You confuse two things: the urge to hide the malicious act and the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act. — David Mo

There is no such thing as "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act". That one's act is truly malicious is a judgement. And, every time a truly malicious act is judged to have been committed the feelings are different, and mixed. That is why you are barking up the wrong tree here. We cannot, and therefore ought not try, to create a category of feeling called "guilt", because the feelings involved with guilt are so varied and mixed up.

You can try to hide the act without any feeling of guilt because of fear of punishment. — David Mo

Do you not see how you contradict yourself? The person here has "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act", and wants to hide that act because of fear of punishment. So you say that the person does not feel guilt. Yet you have defined guilt as "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act". So the person explicitly does feel guilt. It's blatant contradiction, and that's why your declaration of a feeling called "guilt" is incoherent and unintelligible.

Guilt is the feeling of being responsible for a wrong committed on someone. — David Mo

Being responsible, is a judgement, just like guilt, it is not a feeling. So you are just persisting in the same mistake here. We judge responsibility, we do not feel it. So a judgement of responsibility will have associated with it, the same variance in feelings between fleeing from, and facing one's responsibility.

You confuse the guilty verdict in a court of law with the guilty feeling of the guilty. — David Mo

There is no such thing as the feeling of the guilty. That's what I keep trying to tell you, the guilty have a multiplicity of different feelings, so it is impossible to conclude that there is such a thing as the feeling of guilt.

Do you want restrict to this biblical example? — David Mo

We're not going to get anywhere on this issue by discussing the Bible, because it can be interpreted in many different ways.

What does Judas Iscariot feel in the Bible? He feels guilty about giving up Jesus. Yes or no?
Matt 27, 3-5. — David Mo

I don't know what Judas felt. I am not him, and I would not trust a hand-me-down account to tell me what a person felt two thousand years ago. We have no model for how human feelings may have evolved over that time period. I believe Jesus' death was a staged event, a sacrifice planned before hand, so I think Judas would have had some very mixed up emotions at the time. I think that popular translations say that Judas felt "remorse". This would mean that he regretted being in the situation he was in.

When we talk about moral emotions in psychology and philosophy, we understand that they are those that affect my relationship with others. In addition to guilt and shame, this often includes pride, moral outrage and so on. Defining what is moral is complicated, but this definition is operative and serves to understand us in this field. — David Mo

This is the heart of the problem. Defining what is moral is not complicated nor difficult. Morality involves judgements of good/bad, right/wrong, correct/incorrect. As such, we separate morality from feelings and emotions, which are not based in judgements, though they influence judgements.

You want to conflate this separation, talking about "moral emotions". This would require that we bring judgements of good and bad right into the emotions, as inherent within these emotions. But clearly this is wrong, as emotions are occurring independent of judgement, influencing one's judgement, not vise versa.

I've said this already, and I'll say it again now, we need to address the subject of "conscience". The position of conscience in relation to judgements and emotions, and it's role in the development of these, is crucial to this issue. David, you seem to have an aversion to "conscience". Do you not believe that there is such a thing? If not, how do you propose that a human being makes judgements? You seem to believe that the judgement is already inherent within the emotion (moral emotions).

However, what about anxiety, especially anxiety that is future-oriented. I remember quite clearly being anxious, very anxious indeed, about impending exams. In other words I was experiencing the effect (anxiety) of a cause (exam) that was not in the past but actually in the future. This is, to me, an instance of an effect preceding a cause. I'm sure this is a relatable experience since all of us have, at some point in our lives, experienced anxiety about a future event (a public speech, a marriage proposal, an exam, an interview, etc.) — TheMadFool

That you interpret this situation as an effect prior to its cause is an indication that you misinterpret the situation. The anxiety is not caused by the future exam. The presumed exam is in the future and does not even exist yet, so it cannot be a cause of anything. The anxiety seems to be caused by your apprehension of the impending situation.

It should be, but it's not, because there's a deficit of communication between us, clearly. And that was the polite version. :heart: — Noble Dust

The non-polite version is to tell me that I speak like a kindergarten student?
"That's a pretty picture. I can see a man and a woman in there, a horse and a barn. Am I missing anything?"
I suppose there's even less polite versions.

Nope, I never described a "shared experience between the artist and the viewer". Maybe I communicated poorly, or maybe you interpreted poorly. — Noble Dust

You are Noble Dust aren't you? This is where I first engaged you:

This is important because the audience is half the work anyway. The audience members unique experiences, perspectives, and mindset will determine their interpretation. That's not to say that the artist can't have an explanation at hand; but forcing it on the audience will just inevitably cheapen the experience, and therefore, the work itself. — Noble Dust

It's not nonsensical; what borders on the nonsensical is that you barely even addressed what you quoted, which was a description of the difference between the viewer following their own interpretive path based on their inevitable 50% contribution to the work itself, vs. an artist statement trying to block this process. Try again. — Noble Dust

If "the audience is half the work", and "their inevitable 50% contribution to the work itself", doesn't imply that "the work" is a shared experience, then what could "the work" possibly refer to?

When did you say this? — Noble Dust

Sure, it was a reply to Coben, but it was over a number of posts. Here:

.

Let's start with a realistic premise. Let's assume that the viewer creates the "work of art experience", completely, one hundred percentage, and uses the work of art as a tool toward creating that experience. Consider therefore, that the viewer must choose the tools (works of art), which one will be using to bring about the desired experience. Can you make your argument from this perspective? — Metaphysician Undercover

What you don't seem to be grasping is that the viewer has the power of choice. Because of this, the artist really provides nothing at all to the phenomenological experience. You need not view any art whatsoever to have a phenomenological experience. That you choose to include some artwork into your experience is of you own making... — Metaphysician Undercover

Coben seemed to be somewhat receptive of this position, but said "I don't want to go over to the 100 percent camp. I think it is a collaborative creation, at the level of experiencing the work of art."

Again, you're singing to the choir here, talking about not apprehending meaning. — Noble Dust

Then are you ready to release the idea of collaboration between artist and audience, as if each contributes to the piece of art? If it is wrong to say that the art has "meaning", and correct to say that there is no shared experience, then where does the idea that the audience is half the work come from? Furthermore, you ought to dismiss this notion of "interpretation" completely, as there is fundamentally no meaning to be interpreted.

Once we establish a clean slate as a starting point, then we can proceed to address the issue of appreciating a piece of art, and whether or not a "statement" is acceptable as a form of art. You do recognize that some so-called "artwork", poetry for instance, consists of statements? If some people might see meaning in those statements, are we to dismiss this type of artwork as not "true art", just because it is not "pure art" (perfectly without meaning)?

I think that "pure art", absolutely without meaning, might be a little boring. What interests me is how the artist introduces meaning into a medium, which is essentially meaningless. Do you see that "meaning" is the basis for the claim that there is something shared? And, that "interpretation" only starts to make sense after we've made the judgement that there is meaning?

I believe you, but I'm discussing facts. That shame and guilt are two different emotions. That guilt is not a consequence of shame and that the time sequence does not intervene at all in the definition of both. (By de way, these are facts commonly accepted in psychology). — David Mo

You haven't done very well in any effort to explain why you believe guilt is an emotion. And for the reasons I've explained, it appears impossible that guilt is an emotion.. Guilt involves conflicting feelings, opposing emotions, therefore it cannot be an emotion. Guilt is a judgement of responsibility, blame. If you've ever judged anyone, including yourself, as guilty, you would see that the feelings involved with any particular instance of this judgement are extremely varied and conflicting. Have you ever been on a jury? That's why it's impossible that guilt is a feeling, or emotion, a judgement of guilt involves many distinct feelings and emotions.

If you really believe that guilt is a feeling, you ought to be able to describe this feeling to me, in a way which characterizes it as something other than an extension of shame. Instead you just refer me to other people who have claimed that guilt is a feeling, and insist therefore that this is a fact. The problem, as I've explained to you, is that there are two distinct urges (types of feelings) which follow from one's own judgement of personal guilt, one urge is to deny the guilt and hide responsibility, the other is the urge to face responsibility and make restitution. Since both of these very different, and conflicting types of feelings can be involved with the same judgement of guilt, it is impossible that there is a feeling called "guilt".

Honestly, I don't know.

Now I'm confused as to how/why you disagreed with my points this whole time. — Noble Dust

It should be evident from what I said, that I do not view art in the same way that you do. I look at it as something which can inspire me, like any of the numerous other things which might inspire me, sunrise, sunset, cows in the pasture, birds in the woods, a severe storm etc.. You described a shared experience between the artist and the viewer, as if the artwork is some form of communication. Remember, I said that you are solely responsible for the creation of your own phenomenological experience of the art, the artist plays no role in this. That I believe is the difference between art and communication. In communication we expect that the author imposes restrictions on our experience, and we respect this. That is meaning. In art we provide our minds the freedom to appreciate and be inspired by, the beauty, in whatever form it takes, rather than constraining our minds toward apprehending the meaning.

You must have had a good look at that painting ;) — Punshhh

Actually I glanced at it and found that it wanted to draw me in, as if it had depth, 3d, and I wanted to see the bottom of it. I had to resist this inclination and move on because I felt it as a type of deception.

The same feeling of guilt gives rise to two different responses: hiding the guilt or acknowledging it. — David Mo

I am talking about the inclination to hide, and the inclination to confess, which exist at the very same time. I am not talking about having chosen one or the other in response. These are distinctly different feelings associated with the supposed "guilt". To say that the person has conflicting feelings, and that's what "guilt" is, to have conflicted feelings, does not describe a feeling of guilt. All you do is avoid analyzing the actual feelings involved, and class distinct and opposing feelings together as the feeling of "guilt".

If there is guilt without shame and shame without guilt, it is necessary to reach a conclusion: they are different feelings. — David Mo

As I said, there is no guilt without shame. Guilt is an extension of shame. The primary judgement by the conscience is that there is a specific type of deprived, unpleasant, uncomfortable situation, and this is shame. A secondary judgement assigns blame for the deprived situation and this is the designation of guilt. Notice that there cannot be a judgement of guilt (responsibility for the wrong), without first a judgement that there is something wrong. And, the judgement that something is wrong is what produces shame.

As I explained to unenlightened, proceeding to that secondary judgement, assigning blame, the judgement of guilt, is not necessary. When we recognize that the uncomfortable feeling (shame) is a response to a situation which is apprehended as a deprived situation (something's wrong), we can act immediately to rectify the situation; thereby relieving the shame, without any judgement of blame or guilt. But if the uncomfortable feeling of shame was not present we would not be moved to act in this way. This I believe is the intent of the Catholic tradition of confession, we can act to remove the shame without proceeding to guilt. That is the essence of forgiveness, we all act together to improve our situation, remove the unpleasantness of shame, without resorting to judgements of guilt.

Why? The situation that causes shame can be effective immediately, like a reflex, without thoughtful consideration. Where is your problem? — David Mo

The situation must be remembered, or else the shame will disappear as quickly as it appeared, just like a reflex. If the shame is ongoing, then exposure to the situation which causes the shame must be ongoing as well. If it is a past event which causes the shame, then that past event must be remembered, if the shame is to persist.

If it is the thought of an external observer which causes the shame, as you contend, then in order for the shame to be ongoing, the memory of the event, along with the thought of an external observer of the event, must be present to the person. This is a reconsideration of the event.

Suppose though, that the feeling of shame is created simply by the apprehension of an external observer, regardless of the act, and therefore without any reconsideration of the event. This is what is required if shame occurs without a reconsideration of the event, shame is caused solely by the apprehension, even if imagined, of external observers, regardless of the situation. Then we would always be in shame all the time, regardless of what we were doing, wearing, etc., because shame would simply be caused by the recognition of a possibility of external observers. But this is clearly not how shame is. Sometimes the thought of external observers creates pride, conceit, and vanity, while sometimes it creates shame. These are opposing types of feelings, created from the apprehension of possible observers. So it is clearly not the recognition of external observers which creates shame.

You suggest it becomes a process of communication, well yes and the artefact might become an irrelevance at some point during the communication. — Punshhh

Right, just as the choice of which of the many languages we use in communication, the physical expression of language, is accidental to the essence of communication, which is the relationship between different peoples' ideas, so the physical piece of art would be accidental to the artwork which would be a relationship between the ideas of the artist and those of the observers.

But this brings us full circle because if we remove the physical piece of art as unimportant in this way, then what is important is that the right ideas are communicated from the artist to the observers. Now the artist's statement is even more important. We might remove the physical piece of art altogether, but then we would have nothing without the artists statement telling us what this "nothing" was meant to convey. Otherwise we might just create random thoughts, but we wouldn't need the artist for that.

So the way I see it is that there are two extremes. The first is that the physical piece of art is the work of the artist, it is "the statement". Of course any further "statement" would just be redundant, or else simply part of the work. The second is that the artwork is the communication of ideas between the artist and the observer, and then the physical piece is irrelevant, as some sort of placeholder. But then "the statement" is necessary ore else no ideas will be communicated.

I would dismiss both of these extremes. I think that art in its truest form is not designed to "communicate" in any way at all. I would say that it is designed to inspire the observer to create one's own ideas. It is not meant as a communication, but as a catalyst of inspiration. As such, it may or may not include a "statement". But I think that any critical analysis which focuses on subjects like correct interpretation, what the artist meant to portray, or even interpretation at all, are looking at art as a form of communication, and this is the mistake. We ought to look more at the feelings and thoughts which the art helps us to produce, regardless of whether the artist intended to produce these particular ideas, as in communication. Notice the difference between recognizing and interpreting one's own feelings and thoughts inspired by the art, and interpreting the art. Then the art becomes a feature of the observer's own ambition, spirit, and creativity, rather than the observer becoming a feature of the artist's work. The highest quality appreciation is without interpretation.

he distinction you make between different feelings is irrelevant. They all have references to the past and the future. You fear a dangerous man (past) and try to avoid them (future). You are ashamed of having been seen naked (past) and avoid being seen again (future). All feelings can be remembered consciously or buried in the unconscious. Time and consciousness are not defining characteristics. — David Mo

Yes, it's true that anticipatory feelings are tied together with memorial feelings, but that does not mean the distinction is irrelevant, it just means that feelings are difficult to understand because of this complexity.

Consider your example and my response. You have hurt someone (past). The inclination to walk away and hide from this, and the inclination to face the person with apology and repentance, involve completely different feelings which are derived from the very same event. The difference between these two distinct types of feelings is not related to that particular instance of hurting someone, yet both are derived from it. The difference is completely related to your future actions in relation to that instance, how you will respond.

With respect to shame and guilt the main difference is that shame attacks self-esteem directly while guilt only affects self-esteem through a reconsideration of the harm I have done to another person. Therefore, there is not the possibility of remorse in shame because I have not done any harm to other person. Therefore shame can have a moral content or not. I can be ashamed of my bad English spelling, for example, and this is not moral. (Moral implies a relation with other). — David Mo

It really makes no sense to say there is no shame in the recognition that I have hurt another person, that there is only guilt in this apprehension. That's nonsense, and it makes far more sense to follow my model in which there are both types of feelings involved here, feelings associated with shame, and feelings associated with guilt. Shame is involved with walking away from, or hiding the event, and guilt involves facing the event and addressing it. Both types of feelings are derived from the conscience in a consistent manner, but it is confliction within the conscience which causes conflicted feelings.

Also, the idea that there is shame without reconsideration of the event is consistent with what I've said, and it does not actually support your position. Shame is consequent upon the recognition that something is wrong, deprivation in the present situation, and it does not require a memory of the cause of this, or even an identification of exactly what it is that is wrong. That's why shame is involved with walking away from, or hiding from, a bad situation, which may be a mistaken action. In its naked form, shame is an innocence in the sense of an incomprehensible discomfort, within an unknowing naivety.

It requires a further judgement of conscience to produce guilt from shame. Guilt involves the recognition that the cause of shame, hiding the deprived situation, or hiding from the deprived situation, recoiling into one's own presumed innocence, or naivety, is itself something wrong, a pretense. That is what forms the relation between shame and guilt, the recognition that shame indicates hidden knowledge which it is wrong to hide, disguised as naivety.. Pretending that I didn't see what I saw, that I don't know what I know, or that I didn't do what I did, is judged as wrong, a self-deception, dishonesty, and this is the judgement of guilt which inclines us to face the problem. Therefore guilt is a possible, but not necessary, consequence of shame. And the two cannot be separated in the way that you suggest.

If shame is, as you say, involved with external observation, this itself, is a reconsideration of the event, and that's an inconsistency in your description..

I can see how artists would intend to make the viewer part of the work. There are participatory forms of art. Even music, in the sense that the composer writes, and the musician plays what has been written, is a participatory form. These are ways in which the artists push the boundary between creator and audience. However, each of these requires that the artist give explicit instruction to the participants or else the participation will be random. And, the fact that much effort must be taken to push the boundary in this way, and the physical boundary can still be determined through analysis of the instructions, is evidence that the boundary is very real and cannot be avoided.

It's the boundary between your mind and my mind. There is a real medium between us, and as much as we can communicate using words and other symbols, the ideas which you get from reading these words are not the same as the ideas I get when I am writing them.

As an analogy we could say art is like language. If we say that "language" is more than the words and signs which exist between us, as people here want to say that "art" is more than the physical thing in the medium, then we are not really looking at language any more, but something more like "communication". If we replace "language" with "communication", we include what happens within each other's minds as part of what is signified by the term, this is part of "communication". But then "art", just like "language" is a form of "communication".

Now, if we are talking about art as a form of communication, we are talking about something abstract, and not individual pieces of artwork any more. Then we would need to proceed by asking what is the purpose of communication. What would be the purpose of randomness, or even ambiguity in communication?

Here's how I see the significant difference between your perspective and mine. I see conscience as the feature which makes a person judge oneself as guilty. And you might agree with this. But your description proceeds to make a person's apprehension, or imagination, of an external observer the root of shame. Recognition of an external observer causes shame. But I see this imaginary, external observer, as simply a reformulated conscience. You still need a true form of conscience to justify one's own feeling of guilt, then you propose a second form of conscience as one's perceived relationship with external observers.

Therefore, in your separation of guilt from shame you really have two forms of conscience, one from within, which validates one's feeling of guilt, and another form of conscience which is the person's imagined relationship to external observers. In my perspective there is just one conscience.

I ask you in another way: can you identify some of these feelings that, according to you, arise from the consciousness of having hurt someone? Fear, love, indignation, disgust... (You can see a list here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_emotions#Types_of_moral_emotion ) Which can produce remorse and desire for reparation? — David Mo

I don't quite know what you mean by "identify" some feelings. It seems like we disagree as to what the actual feeling is, which is signified by a name, so naming feelings is rather pointless. Therefore I've tried to describe the feelings. But then you disagree with my descriptions, claiming you've never heard anyone describe feelings in this way. I'm beginning to think that you've never heard someone describe feelings, that you've only seen them named in conceptual schemes.

As I suggested earlier, I have two broad categories of feelings, feelings related to the future, anticipations, and feelings related to the past, memories. So disgust and indignation would relate to the past, the act itself, which has already occurred. The desire for reparation relates to the future. The two types of feelings are distinct, so one does not produce the other, though they are intertwining and have affects on each other.

Here's an explanation of why these two types need to be understood as distinct. Suppose I act in a way which hurts someone, and I recognize that the act was a mistake. That's the first point, to recognize the mistake as a mistake. Please do not immediately assume guilt, because "mistake" necessitates that I did something wrong, which may be an innocent mistake. If I dwell on this mistake, referencing my memory of it, this may encourage feelings such as disgust, remorse, lack of self-esteem. These feelings are not pleasant, so I need to get beyond this mistake, and that requires a plan for the future. The goal now is to get the memory out of my mind, get rid of the unpleasant memory with those unpleasant thoughts, so I am now talking about anticipatory feelings. There are two distinct avenues I can take. I can apologize and offer compensation, so that the hurt person and myself, can both get on with our lives to the best of our abilities, or, I can pretend that the mistake never happened, walk or run away from it.

Notice that the two ways of dealing with the bad memory, the mistaken action, which in this case caused hurt to another, are completely different. One way is to face the mistaken act, understand it, and do whatever is possible to repair the damage. This produces a clear conscience, allowing the ugly aspects to slip from the mind. The other way is to ignore the act, get away from it as quickly as possible, so that it can slip from the mind this way. This is the action of a person lacking in conscience. You can see that "conscience" is concerned with how I relate things which have occurred in the past to what I ought to do in the future.

The feelings involved in any such situation often involve a confliction in the conscience. That is indecisiveness. There is often a natural tendency to recoil, get away from the horrible disgusting memory as quickly as possible, because it is painful to the mind, this is a tendency to hide my mistaken action. However, the conscience tells me to face it, and deal with it properly. So there is confliction, no decision, and therefore a need to resolve, or the bad memories persist. The confliction and lack of resolution produces feelings, urging me one way or the other, but the feelings themselves conflict, due to the contradicting possibilities for resolution.

There was a gallery in which the lights were turned off and on again every few seconds. I don't know where, or what the physical form of the art piece was. — Punshhh

Wasn't the physical work the blinking of the lights?

Leaving aside other statements that you unduly attribute to me, I will ask you one more crucial question. There is a feeling that comes from the fact that my self-esteem has been damaged. Another feeling arises because I have hurt someone. Where is the difference? — David Mo

A loss of self-esteem is a loss of confidence, self-worth. This is associated with a lack of ambition and melancholy. Hurting someone results in all sorts of different feelings. That's what I've been trying to tell you, there are all sorts of feelings which may be associated with hurting someone, so it's a mistake to claim that there is this one feeling "guilt", which arises from hurting someone.

Yes, sometimes one cannot see it, as sometimes it is dark. But in the first place, one does not need to be taught. — unenlightened

I think that shame itself is not something that needs to be taught, but a person's response to it, is what is learned and developed over time. This is why I see the need to distinguish shame from guilt, in any attempt to understand these feelings, but it needs to be done in a way which does not constitute misunderstanding. And I think that the practise of confession was a start in that direction.. Not only does associating shame with guilt increase one's shame when the person has done wrong, but it also works the other way so that we can decrease our shame by assigning guilt to another person's wrongdoing.

To rectify this we need to allow shame, encourage the feeling to surface without prejudice, as it is those judgements of guilt we associate with shame, which cause shame to become unintelligible. Then when shame surfaces, we can deal with it by addressing the source of it, regardless of legal "responsibility".

When we refer to external vs. internal we do not mean that the causes of a feeling are on the outside or the inside. We refer to the fact that a particular emotion arises from the subject's belief in being under the gaze of a real or imagined external observer. Whether the sources are in the Oedipus complex or in social pressure is another matter. We are now at the level of description not causal analysis. In the Bible God is not internal to Adam. He is an external gaze of an external entity from whom Adam and Eve try to hide themselves. — David Mo

This doesn't address the issue, which is the issue of the internal observer. A person's own sense of God need not be describe by the Bible when we're talking about an imaginary observer, it might be described as schizophrenia. The argument was meant to show the logical problem with your internal/external division. But if that didn't help you, all you need to do is think about what we call "conscience".

If you recognize the reality of conscience you'll see that one's sense of wrong and right comes from within. Then you ought to also see that the feelings associated with the judgement "I have done wrong" are derived from this internal judgement. I believe that you already see this because you say that "guilt" is a feeling derived from such an internal judgement.

Now, you want to disassociate shame from conscience, as if shame is not derived from one's conscience, the sense of right and wrong, but is derived from one's fear of others. I have a fear of others, it's a shyness, a bashfulness, a timidity. But these feeling of shyness are completely unrelated to my feelings of shame. Shame is associated with my sense of what is right and what is wrong, and that is conscience. So I really believe that you are putting "shame" into the wrong category by classing it as a fear of others..

Everyone knows that there are criminals who feel no guilt. Everyone knows there are libertines who feel no shame. This is banal. But it does not invalidate the fact that shame and guilt exist and are different things. You do not distinguish between the necessary and the sufficient condition. Some cognitive processes are a necessary but not sufficient condition of moral emotions. That is, without them the emotion doesn't exist, but they alone are not enough to produce it. That explains your false objection. — David Mo

I am not denying a distinction between shame and guilt, I am saying that I think the way you have created the boundaries between them is incorrect. To see it my way, consider that feelings must be analyzed, and classified to be given a name. So we have a large group of unpleasant feelings involved with the recognition of something which is wrong, and we call this "shame". You are arguing that in some instances of feeling shame there is also a recognition that the wrong was caused by me, I have done wrong, and this you call the feeling of "guilt". But then you want to separate "guilt" from "shame" as if they are two distinct types of feelings, instead of one being a subcategory of the other, so you attempt to impose a faulty internal/external division between them.

But if you would simply analyze the feelings themselves, you would see that they are all internally sourced. And, you would see that the different feelings are assessed, analyzed, and judged. This act of analyzing and judging is what creates the categories of separation. So, we can see that shame involves a judgement that something is wrong, and that guilt involves a further judgement of that wrong thing, as to who is to blame for it. Neither of these requires external observers. The fact that shame can be amplified by external observes saying "guilty" is irrelevant. And, if there is a need to place a person in relation to other people (external observes), it would only come about in the second judgement, the judgement of guilt. So in reality we feel shame regardless of any individuation of different people, nor the determination of any external observers, and it is only in the determination of guilt that we need to separate ourselves from others, to assign guilt to the person who is to blame.

If you want to go deeper, to analyze "shame" itself, we might find that this feeling is rooted in an even wider category of some sort of fear of others. But we really need to take a look at "conscience" first, because we haven't distinguished "good for me" from "good" in the wider sense, and this division is critical to your supposed import, within one's feelings, of external observers. So I'm not willing to go this way with you until we have worked out a proper relationship between shame and guilt. The point is that feelings are all internally sourced, so one feeling is sourced in another feeling, as a broader category, creating types or families of feelings. If we take one type of feeling, and relate it directly to something external, as you do with "shame", then we put an end to our capacity to further the analysis. This is why I propose that we relate feelings only internally, one feeling to another, and not get distracted by relating the feeling to some supposed external observers, until we have a satisfactory principle by which the external observer can be shown to be important..

I would like not to introduce God here. The Genesis narrative is confusing. Notice that Adam and Eve hide from Yahweh's gaze because they are naked = shame. The concept of God in the Bible is anthropomorphic. — David Mo

"God" here is simply meant as something that you can not hide from or lie to. I did not imply Yahweh, Allah, or any of that sort, although in the context of Benedicts book she obviously referred to the Christian god. — Nobeernolife

This is an issue which relates to David's internal/external division which needs to be cleared up, so we can't dismiss God so easily.

God is thought of as someone, or something, which you cannot hide anything from, God knows. If God is just like another person, a person which you cannot hide anything from, then imagining God as knowing is an instance of imagining an external person who is watching, and knows. The problem here is that the person imagining God as watching, is just assumed to be imagining that God is watching from an external view point. However, God cannot be seen, and God's view point cannot be seen. So, it is equally possible that God is within everyone,, and is watching from that internal view point.

If this is the case, that God is watching from within, then the "shame" or what David calls "guilt", which a person feels when they do something wrong in the presence of no other people, but are still concerned about God, is internally sourced. David wants to dismiss the fact that such imaginary scenarios are internally sourced, by saying that the person or thing imagined as knowing, is necessarily an external thing. But if God's observation point is imagined to be within, and the reason why one cannot hide from God is because God can see what you do from within yourself, then David's internal/external division is decisively refuted. And, since we are talking about imaginary exposure, the proof that God actually is within, is not required for that refutation. All that is required is that one imagines one's own actions to be revealed to God from within, and this is sufficient for the refutation.

Many emotions may be involved in a case but this does not mean that they are the same. Guilt and fear - which you mention - are not the same emotion. They arise from different motivations and have different consequences. Fear does not imply a victim and fear does not produce remorse. Guilt does. Therefore, you can distinguish guilt from fear or shame, even if they are entangled in some cases, not all. — David Mo

You keep talking about "guilt" as if it is a feeling. I've disputed this claim. And the fact that people can knowingly do wrong without feeling guilt is evidence that guilt is not the "feeling" associated with knowingly doing wrong. So unless you can describe to me what type of feeling "guilt" is supposed to be, there is no point in continuing to talk about it as if it is a feeling. There is no validity to your claim that "guilt" is a feeling.

Guilt and shame are moral emotions. They happen inside man. But shame has an external source. Even imagined, you suppose an external observer that triggers your shame. You feel as if you were observed.
This is probably the most debated feature of the shame/guilt distinction. But it is generally considered useful. — David Mo

My example above, of God as an imaginary internal observer, is sufficient to refute this claim that all shame (including imaginary sourced shame) is always externally sourced.

ou do not realize that the difference is not primarily in the present or the future but rather the nature of the damage and how to repair it. When you "hurt" yourself you are destroying your self-confidence, you are degrading the idea you have of yourself as a person. — David Mo

This is not at all true. We learn from our mistakes, so the experience of hurting oneself is often turned into a confidence building experience. Whether the self-hurt destroys ones confidence, or builds one's confidence depends on one's view toward the future. So in athletic training for example, one must intentionally hurt oneself to build strength (no pain, no gain). The hurting experience actually builds confidence.

Despite the fact that you are arguing against this scenario you seem to already recognize it when you refer to "how to repair" the damage. Clearly this is a view toward the future. So your argument here is completely off base. Even if hurting oneself is sometimes an act of damaging one's self-esteem, there is always the question of reparation, and this is a view toward the future, just like restitution is a view toward the future when another is hurt. .

So the point which I made still stands. The act which causes hurt to oneself is essentially the same sort of act, as the act which causes hurt to another. It is a mistake. Therefore the "feeling" associated with these two acts, when viewed in the past, as a memory, is essentially the same feeling. It is a recognition of mistake, and a feeling of regret. The distinction which you are trying to make, that the latter is the feeling of guilt, and the former the feeling of shame, is unjustified. It is only when we take into account the actions which one takes starting immediately after the mistaken action, that we proceed in two distinct directions.

The fact that there are two distinct directions is due to the difference in who was hurt by the action, oneself or another. This difference is a manifestation of how we choose future actions at that time, immediately after the mistake occurs. If the hurt is on another, we immediately apologize and offer to do whatever we can to help in the healing. We proceed toward restitution. If the hurt is on oneself, all we need to do is work on the healing, reparation. The feeling of "shame" or "guilt" relates directly to the past, mistaken action, regardless of who was hurt. If "guilt" is a feeling, I can feel guilty for an act which hurt myself. The feeling here, more properly called shame than guilt, is directly related to the recognition of mistake, and is characterized by regret. There is no difference between "shame" and "guilt" here, but one is a better choice of words. However, when we look toward future actions, after the occurrence of the mistake, recognizing a difference is necessary.

One can learn without being taught. One sees quite easily when one has hurt someone, and one quite naturally regrets it and seeks to comfort. This sensitivity can be seen in quite small children, and doesn't take any religious or moral training. — unenlightened

I think "hurt" is a lot more complicated than that. We hurt people emotionally, and sometimes the hurt is not evident. Failing to keep a commitment for example, hurts the other, and sometimes the commitment might not even be explicit, but implicit, and the person who doesn't hold their end might not even notice the hurt to the other. Further, there are such "little hurts" which we might actually learn to ignore because they're so little. And that's the problem with learning, so much is learnt, that if we stop teaching good habits there will be a hole in that learning, where learning something is required, which could be filled with learning a bad habit. We can learn bad behaviour just like we can learn good behaviour. To return to the example of commitment, if I view "the contract" as something there to protect my rights, then I am only seeing half. And if I am only seeing that half, I'll learn to use the contract for my advantage. Then cheating is fair game, I make sure the contract allows me to cheat, and as much as possible closes the door to cheating from the other side. Cheating is learned behaviour.

And that really is the beginning and end of it. How shall we live together? We need to communicate, so we need to be truthful and honest, we are vulnerable so we need to look after each other, we need to cooperate and share to survive and thrive. And these thing are such obvious truths that they are built into the genes and do not need justification from philosophers or prophets, nor do they need a special training scheme. But we have devised a whole system to convince ourselves of the opposite, and to replicate the opposite in each other. And we call that morality, and justice, and civilisation. And it is destroying us. — unenlightened

Look at what you say here, "we have devised a whole system". If we can devise systems, then the system ought to be just as much a part of the solution as it is a part of the problem. Notice, "the system" is an inanimate thing, it doesn't recognize hurt, like a child does, the system is indifferent and it can go either way depending on the will of the people who devise it, their successes and failures. The system consists of institutions of law, education, etc., and since it can go either way it actually does need justification from philosophers, etc..

We cannot cast shame on the system, blame the system, claiming that the system has taken a turn for the worse, and hope that the system feels shame and fixes itself, because it doesn't make sense to blame that inanimate thing. And we can't say that the system's all messed up so let's just get rid of it all and have no system, living like children with no authorities, trying to observe each other to see what works the best, because bad habits are just as likely, or more likely, to reign, as are good habits. So a system is needed.

Inevitably, mistakes are made. We relate "shame" to the occurrence of such mistakes and attempt to assign guilt. But "shame" goes even deeper, such that we are ashamed of the mistakes of nature, chance occurrences, and this is the real reason why we need to separate shame from guilt. There are many things occurring which are wrong, not right, and those things need to be addressed. We ought to feel ashamed of these things regardless of the guilty party, there may not even be a guilty party. Therefore we ought not seek to blame and cast shame, hoping that others who are responsible for creating the wrongs will fix the wrongs, we need to feel the shame ourselves, regardless of guilt, and we do feel that shame, and so are inspired to fix the problems.

So "shame" involves no boundaries between individuals in the thing which causes the shame, it simply describes how an individual relates to a deprived situation.

n the case of a novel, if the art is the physical thing, what exactly are you referring to? The words in a specific language used? The grammar? The ink choice of the publisher, and their choice of paper type? By "written material" do you mean the whole thing, the "novel"? — Noble Dust

Right, the novel is a composition of all those things, the paper, the ink, the binding, etc.. Now you can get a novel on line, and it will be the words on your screen. So the important part of the novel is the arrangement of words, because this is what these two forms have in common, the same arrangement of words. Therefore the choices of paper, ink etc., are not essential aspects, in the case of the novel, we can call them accidentals, the arrangement of words is what is essential. In the case of a painting, the choice of ink is an essential aspect. And if the painter includes words in the form of a statement, this is most often not an essential aspect, but an accidental.

Do you not realise that something imaginary is art, or part of an art piece if the artist says it is so? — Punshhh

How would you present something imaginary as art, if not in a physical form? And, the physical form is the artwork, not the imaginary thing which is represented.

I summed it up here: — Noble Dust

I don't see any argument there.

No, not at all. Interpretation by the performer has always been an integral part of classical music, for instance; improvisation used to be pretty common place, even. The concept, within classical music, of a rigid, platonic ideal of the piece represented through notation is just an ossification; the formation of an orthodoxy. And that's to say nothing of stuff like this (John Cage): — Noble Dust

Sure, I agree completely. And, representations of various pieces of music morph over time.. But then the music played is not the same as the music written by the artist, and we cannot truthfully say it is the same piece. We call it an interpretation.

LOL, is sci-fi not art? — Noble Dust

The art is the physical thing, the written material, not the interpretation of it.

I don't see how you have shown that the artwork is anything more than the physical piece. The fact that artwork is necessarily temporal only serves to demonstrate the reality of this.

Music is a unique form of art in which the piece must be recreated every time it is to be appreciated. But I don't see how the artwork itself is anything other than the piece which is created. Let's suppose it is something other than the music itself. Suppose the composer writes on paper the specific instructions as to how to recreate the sounds, and the artwork is supposed to be these instructions which are represented by the notations on the paper. Isn't it necessary that the artist (composer) give very clear and precise "statements" in order that the piece be appreciated as it is supposed to be. The person who wants to hear the music cannot just interpret the instruction any old way.

What you say is a matter for philosophers, not for artists, or viewers.
How familiar are you with artistic developments of the 20th Century? Because this distinction and all other attempts restrict art were challenged up to the point where everything was art and anything could be art. I pointed this out in the other thread, " where is art going next".

This development made any analysis by philosophers irrelevant, just like it made any comments by critics irrelevant, to art. — Punshhh

Actually, I think the reverse is true. If it is true that "anything", and "everything" is art, then we need philosophy to determine what a "thing" is, because by this conclusion if it's not a thing, it's not art. Claiming that non-existent things are art is where the others have been going, insisting that imaginary things are art. As if I can look at a piece of art and imagine all sorts of things which aren't there, and claim that this imaginary stuff is part of the art.

That is proven by cases of absolutely impassive criminals who know they have done wrong but feel no guilt at all.They lack the emotion. (There are brain damages that produce this effect). — David Mo

This is the key to understanding my point. The person who has done wrong and knows oneself to have done so, does not necessarily feel guilt. Therefore the feeling which you are calling "guilt" has no direct or necessary relationship to knowing that one has done wrong, and "guilt" cannot be defined as the feeling one has when one knows oneself to have done wrong. You assume that this person simply lacks that emotion. But people don't simply lack emotions, they learn how to suppress and control their emotions so that the person doesn't develop the emotion which another person would develop in the same situation. So there are numerous different emotions involved with knowing that one has done wrong, such as shame, and fear of being caught, pride in one's capacity to successfully do wrong, etc.. There is no one single feeling called "guilt", that is an over-simplification. The person you speak of, the "impassive criminal", cultivates and encourages the good feelings involved in doing wrong, while suppressing the bad feelings. But there is no such thing as a type of feeling which you call the feeling of "guilt".

A person who feels guilty about hitting his child does not need to imagine being watched. — David Mo

Let me analyze this particular point you make. The person recognizes himself as having done wrong, so he recognizes that he has made a mistake. Do you agree with this? What you call feeling "guilt" is a matter of recognizing one's own mistake, to have done the wrong thing in the situation, rather than having done a different thing or a number of other possible different things which would have been better. The fact is that the wrong thing was done and the person recognizes that the wrong thing was. done.

Can we call this feeling "regret"? Notice that there are many mistakes which do not involve guilt, but nevertheless involve "regret". When the person feels regret, with an associated guilt, there are a number of ways that one might deal with the feeling. One might feel the urge to apologize, to confess. Or, one might decide that hiding the occurrence of that incident from others, pretending it didn't occur, is the thing to do. Notice the difference between the two. If the person apologizes, then we can forget the incident and get on with our lives. Confession and apology relieves the bad feelings so that the incident may be put aside (forgive and forget). If the person decides to hide and conceal evidence, then there is a secret which must be kept. The need to keep that secret prevents the person from forgetting, and this is what you call the feeling of "guilt".

So what you call feeling "guilt" is just a matter of remembering the mistakes you have made which have had a negative affect on others. If we confess and apologize, this is the move toward forgetting, relieving the guilt. If we do not, we remain conflicted, should I confess and apologize, or should I keep on hiding the incident. The criminals whom you say "lack the emotion" have developed ways to look at what they are doing as good. They have no need to apologize or forget what they have done because they are proud of it.

I'm not the one who's mixing the two. It's you. Shame always has an external source, real or imagined: let's call it public opinion, for short. Without being seen or imagining yourself being seen doing the wrong thing in the wrong place, there is no feeling at all. Therefore, the source of shame is always external and restricted to local circumstances.

The source of the feeling of guilty is inner. Even in an isolated island you would feel guilty to have done the wrong thing. It is unconditioned and universal. — David Mo

So, I disagree with this external/internal portrayal of shame/guilt, completely. I think you are attempting a simplification which just doesn't work. What I think is required to understand these feelings is to analize in relation to time, past and future. Some aspects of one's psyche are directed toward the future (anticipation), and some are directed toward the past (memory). The two are very much tied together and intertwined.

"Regret" clearly is based in memories of the past, as is what you call the feeling of "guilt". But "shame" reflects both memories and anticipations, and this is why it is extremely difficult to apprehend its character. You say "Shame always has an external source, real or imagined." But the "imagined" is obviously an internal source, and that's why your portrayal is faulty. The imagined shame is the anticipation of consequences. So shame exists right in the present, as regret concerning the past, and anticipation of future consequences, all tied together.

I propose a simple case for analysis: — David Mo

I can't see the point of your example. It appears to me like you are attempting to create a separation within the feeling of "regret", between different types of mistakes. A mistake which hurts another person you are proposing as different from a mistake which hurts oneself. The former causes "guilt", the latter does not. I agree that there is such a difference, but the difference is in relation to one's future actions, one's anticipations, not in relation to one's current repentance. I have made a mistake, I have done wrong, is no different, whether it hurt myself or it hurt another, though there are differences in the magnitude of the error.

But if we take mistakes of equal magnitude, one hurting oneself, and the other hurting another, the consequences and therefore future action required, are completely different. It is this requirement, for future action, the apology, compensation, which characterizes the feeling of guilt. If there was no need for this future action, the two mistakes would be equivalent, except the hurt to oneself would have more lasting pain. It is the need for the expression of an apology and to compensate, which is an outward expression, which characterizes guilt. So again, your internal/external dichotomy is a misrepresentation.

I wonder if anyone can relate to just a very simple realisation that one has been inconsiderate, say, and the rejection of that as a way of life for the future. Something a child might do on their own, without pressure from anyone. I think this is the capacity that is exploited to produce a conformist, when we would do better to raise kind and thoughtful individuals who do not need to be told what to be ashamed of. — unenlightened

I'd like to say that I was a bit inconsiderate earlier in the thread. I said some things before completely understanding what you said, and misrepresented what you had said. I suppose there was pride and confidence which led me to say what I did, and some shame followed when I realized the mistake.

But I really don't think that a child, or anyone, can determine what being inconsiderate is, without learning that. We can easily learn hurtful actions which hurt oneself, because we feel the pain. But how can we learn the actions which hurt another, without being shown the pain? We have the golden rule which we are taught, so we know that the same type of action which would hurt oneself would also hurt another. But what about all the different feelings which different people have developed in different ways? Don't we need to "conform", to have the same feelings, and therefore know when we might be hurting another?

You seem to be reducing the discussion to the physical object of the artwork. — Punshhh

Despite the fact that many here are arguing on the premise that the artwork is something more than the physical object, I see no principles to support this assumption. The other aspects, creation and appreciation, are distinct activities which must be considered separately. If they are not considered separately, then we get conflation of these two, as if they are equally essential to the existence of the artwork. But in reality creation is essential, while appreciation is not. Therefore we must uphold the real division or boundary between these two, and that is the real existence of the physical object, as a boundary of separation between them. When the artwork is respected as such, the divisional boundary between the creator and the appreciator, we can also have proper respect for both the creator and the appreciator, having distinct functions.

What "we" do you mean? Whenever I've read about it I've seen the words shame and guilt used the way I do. It is true that the word shame can be ambiguous in ordinary language, but it is a matter of dissolving that ambiguity through analysis. And that is what psychologists and anthropologists do, starting with Darwin and ending with contemporary studies of empirical psychology.
But I don't think you're using words as is commonly done in ordinary language. — David Mo

Have you never heard the word "shameless" used to refer to a person who has done wrong, knows oneself to have done wrong, yet is not at all ashamed, i.e. feels no guilt? That is what I mean by "shameless".

So, if we say that there is a "shame" which one feels when one knows oneself to have done wrong, but does not reveal this wrong doing to others, and there is also a "shame" which one feels when one's wrong doings are revealed to others, then that is a reason why there is ambiguity in the use of "shame". These two feelings cannot be the same feeling.

To disambiguate one might insist that the feeling is the same feeling, it is like the feeling of guilt, and this feeling of guilt. is exactly the same whether the individual is keeping the secret, or whether the secret has been exposed. The person knows oneself to be guilty and therefore feels guilt, regardless of what is revealed. But this is a falsity which misrepresents the situation because "guilt" is not a feeling, it is a reasoned judgement. And this is why one can judge oneself to be guilty, yet not have the feeling which is supposed to be associated with guilt. That feeling is "shame" and we call this shamelessness.

Therefore a proper disambiguation requires that we separate the feeling which one has when hiding one's guilt, from the feeling which one has when one's guilt is exposed. When expressed in this way it ought to be blatantly apparent to you that these two feelings cannot be the same feeling. How could it be possible that a person could feel and act the same way when hiding something from others, as they feel and act when that something has been exposed? Despite the fact that we call both of these feelings "shame" there is an important need to recognize that they are completely different types of feelings, with completely different associated sub-feelings, if we want to properly dissolve that ambiguity.

You're confusing the feeling with their circumstances. We're talking about two different feelings and their definitions.
If you know you are guilty but you don't feel anything there is a criminal problem (you are dangerous) but not a problem of definition: you don't feel a specific feeling: guilt. There is no case. The same thing if others say you are guilty and you don't feel guilty. We can talk about the feeling of guilt only when you experience the twinge or discomfort that points to your emotional state.
I must insist: we are talking about feelings, not about justice, public opinion or moral rules. — David Mo

The point is that there is no feeling of guilt. That is to take the analysis in the wrong direction, a ruse. Guilt is simply a judgement. That is why the person with the "criminal problem" can know oneself to be guilty without any feeling of guilt. There really is no feeling of guilt. So if we proceed to talk about feelings which are associated with guilt, we talk about feelings like "shame". But right away we are confronted with the ambiguity, the difference between the feeling of "shame", when the guilt is exposed, and the person is shamed by others, and the feeling of "shame" when one is hiding one's guilt from others.

It is very difficult for the shame of being seen as a pedophile to be overcome by pride in being seen as a pedophile. It's not really reasonable that something that causes shame can also cause pride. — David Mo

Shame and pride are distinct, as opposing, so they cannot have the same cause. Shame is associated with the urge to keep a secret and pride is associated with the urge to reveal what has been kept as a secret. That is why pride can overcome shame, when "shame" is used as the internally sourced feeling. Even a pedophile might see the need to confess.

I think we should focus on the features of the usual definition of shame and guilt. The damaged object of guilt is an external Other; there is no external damaged object in shame. It is the Self.

Shame is caused by an external look (being seen). Guilt is caused even without this external exposure (the voice of guilt is internal: the consciousness).

Perhaps we can start with these points. — David Mo

There is clearly a problem with the division proposed here. If the internally sourced form of "shame" which I described above, is simply replaced with the term "guilt" as you propose, to distinguish it from the externally sourced form of "shame", then it is necessarily associated with thoughts of wrongdoing, as "guilt" implies. But this does not properly describe the internally sourced feeling of shame which is independent from any judgements of wrongdoing. That is why "guilt" is the ruse, because you turn outward, toward the conscious judgement, instead of continuing inward toward the source of the feeling, in your attempt to understand the feeling.

So if we keep going inward, away from such judgements of wrongdoing, we can find the feeling to originate in the need to keep a secret. This is evidenced by your example of the girl in menstruation. We cannot associate this with guilt because there might be a good reason for keeping the secret rather than a bad reason. Therefore we cannot judge this internally sourced feeling which is associated with the need to keep something secret as a bad feeling, which "guilt" implies.



There is a Catholic tradition called "confession", which is for the most part absent in modern society. Confession is the means by which people release their inner shame, reveal their secrets, without being shamed by others. It is important to separate the inner feeling of shame from the shame which is cast onto us from others, in order to cope with the inner shame. This is because fear of the shame which will be cast onto oneself by others (punishment), is an enormous part of the inner shame which is associated with keeping the secret, as it increases the perceived need to keep the secret.

I made a much more complicated argument than that and the whole point is that the person is doing it in verbal manner when, most cases, the art form itself is not verbal. I am pretty sure I said this a number of times and then pointed out my specific issues with this. — Coben

Actually, "verbal" usually distinguishes spoken from written. I think a verbal statement from the artist would be even better than a written statement, because this would be more personal. Regardless, you are the viewer, not the artist. If the piece of art contains what you call "verbal" aspects, then so be it, that is the artist's work, and the work has verbal aspects.

If you do not like the verbal aspects then you are free to express your dislike, just like you might express your dislike of any trend in art. But you speak of this statement trend as if you believe that the artist is attempting to get into your mind in some form of brainwashing. It's as if you are allowing the artist a limited access into your mind, and you're afraid that with the statements the artist will get beyond the halfway point of balance, thereby seizing control of your mind.

I think I prefer to think of the situation as coagency where the work of art is presented to the view by the artist, in its specificity, and the viewer moves toward the work of art also. — Coben

Have you ever considered the idea of simply not reading the statement? When I look at art my eye is drawn to certain aspects which appeal to me, and others kind of get ignored. If I talk to someone about the piece they might ask me about something which I haven't even really noticed, because it never attracted my attention in the same way that it attracted the attention of the other person. Why not do this with the statement, simply ignore it if it doesn't attract your attention but the rest of the art does?

Thanks for your unecessarily consdescendingly presented, yet useful, suggestion, but I don't want to go over to the 100 percent camp. I think it is a collaborative creation, at the level of experiencing the work of art. — Coben

What you don't seem to be grasping is that the viewer has the power of choice. Because of this, the artist really provides nothing at all to the phenomenological experience. You need not view any art whatsoever to have a phenomenological experience. That you choose to include some artwork into your experience is of you own making. It's not that the artist is contributing to your experience, as if there is no way to exclude the artist from your experience, you invite the art into your experience. The artist has absolutely no causal control over your phenomenological experience, so it's completely wrong to say that there is a "collaborative creation" here. The creation is all yours, because you decide whether or not to bring the art in, and your creation (your experience) will be different depending on what art you decide to bring in.

I think the artist growing dependence on presenting the meaning of their works and what people should think about the contents is part of a trend away from skills and works including sensual AND conceptual aspects, and rather is part of a trend to see art as stimulating verbal thoughts and for people to not spend the time training in and creating sensual experiences. — Coben

I know you think this, you said so already, but so what? Art goes through all sorts of different phases, different schools, etc.. If you don't like the current trend, then look at some older stuff. All you are expressing is a personal taste. You don't like the current trend, other people do like it, that's simply the way art is.

So they overrely on verbal thoughts, and so try to get at even more of the collaboration. — Coben

There is no "collaboration", you are a free willing human being with choice. I think you're a conspiracy theorist. You seem to believe that the artists are conspiring to take away your freedom to control your own aesthetic experience. You think that the artists already control half that experience, and you're afraid that the artists are trying to get the other half now. Are you paranoid that the artists might get right into your mind as brainwashing agents?

have to disagree with this exclusion of the Genesis story as an incidence of ‘shame’. It is an exposure or revelation of fragility or susceptibility to harm that is made only to Adam and Eve themselves - not to anyone else. Their unhappiness at this knowledge and their lack of confidence as a reason to keep the secret results in them attempting to cover up or hide what is not even apparent to anyone else. — Possibility

I'm not a biblical scholar, but this appears as a misinterpretation to me. There are no people other than Adam and Eve. Eve has come into possession of "the secret", and reveals the secret to Adam. So the supposed "shameful" act here is the revealing of the secret. Once the secret is out, there is no attempt to hide it from future generations. The problem is that they are supposedly "shamed" for revealing the secret, but what are the feelings which led Eve to reveal?

You distinguish between the norm that has been broken and the feeling. That's not what I meant. I was distinguishing between two different feelings. Guilt involves an external victim: you feel guilty because you have hurt a person, an animal, etc. In shame the damaged one is the self (your self-esteem). Other important differences can also be established: shame implies your inner self (you are cowardly, shy, etc.). In guilt something you have done: a crime, a fault. — David Mo

I find it very difficult to understand things by these terms, the way that you separate guilt from shame. The problem is that there are cases when a person knowingly hurts another, and therefore knows this to be a wrongful act, but does not feel guilt. This is what we call shamelessness. So your description of "guilt" is not correct.

Because of this, it is questionable whether there is such a thing as the feeling of "guilt", perhaps what you call "guilt" is just a special type of shame. But if we look at guilt directly, we see that it requires necessarily a judgement, and there is a clear division into two types of judgement. One type is when others judge you as "guilty" for having done wrong, and the other type is when you judge yourself as "guilty" for having done wrong. The first requires an exposure of your actions, to others, and recognition by the others that the act is wrong, and so there is a type of "shame" involved for you, with this exposure.

The second involves recognizing one's own acts as wrong, and this is a bit more complicated because there are two distinct and somewhat opposite directions in which one can proceed from this point. The person might be compelled to reveal one's actions to others, "confess", or the person might be compelled to hide one's actions from others. These are two very conflicting feelings, 'I must confess', and 'This must be kept secret', so we cannot class them both together as "the feeling of guilt". Therefore we tend to refer to 'I must confess' as the feeling of guilt. But this leaves 'this must be kept secret' as a feeling distinct from guilt, despite the fact that the person recognizes oneself to be guilty. The feeling of the need to keep something secret might be called "shame", but notice that it is completely different from the "shame" mentioned above which results from exposure.

n my examples: the girl's feeling due to her first menstrual flow is shame: she has not hurt anyone and her feeling is caused by something internal (not only in a physical sense). The feeling of the boy who has hit his girl is guilty: there is a victim and he can ask her to forgive him because it is out of his character and it will not happen again. — David Mo

In this example, the girl and the boy both appear to feel the need to keep a secret, so they both feel "shame" in the same sort of way. However, if the boy is actually feeling the need to expose himself, to "confess", then he is feeling guilt. Notice that the two, the need to keep the secret, and the need to confess, cannot be the same feeling, because they are opposed to each other. However, so long as the secret is kept, there may be confliction between the two feelings (the urge to confess along with the desire not to), and there may also be further complications to keeping the secret (what a web we weave...), and this is why this type of "shame" is so discomforting.

If we go back to the girl, I believe she is also feeling the same type of "shame", to a different degree. The "shame" in both these cases involves the discomforts of having to keep a secret. She does not have the self-imposed judgement of "guilt" against her, which might increase the discomfort with the urge to confess, but she still has the discomfort and "shame" involved with the burden of keeping a secret. We ought to represent the keeping of a secret as a burden, and it is this burden which is associated with the discomfort of this type of "shame".

I hide my shame (cowardice). I exhibit my pride (triumph). — David Mo

I would describe this in a different way. The feeling of shame is caused by hiding something within. But shame may be overcome by pride, and this leads to exposure. In relation to guilt then, (as one reason out of many, for hiding something), the urge to confess is a feeling of pride. This leads us toward authenticity, which is to accept oneself as you are, to accept one's past mistakes as part of who you are, hiding nothing, revealing your entire person.

Is shame to be counted amongst the virtues? — Banno

I would think that the pride which is somewhat opposed to, and inevitably overcomes the shame in healthy human beings, is better to be counted as the virtue.

Obviously, but it's a part of the work of art as experienced. I don't think I used the pharse the work of theartist. And in the context of artists statements that inform us about what we are experiencing, this is an obvious attempt to affect our half of creating that work of art experience. — Coben

As I told Noble Dust, this is all nonsense to me. The artist's act of creating the piece of art is an obvious attempt to affect your "work of art experience". If you reject the artist's statement on this basis, that the artist is attempting to have an affect on your experience of the artwork, then you might as well reject all artwork as well, because that's what artwork is, an attempt to affect your work of art experience

And the premise, which you cling to, that you yourself, as the viewer, has the right to create "half", or some other percentage of that "work of art experience", I've demonstrated as complete nonsense.

Let's start with a realistic premise. Let's assume that the viewer creates the "work of art experience", completely, one hundred percentage, and uses the work of art as a tool toward creating that experience. Consider therefore, that the viewer must choose the tools (works of art), which one will be using to bring about the desired experience. Can you make your argument from this perspective?

Crossed purposes? Maybe, but what's the difference between a metaphor and crossed purposes?

You don't have to like it, but then you don't have to participate. If you do participate, then you need to use the word the way I am using it, or you will confuse an already difficult topic. — unenlightened

I am sorry Unenlightened, I am willing to follow your instruction, for participation in your thread, and I apologise for any unnecessary persistence. However, we must maintain the following important point which I regret that I missed earlier:

I think, purely for the purposes of this thread, I will stipulate at this point that the shame under discussion is some kind of unhappiness with the image one has of oneself, and that guilt is a possibly and possibly not associated kind of unhappiness with (the image one has of) what one has done or not done — unenlightened

We must maintain that separation between this feeling you have named "shame", and any necessary association with guilt. Any person who uses "shame" in this thread as if it implies guilt, I will charge with equivocation, and justification for that charge is found here.

Accordingly, I will revoke the following, and other related statements in my last post:

Since the keeping of a secret might be either for good or bad purposes, we cannot call this feeling, which pushes the person toward exposure of the secret, "shame", because that implies that keeping the secret is wrong, guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have clearly removed the association between the feeling you describe as "shame", and what we call "guilt", so there is no reason not to call this feeling which I described as the feeling one gets from keeping a secret, as "shame". So long as "shame" does not necessarily imply guilt, I have no problem with calling this feeling "shame".

Now I will question the relationship you describe here:

Rather it is to note the tradition that shame is the primary mark of humanity, and that it results in the urge to hide, to self efface. — unenlightened

As I understand this feeling of shame, it results from hiding something, keeping a secret, thereby producing the urge to reveal as the unhappiness referred to earlier. What you do, is describe a relationship between pride and shame, almost to the point of a dichotomous opposition. To put this into my perspective, pride is the feeling of having nothing to hide, laying it all out there. Shame is the feeling of having something to hide, and this only occurs if there is a reason for hiding that thing. The reason for hiding something, is what produces the unhappiness you refer to.

It is a confliction, because there appears to be a natural tendency towards being proud, laying it all out there for the world to see, as this makes one feel good. This "pride" is closely related to confidence, so the reason for hiding something, which manifests as the actual secret and the feeling of shame, can be understood in terms of a lack of confidence. The lack of confidence is what you describe as "the urge to hide". Notice the distinction, yet the relationship between, the act of hiding something, keeping a secret, and the urge to hide oneself. This I propose as the characteristics of the feeling "shame". The difficulty of keeping the secret, when pride is what brings enjoyment, is the root of the unhappiness.This difficulty appears to be lessened by hiding oneself, and so the urge to hide.

Once again, I'm sorry for my earlier obtuseness, but I think it is very important for any clear understanding of the subject, that we do not conflate two very distinct senses of "shame". They are very distinct, because one is the feeling when the person is hiding something, keeping a secret, and the other is the consequences when the secret is exposed, revelation. Therefore if you refer to the biblical story of Genesis, or any other stories to elucidate the nature of "shame", we need to respect this difference. We cannot relate "shame" to the fruit of tree of knowledge, because this is the "shame" of exposure, revelation, and that would not be the "shame" you are talking about, but equivocation by the rules of your thread.

Therefore we must relate "shame" to the feelings which are involved with keeping the secret, the secret existing prior to that incident. These feelings of "shame", the unhappiness and uncomfortableness of keeping a secret, the need to tell someone, are the feelings which inspire the creation of language. Notice that in this case the reason for keeping the secret, the lack of confidence, and therefore the root of that shame, is the inability to communicate. That is why this shame, this unhappiness which led to that first exposure of knowledge is associated with innocence.

That's because you give a special meaning to the word "shame." — David Mo

I was distinguishing between "shame", as that which is cast upon a person by others, and the feeling of being "ashamed", "embarrassed". The latter is the consequence of the former. The feeling of being ashamed, requires the act of shaming, and this is why a person who knows oneself to be guilty can be in that state of knowing oneself to be guilty, without being ashamed or embarrassed, shameless. That is when the person has not been shamed

So if there is a feeling which one gets, when one knows oneself to be guilty, but the person has not been shamed and therefore cannot be ashamed or embarrassed, the feeling which causes the blush we associate with embarrassment, this feeling is something other than shame. The feeling is related to the keeping of a secret. Since the keeping of a secret might be either for good or bad purposes, we cannot call this feeling, which pushes the person toward exposure of the secret, "shame", because that implies that keeping the secret is wrong, guilt. But the feeling, which leads to the exposure of the secret is the same whether the secret is held for good purposes or for bad purposes.

I see a difference with the girl who betrays her best friend with her boyfriend or the young man who feels bad because he has hit his girl. Is it not? — David Mo

What I said above ought to partially answer this question. And this example with different degrees of wrongness, or degrees of guilt, will help demonstrate what I said, that the feeling which one has when hiding a secret from others ought not be called "shame". This is because it is the same feeling, or more properly the same type of feeling, regardless of the degree of guilt involved with the secret being kept. Furthermore, there may be no guilt at all involved with keeping the secret, if the secret is kept for good reasons. The name "shame" implies guilt, but the same type of feeling occurs when one is keeping a secret for good reasons, and there is no guilt.

When I suggested you were equating art and philosophy, I was referencing the transition you made here: — Noble Dust

I wasn't "equating" anything, I was comparing the interpretation of the artist's art, to the interpretation of the philosopher's word, just like you suggested. Why would you suggest that I compare two things, and then when I do compare those two things, you claim that equating those two things is embarrassingly erroneous? Did you know already that the comparison which you were making was erroneous, and you mentioned it solely for the purpose of leading me into that embarrassing position where you could make such an accusation against me?

Again, you did not address me in those terms when you equated art and philosophy; you made that equation first, and then you addressed my metaphor. — Noble Dust

That's clearly false, the evidence is right here on the page. You made the comparison first:

A work of art is more akin to a word, and how that word's language is always in flux; words change their meaning, but they leave something of a husk behind as they change. — Noble Dust

Then I made a reply to your post:

That's why we have a distinction between primary and secondary sources in philosophy. This marks the difference between what the author actually has said, and how the commentators interpret what has been said. It is wrong to make the commentary part of the work, just like it is wrong to make the critic's interpretation part of the work of art. There is a distinction between the events occurring, and the narrative. — Metaphysician Undercover

Notice my use of the comparative phrase "just like". "It is wrong to make the commentary part of the work, just like it is wrong to make the critic's interpretation part of the work of art." Then I gave the reason why, there is a difference between the events occurring, and the narrative of the events.

Hopefully we can now get back to my arguments (or yours, if you'd like to make any). — Noble Dust

I don't see any point. I think I've demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt (and a doubt casts one heck of a shadow), that your argument is completely irrational. It is demonstrably wrong to portray the appreciation of the artwork as part of the artwork itself. Now, being left with no means to defend your claims, you've resorted to making false claims about what I've said.

Remember Metaphysician Undercover likened him/herself to an Escher painting. — Punshhh

At least someone understands me. Do you think an Escher could be improved with a statement? Or are we all just satisfied by saying his work is "embarrassingly erroneous"?

That is what I am talking about. The experience of the art, not the ding an sich. And that is something each of use does an incredible amount of work, mainly automatically and then alsoc consciously as we investigate portions of the painting and mull and come back to it. Because much of this is automatic and silent, we often think we are passive receivers. — Coben

Sure, each of us does "an incredible amount of work". But that work is not part of the work of the artist. Therefore it is wrong to portray the work that each of us does as constituting part of the work of the artist. If we could identify an overall project which both the artist and the viewer were working on, then the work of the artist and the work of the viewer could each be a constituent part of that overall project. But I see no such overall project, by the time the viewer sees the art piece, the artist's work on that piece is done, and the viewer is not working on the piece, but thinking about it.

To equate philosophy and art is a pretty embarrassingly erroneous assumption to make. — Noble Dust

Need I remind you, that it was you who started comparing a work of art to a word in language?
"A work of art is more akin to a word, and how that word's language is always in flux"
This it seems was part of you metaphor. So when I address you by the terms of your metaphor, this is called "embarrassingly erroneous". Therefore it appears that by your own judgement your metaphor is "embarrassingly erroneous".

That's not a good analogy at all. The analogy would be you telling me, as the creator of the landscape, so a kind of deity, that the bird is the most important thing and it symbolizes my soul or your sexual abuse.

That would completely change my experience of the landscape. — Coben

You can change the analogy in this way, if you want, but if I am the deity who created the landscape, then I have the right to make the rules as to how you may enjoy my landscape. Who cares if this completely changes the way you might experience the landscape, I am the deity creator of the landscape, it is mine, and I have the right to dictate the rules as to how you may experience it. If you come to play in my landscape, you must either play by my rules, or be punished. Sorry if this offends you, but if you only come to my landscape to get some kind of kicks, you'll have to get your kicks somewhere else, because around my landscape we don't live by "anything goes".

That's how deities tend to behave, they always seem to want people to follow rules.

t may be the way most people use the word, and it may be the conventional meaning of the word, and you may have a superior understanding of the relation of that usage to guilt or any other term; but there is also a usage that treats it as a feeling, and that is how I have stipulated it to be used in this thread. So in this thread you are wrong. Shame is a feeling and I cast shame on you for attempting to prevent the discussion from taking place in the terms I have already set out. It's equivocation. You don't have to like it, but then you don't have to participate. If you do participate, then you need to use the word the way I am using it, or you will confuse an already difficult topic. — unenlightened

What I've demonstrated is that it is impossible that there is such a feeling as "shame". This is why we can have shameless guilty people, guilt without shame, because shame, as it is commonly described, as being self-conscious of guilt, is actually not something we feel at all. Being conscious of one's guilt does not cause a feeling of "shame", so defining the term in this way is not a true definition. It just makes some people feel better, more secure, thinking that guilty people will naturally feel shame. So people like you, who think they are referring to a feeling called "shame", really do not know what they are talking about, because they've never felt shame, nor has anyone else. Notice your quote in the op refers to being "ashamed". That a person might feel shame itself, rather than "ashamed" is an illusion. And limiting your thread to such a definition of "shame" will produce a dead end because you prevent us from addressing the real nature of shame.

When someone says the viewer is half the work, they don't mean the thing on the wall. They mean the phenomenological work. Which is going to be different for every viewer. Or better put there will be different works of art arising in the interaction between a unique individual and that piece of art. So, this means there is an endless amount of percentage available, each new patron resetting the measure. — Coben

What you are saying is that the artist's "work", is the psychological affect produced in the viewer. But that's simply wrong, the "work" is the physical piece, not the psychological affect. If your perspective were correct, then the artist would be responsible if, after viewing the art, a viewer was inspired to commit a crime. You could say that the psychological affect on the viewer, causing the crime to be committed, was the "work" of the artist.

I think it correlates with a loss of aesthetics, a loss of trust in the artwork itself, an problematic increase in verbal mental experience of art over sensual experience of art. — Coben

I don't agree, there is no loss of aesthetics, or loss of trust in the artwork by the artist, expressed by the statement, it is simply background information. The viewer does not, and cannot have the same perspective that the artist has, so if the artist wants to impart some perspective, context, to the viewer, dependent on what is required by the peculiarities of the particular piece, this does not constitute a loss of trust, or aesthetics.

It's analogous to two of us looking at the landscape in front of us. The landscape is beautiful. If I point out a bird, and say "look at that bird at the top of that tree", this does not negate the overall beauty of the landscape. If you think that I am pointing out the bird with the intent to distract from the beauty of the landscape, then you misunderstand what I am doing, because I am pointing out something which contributes to the beauty of the landscape. And if you cannot look at the bird without ruining the beauty of the landscape for yourself, just because you did not see it before I pointed it out to you, then there is something lacking in your aesthetic capacity.

I'm happy to admit that finding the proper language to express this concept is difficult, and this is leading to confusion, although I get the feeling that you won't be charitable to that fact (I hope I'm wrong); but never the less. When I say "the viewer is 50% of the work", I'm saying that metaphorically, not mathematically. If I was saying it mathematically, clearly I'd be wrong and you would be correct in your critique. — Noble Dust

The point is that when you make claims such as "the viewer is half the work", you need to support these principles. If you support them with faulty math then there is no support.

But the viewer is half of the work each individual time the work is viewed. — Noble Dust

Even this doesn't make any sense. You are saying that "the work" is different each time it is viewed by a different person. But that's not at all true, the work stays the same, as the same piece of art, it is only viewed and interpreted differently. It is completely wrong to suggest that the interpretation which the viewer offers is actually part of the work.

That's why we have a distinction between primary and secondary sources in philosophy. This marks the difference between what the author actually has said, and how the commentators interpret what has been said. It is wrong to make the commentary part of the work, just like it is wrong to make the critic's interpretation part of the work of art. There is a distinction between the events occurring, and the narrative.

A work of art is more akin to a word, and how that word's language is always in flux; words change their meaning, but they leave something of a husk behind as they change. — Noble Dust

Right, since "the word's language is always in flux", we need to respect the fact that any interpretation is made from a particular position within that flux. Another position will give a different interpretation. However, the meaning of the statement of words, "what is meant" or "what is meant" by the piece of art in this instance, is grounded, stabilized, by the author's intention. The statement of words, or the piece of art, remains essentially unchanged, as what was meant by the author or artist, despite the flux of the interpretive perspective. it is wrong to represent the flux in the interpretive atmosphere as part of the art itself. Of course the artist fully grasps the importance of that flux and incorporates that apprehension into the work, but the artist's methods are distinct from the flux of the atmosphere. The artist's methods are the occurring events, recorded and displayed in the art piece. The flux in the interpretive atmosphere has an effect on the narrative, but not on the art itself.

I’ve read the same well-documented nonsense you have. But then I went further. — NOS4A2

We've noticed.

The boundary between "learned" and "innate" is the boundary between "culture" and "nature". — Galuchat

There is no such boundary between culture and nature, cultures are natural. You've merely suggested a faulty starting point, which needs to be rejected for that reason.

Yes, that might be a better way to put things, but it is almost too precise for me here. It smacks of abstract theory rather than the way we actually live and talk. — unenlightened

It is the way we use "shame". "Shame on you!" Shame is what is cast on to others, not what one feels. We feel embarrassment upon being shamed. We also call this feeling ashamed. Shame is meant to be the objective description of the situation rather than the subjective feeling. That's why we've developed statements like "It's a shame". Shame as part of the shaming, is disassociated from the feeling one gets from the shaming, which is embarrassment.

You might call this abstract theory, but it is important as you say, because the abstract theory helps us to understand the mechanisms of guilt, and how one can successfully conceal guilt. There are two distinct aspects of guilt, the judgement of "guilty" passed by others, and the guilt one holds within when knowingly acting wrongly, with or without judgement from others. If the guilt within can be successfully concealed, there may be no shame whatsoever associated with that guilt. That's the important point. When the shame is successfully prevented, in this way, there is no embarrassment and no bad feelings involved with that guilt within. Then the person can knowingly proceed in doing what is wrong without any "guilty feelings".

On the other hand, one might try to hide one's own guilt, but self-reflection, introspection, could reveal the guilt to oneself, causing embarrassment from within (we ought not confuse this with "shame" which comes from others). The blush of embarrassment, or other consequent changes in the person's actions, could reveal the guilt to others, and shame would follow, increasing the embarrassment.

[

'll grant that you're talking about something that happens, but you're still off on the definitions. Telling me that it happens is beside the point... it is not a sign until it is fixed in a medium. The things you do in your head leading up to the sign comprise intentional actions; that certainly requires goal setting and initiating actions directed towards attaining those goals. The thing you're "thinking of" that you want to type should indeed predate the typing of it. But you're not producing a sign until you actually wind up typing it. — InPitzotl

That's not true, because we use signs in our minds. A person can make up one's own system of association within one's mind, that's why there can be illnesses like schizophrenia And that's how recognition works, things have significance, one thing is associated with another in the mind. There is no warrant to your claim that signs can only exist in the public medium, and it is not representative of how we actually employ signs in the act of remembering. This is well demonstrated in semiotics.

I'd rather start with Adam and Eve and the shame of nakedness and sexuality. Nothing to do with acting in one way or another, but a state of being other. — unenlightened

I think that an important aspect of shame is the attention which others give to the shamed person. This is why shame and embarrassment come together in the same package. Shame is what is given to you by the others, and embarrassment is how you feel shame.

It is also how we can understand the difference between shame and guilt. We can feel guilt without embarrassment, without showing it, and some guilty people become very good at hiding their guilt. They have no shame. So shame is not a self-recognition of guilt. Shame only comes when the guilt is recognized by others, the nakedness is a revealing of guilt, and this necessitates embarrassment.

I do not know if you can take "shame" to the extent implied above. Simply being another, not the same as someone else, is insignificant to produce shame. We are all different in our own ways. However, if the others are all the same in some way (clothed), and you are different from them (naked), this may be sufficient to produce shame, as you are recognized as outside the norm.

The boundary between "learned" and "innate" is not so clear, so I do not think reference to such a boundary could make a useful moral principle. Furthermore, if "virtue" could only refer to learned characteristics, then if we were to judge innate characteristics they could only be judged as vices or indifferent. If all innate characteristics are indifferent, then we cannot learn to overcome any innate tendencies to become virtuous. But if some innate tendencies are vices, then we could learn to overcome these vices to be virtuous. We could say for instance, that the innate tendency toward ire is a vice, and if we learn to overcome that tendency this would be a virtue. But why shouldn't we look at some innate characteristics and designate them as virtues?

This critique is incoherent to me. Are you saying, there's no key under your pinky, only a possible key under your pinky? — InPitzotl

No that's not what I'm saying. You said that the symbol relates to an idea, and the idea relates to a thing. But the idea doesn't necessarily relate to any one thing, the idea may be related to many things, Therefore it relates possibly to many different things, depending on the application.

When I convey ideas to you in the forum, I formulate signs by typing. — InPitzotl

You formulate the signs within you mind, what you will type, before you type it, just like you formulate what you will speak before you speak it. Then the typing is just a representation of what you have already formulated in your mind. The act of formulating the signs occurs within your mind, not on the keyboard.

So formulating the sign is not something you do with your fingers on the key board, it is something you do in your mind, thinking about ideas, trying to determine the best words (symbols) to express your ideas. That is why this is an act of extension. The ideas you mull over in your mind may be expressed in numerous different ways, with numerous different words (there are numerous possible symbols (things) which can be related to the ideas).

...when describing world objects, the extensions are those world objects. When you reason about world objects, those world objects are not symbols, and you don't reason "with" them (I suppose you could; if we want to call that reason... if, say, I'm making use of a calculator, I'm reasoning "with" a calculator, but I suspect this isn't what you mean). You reason with your ideas about those world objects. (Now that can be comprehensions, but it's never going to be an extension, so long as you're talking about world objects). — InPitzotl

Symbols are themselves objects, and we use them in the process of reasoning. For example, 2+2=4. The reasoning is carried out with the symbols, but what the symbols refer to, the meaning, or ideas, is something distinct. We reason with the symbols, not with the ideas, though we are sometimes aware of what the symbols mean when we reason with them.

Well... except that makes the term "sensing" a not so tidy concept. — InPitzotl

"Sensing" is not a tidy concept. That's the problem. If you want to make it into a tidy concept then you are not representing what sensing really is.

How is that different than what's already on the table... just calling it some other thing, like, "perception"? — InPitzotl

What was on the table, is that Samuele wanted to make "perception" into nothing other than sensing. The compromise I suggested places "perception" as something intermediate between sensing and reasoning.