. Hume, I believe had a similar approach. "Matter" in his philosophy would be an inductive concept, therefore lacking in necessity.

Maybe Wayfarer is more accurate, and Berkeley was showing problems with that 'new' concept of matter without any understanding of the Aristotelian concept, but he seems to have at least a fundamental grasp on the classical understanding of contingency which is Aristotelian based.

I believe the shift away from Aristotelianism, in the way that "matter" is conceived, is derived from the physicists. They were the first to drop Aristotle as a principal source for higher education, while his logic was still taught in schools, and philosophers would still study Aristotle.

Newton assigned to bodies, the fundamental property of inertia, with his first law of motion. This effectively replaced Aristotelian "matter", as what provides for the substance of a body. The logical consequence of this, which is unseen without critical analysis, is that "inertia" is a property, while "matter" in the traditional sense is in a separate category, properties being formal. So "inertia" cannot really replace "matter". Therefore it was assumed to be implicit within that conception of inertia, that inertia is a property of matter. But that leaves matter as something itself, subsistent. I believe that this is how the divergent concept of matter, as "subsistent substrate".

A similar, but more substantial issue has developed with the concept of "energy". Strictly speaking, "energy" refers to a property. However, when it comes to things like electromagnetic energy, radiation, people often speak of "energy" as if it is a thing itself. This leaves energy as a property without a substance. We cannot assign "matter" as the subsistent substrate which energy is a property of, so that logically, this concept is left unsubstantiated. This is the result of moving from Aristotelian "substance" which is the fundamental property of individuals, particulars, to allowing that "movement" is what is fundamental to particulars. Movement is allowed to replace substance, but in doing so the need for something which is moving is lost.

Yes, I'll concede that, but there's nothing in Berkeley's philosophy that corresponds with the 'morphe' of Aristotle's hylomorphism. — Wayfarer

I think, that at Berkeley's time, modern philosophy was extremely underdeveloped. There was Cartesian "mind", and Hume was discussing "ideas", but very little in the way of extensive understanding of metaphysics and ontology as there was with the Scholastics. The reason I believe is that popular focus had turned to physics, and a rapidly evolving understanding of motion. Attention was turned in this direction, so the primary focus of philosophy was actually the mathematics required to support the new physics.

Berkeley, I believe noticed that physicists were doing strange things with the conception of "matter", and he wanted to bring attention to this. However, he does not appear to have had any extensive training in classical philosophy.

Hmmm….dammit, you’re right, I forgot about that. In the strictest possible sense of spatial continuity, yours is the stronger for being deferred to the temporal, but for the common understanding of the ordinary man…of which there are decidedly many more than philosophers per se….that a thing is in his way is very much more apparent than the notion that if he waits long enough, it won’t be. — Mww

It's more than just the ordinary man who believes in the priority of spatial relations over temporal. Modern physics has reduced time to being an aspect (dimension) of space. This is due to the fact that with empirical science we assign importance to sense observation in understanding the reality of substance. Sense observation is of the external, therefore producing principles of spatial separations and movements. "Time" as being understood through internal reflection, and logical comparisons, is secondary.

I agree with Count Timothy von Icarus. As I put it in an earlier post: — Wayfarer

The quote you provided seems to agree with me. Berkeley was criticizing the 'new' conception of matter. And he did this by falling back onto a more Aristotelian conception which allows him to disassociate substance from matter. He showed that substance does not require matter. This is what i said:

I believe that Berkeley is actually demonstrating the incorrectness of this 'new' way of conceiving of "matter" by showing how these ideas that people have about "matter" do not hold up if we adhere to principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kinda agreed. I’d be more inclined to grant to the concept of matter the underpinning for spatial continuity allowing a body to have an identity. — Mww

This is an interesting perspective. But I tend to apprehend spatial features of a body as formal rather than material. Spatial features tend to be the traditional properties, which are formal.

In his Physics, Aristotle describes the material cause as what persists through change. This idea of persistence from one time to another, is why I interpret "matter" as temporal continuity. Zeno's paradoxes, and the idea of infinite divisibility, had cast doubt toward the reality of spatial continuity. So Aristotle moved to assign identity to the thing itself, and the essence of being a thing is to have temporal extension, as a continuous duration of being.

While it's true that for Aristotle "matter is what stays the same," when there is change, the "matter" and "substance" of Berkeley's era had changed dramatically from their ancient or medieval usages. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not agree. Berkeley takes "matter" in very much the way of Aristotle. That's how he manages to conceive of substance without matter.

The entire idea of "materialism" makes no sense from an Aristotelian framework. It would amount to claiming the whole world is just potency, with no actuality, and so nothing at all. But the term "matter" by Berkeley's era is more often conceived as a sort of subsistent substrate (often atomic) of which spatial, corporeal bodies are composed, such that their properties are a function of their matter (which would make no sense under the older conception of matter as potential). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that Berkeley is actually demonstrating the incorrectness of this 'new' way of conceiving of "matter" by showing how these ideas that people have about "matter" do not hold up if we adhere to principles.

The reason why I mentioned Marx, is because he also maintained the Aristotelian conception of matter. But Marx demonstrated how, contrary to what you say here, a true materialism is possible. It just develops some odd features like violation of the law of non-contradiction in dialectical materialism. But Marxist materialism is actually well structured conceptually.

"Idealism" ("eidos-ism") would also make no sense in the Aristotelian frame. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is why Marx was so easily able to invert Hegelian idealism, and transform it into materialism. Aristotle refuted traditional (Pythagorean) idealism by putting human ideas, and matter, both in the same category as potential, then applying the cosmological argument. So when Hegel proposed "the Idea" as fundamental, Marx was able to apply Aristotelian principles to replace "the Idea" with "matter", thereby hijacking Hegelian dialectics and turning that idealism into materialism. And then it turns out that Hegelian principles are better suited to materialism than idealism.

That's why begging the question is known as an "informal fallacy".

If you can’t prove primary perceptible qualities in us are not ideas in an immediate principal perceiver, perhaps it can be argued…….what difference would it make to the human perceiving mind, if they were not? Was the idea of measurable distance implanted in my head as an idea belonging to some sort of prevalent, re: un-constructed, spirit, or does the idea belong to me alone, as a mere distinction in relative spaces? — Mww

To understand this "what difference would it make...", we need to get a good grasp of the philosophical concept itself, "matter"; that being the concept which Berkeley insisted we can dispense with.

In my understanding "matter" is a concept employed by Aristotle to underpin the observed temporal continuity of bodies, allowing for a body to have an identity.

Hegel, in positing the priority of "the Idea", rejects "identity" and this enables his logical dialectics, characterized by "becoming". That takes the world of change, and brings it from the external material realm, into the internal Ideal realm. Instead of being eternally unchanging, the Idea evolves with time. This is a significant change, but whether or not it provides the means to completely dismiss the concept of "matter" is debatable. Marx, who followed Hegel, argued that under Hegelian principles "matter" is still necessary as the kernel of content within the Idea.

If the future is present to the mind, then it's present in the mind in the present as the present. No amount of word-gaming will change this simple truth. — ucarr

No word games on my part. As I said, both, past and future are present to the mind as "the present". That is the reason for the need for a two dimensional conception of "present". The present has two dimensions, past and future.

The other two tenses: past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds. — ucarr

That is what I dispute. That claim you make is conceptual only, and it is a conceptual feature necessitated by the idea that the present is a dimensionless point in time. The problems with this conception we've already discussed, and you seemed to agree with to an extent.

Since this "point in time" conception is faulty, then also its extension, that "past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds" also is faulty. Therefore the whole conceptual structure needs to be replaced with something more realistic. And most of the rest of your post is dismissed along with that faulty conception.

You misquote me (see my bold text above and compare it to your bold text immediately below): scant ability ≠
≠
no ability. So, again, as our past deepens, it enriches our intentions for the future. — ucarr

Well then, your objection to my point becomes irrelevant, because to make the point you desired, requires "no ability".

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty. — ucarr

I suggest you go back and read all the posts from the beginning, and pay close attention. Heisenberg Uncertainty is the result of mathematical principles which do not correspond with observed physical reality. This brings unknown aspects of reality into our knowledge as "uncertainty", instead of leaving the unknown out of the knowledge as "the unknown". "The unknown" in this case, I argue, is the nonphysical. Application of the mathematics incorporates the nonphysical into the physical and this produces "uncertainty".

If you can't do that, then your inability is evidence Heisenberg Uncertainty is not a measurement problem; it's an existential limitation on possible measurement. — ucarr

I told you already, more than once, that this "uncertainty" is the product of mathematics which does not correspond with observed physics. The shortest possible duration of time, according to physical observations, is an infinitesimal length of time, we've been calling it Planck. The mathematics of "infinite series" treats this boundary as a zero length point in time. Therefore these two do not correspond. I explained this with reference to the difference between being at rest, and being in motion, and the problem of infinite acceleration.

You replied with some claim about there being no such thing as rest, in relativity. But this is false, because there is a rest frame, or inertial frame. And so there is a whole nest of problems here, starting with the difference between invariant mass and relativistic mass.

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr

I explained this. The seesaw example does not properly represent the uncertainty principle. Go back and read it please.

(As a side note, I dispute your premise self-examination "...is not a matter of observation." Knowledge is always acquired by observation, whether through the senses, or through the mind. A priori knowledge is based upon the mind's observations of logical truth.) — ucarr

Knowledge is not necessarily acquired through observation. We are born with knowledge so you ought not jump to such conclusions.

I think you are simply stretching the meaning of "observation" here, to suit your purpose. How would the mind "observe" if not through some sense apparatus? You simply claim that the mind can "observe" without the observational tool of sense because this appears to make a neat and tidy source of knowledge for you, "observation".

But it doesn't really solve any problems, because we're left with the problem of what could the mind observe without the use of senses, And the only answer is "itself". And if the mind can learn any sort of knowledge by observing itself, this implies that it is acting in a way which demonstrates that it already has knowledge. Otherwise it would be acting in a totally random way and self-observation would produce no knowledge. Therefore your proposal of stretching the meaning of "observation", to suit your purpose, actually gets you nowhere toward proving what you want to prove with it. We still cannot conclude that all knowledge is acquired through observation.

In fact, the logic proves that knowledge must precede observation. And of course this is very obvious to anyone who has given this subject any serious consideration. "Observation" is clearly an activity which requires some sort of skill, or at least the capacity to observe, and this must consist of a type of knowledge.

If we're sitting side-by-side on a bench in the park, and you start indulging your desires for the future: vehicle, home, large income and I, hearing tell of this from you, also start indulging my desires for the future with me in possession of similar things, do you believe the two of us have entered the future mind, brain and body? — ucarr

Just having desires indicates that while being at the present, we are causally influenced by the future. Acting on such desires is even stronger evidence of this. This is no different from the fact that observing a moving object indicates that while being at the present we are causally influenced by the past. Put these two together, and we make predictions. If the moving object is coming toward your head, you duck. Living in the present is not a matter of simple observance (being in the past). And, it is not a simple matter of trying to get whatever desire moves you (being in the future). Nor is it a matter of being in between past and future, as the dimensionless point of division does not produce a concept which corresponds with reality. Therefore we are left with living in the present being a confluence of future and past.

For a long time you've been telling me the future jumps to the past, skipping the present. Next the present and the past overlap and, somehow, the dimensional present includes the past. — ucarr

This is misunderstanding, just like those charges of contradiction which you were making.

So, given the overlap of two different temporal tenses, I occupy two different times simultaneously. — ucarr

There is an easier way to state this. What you call "temporal tenses" are the dimensions of time. Therefore you can replace your confusing statement of "I occupy two different times simultaneously", with "the time of my being, i.e. the present, consists of two dimensions".

The upshot: In spite of all of this complexity, I still need a dimensionless present I approach as an infinite series that narrows the time lag down to a differential so minute I can know my virtual self. — ucarr

Why do you want to reintroduce the principle which we both agreed is faulty, the "dimensionless present". We had a long discussion about this when we first engaged, and my purpose was to get you to see, and agree with the faults in this representation, which you did at the time. This concept left "the present" as outside of time, nontemporal, such that no being which exists at the present could interact with temporal existence. Why do you now want to bring back this faulty principle when you know how bad it is?

Even if we suppose thoughts are non-physical, supposing they're free is a big assumption. — ucarr

I've told you already, it's not the thoughts themselves which are properly "nonphysical", its their cause which is. This is why its better to relate to the nonphysical through feelings, emotions like desire and anticipation, which demonstrate our participation in that dimension of time which is nonphysical, the future. In a similar way, we refer to memory to demonstrate our participation in the physical dimension of time

Is this a description of physical things, both massive and massless, coming into existence at each moment of passing time? — ucarr

Yes! Now you're catching on.

The free will of the thinking mind is the sufficient cause acting as the agent of creation of the two types of things? — ucarr

No, the human free will acts as an agent of change, not the agent of creation. So do the wills of other animals. But obviously none of us, nor all of us together for that matter, creates the world as we know it (in its independence from us) from one moment to the next.

What are some important details of the physics of the continuous recreation of all things? — ucarr

Spatial expansion to begin with. Remember, I explained the recreation as a mini big bang, at each moment of passing time, at each real point in space.

How is passing time fueling this continuous recreation? — ucarr

The passing of time is the succession of recreations, one after the other, at each moment as time passes.

How is it that passing time is non-physical? — ucarr

The passing of time is actually nonphysical, because it is completely left out of physics, as a real physical thing, to be dealt with. However, we could proceed to distinguish between the nonphysical and the immaterial here, and say that everything on the future dimension of time is immaterial, material existence being given at the present.

How does non-physical passing time become the dynamism of physical things changing? — ucarr

This is a feature of our observational apparatus. We observe across the moments of recreation, like watching a movie which really consists of a succession of still frames. Each moment has changes from the last, and we observe this as "the dynamism of physical things changing".

Does your mind freely will the changes that are the events that populate your life? Does this mean nothing happens in your life that you don’t freely will into the
changes that are the events that populate your life? — ucarr

I see that this is the part which is giving you problems. Suppose that each still frame in the succession of moments, is created at each passing moment, by some sort of behind the scene information (what some call Platonic Forms). This information (Platonic Forms) is the immaterial which is on the future side of each moment, determining what will be at that moment, as time passes. The freewill has the capacity to manipulate, change that information, to some degree. The laws of physics are based on our observational readings of patterns in the order of recreation, which dictates how the world (as independent from us) is recreated at each passing moment. Therefore the laws of physics which are designed to explain the independent world (as independent from us) do not account for how we interfere in the world.

So, it (probability distribution) =
=
illusion of continuity. — ucarr

No, you are still misunderstanding. There is probability, it is still mistakenly assumed by some to be necessity. Therefore there is something there which produces the illusion of continuity which induces the assumption of necessity.

I'm sorry if I was sloppy, and did not state things clearly. After explicitly stating in the first part, that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, I didn't think that I needed to restate "the assumption of necessity" in the second part, because I thought it was clearly implied. Obviously, it was not, you misunderstood and interpreted the second part as contradicting the first.

So, it (probability distribution) ≠
≠
illusion of continuity. — ucarr

Correct, the assumption of necessity is what is related to the illusion of continuity. I think the problem was caused because I was speaking about predictions based on probability, such as is the case with cause/effect predictions, and you introduced "probability distribution". I think this is what Amadeus pointed to.

Often, the cause/effect relation is assumed to be necessary. Remember we were talking about whether the cause/effect relation is biconditional. I explained how it is not biconditional because it is not a relation of necessity, but one of probability, as demonstrated by Hume. Further, I was explaining that when these probability predictions of cause/effect are taken to be necessary, this is related to the illusion of continuity. You replaced "probability predictions" with "probability distributions", and I didn't see any problem with this. However, when you did this, I think you lost sight of the assumption of necessity, thinking that no one would assume that predictions of probability distributions would be taken as predictions of necessity.

More importantly, the uncertain path of a photon gets resolved by observation into a definite and measurable path, as evidenced by: 5.39x10−44s
5.39

10
−
44

. — ucarr

This is not true. The photon can only be observed to have locations however far apart is determined by the measuring devices. And this is assumed to be limited by Planck length. The photon cannot be claimed to have "a path", or any specific trajectory in between, as evidenced by the fact that it is understood as probability.

The photon duration of travel one Planck length, being observed and measured, was a certain and completed direction of travel without any fog of discontinuity. — ucarr

Sorry ucarr, but this is simply not true. Read up on your quantum physics please. The photon is "observed and measured" at a particular location, and it cannot be shown to have a path of continuity between those points of measurement. That's what the basic double slit experiment shows.

This is exactly the problem with the assumption of necessity that I refer to above. The photon has a location at its points of measurement. Its existence between those points can only be described by the probability distribution. It has no necessary path between point A and point B. However, you are insisting that it does. Therefore you have fallen into that trap of falsity. That faulty assumption of necessity induces you to insist that the illusion of continuity is real.

The Heisenberg equation, without uncertainty, gives us one measurement much more precise than the other, and vice versa. — ucarr

That's why the seesaw analogy is no good. With the seesaw, you can infer the position of one from the position of the other. With the uncertainty principle, determining one renders the other as uncertain. That's why its consistent with discontinuity.

If your training in philosophy provided means to back your immaterial claims with evidence, no doubt you would use it. As you say, however, "...your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence. — ucarr

At least I'm honest with my definition of "observe". You fudge it around in an attempt to obscure the problems of physicalism. But as I demonstrated above your fudging of "observation" does not help you to avoid the inevitable conclusion of the reality of the nonphysical.

I keep insisting that free will, being dependent upon the brain, is not non-physical. — ucarr

That's contradictory. If it's physical, it's not free. So all you are doing now, is fudging "freewill". But just like in your fudging of "observation", it will not lead to anything productive.

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And Johnson thinks it is true, as does Tallis. If you think it is false then what you need to do is argue against it, not cry "fallacy!" Note that you haven't managed to address Tallis' argument at all, and Tallis is defending (1). — Leontiskos

To me, thinking that such a premise is true, just demonstrates a lack of understanding of Berkeley, as Wayfarer has already (very competently, I might add) argued. So there is no need for me to address this as well.

And it still is begging the question, because no information is given as to why the premise is believed to be true. Your assertion reduces it to the following argument: "If this premise is true, Berkeley is refuted. I believe this premise is true therefore Berkeley is refuted." As you can see, the primary premise " if this premise is true, Berkeley is refuted", is still an instance of begging the question. All you are doing is trying to prove that one argument is not a matter of begging the question, attempting to justify that claim with another argument which is begging the question. Your claim is supposedly justified by an argument which is fallacious, as begging the question. Therefore, if you keep progressing in this way you'll have an infinite regress of arguments which all beg the question, because the claim that each one does not, is supported by an invalid argument (an instance of begging the question).

Clearly the charge of "begging the question" cannot be avoided in this way. If whenever someone had that charge against them, they could simply be vindicated by saying "but I actually believe that premise is true, rather than simply manufactured to necessitate the conclusion", the fallacy of "begging the question would be impotent.

Again, you are just imputing specious motives to Johnson. I see no reason to impute such motives, and that sort of psychologism/mind reading is bad philosophy. If you have an argument, offer it. If all you are going to do is say, "I did some mind-reading and found a bad motive," then you're not doing philosophy. — Leontiskos

I believe it's very obvious that Johnson had "specious motives", and you are being ridiculous to assert otherwise. When someone says "I refute you thus", and makes an action which is intended to demonstrate refutation, it's very obvious that the person has the specious motive of creating the illusion that the argument could be refuted by an action, without actually addressing the argument itself.

Here's an example to consider. Suppose I produce an argument which concludes that you do not have the ability to climb a specific tree. You say "I refute you thus", and you climb that tree. That act does not refute my argument. It provides evidence that there is probably a problem with my argument, somehow, or somewhere, and that my argument ought to be refutable, but actual refutation requires demonstrating that problem.

This is also the issue with Zeno's paradoxes. We see that the arrow moves, and this is very strong evidence that Zeno's argument ought to be refutable. But the movement of the arrow does not actually refute Zeno's argument, which proves that movement is logically impossible.

The future is present in the now as an abstract thought. The mind understands that plans toward a goal are about the future, but this understanding is in the empirical present. — ucarr

I told you, the future is present to the mind as desire, anticipation, and such emotions which influence us in relation to the future. It is not present to the mind as "abstract thought". So you argue from a false premise.

The so-called "empirical present" is a 'present" which is purely past, as you admit. So you assume, when you say "understanding is in the empirical present", without any justification, that "understanding" is in the past. But this is clearly wrong because true "understanding" must involve the future just as much as the past, because the future is just as much a part of our reality as the past is.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. — ucarr

Sure representing the present in this way is "useful", that's what I've argued from the beginning. The problem is that it is not truthful. And because it is not truthful there are limitations to its usefulness. And attempting to apply it beyond the limitations of its usefulness will be misleading.

Instead of skipping over my argument in bold above, why don't you respond to it? — ucarr

I don't see an argument, just more false premises. An infant cries to fulfil its wants. Your claim that an infant has no capacity to fulfil its desires is unfounded and unsound.

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So your past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding. — ucarr

Something with no physical evidence, time travel, and the capacity to change the past, cannot be offered as physics. Therefore I take it merely as a desire which you have. It serves as more evidence of the reality of my perspective, that in reality, desires are given priority over physical evidence.

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?" — ucarr

This is evidence that "the present" as a point with zero dimension, though it is useful in many situations, reaches the limitations of its usefulness at QM.

If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. — ucarr

Another false premise. You keep insisting that the only way to the nonphysical is through observation of the physical, and I insist that this is false. Yet you keep insisting on it. We can derive information from ways other than observation. This is how a person comes to accept freewill as self-evident, through knowing one's inner self, and this is not a matter of observation.

My scope of the observable includes abstract ideas. What does your scope of the observable include beyond physical things and abstract ideas? Bear in mind, abstract ideas include the contents of the imagination (free will), where I locate your non-physical world. — ucarr

The future is present to us through feelings like desire and anticipation, it is not present to us as "abstract ideas". We have contact with the nonphysical through these emotions. This gaves rise to the abstract concept of "freewill", which is how we relate to our contact with the future.

he future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self. — ucarr

I don't understand what you mean by "future-as-past", and the rest of the paragraph makes no sense to me.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting. — ucarr

This is addressed above.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? — ucarr

Desire and anticipation.

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time. — ucarr

I told you why relativity is unacceptable. So reference to it really does little here.

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. — ucarr

I told you, freewill. You don't agree with me, therefore we have no platform from which to discuss details. The inverse is your claims about time travel. I don't agree with you, therefore we have no platform from which to discuss the details of time travel. The difference is that I do not ask you for details because I have absolutely no interest in your fantasy. You, on the other hand are somewhat interested in freewill, probably because it actually is a self-evident truth rather than a fantasy. Still, for some reason you refuse to accept it as a premise.

However, to address your complaint, I did discuss details concerning how the material world is created anew at each passing moment, and I described the type of model of time which is required for this. You told me mathematics and diagrams would help.

The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..." — ucarr

That line explicitly states "we have something... which produces the illusion of continuity". Why would you conclude that "something" refers to the probability distribution, when I've already stated that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not to the probability prediction? What is stated is that there is something there, which produces the illusion of continuity, and it also supports the assumption of necessity. I make no claims as to what that "something" is, but it is obviously not the probability distribution itself, because I've already explained how it is not that Your interpretation makes no sense. It's like you are intentionally making an obvious misinterpretation for the sake of claiming that I contradict myself.

Can you take this QM-Uncertainty caused discontinuity and put it into a thought experiment that shows when and where the discontinuity occurs and what effect it has on the trajectory of a photon? — ucarr

The photon has no trajectory. I've repeated this already, yet you keep talking as if it has a trajectory. You will never understand what I am saying until you drop this idea that the photon has a trajectory. Check this article (or any similar article), where it is stated "First, the photon has no space trajectory; it famously “follows all paths” like a wave." https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030402621003983

The photon has a location at T-1, and a location at T-2. The two locations are not the same, and there is no trajectory which accounts for how the photon moved from position A to position B. Therefore we can conclude that there is discontinuity of information, relating to what happened to the photon between T-1 and T-2. The reality of the discontinuity of information is indicated by the fact that the photon's location is represented by a probability distribution rather than as having a specific, necessary trajectory. Furthermore, observable evidence of wave phenomena indicates that there is a discontinuity of the photon itself.

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity? — ucarr

Your example does not represent "uncertainty" in our context, which is a statement about what we can know. Suppose the greater certainty we have about whether child A is up or down, this implies that we have less certainty about whether child B is up or down. That is analogous. This is contrary to "if child A is up, child B is down", and indicates a discontinuity between the two, because knowledge of one does not translate to knowledge of the other.

I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence. — ucarr

That's a bad assumption. But you keep insisting on it even when I tell you not to.

Every premise is designed for the purpose of the conclusion, and every premise of a refutation is designed for the purpose of the refutation. Perhaps you are the one begging the question, here. — Leontiskos

You are neglecting a key point, the need to have truthful premises, in order for the conclusion to be sound. The desire for truth of the premises must take priority over the desire to produce a specific conclusion, or else the conclusion will be unsound, having premises designed just to reach that conclusion with complete disregard for truth. Such an argument would be pointless.

The premise in question appears to be false, and designed solely for the purpose of producing the desired conclusion, in complete disregard for truth or falsity. Therefore it constitutes "assuming the conclusion", begging the question.

In honest logical procedure, in contrast with sophistical rhetoric, the premises are designed to represent the truth. And truth of the premises clearly must be given higher priority in the design of the premises, than the desire to produce a specific conclusion, or else the result will be unsound conclusions and in the worst case, begging the question. Designing your premise for the purpose of producing a specific conclusion with disregard for the truth or falsity of the premise is called "assuming the conclusion" or "begging the question": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion — Leontiskos

I don't see any point in arguing with you then. You'll just design your premises to produce your desired conclusion, with complete disregard for whether or not the premises are true. What's the point in debating anything with a person who's goal is to produce premises which will logically support a prejudice, with complete disregard for truth or falsity?

I don't grant your imputation of specious motive. — Leontiskos

Why not? The motive of refutation is obvious, even explicit, "I refute it thus". And the premise you stated "1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen." is arguably false, and clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation. It looks like a very clear cut example of begging the question to me.

The conclusion "this act refutes Berkeley" is only derived if the very dubious premise (this act will refute Berkeley), which is designed specifically for that purpose, of refuting Berkeley, is accepted. One could not imagine a better example of begging the question.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present? — ucarr

We already discussed this. The "now" of the present cannot be an extensionless point in time, for the reasons we discussed. Therefore it must be a duration. "Empirical present" is unacceptable because it implies that the entire duration of the present is in the past. We need to acknowledge that since "the present" refers to a duration, it consists of both past and future. To say that the present consists only of past is self-contradicting.

The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

I see no reason for your so-called "common sense conclusion". The past cannot be altered, but the future holds the possibility of getting what you want. I don't understand why you would not prioritize the possibility of getting what you want, over that which is impossible to change.

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. — ucarr

We discussed this already as well. The restriction is due to the limitations of "observability", and imposed by the need to observe in the science of physics. Therefore "that's all the info there is" is not implied at all. The lack of information available for the representation, is attributable to the restrictions of the scientific method of physics. The information we have is restricted due to the limitations of observability.

If something is part of the observable world, even if that something is an abstract idea, then it can be measured for possible use. This is what semi-independent reality, apparently non-physical, should be amenable to. — ucarr

Again, the problem is the limitations of observability. Yet you are restricting your knowledge of the world to "the observable world". That is the influence of your physicalist bias

You are only demonstrating that you are failing in your effort to understand. All observations are of things past. We have never, and simply cannot, observe the future. Since "the present" as what constitutes the reality of "what is", consists of both past and present, there is therefore a large aspect of the reality of "what is", which has never been observed, and simply cannot be observed.

Your attitude appears to be "if we just wait a Planck length or two, the future will become the past, and then it becomes observable, and measurable, so what's the difference?" The difference is that if we wait for it to become past, before acting on it, then we can never get what we want. In this case, what is wanted is a more complete understanding of reality. Therefore your proposal of "semi-independent reality" ought to be rejected as not having the capacity to be productive in relation to the goal of getting a more complete understanding.

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe. — ucarr

Only from your perspective of physicalist bias, am I left with nothing but physics to explain what I believe. This is a restriction which your attitude imposes on me. You will only accept an explanation in physical terms. Therefore I have no choice but to demonstrate the deficiencies of physics, to get across the need for something else.

From the perspective of some mysticisms for example, within which the givenness of Newton's first law is rejected, and the assumption that the entire world is created anew at each moment of passing time is adopted, the constraints of "physics" are left behind, and we may speak freely in terms of willful creation. But such a discussion can only be meaningful if those physicalist assumptions are first rejected. That is why the reality of free will must be adopted as the primary, and self-evident, premise.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... →
→
The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity... — ucarr

Right, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. It is not in relation to the prediction, which is a prediction of probability. When a prediction of probability is falsely assumed to be a prediction of necessity, as in the case of a cause/effect prediction (the falsity demonstrated by Hume), this false "assumption of necessity" is consistent with the idea of continuity (which is an illusion of sense observation). There is a relation between the two "the assumption of necessity", and "the illusion of continuity", by means of which each one supports the other logically. So it is a sort of biconditional relationship of a vicious circle of falsity. Necessity (logical) implies continuity, and continuity (observational) implies necessity. The fact that the whole thing is based in probability rather than necessity, such that the whole vicious circle is actually irrelevant, is dropped right out of the picture.

Please explain how you apprehend contradiction.

If the gap in the existence of a particle - from one point in its trajectory to another point - is ontologically real, then, as I've said, that's your claim the trajectories of particles are incoherent. This conjectured discontinuity has nothing to do with not knowing before measurement, which possible trajectory will be the actual trajectory. Moreover, the measurement of the trajectory within the LHC will not show a discontinuity due to QM uncertainty. Instead, it will show discontinuity if the particle decays, or if something massive intervenes into its trajectory. Such discontinuity is something sought after by the design of the experiment. Physicists want to see particles interacting. — ucarr

Right, discontinuity is the reality, and that's what physics seeks to understand. Trajectories are fiction.

And QM uncertainty is a discontinuity, the discontinuity of information, which I explained. You are conflating the discontinuity of the supposed observed particle, (a discontinuity related to the limits of observability), and the discontinuity in the information about that situation, QM uncertainty. The point is that the latter does not correspond with the former, due to a lack of correspondence in the mathematical principles applied.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Right, that I characterize as a gap (discontinuity) in information. If certainty is requested (as per normal epistemic standards), the uncertainty principle is reduced to either/or. Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other.

Something at rest has rest momentum as well motion momentum. Infinite acceleration violates relativity: there is no acceleration all the way to light speed. — ucarr

That's why the problem of acceleration remains an unresolved problem.

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood. — ucarr

This makes no sense. How are my "observations of physics" rooted in physics, when I am educated in philosophy, not physics? You only interpret them as rooted in physics because you cannot apprehend any other possibility due to the influence of your physicalist bias. I don't deny my dualist bias, but I deny that my "observations of physics" are rooted in physics, because my observational perspective is derived from an education in philosophy. This puts my observational perspective outside of physics.

What is his argument?

1. If Berkeley were right, *this* would never happen.
2. But it did happen.
3. Therefore, Berkeley is wrong. — Leontiskos

I think the issue is that premise #1 is wrong, false for the reason explained by Wayfarer. Since that premise is false, and obviously just intentionally designed to produce the conclusion desired, it is a matter of begging the question.

You might be giving Berkeley a little more credit here than he deserves. "When Berkeley (1685-1753) was questioned as to how objects could continue to be when no-one was perceiving them, he claimed they were still in the mind of God." Berkely still requires that something 'observe' what exists for it to exist. — Philosophim

I think this is the real issue. "Matter" is a concept developed by Aristotle to account for the observed temporal continuity of bodies, objects, which are actively changing. Both Hume and Newton take this temporal continuity for granted, as "inertia", but they assign it to the temporal extension of the activity, the motion, rather than assigning it to a substantial body or object, as Aristotle did.

As Berkely shows, the concept of "matter" is unnecessary, so the assumption of an underlying continuous body, or object is likewise unnecessary. Furthermore, it is impossible that "matter" by its proper conception, has properties, because properties are formal. This allows that whatever is referred to by "inertia", cannot be a property of matter, but it can effectively replace the concept of "matter", to account for the observed temporal continuity. As a result, temporal continuity is no longer restricted to bodies or objects, but is allowed to be a feature of motion itself. Motion itself is "the object", with the property of temporal continuity, and there is no need to assume a body which is moving, thereby enabling the concept of "energy" as an existent thing.

John was written later and reflects the idea that Jesus was the Son of God. That's all Neoplatonic, Stoic stuff. The original Jesus was obviously just a prophet associated with the Essenes. — frank

Jesus became "truly" known as Son of God after Saul/Paul had the epiphany on the road to Damascus, which led him to realize that he could quell the dispute between Jews and Christians, and cease the unnecessary persecutions, by asserting that Jesus actually is the Son of God. This way the past actions of both Christians and Jews could be correct and justified, Christians in claiming Jesus is Son of God, and Jews in crucifying Jesus for claiming to be Son of God.

There's one slight glitch to that scheme. Careful reading of the gospels will reveal that Jesus claimed himself to be Son of Man rather than Son of God. So Saul/Paul's interference actually marks the corruption of Christianity by allowing it to be subsumed by the evil which it rebelled against.

So far he doesn't answer the question why none of his independent, immaterial things can't do anything observable without the grounding of physics. — ucarr

Oh, I missed this. I did answer this question already. The evidence of the nonphysical is the existence of activities which are contrary to, or cannot be grasped by physics. This includes free will acts. So the assumption of the nonphysical is not grounded in physics, it's grounded in the fact that physics cannot explain everything which is observable. And, my argument concerning time shows that it is highly probable that there are activities which physics will never be able to explain.

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly."

Since sensory processing by the brain at light speed is time-lagged only nanoseconds behind sensory stimulus, and thus it is negligible, you, like me, always wake up in the empirical present, it being noted you call it the past.

If this is true, as I judge it, based upon your words, then I see your temporal direction, like mine, is a passage through a never-ending, nanoseconds time-lagged sequence of pasts. — ucarr

This is not true. I also recognized, and have explained, why we "wake up" in the non-empirical present, just as much as we "wake up" in the empirical present. The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. That is not a matter to be debated. We are just as much in the future as we are in the past.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. I would argue that the future ought to be assigned priority, as we notice that a person's intention directs one's attention. And in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past.

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy. — ucarr

Again, this is not true, uncertainty does indicate incomplete information. "Uncertainty" refers to the attitude of the knower, as a feature of the knowledge. When you say uncertainty is "...due to an existential limitation on measurement..." you are referring to the cause of this incomplete information, when you say "due to".

You may insist that this "uncertainty" is the result of an "existential limitation on measurement", and that is what I called the limitations of observability, but this is not a complete explanation. It does not explain how these limitations cause the knowledge which ought to consist only of certainties, to get contaminated with uncertainties.

I explained to you already how this uncertainty is due to a lack of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world. The "infinite series" of calculus, treats the limit as infinitely small, zero. The limitations of the observable world result in a boundary, or limit, which is non-zero, infinitesimal (as exemplified by Planck length). The uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is due to this lack of correspondence, which is an epistemic problem. This failure of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world, allows that the unknown, (which could be excluded from physics, and left as the non-physical part of reality which physics cannot explain), gets incorporated into the expression, the representation of the physical world, as the uncertainty of that representation.

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction. — ucarr

OK, so my language was unclear, and you thought there was contradiction where there was not.

Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes. — ucarr

No it does not. That is the issue, with the uncertainty of the particle's location. We cannot say that the particle traverses that length because it's location in that extremely short duration of time when it is assumed to be moving, cannot be known. That is why physicists say that it takes every possible path from A to B. There is a discontinuity of information, such that we cannot really say that a particle even exists during this time. That's why its better to defer to the non-physical at this point, the circumstances are such that the principles of physics do not apply.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise,
we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it. — ucarr

This is utterly misleading. We cannot say that the supposed "particle" takes any "particular trajectory". Therefore we cannot say that it has "a trajectory", "a journey", or even that it exists in the meantime. There is a very clear lack of continuity of the supposed "particle", in this time period, Therefore we cannot talk about changes to the particle in this duration.

This isn't what you wrote originally: — ucarr

Of course it is not what I wrote earlier, I had to clarify what I had said, because you (wrongly) interpreted what I was saying as contradictory.

I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. — ucarr

This makes no sense. If I could see contradiction in my own words, I would not have said them. You need to explain to me in your words, why you think what I have said is contradictory. But you haven't. Each time you tried, you simply demonstrated that you misunderstood. Now you just take snippets of what I said, without any context, and wrongly claim that these snippets constitute contradiction.

MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous — ucarr

You continue to misunderstand. I've insisted that the discontinuity is a discontinuity of information. If we could say that possible trajectory #642 is necessarily the actual trajectory, then we have complete information, no discontinuity of information. If we cannot say necessarily, which trajectory is the actual trajectory, this implies a lack (gap) of information. Further, I argue that in the case of quantum "particles", the lack of information is due to a real, ontological, gap of existence of the physical "particle". This is an ontological discontinuity of the physical "particle" between t1 and t2. This ontological discontinuity is the cause of the lack of information, which produces the need to express the "particle's" location in terms of "probability" rather than expressing where the particle necessarily is.

MU wants to ride piggyback atop the dynamism of physics, then, at the critical moment of his conjectured dis-continuity of the trajectory of the particle, insert his immaterial agents, i.e., immaterial information doing an immaterial info exchange at the last lap of the trajectory, thus proving both the independence and causal power of immaterial info. — ucarr

This is a misrepresentation. There is a very real discontinuity of the "particle" as demonstrated by the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle is an expression of the obvious, common sense principle, that "the particle" cannot be moving and have a specific location at the same time. That's obvious to you, right? Zeno brought this to our attention. If a particle has momentum (movement), it cannot have a location ( a position), and if it has a position it cannot have movement (momentum). So we've assigned this sort of dichotomous scenario, either the particle has this or it has that. Simply put, either it has movement (momentum), or it has rest (location).

But this invites a fully valid philosophical question. If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite. So a philosopher might ask, what is happening, what type of change is this, when a thing's rate of acceleration is infinite.

Does a person experience future and past empirically? — ucarr

I think we already went through this. If by "empirically" you mean through sense observation, then "no", because everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. However, the word "experience" is nuanced with a number of different meanings. In one sense we say that if we are in any way affected by something we experience it. And in this way we "experience" the future by way of emotions like desire and anticipation.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — ucarr

Correct, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity.

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — ucarr

It is when the prediction of probability is taken as a prediction of necessity, which creates the illusion of continuity.

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. However, when we assume the cause/effect relation to be one of necessity, and we assume therefore that the prediction is one of necessity rather than one of probability, this creates the illusion of continuity.

Therefore, the illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution itself, it is related to the assumption (belief) that the prediction which is based in probability is a prediction of necessity.

Where is the contradiction here?

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

I really don't see how you apprehend contradiction here. The prediction is based in a relation of probability, not in a relation of necessity. However, when this relation (the cause effect relation) is taken to be a relation of necessity, the illusion of continuity is created.

If you are still having difficulty, try this. Assume a continuous causal chain of cause/effect, from the past until now. Also, assume that what happens from now onward will be a continuation of this cause/effect chain, determined by the past, onward into the future. The determinist continuation in this model is produced from the assumption of necessity in the cause/effect relation. The cause/effect chain cannot be otherwise, it is necessary. and therefore a continuity between past and future is declared.

Now, in comparison, allow that any prediction of the future, is based on probability rather than necessity. If this is the case, then anything which happens is not necessary, but contingent, and there is no continuity from the past into the future, through the present.

I take as fact, that the cause/effect relation is a relation of probability. So what is at issue is how we relate to the cause/effect relation, what we believe about it. If we (wrongly) believe that it is a relation of necessity, in the determinist way, this is consistent with the illusion of continuity. But if we (correctly) believe that it is a relation of probability, then there is no illusion of continuity.

As I read you, you're charging QM physics with trying to pass off probability as necessity. — ucarr

I'm doing no such thing. I never mention QM physics in this context. What I said was that the determinist perspective, which treats the cause/effect relation as a relation of necessity rather than a relation of probability (with reference to Hume), results in the passing off of probability as necessity.

Probability and continuity run on separate tracks here. — ucarr

Exactly, continuity is associated with the determinist necessity of cause/effect. So, how continuity enters the track is through conservation laws.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q

↔
︎

. This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr

Did you not even read what I wrote? The relation between "dipped in liquid vinyl", and "non rusted" is not biconditional. This is obvious, because other things can cause "non-rusted". I explained this problem to you thoroughly, but you've completely ignored it, and continue to represent this as if people would actually believe it to be biconditional.

Furthermore, this stresses that causation is a logical concept of the abstract mind, and thus it too is atemporal. — ucarr

You continue to misrepresent "causation", as if it is a necessary, and biconditional concept. That is the determinist falsity. A true understanding of causation would not represent it in this way. If you look at the way logicians actually do treat causation, it is through modal logic.

Your attempt to distinguish between atemporal and temporal only has you confusing categories. How can you even validate this category of "atemporal" which you are proposing?

If what I wrote is now irrelevant, it's because you've shifted from denying physics below Planck scale to asserting physics has measurement limitations, an assertion nobody disputes. The difference between what you say now and what you said directly below is obvious. — ucarr

From the outset of the use of this example, I defined "physics" as being restricted to the observable. This is not a shift.

Since your "observations" of immaterialism are restricted by the observational limitations of physics, your suppositions about immaterial info and causation are really just speculations made possible by the work of physicists. Your dependency on physics doesn't make a strong case for believing immaterialism has logical and existential priority over materialism. — ucarr

Yes, metaphysics is by its very nature, speculative. But as I explained, it is the deficiencies of physics which supports the possibility of the nonphysical, as more than just possible, but highly probable as well. You can deny this all you want, but that's what I mean about the physicalist attitude interfering with honest inquiry, making discussions like these with physicalists impossible.

The first law of thermo-dynamics says the total energy of a system remains constant, even if it is converted from work into heat energy.

Entropy is the loss of a system's available energy to do work. There is no violation of the first law. — ucarr

It is veiled contradiction. Look, energy is defined as "the capacity to do work". As time passes, the energy of a system remains constant. However, some of that energy becomes not available to do work, as "entropy". Do you not see the contradiction between "the capacity to do work", and "not available to do work"? In reality, energy is lost, in violation of the conservation law. However, instead of admitting this violation people just say that this lost energy is converted to a different form of energy, which contradicts the definition of "energy".

This statement has you acknowledging passing time and increase of entropy are moving in the same direction. — ucarr

Right, this is the common representation which I argue is faulty.. It's faulty because it leads to the contradiction outlined above. And the desire to maintain the necessary continuity of the conservation law inclines you to say that time is not really passing, but you are passing through time. All this indicates that this common representation is faulty.

To me this looks like an acknowledgement, by implication, that immaterialism, i.e., abstract thought, is an emergent property of physic. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see that.

Do these dimensions include line, area and cube? — ucarr

No, I was describing the two dimensions of the present. Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional.

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr

You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption.

So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. And the point is that it is an illusion, not real. The first quote indicates what are the consequences of treating the probable as necessary, and the second quote states the consequences of treating the probable as it truly is, probable. So in the first it is the assumption of necessity which is related to continuity, and in the second, it is stated that what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false.

With my two above quotes, I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr

Sure, but the causal relation is a relation of necessity and also a type of continuity. It's an epistemic continuity. We could call it a "continuity of information". This continuity, which in physics is expressed as a temporal continuity, supporting Newton's laws, and the conservation laws, is taken as necessary. However, in reality the continuity is false. As evidenced by the law of entropy, conservation is not absolute. And what breaks the continuity is the fact that the relation is not a relation of necessity, but one of probability.

Then I believe, the logic becomes modal, and the bi-conditional feature is not valid. That's the problem explained above. Causation is assumed to be necessary, this implies continuous and bi-conditional. But the assumption of necessity is false, and this breaks the continuity and bi-conditionality.

If you do not understand the role of continuity here, look at it this way. Consider A is the cause, and Z is the effect. A necessarily implies Z, and Z necessarily implies A. We might say that A and Z are not necessarily contiguous, as there may be a whole alphabet between them, but there is necessarily a continuity of information between them. An empty gap would leave a hole in the chain of information which is required to assert cause/effect, and this would produce a break in the causal chain (an unknown feature), leaving no necessary pathway from A to Z or the inverse. The cause/effect necessity is epistemic, requiring the criteria of information. Without the continuity of information between A and Z we cannot conclude A is the cause of Z, because it might be something from within that informational gap which causes Z, rather than A .

So, this is what the concept of "probability" does, it recognizes the gap, the lack of informational continuity between A and Z. By removing necessity, the gap is acknowledged. Now there is no continuity (continuous causal chain) between A and Z as separate events, because the occurrence of Z, after A, is not necessary, but probable. Something may interfere during that time which constitutes the gap.

The problem which arises can be exemplified in this way. Every time we see the occurrence of Z, we observe A as the cause, and we are inclined to say that if Z occurs, it is necessary that A occurred. However, when we acknowledge the reality of probability, and the lack of bi-conditionality, we cannot say that A will necessarily cause Z, because there may have been a lot of other instances of A which did not cause Z. The conclusion of causation was produced from observance of "all Z", not from the observance of "all A". Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so P↔︎Q

↔
︎

.
This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal. — ucarr

We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead.

From this event we don't declare that the bi-conditional logic is faulty because the pipe is rusty. Real life is temporal, and thus causal relationships are subject to interruptions. Logical relationships are atemporal, and the change of circumstances of life interrupting real and causal chains of events have no bearing upon the truth content of atemporal, logical relationships. — ucarr

I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. The continuity of information is a requirement for the judgement of causation because a lack of information allows for other unknown factors, and the judgement could be false.

So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose.

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr

As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics".

The further principle which I've tried to impress on you, is that this restriction necessitates an "informational gap". There will always be a shorter period of time, shorter than what observational capacity allows for, and physics will not be able to tell us what happens during this time period due to that restriction. Therefore something nonphysical could happen during this time period which could have a causal influence.

Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time.

Again, the singularity assumes the persistence of physics all the way down to the infinitely small interval of time. — ucarr

You are not listening to me. Physics persists all the way down to the smallest observable interval of time. This is not an "infinitely small interval of time", it is an infinitesimal interval of time. Within that infinitesimal interval of time is a period of time during which physics is not applicable. Application of the "infinite series" mathematics represents this period as infinitely small. But application of the scientific method in physics, renders what is represented as "infinitely small" in numerical theory, as an infinitesimal period of time in the experimental practise of physics. This constitutes a misrepresentation. In numerical theory, the infinitely small is equivalent to "nothing". But in the practise of physics this is actually an infinitesimal "something". The numerical representation of nothing produces the illusion of continuity, and necessity in act, but what this really does is veil and obscure the "something", which is an informational gap within the assumed continuity.

For example, at Cern the math is applied to the spectral imaging of particle behavior. — ucarr

Observational data.

Your question reveals your belief the immaterial realm cannot be active, cannot do anything without converting into the material realm. — ucarr

That's a misunderstanding. My belief is that there is nonphysical activity which occurs during the period of time when observation is impossible. As discussed, as time passes at the present, what is known as "the present" consists of both past and future. Observational data is always information about the past, because it requires a duration of time to make an observation. This leaves the part of the present which is future, as unobservable. And, just like we observe activity to be occurring in the past part of the future, we can conclude that there is probably unobservable (nonphysical) activity occurring in the future part of the present. This is evidenced by the law of entropy, as explained above.

Furthermore, as I explained above, we must be very careful with our application of bi-conditional logic. We observe how the immaterial (nonphysical) influences the material (physical) through principles like freewill and entropy. These are the observed effects of the immaterial activity. From this, we cannot conclude that the immaterial "cannot do anything without converting into the material realm".

We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity. But this does not mean that the immaterial is not highly active within its own realm, with most acts not having any effect on the material. This is evident from Aristotle's representation of contemplation, a thinking, which is thinking about thinking. In its pure form, this contemplation is an immaterial act which has no effect in the material world, and it is sometimes represented by the material image of an eternal circular motion. But Aristotle cautioned against this mode of representing the immaterial with material images. It is misleading. So the pure, immaterial activities (contemplation being a better representation), could be ongoing indefinitely, without having any influence in the material world. The more pure it is, the less it influences the material world.

You're falsely claiming the math interpretation of the ATLAS and CMS detection of particles at Cern is not empirical verification of physical phenomena. Can you present a math interpretation that contradicts the Cern math interpretation? — ucarr

As explained above, the mathematical representation is a false representation. The mathematical theories represent an infinitely small point, which is interpreted as "nothing", no time. However, in practise, what is represented as infinitely small is really infinitesimal, therefore "some time". It is within this "some time", being mathematically represented as "no time", which is where the informational gap known as "uncertainty" exists.

Consider the "uncertainty principle" in general, commonly represented as an inability to accurately state both a particle's position and its momentum. "Position" implies a fixed location. "Momentum" implies movement, therefore no fixed location. The two are fundamentally incompatible, because "position" of a moving particle implies a fixed point which is not consistent with movement. Further, measurement requires a duration of time. If that measurement is used to indicate "position", the particle must not be moving in that duration, to have a position, but if it is used to indicate momentum, it must be moving in that duration. These two are incompatible. So, the mathematics just fudges the incompatibility, and represents the duration of the measurement, as a point in time, rather than as a period of time, falsely implying that there could be momentum at a point in time when movement could not actually be happening. This fudging is very evident in the concept of "instantaneous velocity".

The uncertainty principle is a display of the way that mathematics falsely represents a duration of time as a point in time. Duration as points in time, would allow us to assemble a serious of contiguous points, conglomerating a complete "duration", thereby assuming a continuity of information, and epistemic necessity. However, what is represented as a point in time, is really an infinitesimal duration of time, and within this duration there is an informational gap known as uncertainty, Therefore any assumptions of continuity, or epistemic necessity, derived from the representation of these infinitesimals as infinitely small, are false assumptions.

That's because we've limited the scope to that factory only. Increase the scope to the people who planned and built the factory and now we have intention. — Philosophim

This doesn't really answer the question. Finding out that there was a being with intention involved in the creation of a thing doesn't provide "the intention". The question of "why" is answered by determining the specific intention, not by determining that there was intention, in a general way.

Intention doesn't require the future to understand it. Intention is merely a 'What I'm hoping to result from this," action. We could build a factory with the intention of creating 5,000 jobs, and it creates more or less than that. That doesn't change the intention. — Philosophim

So if you do not see the purpose, by watching the thing fulfil its function (in the future), how would you determine what the intentional being was "hoping to result from this"?

What is a purpose if not the intention of something? Perhaps consciousness isn't needed, I suppose intention can be an unconscious desire too. I'm still not seeing how this applies to the argument. Can you relate it somehow to the argument so I can better understand the point you're making against/for it? — Philosophim

I'll go back to your example then, the suns rays traveling to earth. We've agreed that consciousness isn't a necessary feature of intention. On what principles would you decide whether there is intention behind this activity?

We're never paralyzed by doubt? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Paralysis is a physical condition. I've never heard of, or seen. anyone actually paralyzed by doubt. I know that indecision can lead to emotional distress, but I don't think it ever leads to paralysis. Generally, if a person is indecisive with respect to a specific act, they'll move on and do something else. In this way we avoid emotional distress, but the subject of doubt never gets addressed. Therefore it is a better procedure to move directly into the skeptical process and get it over with, rather than letting the indecisiveness of doubt, linger in the background.

In The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris gives the example of a doctor he spoke with who was unwilling to pass any judgement on a hypothetical culture that tears the eyes out of every third born baby due to superstition. Likewise, in the policy world, bad policy often carries on due to inertia because people doubt plausible better alternatives, and do not want to take on the risk of having been in error. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How is any of this relevant?

Well, if one thinks more in terms of knowing/understanding better or worse, more or less, instead of a binary, it seems to me that fears of error will loom less large. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But the point I made is that the fear of error ought not be reduced. Thinking strategies designed to reduce the apprehension of possible error, by making error appear as insignificant. are fundamentally misleading. "Error" by its very nature cannot be insignificant. That would be contradictory, because to recognize it as error implies that it is significant to you.

Afterall, we face both ignorance and error, and it does not seem possible to reduce ignorance without taking on a greater risk of error. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ignorance and error don't make a proper dichotomy. We don't ever face ignorance, because we always have some form of knowledge. That's the point of my statement "we can and do act". We always have the knowledge required to act, so ignorance is not a feature relevant to this discussion.

I believe the proper statement would be "we face both knowledge and error". The problem is that error inheres within knowledge. Therefore we face both together within the same information. And doubting knowledge exposes and consequently reduces, error. This increases the quality of knowledge knowledge.

For instance, if one never implements an education reform because one doubts one's knowledge of what would truly be best, one will never learn from the implementation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is only by doubting one's own knowledge that true certitude is produced. Through the process of being doubted, principles are justified. With your repeated use of "never" here, you wrongly imply that doubting of a single principle would last forever. Once the skeptic's procedure is applied, the principle once doubted may be rejected, then it will not need to be doubted again.

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr

Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence.

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions.

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr

I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed.

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. P↔︎Q

↔
︎

is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional?

Read Newton again. His first law says, "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it." — ucarr

Right, and in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical.

So, as I said, the photon covers the Planck length. If its path is altered by another photon, then, from start to finish, we're looking at the physical activity you're trying to deny. Likewise, this applies to a photon having several possible paths. — ucarr

Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.

The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this.

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr

Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something.

Being unobservable to the senses is not proof something is non-physical; the EM waves feeding your tv are unobservable. — ucarr

This is a whole can of worms in itself. This electromagnetism cannot be called "waves" unless there is a substance, a medium within which the waves are active, the aether. That's what a "wave" is, an activity of a substance. But many physicists deny the ether. Therefore we have to conclude that it's not EM "waves" feeding the TV. The waves are not observable as waves, and they are not "physical", because they have no substantial existence, no medium. What is observable is photons, particles, and the photons are "physical". The so-called "waves" become pure mathematics as "wave function".

Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr

What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try.

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr

Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying.

So, per scientific rigor, I stipulate at T1 a photon emits, and at T2 the photon covers the distance matching one Planck length. So the change of state of our thought experiment is the change of position of a photon across one Planck length. — ucarr

You haven't stated this quite right. We have to say at T1 the photon is at position X, and at T2 the photon is at position Y. What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. That is why you hear some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. Because it cannot be observed in the meantime, the continuity of its existence cannot be verified, during that time. Therefore we cannot even conclude that the two instances are "the same photon".

All we can say is that a photon was produced at position X at T1, and a photon was produced at position Y at T2. Further, we can analyze "the causes" of these two occurrences, but if we adhere to the determinist principles, which limit causation to the temporal succession of observed events, then we restrict ourselves from considering that anything between T1 ant T2 could have occurred, and had causal influence on the state at T2, because this is outside the possibilities of "a physical event". Such an event would violate Newton's first law of motion, which describes temporal continuity. That law assumes temporal continuity of "the same body" between T1 and T2. At this scale, that temporal continuity cannot be verified

So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility.

However, let's take a look at what really happens, without that restrictive presumption of continuity. A photon occurs at PX , T1, and a photon occurs at PY, T2, and there is time between these two occurrences. A non-physical act (freewill acts are in this category), could act between T1 and T2, as a cause of what occurs at T2. See, when we remove the necessity of temporal continuity described by Newton's first law, because it cannot be verified at that temporal scale, then we have that gap between moments in time, which allows for the nonphysical to operate, and have influence over the physical.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr

The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present.

So, thanks to your demand for scientific rigor, it appears that our contemplation of its requirements has imploded your project to establish a spacetime wherein no physical event can occur yet wherein a supposed non-physical exchange of info is possible. — ucarr

The important thing to note is that the nonphysical, which we term "info" here, is not only active within its own realm of "nonphysical", but also, as freewill demonstrates, it is causal within the "physical". This implies a type of causation which "physics" cannot account for, or understand, due to the natural limitations of observability.

For clarity, it should be stated that the Planck length is currently the smallest spacetime unit we can measure. Smaller spacetime units, such as those occurring at the time of the Big Bang, are not currently measurable.

The Big Bang theory makes it clear that some scientists believe physics persists all the way down to the singularity, which is infinitely small. So, by this reasoning, there is no pre-singularity point at which physics stops. — ucarr

The problem here, obviously, is the limitations of observability. Since observation is necessary to verify the theories of physics, speculations and theories at this scale cannot be verified, and therefore cannot obtain to the level of "science", so it is wrong to call this "physics".

Consider this analogy, which I touched on already. We assume a continuity of time. We name a point in time as a boundary, or limit, and by the method of calculus we approach that point in description, but must cross infinite divisions before arriving at that point. We can never actually, truthfully determine what is at that point. We say this does not matter, because there is really nothing at that point, it is a nondimensional boundary. However, this is not really true, the point is actually dimensional, infinitesimal, as the "Planck length" demonstrates. Now, whatever lies behind that boundary, within that point, is completely inaccessible to the inquiring mind, because the method by which we approach it has made it impossible to get to it.

Firstly, again I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr

I don't see why you say the statement is invalid. It is the logical conclusion from the described conditions.

Using the new example, there is a photon at PX T1, and a photon at PY T2. The photon cannot have a physical presence at any position between PX and PY due to the prescribed limitations. This implies that "the photon" cannot have a physical interaction with anything in that space between PX and PY, nor in that time between T1 and T2. Any assumed interaction must be nonphysical.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks. — ucarr

That's exactly the issue, the conditions do not allow for such a physical "catalyst". Nothing physical can happen between T1 and T2, by the prescribed conditions. You say such and such "cannot happen without a catalyst", but the stated conditions have ruled out the possibility of a physical catalyst. Therefore we must look for something nonphysical as the catalyst.

Well if we could trace its composition over time we would come to a being that had intention when making the object. — Philosophim

Not necessarily. Think of something produced mechanically in a factory for example. We trace the composition of the thing, and the closest we get to the being with intention, is the factory. We would never know that there is intention behind the thing, and we would not necessarily see the need to trace the factory for intention.

And even if we determine that the factory was built intentionally, we cannot answer "why the thing exists" until we determine the specific intent. And this is the real problem with what you said about determining why a particular state exists. Anything created with intention requires that we determine the specific purpose of the thing, in order to know why it exists. And, a thing right off the production line will not fulfill its purpose until a much later time. This implies that we cannot know why the thing exists until sometime in the future.

We need a consciousness for intention, and if the scope is the sun itself, it doesn't fit the criteria for being conscious. — Philosophim

We do not necessarily need a consciousness for intention, as intention is defined by purpose, not consciousness. And, we do not know whether or not there is purpose, or even some form of consciousness, behind the existence of the sun.

I am not excluding intention, and I'm not understanding where you think it is. — Philosophim

I don't know where intention is, neither does anyone. But we do not deny the reality of it, even though we do not know how or why it exists. As is the case with specific "intentions", it's probably the same with the general "intention", that we will not know why it exists until sometime far in the future.

Only if it is assumed that keeping falsity out is more important than keeping truth in, and that wisdom consists primarily in avoiding falsehood. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We will act, and do act, regardless of the knowledge we have. Therefore the primary criteria for wisdom is not the capacity to enable acts with truth (acts are enabled regardless of truth), but to avoid mistakes caused by falsehood.

Second, when accepted knowledge is exposed as "wrong" it often isn't totally wrong. The differentiation between fixed stars and mobile ones still holds up. Understanding something better doesn't need to imply that the poorer understanding is simply false.

So, perhaps part of the motivation for skepticism is the idea that knowledge is a binary. Either you know something or you don't. Propositions as the main or sole bearers of truth lead in this direction. Whereas if the question is about knowing things better or worse, then, while we might understand ancient astronomy different, it still managed to get plenty right even in modern terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand the relevance of this.

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?

Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time.

I have made bold the letters where the jump appears to occur. You inexplicably claim we've established that physical change cannot happen. Apparently, you're jumping from the interval between T1 and T2 being one Planck length to being one half of one Planck length. — ucarr

The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.

So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event.

If “no” equals “now,” then okay. — ucarr

Yeah, sorry, typo.

Now the question arises, "How are non-physical things measured?" Measurement itself implies physicality. What does a non-physical measurement of a non-physical thing entail? Assuming such measurements exist, how are they translated into something practically verifiable and useful? — ucarr

Are you seriously asking me these questions?

But here's the issue. In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established.

How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation?

So in your example, necessity is related to the "individuals committed to vote for Candidate A". What has occurred in the past (they said they would vote for A) is believed to predict the future (they will vote for A) in a necessary way. It is impossible for them to vote otherwise. This assumption is based on an assumed continuity of the delegates' commitment. Only by disallowing that there could be a break in that commitment (a discontinuity), can we conclude that the delegates will necessarily vote for A.

Notice the "illusion of continuity". The delegates may actually change their minds, the necessity is not a true necessity, and neither is the assumption of continuity which supports that necessity.

Quine's web of belief image is helpful for illustrating the differences here (though we need not accept the ideas behind it for it to be so). The skeptic tears down the web, or at least brackets it out, and starts trying to construct a new web. They don't just tear out more questionable beliefs on the fringes, they go right to the center and begin tearing out essential assumptions, hoping to reestablish them later.

They cannot tear out everything, but they can tear out a lot. Different thinkers decide to tear out different things. The difference between rationalist skepticism and empiricist skepticism is not that both don't tear down most of the web, including central parts, but that they leave different parts up.

Then they work themselves back. The difficulty, as I see it, is that this makes philosophy extremely chaotic in a way that the "sciences" are not. This is chaotic in the sense of "strong susceptibility to initial conditions." Depending on which central parts of the web are allowed to stand, the philosophy that comes out looks radically different, even between thinkers in the same "camp" in the same era. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Notice here, that you describe the skeptic as having two conflicting intentions. One is to tear down, and the other to construct. Since these two are conflicting, we must choose one of them as the true intention of the skeptic, and that of course is to tear down.

So this whole aspect of the characterization, "to construct a new web", to "work themselves back", is a misunderstanding of skepticism. And this misunderstanding influences the characterization of the tear-down with the qualification of "hoping to reestablish them later". This is all a misrepresentation of skepticism because it represents the skeptic as tearing down with the intent of rebuilding. This intent of rebuilding would contaminate the skeptic's tear-down, with an ulterior motive, as if the skeptic already has in mind, a goal of rebuilding, and is tearing down as the means to this end, rather than assigning to the skeptic the pure goal of tearing down.

I have my doubts about the skeptical methodology. Is worrying about underdetemination in extreme cases reasonable? If philosophy is the love of wisdom, is it wise? Should we build our understanding of the world and knowledge off of the fear that our sense data is also consistent with us being the last human alive, raised in an alien zoo full of human-like robots? It's certainly underdetermined by the data, as Chesterton says, the madman's explanation covers the facts as well as ours do. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The issue is this. There is very clear evidence that mistake hides within accepted knowledge. Whenever accepted knowledge is exposed as wrong, and replaced with something different, this is evidence of mistake which has lain hidden within accepted knowledge. And, since all accepted knowledge appears the same, appearing as accepted knowledge, all accepted knowledge must be subjected to skepticism in order to reveal where mistakes lie hidden. Therefore skepticism is the choice of wisdom.

I suppose another consideration is: "should demonstration proceed from premises that are better known than the conclusion?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is actually a very tricky question, much more difficult than it appears. The application of logic, with principles of necessity, produces valid conclusions. However, sound premises are required for sound conclusions. Often, the soundness of the premises is taken for granted as having already been demonstrated some time in the past, therefore not questioned. This, along with the validity of the logic produces a conclusion which constitutes "well known". The problem is, that the "taking for granted" of the premise produces a conclusion which is actually "better known" in practise, than the premise is.

This is a feature of what is "given", "taken for granted". That status puts the premise as beyond reproach. Then valid conclusion produce knowledge which in practise, is assigned the highest level of "best known". But from the skeptic's perspective, no premise can be taken for granted, so "best known" is defined in a completely different way from common practise, which incorporates what is taken for granted into "best known". Sometimes "taken for granted" is even assigned the status of "best known". This allows that a conclusion is better known (from the perspective of common practise) than the premise (from the perspective of skepticism).

Well, let's all hope that Trump will actually get prices to go down because that's apparently the trade that alot of American voters have made for this. — Mr Bee

So, how is imposing massive tariffs on imports supposed to make prices go down?

I didn't ask you a psychological question. We've established a context within our dialogue. We're examining the role of time in the physics of our world. Our focus has been on the facts of time passing within physics. Our standard of judgment has been whether our claims, respectively, have been verified logically and empirically. You've been claiming the arrow of time, one way, supports free will, and the other way blocks it. We've agreed that members of both groups make plans and realize them.
So, our topics have been physics and philosophy, not psychology. — ucarr

You asked a question concerning the psychology of committing oneself to a belief in determinism. And I answered that question the best I could, explaining that it is a complex matter. Look what you asked:
"So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they?"

Since determination and efficient causation overlap, we conclude the former is a component of the latter. This being the case, we know embrace of determination does not necessarily exclude embracing the other three types of causation. This peaceful coexistence of the two things can operate within the free will advocate. We know this because everyone with intentions acts so as to determine outcomes. — ucarr

I disagree with this. I believe that determinism excludes the possibility of freewill, because a freely willed act would violate the precepts of determinism. I also believe that the freewill perspective provides a different interpretation of efficient causation than does the determinist perspective. What I explained already, is that I think that the freewill perspective denies the necessity of efficient causation, in the way described by Hume, but the determinist perspective affirms the necessity of efficient causation.

By saying a possibility has a window of opportunity, you're saying: On Thursday, P → A (possibility = P; actualization = A; and Thursday = the window of opportunity, so P implies A during a twenty-four time period). Why do you think P has temporal priority to A? Why do you think the P → A relationship ends when a specific P is actualized as a specific A? — ucarr

I don't think I can explain this any better than I already did. Your representation here demonstrates that you don't understand my use of terms like "possibility". For example, if "P" represents the possibility of "A", how do yo conclude "so P implies A during a twenty-four time period"? Since P represents the possibility of A, not the necessity of A, P never implies A.

If a possibility is a reality before being realized, then a possibility is always a reality, so how is it a possibility, i.e., how is it's reality conditional? — ucarr

I don't understand what you are asking.

As an example, consider: The demolition charges will vertically drop the condemned building. We know that dynamite explodes and we know buildings implode vertically. Before the demolition charges are ignited, we know in abstraction what will happen. — ucarr

OK, let me explain with reference to this example. The explosive charges are planted in the building. If the charges are detonated the building should implode according to plan. However, the explosives might not ever be detonated, they may be removed, and the building may never implode as planned.

So, the possibility I am discussing here is the possibility of the building being destroyed by the explosive charges. That possibility is very real, as the charges are already planted. Further the possibility of the building being demolished is clearly prior to the actual demolition. Also, the possibility does not necessitate that the building will actually be demolished. The actualization of that possibility is the act of detonation, which may or may not occur.

When things change how they're changing, doesn't time follow suit by changing how it's changing? — ucarr

No, I don't believe that. I told you, I think relativity theory does not provide a good representation of time. This feature you discuss is the result of Einstein stipulating the relativity of simultaneity, in his theory of special relativity. I believe that replacing this principle with the multidimensional present (the fat present) provides a much more accurate description of time.

If you're saying time changes me and not I change myself in time, then that difference seems to have zero effect on the changes we're discussing. — ucarr

That's what I keep telling you, each is just a different way of modeling the same thing. So switching from one model to the other has "zero effect" on the understanding of many things. You kept insisting that the future-to-past representation reversed the flow of time, and I had to reiterate over and over, that there is no reversal of the flow of timem just a different way of looking at (modeling) the same flow of time.

However, as much as the difference between the two ways has little if any effect on many of the changes we are discussing, it has immense effect on the ability to understand freewill acts. This is because if you model yourself as traveling through time, the changes to yourself are necessary. But if you model time as changing you these changes are not necessary, because through freewill and will power we can resist some of those changes.

Notice, from your perspective the only way to avoid the changes caused by traveling through time, is through your fantasy "time travel". From my perspective, to avoid the force of time induced change, all one has to fo is use their will power. You know, if something is coming at your head, you duck out of the way. So my perspective readily allows for the reality of what we naturally understand through experience, as free will acts. But your perspective leaves free will as requiring magic.

...aren't I always in my present? I'm never in my past, or in my future, am I? — ucarr

Didn't we both agree that the present is both future and past?

I need to define "the feeling"? Of heavy metal? It feels heavy, and metallic. And somewhat pretentious, of course. And in very bad taste, if we compare it to, I don't know, jazz or whatever. But jazz is just as pretentious as heavy metal, if not more. So, there's that, I guess.

If you just go on how it sounds, then we'll get all sorts of shape-shifting, genre-crossing posers, pretending, just to cash-in.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I don't really use the term "poser". It reminds me of Heidegger's nonsensical difference between "authentic existence" and "impersonal existence" (what he calls "das Man"). It sounds like a fallacious rant to my ear. No True Scotsman, No True Dasein, No True Metalhead, yadda yadda. Heavy metal is just loud music for drunken assholes, there isn't really much "Trueness" to it. Like, if you're worried about "posers in the scene", then you kinda need to get an actual life, you know what I'm saying? — Arcane Sandwich

What about the "hate" though? Didn't you agree that this is what it is all about? And isn't this a feeling? Aren't the form of those cool guitar riffs, scales and effects, an expression of that hate? Don't you think it's possible to be a poser in relation to this feeling?

My favorite country metal? I like country, not sure about country metal. — Arcane Sandwich

I was thinking along the lines of Eric Church maybe, or someone like that.

Anyway, the mention of "poser" has to do with the matter of "feeling". The feeling of hate, though amplified by the guitar riffs, is best expressed by the vocal quality. Any band can mimic the instrumental sound, but the feelings expressed by the vocal quality are difficult to imitate. That's why the whiney country voice doesn't quite cut it for heavy metal. Maybe Johnny Cash could've made it in the metal scene.

But when a prior reason does not include an intelligent being, like sun rays traveling to Earth, there's no need to include it. — Philosophim

Often, the purpose of an object, and even sometimes, that it was created for a purpose, does not become evident until after the object has existed for an extended time. When encountering an object, what principles would you apply to determine whether intention was involved as a cause or not?

But when a prior reason does not include an intelligent being, like sun rays traveling to Earth, there's no need to include it. — Philosophim

Take this as an example. On what principles do you conclude that the cause of the sun's rays travelling to earth does not involve intention? I do not see how the classification of "composition and time" as you describe it, could provide adequate criteria.