• Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    Therefore any subpoena issued before the house vote for an impeachment inquiry is invalid. This is one of the many arguments in the White House impeachment memorandum, which deserves a read. — NOS4A2

    OK, here's an analogy then, tell me what's wrong with it. The police show up at your door and ask to search your house for evidence of a crime. You refuse them, and send them away because they have no legal warrant. They return later with a proper warrant, but you refuse again, saying that the warrant is invalid because they came first without a warrant.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    ↪jgill

    It's one of the first things I learned in high school physics, waves are an activity of the medium, and we experimented in wave tanks.
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    What I wrote is only an idea, that (in my opinion) is important to understand the "meaning" of a theory, but from the point of view of mathematics all explanations that you can give by words are worth nothing: at the end, the only thing that counts in a mathematical argument are proofs. If what you say cannot be proved, it's not mathematics. I know, neither of us presented any proof of what we said here, but we are on a philosophy forum here, right? — Mephist

    It's not true that words are worth nothing in mathematics, because the axioms are written in words. My demonstration was a proof, a logical proof that a set cannot be more fundamental than its elements, because that creates an infinite regress. If you are satisfied with an infinite regress you have an epistemological problem. Such mathematics is not supported by sound epistemology.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    I am unaware of any actual model that has been fleshed out that works this way for our universe. Is there one, or is this just your contribution here? — noAxioms

    The only models I can think of are those of particles physics, in which the particles are a feature of the fields..

    The M-M experiment results do not suggest this case is particularly likely since there are actual fleshed out models that don't involve the ether which are still entirely consistent with the M-M results. — noAxioms

    Empirical evidence indicates that there are waves and this necessitates the conclusion of an "ether" or some such substance which the waves exist in. The M-M results show that the "ether" is not a substance independent of material objects. There is little, if any movement of the ether relative to the earth. Therefore we can conclude that the "ether" and material objects are not separate substances, they are one and the same substance, just like "particle-wave".

    You seem to be failing in your demonstration of that. — noAxioms

    Actually you seem to understand now. Your objection about the two clocks, or two billiard balls is not applicable when the objects are conceived of as part of the ether. Each is a different activity of the ether. The two clocks cannot be said to have the same activity (therefore as 'clocks' they are not the same), nor can the two balls be said to be the same, in any real way. It makes no sense to refer to these distinct things involved in completely different activities, as the same. That's all I wanted to explain, and I think I've finally succeeded. Whether you agree with the premise which makes your objection irrelevant, doesn't matter, your objection is still irrelevant from the perspective of the metaphysics which holds this premise.
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    Now, the essential change in the point of view that allows you to see the correspondence between topology and logic it this one: consider sets to be more "fundamental" than their elements.
    So, if our model are the real numbers, the sets of real numbers are more "fundamental" than the single real numbers. If you think about it, that's what boolean algebra does: boolean algebra speaks about sets and operations between sets (union, intersection, complement): you build sets starting from other sets, without mentioning their elements.     — Mephist

    This is the mistaken procedure called Platonism. A set is a human creation, produced to categorize. If we produce an empty set, which may or may not be filled, and this is implied if a set is more fundamental than its elements, then the type, or universal Form, is prior to the particular, or individual. However, as Plato demonstrated, then the type, or universal, what you call "the set", must itself have some existence, and this would be as a particular, individual object. So the empty set has been created with the purpose of being a universal Form, a type, but upon creation, it actual exists as a particular object. To uphold the premise, that a set, or universal Form is more fundamental than an element, this created object, the empty set must already exist as an element of an existing larger set. Aristotle demonstrated this premise, that the Form, as a universal type, (what you call "the set") is more fundamental than its elements, leads to an infinite regress and is actually impossible, therefore false. This is because the set itself can only be represented and understood as a particular object, and understanding a particular requires relating it to a more universal, categorizing it.

    The Neo-Platonists get beyond this problem by producing an Ideal particular as the most fundamental. The Ideal particular is the most fundamental, as a type, a universal Form, or a set, which is also an individual, or particular. It is both. However as the most fundamental, it cannot be an element of a further set, or part of a more fundamental or universal Form. As a particular, and also the most fundamental universal, it is identified as the "One".

    Making the "One" the most fundamental resolves the inherent contradiction of having the empty set as fundamental. The empty set is inherently contradictory because it is something, an object, which at the same time must be nothing.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    ↪creativesoul

    I asked NOS4A2 why the request for documents was deemed invalid.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    ↪NOS4A2

    Isn't it the case, that when the House (as an entity) decided to begin impeachment proceedings, demands for evidence were valid?
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    The constitution grants the House full power of impeachment, not just select individuals and committees. That’s why the demands for documents were deemed invalid. — NOS4A2

    Can you explain this better? Are you saying that the House (as an entity) must pass judgement on impeachment, before any request for evidence is valid?
  • An hypothesis is falsifiable if some observation might show it to be false.
    Besides the indefinite article, it sounds straightforwardly correct to me, but if people are being so dense as to not understand it, maybe couch it in a conditional: "if it is false, there is some observation that can show it to be false". — Pfhorrest

    This is not a proper rendition. Because of the subjective nature of "observation", there are limitations to what can be observed. There are things which are beyond the capacity of human beings to observe. We might still say that there is truth or falsity relating to these things, despite the fact that they cannot be observed.

    The op speaks of the "falsifiability" of a hypothesis, not whether the hypothesis is true or false. And, like "observation", "falsifiable" refers to a human capacity. So it avoids the issue of hypotheses which might be true or false which cannot be observed as such, by speaking not of whether the theory is false, but whether the theory is falsifiable, and this is limited to the capacities of human beings to falsify.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    That's right. Maybe it doesn't. Hence your assertion that we can't deny the reality of these waves being fallacious. Yes, light has a dual nature, and of course you gravitate towards rainbows where it is most wave like, but you've not demonstrated that matter is actually waves, so one is free to deny it. I'm personally open both ways. I don't know. — noAxioms

    The only thing I'm trying to demonstrate is that the objection you made to what I said, is baseless.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    The moving one is half the length and twice the mass of other (a physical change), but the 'activty' of the ether is the same at those two locations, — noAxioms

    You don't seem to understand. The objects, billiard balls now instead of clocks, are features of the ether. I've explained this over and over, but you don't seem to get it. It's what we can take away from the M-M experiment, as what is likely the case, objects are not independent from the ether. The existence of an object is a feature of the ether, like a particle is a feature of the field in particle physics. So if one ball is moving at a high velocity in relation to the other ball, then the activity of the ether cannot be the same at the two locations. The movement of the ball is an activity of the ether.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    The term 'activity' comes from you, and you did not seem to be referring to the activity of each clock, but rather to the ether or something else in the environment: — noAxioms

    Yes, I was talking about the activity of the ether. You introduced to that discussion, "clocks". Now a clock is itself a form of activity, and you asked how it is possible that two clocks (two specified activities) at the same place, at the same time, with one of them moving at a high velocity in relation to the other, could be "the same". I just pointed out to you how this notion, this scenario you created, is in fact contradictory. If one is moving at a high velocity relative to the other, then clearly the two clocks are not each the same "activity".

    So the "activity" of each clock cannot be said to be the same activity, they are distinct as one is at a high velocity relative to the other, and your objection is unfounded.

    If the ether is undetectable, then the M-M experiment proved nothing about it. — noAxioms

    Why do you conclude that the ether is undetectable? What the M-M experiment demonstrated is that the ether is not detectable through the means employed. The means employed assumed as a premise, that the ether would be a substance separate from the substance of physical objects like the earth. So the experiments demonstrated that the ether is not such a separate substance, and cannot be detected in a way which assumed this premise. The experiments do not demonstrate that the ether cannot be detected in any absolute sense. And, as I explained, quantum physics demonstrates that the ether does not exist as a separate substance from the objects, the particles are attributes of the ether.

    The ether is changing (instead of 'activity'). There are the same two objects in proximity, one heavily length contracted. The cause seems to be the object's speed and not a difference in how the ether is changing. Same argument. The object's speed causes the contraction, not the ether causing it. — noAxioms

    The "object" is a feature of the ether, as demonstrated by quantum mechanics, and understood through the precepts of particle physics. Therefore any change in location of the object is better described, and understood as a change in the ether. What you call "the object's speed" is simply how changes in the ether appear to us, as observers. The appearance of "an object" is simply a feature of the ether. Therefore the object's apparent form (length contracted) is also a feature of the ether. The "object's speed" is a fundamentally arbitrary judgement which you and other human beings make based on some assumptions of an inertial frame or whatever, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything real concerning the object. That's why it's wrong to say that the object's speed causes the contraction. The true inertial frame can only be understood from a description of the ether and its activities (changes). The contraction is an appearance only.

    They might represent something real that simply isn't actually a wave. — noAxioms

    Sure, and a rainbow doesn't involve the refraction of waves either. What is the point in referring to science, if you are simply going to deny the obvious conclusions drawn from simple observations, saying things "might " be otherwise, just for the sake of supporting the possibility of some obviously faulty metaphysics? Instead, try changing your metaphysics to be consistent with empirical observations and real science.
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    believe where love comes into play is when along the process of evolution our ancestors developed sufficient neuro-chemical complexity to experience anticipatory emotions such as hope and fear which anticipate, respectively, sensations of pleasure and pain. The sensations are a more direct "ethic" wired into our structure, the emotions provide a built in system of abstraction applying to what we anticipate as good or bad in this immediate sense. Then as we evolved more abstract learning and memory and time sense and we are able to recognize and empathize others of our kind (in the broad sense of other goal seeking agents) we learn to love those agents we identify as kith and kin. — jambaugh

    If I understand correctly, you are distinguishing here between the anticipation of sensations, and the sensations themselves. Where I have difficulty is that the sensations themselves are provided to us by our capacity to sense. The capacity to sense exists in an anticipatory relation to actually sensing. So the anticipation of sensation is prior to sensation in a more absolute way than you describe, and cannot develop from sensation. In this way we can see that sensation itself is formed and modified (evolves) through the influence of the anticipation of sensation rather than trying to understand such anticipation as having emerged from sensation. Our capacity to sense, and therefore also the sensations which we do have, have been shaped through evolution by our anticipation of good and bad. From this perspective, the direct ethic which is wired into our structure is the judgement of good and bad, and our systems for sensation have evolved under influence of this.

    With regard to types:
    I would assert that our structure of moral principles are no different (in type) from our structure of causal principles and our world model. Once we act upon a value system we are already in a hypothetical mode. We are extrapolating the effects of our potential actions utilizing an object model of our environment and understanding of behavior utilizing rules of interaction. It is "principles" all the way down insofar as we treat it cognitively.

    In other words our value structure is just like, and in fact a part of our reality structure, a dynamic growing system which we continuously update as we experience our environment and categorize into people and things.     — jambaugh

    I agree with this completely, and that's why I was arguing against Possible's position which was an attempt to create a separation within the value structure. If you understand what I wrote above, you'll see that it is a perspective well suited to what you describe here. We might find that the "hypothetical mode" extends right to the most simple life forms. The actions of simple life forms are often represented as reactions to their environment. However, we might see that even simple life forms are presented with choices, and what appears like a reaction to the environment is actually a very basic form of choice, as to what is good.

    So the capacity to "model our environment", and have "potential actions", requires that we have an underlying capacity to distinguish good. What appears to us as a "reaction" by a simple life form is really a judgement of good, a movement of choice by that living being. And so there are "principles all the way down" as even the simple life form acts on principle.

    Even what we think of as "(particulars)" are abstracted to a sufficient degree that we can't easily categorize them as distinct from generalizations although we can probably order the degree of abstraction. I think you see this in its deficit in autistic children. They are less able to generalize across the changes in their environment. We do this even with what we consider concrete objects like the chair I'm sitting in. I still recognize it as the same chair from day to day even as the scuffs and stains increase and as it changes position and orientation from day today. — jambaugh

    I believe that understanding of "the particular" is what emerges, and develops through evolution. To see something as a particular requires that we individuate that thing, distinguish it from its environment. This probably develops from self-recognition, recognizing that oneself is a distinct individual. So we apprehend the individual being as an individual self, through understanding the principles described above, that one makes one's own choices of activity, and this separates one being from another, as a particular, individual self.

    The being is as you say, in hypothetical mode, acting on principles all the way down to its very basic level of existence, but then this being comes to recognize that it is nothing other than an individual, a particular, which is carrying out those activities. So the assumption of a "particular" comes about as a sort of logical necessity. And, since it is demonstrability the case that existence of the particular, individual being, is a necessary requirement, as the specific creature which is operating through the use of the general principles, the particular is understood as more fundamental than the universal. With this recognition, and realization that the particular individual is the base, we develop a completely different approach to the nature of "love" and its importance. No longer can we assume love as basic, underlying our existences as beings, a thing or principle, which unites us all fundamentally, such that we might take love for granted. There is no such fundamental principle, only individuals, fundamentally, each developing one's own principles of action, from the bottom. Therefore we must see love as something which must be cultured and nurtured, developed, if we want such a unity amongst us.

    Well, it's true that there's a gap between theory and practice - my description of what love is far removed from reality. — TheMadFool

    This is a manifestation of the difference between the illusion that general principles, principles of ethics or whatever theoretical principles one wishes to follow (even mathematics), are fundamental features of reality, and the true reality, that individuals, particulars are the fundamental features of reality. Once we recognize that actions within the world are the true reality of the world, and there is a gap between practise (our actions in the world), and theory, which cannot be adequately closed, we can realize that the claimed reality of general principles is an illusion.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    I mean one clock stationary and another right next to it (momentarily at least), but moving at high velocity. The 'activity' at that location is the same, and yet one clock is dilated (runs slow and is length contracted) and the other not, so thus it isn't the local 'activity' that causes it. — noAxioms

    Don't you see that as a nonsense (impossible) situation? One clock is moving at a high velocity relative to the other. It is next to the other "momentarily". Therefore there is no such thing as the same "activity" of the two distinct clocks at the "same" location. Each clock has its own particular activity relative to its location as it approaches, and recedes from the location of the other clock. If one clock is assumed at rest, its activity will occur in one very small, particular locality, while the supposed "same" activity of the other clock (moving at a high velocity relative to the other), will occur over a large, extended area. There is no duration of time in which the clocks are at the same location, and therefore no activity when the clocks are at the same location. In reality, the clocks are never at the same location, they only pass near to each other, and the respective "activity" of each clock cannot be compared as you propose.

    That's why 'speed relative to the ether' works better because the two clocks are in the same ether but have different velocities to it. — noAxioms

    This scenario ought to be impossible according to Michelson-Morley experiments. That's what was disproven, the idea that a physical object moves relative to the ether. This would necessarily create a disturbance in the ether, and none can be detected. That's why I proposed that we conceive of physical objects as property of the ether. This is consistent with particle theory which conceives of particles as property of fields.

    But if speed through ether is the explanation, then ether must be moving through me if I'm in a gravity well, but there are cases where it clearly shouldn't be. So the 'dilation by motion relative to the ether' also seems to fall apart. — noAxioms

    It's not that the ether is moving "through" you, but that you, as a physical object, are a property of the ether. That's why I said it's better to conceive of the ether as changing rather than flowing. The ether is continuously changing as time passes, but so are you, so there is no inconsistency. Think of the motion of objects as changes within the ether in which energy is transmitted, just like waves, except we really don't know all the ways in which the ether is capable of changing. We barely touch the tip of the iceberg with electro-magnetics, because electrons hardly account for any mass.

    t seems the theory proper doesn't have an answer to this (why ether is necessary at all) and other issues, because if it had answers, you absolutists would tell me how they've been resolved. If the issues haven't been resolved, it would explain why mainstream relativity is taught in schools and not the absolute interpretation. — noAxioms

    Ether is necessary to account for the reality of waves. A wave is in a substance. We can deny the reality of these waves, but then fields and wavefunctions don't represent anything real. Observation attests to the reality of these waves. If the waves are real, then so is the medium in which they exist.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    Meta (in the post following the one to which I'm replying) calls it 'activity' instead of motion, but activity doesn't explain two clocks in the same place running at different speeds. The flowing ether model does, but it seems to come up short in some cases. — noAxioms

    I really don't know what you would mean by "two clocks in the same place". Are the clocks composed of different materials such that one exists within the other? If so, that would explain why they run at different speeds. If they are similar materials and side by side, the fact that they are side by side, in an active medium would explain the difference. I don't think you have a valid argument here. You need to better explain your proposed situation of 'two clocks in the same place running at different speeds".
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    There is no judgement in the statement: “honour your mother and father” - nothing at all to say what is good or bad, per se. — Possibility

    You cannot see that this is an "ought" statement, and is therefore the expression of a judgement? Any time I say "you ought to do..." I am expressing a judgement. The statement is saying that honouring your mother and father has been judged as good, therefore you ought to do it.

    Perhaps you are interpreting it as a command instead of a statement of what one ought to do. Nevertheless, it is still the expression of a judgement. If I command you to do this, or not to do that, the statement is a representation of my will, what I want from you. This implies that to get what I want, you must act in such a way. So there is necessarily a judgement inherent within the expression, I want such and such, and to get that, you must act accordingly. Therefore I am telling you to fulfill my command. I have judged that this is necessary in order for me to get what I want., as explained above

    As an ethical principle, the statement “honour your mother and father” serves as a foundation for a moral system of evaluating behaviour. Judgement is implied or has meaning only by relation to a moral value system - without this relation, there is no judgement in the statement as such. — Possibility

    You are missing a crucial part of the picture.. A "moral value system", what I would call a "code of ethics" receives its meaning from moral judgements. Evaluating behaviour may be done relative to such a system, but we must account for the creation of the system as well. The system, or code of ethics, is created by moral judgements as well. So we have two types of moral judgements, those which create the value structure (general principles), and those judgements of individual human actions (particulars) as good or bad. Since the general principles are created from judgements of what is good and bad in human actions, character, or disposition, we cannot deny that these are moral judgements, as well as the judgements of particular human actions in relation to the code of ethics.

    This is what I’m getting at. “Honour your mother and father” has meaning regardless of any moral value, as well as the capacity to guide behaviour to what is judged as ‘moral’ without the implication of moral judgement. — Possibility

    Well, this is clearly false. "Meaning" implies what was meant by the author of the statement. "Honour your mother and father" has meaning either as what one ought to do, or as a command of what one must do. As such, the meaning exists relative to the end, what is desired by the author of the statement. Therefore there is necessarily a judgement on the part of the author, as to what is wanted from the audience, and this is a moral judgement. Without this judgement "honour your mother and father" would have some other meaning, as neither a statement of "ought" nor a command of what is requested, so the statement would loose the meaning which it has.

    Moral judgement has nothing to do with character - it has to do with how we relate to a demonstration of character. — Possibility

    This is clearly false as well. And I really shouldn't have to point this out to you. It makes me wonder about your education. First definition in my OED, moral: "concerned with goodness or badness of human character or behaviour, or with the distinction between right and wrong". I really don't know where you have derived such false ideas from.

    By exploring the different ways we each reduce this interrelated value information, we get an idea of the irreducibility of human experience that renders ‘moral judgement’ an inaccurate and dangerously limited perspective of reality. — Possibility

    The opposite to this is what is really the case. You have proposed a very dangerously limiting perspective of morality, which renders human experience as unintelligible.

    Jesus deliberately didn’t pass judgement on these ethical principles at all. He simply pointed out that these moral judgements by the Pharisees were incongruous with our own human experience. — Possibility

    That an ethical principle is incongruous with our experience, is a judgement. Check out what Jesus said about washing hands for instance. If you do not think that this is a passing of judgement on that ethical principle, then I think you are extremely confused.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    Dark matter and energy aren't incompatible with an absolute inertial frame. — leo

    That's right, but until it's understood what they are, a proper absolute inertial frame cannot be produced. And understanding what they are requires a proper understanding of the nature of space, and this is most likely as an ether. So the way to an absolute inertial frame is through ether theory.
  • Philosophy and the Twin Paradox
    Keep in mind I'm just asking here since I'm not totally familiar. If the ether moves/flows, where does the ether go when it gets to say the center of say Earth? — noAxioms

    Physical objects must be conceived of as part of the ether, properties of the ether, juust like particles are conceived of as property of the fields described by wavefunctions. Michelson-Morley experiments demonstrate that the ether is not a substance independent from the substance of material objects. Modeling the ether in this way connects all objects as property of one ether. Now the relations between distinct material objects are simply a feature of that ether. Observations like "spatial expansion", indicate changes in the ether itself, which affect the relations between objects. as motions which are inconsistent with a static ether.

    As I said I don't consider that time 'flows', but in order to compute absolute time dilation one would have to have detected the absolute frame in the first place, so until then that absolute dilation is unknown, but even without knowing it we can make accurate predictions, again that doesn't prove there is no absolute frame or no absolute dilation. — leo

    With the ether theory, the flow of time can be represented as the flow of ether. It might not be proper to call it a flow though, rather it is an activity, as evidenced by spatial expansion and other related concepts, and that activity is what we call the flow of time.

    If you have an absolute inertial frame, you can see all galaxies moving like projectiles. — leo

    The "absolute inertial frame" cannot be produced without a proper representation of the ether flow, which may not be a flow at all, but some other unknown type of activity. So with our present knowledge of these things it only makes sense to talk about an "absolute inertial frame", as something desired but completely unobtainable. To claim as you do, that we might just produce an absolute inertial frame from our present understanding is not realistic, because there are too many unknown factors like dark matter and dark energy.
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    You don't use symbols to express music? Well, one can play an instrument by ear I suppose. — jgill

    Right, the symbols simply facilitate understanding of the expression which is the music itself, allowing others to join in the expression. The artist produces the mathematical expression as a composition of music, the symbols are not the expression, but represent the expression. In more conventional "mathematical expressions", the symbols represent the mathematical ideas. In music, the music represents the mathematical ideas (dealing with temporal extension), and the symbols represent the music
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    Conventions" ? Can you be more specific? — jgill

    When numerous people use the same principle, it's a convention. So when we learn how to produce art, we are taught in the existing conventions. Do you not agree that to produce "pure art", "pure creativity", one would need to free oneself from the influence of such conventions?

    Although the physical sciences have influenced quite a bit of mathematics, the intervention in the artistic process of mathematics as a medium that necessarily pollutes "pure mind art" is debatable. How does pure mind art make it to the public domain? Must it always involve sculpturing with one's bare hands? Or painting with colored oils that are extracted from plants? Or wait, for a novelist, does it entail writing out one's work with a pencil? — jgill

    Yes, art always requires a medium, otherwise it cannot be in the public domain, just like communication requires a medium. If not for the medium it would just be ideas in someone's mind. So words and symbols are just another medium. And the accepted symbols and words form the conventions of mathematics. But symbols are not the only medium for mathematics. For example, many mathematical ideas are expressed as music, rhythm, harmony, etc.. This is a completely different way of expressing mathematical ideas, distinct from putting symbols and geometrical figures on paper. But music is a very adept way of demonstrating some principles of division. The medium being divided is a temporal medium. What we can observe, is that the principles for dividing a temporal medium are completely different from the principles for dividing a spatial medium. So these two distinct forms of division require distinct mathematical systems
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    If, however, the precept “honour your mother and father” is an expression of ethical principle and NOT a moral judgement, then it is the specific behaviour that fails to honour when judged against this principle, and the person is empowered to change or correct the failed behaviour without being defined or condemned by judgement. — Possibility

    An expression of an ethical principle is an expression of a moral judgement. So, if "honour your mother and father" is an expression of an ethical principle, it is also an expression of that very same moral judgement. You are only trying to create an unnecessary separation between a moral judgement and an ethical principle. If someone claims, or believes that such and such type of activity is good and desirable, and therefore ought to be established as an ethical principle, this is a moral judgement, plain and simple. A moral judgement is a judgement as to what is good or bad in human character. It is not necessarily a judgement of particular action, but mat also be a judgement of a general principle. If not, then what type of judgement is this, when we judge a general principle concerning goodness or badness of human acts??

    The ridiculousness of the Ten Commandments as ‘moral judgement’ is even demonstrated by Jesus, who says that ‘if your eye causes you to sin’ then you should ‘cut it out’ rather than be condemned for ‘adultery’. He upholds them as ethical principles, but challenges the interpretation of them by the Pharisees as judgements in themselves. — Possibility

    This actually exemplifies my point. A person, like Jesus or anyone else, might pass judgement on an established ethical principle, as to whether the principle is acceptable or not. This judgement would be a moral judgement. And since ethical principles are upheld by convention, agreement concerning such moral judgements, (the ethical principles) are simply an expression of consensus on moral judgements.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I have a sinking suspicion the GOP might betray the president. — NOS4A2
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I have a sinking suspicion the GOP might betray the president. — NOS4A2

    Yes, it's beautiful isn't it?
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I have a sinking suspicion the GOP might betray the president. — NOS4A2

    Oh, I forgot to say, I really like the way that quote looks. Let me try it again
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I have a sinking suspicion the GOP might betray the president. — NOS4A2

    There ought to be at least a few Republic Senators who would desire Trump's office. Once they realize that attempting to prop up Trump is a hopeless course, all they would need to do is garner some support, and then out with the old, and in with the new.
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    Lots of wiggle room in that "something." "Pure mind art" is good! :cool: — jgill

    Sure, but the problem is that it does not actually exist as "pure mind art". The scientists, engineers, and others who use the mathematics force the existence of conventions which form the artist's medium. Then the mathematicians work with the existing conventions, and those conventions are a pollution to the notion of "pure mind art". Notice for example, that artists work with accepted (conventional) media, paint on canvas, music, etc.. The use of such conventions is a self-imposed restriction on the artistic expression, the artist chooses a medium. So if an artist chooses "mathematics" as a form of artistic expression, then by the very fact that it is mathematics and not some other art form which has been chosen, the artist has already restricted oneself to the use of certain principles, as the medium.

    There are most definitely reasons. Penelope Maddy, the foremost authority on the philosophy of set theory, has a pair of papers, Believing the Axioms I and II, that describe the historical context and philosophical principles behind the adoption of the ZFC axioms. You might find these of interest. — fishfry

    That's what I am arguing, there are always reasons for such choices. If we insist that a true relation between the axioms and the reality of the physical world is not necessary in such choices, then I believe we restrict our capacity to properly understand the reality of the physical world.

    Thanks for the references, I'm going to try to read some of that material. it looks interesting.
  • The Notion of Subject/Object
    For Aristotle, it's the celestial spheres that move in a circular motion (as moved by the Unmoved Mover). The Unmoved Mover, per its name, doesn't move. — Andrew M

    Well, the so-called "Unmoved Mover" is better translated as "Unmovable", or "Immovable", according to what is explained in BK12 of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

    It is described like this. It is necessary to assume an eternal unchangeable actuality to account for the fact that no change can be prior to time. So there is necessarily something which is moved by the immovable actuality, and this must be the "first motion", which is the eternal continuity of circular motion. The cause of the eternal circular motion, the "immovable" cause, must be a final cause, as the object of desire, or object of thought, which moves without itself being moved. Therefore the so-called "Unmoved Mover" moves without itself being moved, because it is necessarily "immovable".

    The problem, as I said, is that it is a faulty concept. Eternal circular motions of the planets, or of anything else for that matter, are not real. Therefore if there is something which is necessarily "immovable", because it is prior to time, it cannot be described as the cause of eternal circular motion, because eternal circular motion is not real. Where Aristotle goes astray is at Ch.6, Bk12, where he assumes that it is impossible for movement to come into existence. He assumes this because he cannot conceive of anything as prior to time. This is the false premise which leads him to the falsity of the eternal circular motion.

    For Aristotle, time is the measure of change. The Unmoved Mover does not change, so time is not applicable for it. — Andrew M

    Aristotle clearly distinguishes two senses of "time" in his Physics, one as the thing which measures, and the other as the thing measured. When he speaks of "time" in his Metaphysics he his referring to the latter, the thing being measured. The problem is that he cannot conceive of time as having come into existence, because this would imply an actuality which is prior to time, and "before time" appears to be contradictory. This is why he settles on time having always existed, and explains this with eternal circular motion, which is how that time which always existed, would be measured. But "eternal circular motion" is a faulty concept.
  • The Notion of Subject/Object
    I don't think you're understanding me. 'Knowledge is unstable' is posited as something stable about knowledge. — jjAmEs

    It's you who is not understanding; "knowledge is unstable" is very clearly not posited as something stable, because that would imply contradiction. The person proposing "knowledge is unstable" is very clearly not proposing it as an eternal unchanging truth, because that would be a contradiction of terms. You are simply interpreting it this way, because it is your belief that knowledge consist of such eternal unchanging truths. You have not properly interpreted what the person who says "knowledge is unstable" means. Therefore it is very clear that you have misunderstood.

    Or, more generally, 'everything changes except change itself.' — jjAmEs

    "Change" is just a word, and what that word means, what you call the "abstraction" also changes. So it's false to say that change itself does not change. The "abstraction" changes.

    The question ignored here is: why philosophy? If philosophy only breaks our hearts, then why is it preserved ? Why do we spread the heartbreaking virus and scorn an unexamined life as not worth living? Is this not a return of the crucified hero, who also is stapled to a T? — jjAmEs

    But why would you say philosophy breaks our hearts? If it is removed from the category of pleasure and pain, as I suggested, it's not itself a heartbreak, which is the description of a pain.

    Why dispel illusions? And if no eternal truth can be obtained in the first place, is an illusion still an illusion? If so, with respect to what? When ordinary notions of illusion and reality get inflated to metaphysical entities, the utility of the distinction shrivels. — jjAmEs

    You seem to be mixing temporal perspectives. "What is" refers to the present in time, and that is changing. So to convert "what is" into an eternal truth is a perversion. That actually is the nature of the illusion, that the changing nature of "what is" can be converted into an eternal truth. The illusion ought to be dispelled because it induces pain and suffering through mistaken certitude. The relief or release from pain and suffering is itself a pleasure, but the thing which brings us that pleasure, knowledge, is not itself the pleasure. But when knowledge is categorized like this, it can bring either pleasure or pain, and pain is produced by mistaken knowledge. Philosophy is the means by which we discern between the two. Yes it may still break the heart but it lessens the probability.
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    Certainly some sort of goals, but not necessarily physical ends. To a large extent it's curiosity about "what comes next?" — jgill

    Suppose we distinguish between "what comes next" in the physical world, meaning what happens in the next moment of time, and "what comes next" when you're counting 1,2,3,4,5..., meaning "6" is what comes next. The latter is really just a form of the former, you saying "six" is just an instance of what happens next in the physical world. One could argue that there are differences between natural, and artificial, in what comes next in the physical world due to intention and free will. But if such a difference is a real difference, we would have to validate the reality of the difference through some dualist principle like "the soul", which reaches in from some non-physical world to interfere with "what happens next" in the physical world. Otherwise "ends' are nothing other than physical ends.

    So Platonism comes back on us, as 'the good", meaning what is intended, striven for. If we situate this "object", the end, the goal, in the non-physical, such that "what comes next" is a creation from the non-physical, rather than a natural process, then we cannot avoid dualism. However, we must maintain respect for the fact that the natural physical world imposes restrictions on what is possible, as a goal, object, or end. So for instance, the idea of "infinite possibility" is really an impossibility, due to those restrictions, and is therefore a contradictory idea. One might define "possibility" as a sort of logical possibility to avoid such a contradiction, but since what is possible and what is impossible is ultimately dictated by the physical circumstances, such a move would be an act of self-deception, telling yourself that "logical possibility" is not limited by "physical possibility'.

    Or do you mean that the use of irrational numbers is conceptually inaccurate with respect to a first-principles analysis of physics? If the latter, as I said, I don't think that it matters for mathematics. — simeonz

    I think that this is the more accurate representation of what I was saying. I don't agree with your conclusion though, because it requires that we make a complete separation between physics and mathematics. Suppose we assume such a separation. Mathematicians just dream up their axioms and principles for no apparent reasons, just because they are beautiful or something, so that the mathematical principles are somewhat arbitrary in this way, pure mind art. They leave these principles lying out there, and the physicists pick and choose which ones they want to use. It's like a smorgasbord of tools lying on the table, which the physicists can choose from. That's a fine start, but we must respect the fact that the process is reciprocal. So once the physicists choose their preferred tools, and start using them, then these are the principles that the mathematicians are going to concentrate on improving and fine tuning. Evidence of this is the fact that the real numbers came from the use of rational numbers, and the use of geometrical principles which created irrational numbers. Mathematicians did not have to allow irrationals into their numerical principles, but they were being used, so the mathematicians felt compelled to incorporate them . Therefore I think it is incorrect for you to say that a first principles analysis of physics is irrelevant to mathematics. .
  • My own (personal) beef with the real numbers
    think that you are ascribing to mathematics the kind of role that I don't think it has. At least, not directly. Or maybe I did walk into this when elaborating over my example. Its aim wasn't to model the structure of physical objects, but to illustrate how coarse structures not literally represented by mathematical ideals, can still be usefully approximated by those ideals. It was designed to have some similarity with the atomic structure of materials. — simeonz

    I don't think I agree with your assumptions about the role which mathematics has. I believe that mathematical principles are always developed for purposes, goals, ends, and therefore utility in the physical world. Now, I discussed this to some extent in another thread, and I was shown that this is not necessarily the case. It was demonstrated that mathematical principles, as art, may be created purely for their beauty, without any intent to purposefulness, and then found to be purposeful posteriorly. Of course these arguments are still debatable, and we probably cannot get to the bottom of this. Even if a person creates a mathematical principle without intent or purpose, the demonstration of that principle to another person would be done with purpose. So the fact that we can argue that mathematical principles may be created without a purpose, is really just a demonstration of free will. When there is no necessary relation between the effect, and the cause, we have a demonstration of free will.

    So I have a problem with your example, in the sense that it seems unrealistic. The purpose of the example is to illustrate something, to argue a point. But if you assume unrealistic "materials" to make that argument, how can the argument be acceptable? You have chosen a particular type of "material", one sufficient to make your argument, but one which is not real.

    The idea was, that actual physical structures approximate the mathematical ideals, and our numerical algorithms approximate those same ideals, and thus, under certain assumptions of the magnitudes of the involved deviations, our numerical algorithms match the physical structures within the required precision. — simeonz

    So my argument was that "actual physical structures" do not approximate the mathematical ideals, in your example, because the "materials" are completely different. So, further to your example, I think that this problem is widespread in physics. The physicist applying mathematical principles believes that the "materials" of mathematical ideals are a good approximation of the "materials" involved in actual physical structures, when in reality they are not. This mistaken notion is a holdout from Platonism. Platonism assumes that the mathematical materials 'are' the materials of physical structures. When we let go of Platonism, we have a desire to maintain some semblance of truth within our conceptual structures, so we maintain that the mathematical materials provide an approximation of the actual physical materials, but there is no justification for this. "It works" justifies the means to the end, but it does not justify "an approximation of the actual physical materials".

    P.S. I want to clarify that I do actually think that our computational and logical ideals are naturally inspired. They are not literally representative of any particular physical structure, but they are "seeded" as concepts by nature, whether our sentience existed or not. — simeonz

    This is the point we need to iron out then. Let's assume that human beings came into existence through evolution. The kernel to the concepts which are "seeded", are what is instinctual to us, but these must have been produced through evolution, therefore they are purposeful. If there is always a seed prior to the instinct, and that seed is not necessarily for a purpose, then we'd go right back to the first life form and ask where did that first seed come from. So it really doesn't seem to make sense to say that the concepts are "seeded" by nature, and they are not representative of nature.

    How could we proceed from here? If the seeds are part of nature, then we fall into Platonism. If they are something other than natural, wouldn't they necessarily have to represent something natural in order to be at all useful? How would a concept which has absolutely no representation of anything real become useful?
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    So what about congressional Democrats pursuing investigations into their political opponent, POTUS, who is the man to beat in the upcoming election? — NOS4A2

    How's that comparable? The issue is foreign influence in an American election, which is explicitly illegal.
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    ↪Possibility

    So the statements "you ought to do...", and "you ought not do...", which are constitutive of ethical principles, are not expressions of moral judgements? Ethical principles are not expressions of moral judgements?

    As I said, I think you are incorrect.
  • The Notion of Subject/Object
    But I'm suggesting that seeing knowledge as evolving is seeing its timeless essence as evolution and change. — jjAmEs

    Now you've gotten into the type of contradiction I warned about. Change requires time, it cannot be timeless.

    Or to make this more concrete: we have some Kantians in this thread and also some mystics. The Kantians 'know' that the mystics can't really have access to metaphysical truths but only to the meta-metaphysical truth that such access is impossible. The mystics simply ignore this. I'm more a Kantian personally, but one could argue that the metametaphysical belief is still just a metaphysical belief that puffs itself up. — jjAmEs

    Do you not see the problem with your representation? If someone states "truth is impossible", then it's very clear that they are not presenting this as a truth. To represent this as if the person were stating what is believed to be a "truth", is an obvious a misinterpretation. It's a classic straw man. The person has stated "truth is impossible". Clearly they are not stating that they believe that this is a truth. If you cannot apprehend this, you could ask the person how they think that statements and beliefs represent something other than truths, and try to learn and understand the person's perspective, but to simply assert that they must be stating this as a truth, because that's how it appears from my perspective, is to completely misunderstand, and not even attempt to understand the other person.

    As I read your position, you'd probably reject those who make claims of direct access to Truth, since your basic position seems to be that we are stuck at a certain distance from this object of our longing. — jjAmEs

    There's a difference between claiming that there is no such thing as truth, and claiming that we do not have direct access to truth. If Truth requires God, then claiming that we have no direct access to Truth still admits to a belief in God, because it is implied that there is a Truth (therefore God) which we do not have access to. Atheism implies that there is no such thing as Truth, when Truth requires God.

    Aristotle was a natural philosopher and, on the basis of his observations of the world, argued for an Unmoved Mover. — Andrew M

    The Unmoved Mover is actually quite distinct from God. Aristotle demonstrated that anything eternal must be actual. In this way he separated the concept of "eternal" from "infinite". "Infinite" was demonstrated as necessarily potential. He then posited the Unmoved Mover to account for the eternal actuality, that actuality which is necessarily prior to the potential for material existence. However, he described the eternal actuality as a circular motion, which is a description of a material thing, with infinite time duration. So his Unmoved Mover is a faulty concept which falls back into the category of an infinite material existence, which he had demonstrated was impossible. The Unmoved Mover is inconsistent with his logical demonstrations.

    So the Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians understand "eternal" in a different way, meaning outside of time. And this is how God is understood, as outside of time, not as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. This is very important, because "eternal" in this context does not mean an infinite duration of time (what Aristotle demonstrated as impossible, then turned around and proposed as Unmoved Mover), it means outside time.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    Nos4's replies here say it all. On the basis of his many posts, he is a) playing games, b) is mentally ill, c) is in some way a paid troll. — tim wood

    Why don't start a thread in the lounge, with a poll, what is Noseforatooth? I vote c)
  • The Notion of Subject/Object
    Perhaps, but does it not offer us nevertheless the pleasure of being wised up about our situation? If it didn't put us in a superior position, why would we spread it, cultivate it, pride ourselves on its study? — jjAmEs

    It's questionable whether this is a pleasure. We tend to get pleasure from fulfillment of desire. If we seek knowledge, and all we get (what you call "being wised up") is a recognition that we have none of what we want, like Socrates, how can this be pleasurable? We must avoid contradiction, if it's what we want, then it's impossible that we already have it.

    I think this is why Plato sought to put "good" in a category other than pleasure and pain. If pleasure and pain are diametrically opposed, and 'good" is associated with pleasure, then we can only get to the good through a release from pain, therefore pain is necessary for good. So he put "good" into a category with knowledge, which is distinct from the opposing pleasure and pain. Now, what is sought as knowledge, is sought as being good, but acquiring knowledge is not "pleasure", and having a lack of knowledge is not "pain".

    Contradiction is avoided because knowing, knowledge, and good, are taken from Parmenides' category of being and eternal truth, and placed into Heraclitus' category of becoming. When we steadfastly avoid contradiction, we are forced to reconsider the law of excluded middle, and Aristotle puts considerable effort into this. What follows is that we take knowledge from the realm of what is and is not, and place it into the realm of what may or may not be.

    And how can we trust that our knowledge is deficient if knowledge of such deficiency is a part of that knowledge? It's hard to avoid positive claims and still do philosophy. Even 'skeptics' find themselves asserting timeless truths about human cognition. — jjAmEs

    I don't agree with this, because there is an issue of what is intended by the person making the assertions. When a skeptic asserts a principle of skepticism, it is meant as a principle of guidance for that particular set of circumstances, which the skeptic is in. It is not asserted as a timeless truth. For a person who thinks of such principles as timeless truths, it would appear like the skeptic is asserting timeless truths. But this is a misinterpretation, because it is not what was meant.

    It's simply a different way of looking at things. Recognizing that one's own knowledge, and human knowledge in general, is deficient, is not to see knowledge in terms of timeless truths, but to see knowledge and principles as changing and evolving. Once we dismiss timeless truths we have a completely different perspective which cannot be described in terms of timeless truths.
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    Morality does not judge thinking, but is concerned with the actions that follow thinking; with what is good or bad behaviour — Possibility

    Yes we do pass moral judgement on thinking. Take a look at the ten commandments for example, half of them are concerned with thinking; don't take the Lord's name in vain, honour, and don't covet. And if you read Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, you'll see that he names "contemplation" as the highest virtue, this makes thinking itself an act.

    I have yet to come across a definition of ‘moral’ or ‘morality’ that does not mention behaviour, customs or actions, so I stand by my definition. — Possibility

    Sure behaviour is mentioned, but morality extends beyond behaviour to include thinking. So your definition is an attempt to force an unjustified restriction onto the classification of what types of values are moral and which are not. You try to force that restrictive definition to support an epistemological position, which is clearly not grounded in reality.

    Apart from the fact that I haven’t asserted any claim but expressed a disagreement, you’re referring to value and value judgements as if they’re the same thing. They’re not. I’ve already addressed the various types of value that have nothing to do with moral principles:

    Value (noun):

    1. The importance, worth or usefulness of something.

    2. Principles or standards of behaviour; one’s judgement of what is important in life.

    3. The numerical amount denoted by an algebraic term; a magnitude, quantity or number.

    4. The relative duration of a sound, signified by a (musical) note.

    5. The meaning of a word or other linguistic unit.

    6. The relative degree of lightness or darkness of a particular colour.     — Possibility

    This is all wrong. #1&2 are clearly moral issues, as related to "the end", what is desired. The thing desired, which is what is important in life, and also what makes something useful as being for that purpose, can be judged as morally good or bad. #3&5 are conventions, norms, which are supported by morality. So though it is not directly a moral value, it is supported by morality because without morality norms and conventions cannot exist. #4&6 do not make any sense because you are talking about a relation, something "relative" without naming what it is being related to. To judge a relative degree of light, or a relative duration of sound, requires some sort of standard, like a scale and this is a norm, or convention like 3&5, requiring morality for existence. Suppose you try to judge "brighter", or "longer duration" without such a standard or convention for comparison. A correct judgement requires that you have a correct disposition, or correct character, and such "correctness" in the person is a moral issue. Therefore the correctness of your judgement is a moral issue.

    Something doesn’t have to be judged morally ‘good’ or ‘bad’ to be considered important or beneficial, so I maintain my opinion that we can value other than morally. — Possibility

    Again, this is clearly wrong. What do you think "beneficial" means, other than having been judged as good for some purpose? And, that purpose can be judged as morally good or bad, rendering the "beneficial" thing as either morally good or bad depending on whether it's being used for a good or bad purpose.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    ↪Punshhh

    It's not a matter of what the witnesses deny, they could make truthful testimony, as others have already. it's a matter of what those judging the testimony deny. As you see from NOS42's denial, with a few "white lies", it's very easy to deny that the evidence is evidence. A "white lie" is used for the purpose of being polite to an individual who might be hurt by the truth.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    After all, they are politicians.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    If witnesses are allowed they will either have to ignore the evidence, therefore losing any integrity they have, or if they accept it they will have to rule against Trump. — Punshhh

    If NOS4A2 is any indication, ignoring the evidence (lying) will be very easy for these people.
  • Defining Love [forking from another thread]
    I recognise that we each have an individual structure of value systems, but I disagree wholeheartedly that we cannot value other than morally (and I’ve had a similar discussion about this in relation to logical evaluation). Moral is, by definition, related to behaviour, so we can only value morally what relates to behaviour, although by extension we also have a tendency to morally value events (and people understood as events). Moral value is also often a reduction of value information to a binary system: good/virtuous or bad/evil. — Possibility

    I think your definition of "moral" is incorrect. Morality is concerned with what is good and bad. And since it extends into judging thinking in this way, and thinking is not properly "behaviour", but related to behaviour, morality has a greater extent than what you claim.

    This casts doubt on your claim "I disagree wholeheartedly that we cannot value other than morally". Evaluating is an act of thinking, and acts of thinking may be judged as good or bad in relation to moral ethics. Morally "good" thinking will produce good value judgements, and bad thinking produces bad value judgements. If you think that there are value judgements which themselves can be judged as correct or incorrect, without reference to moral principles then the challenge is yours, to demonstrate these. Before you proceed, consider that correctness and incorrectness in value judgements is normative.
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