"The signpost is in order - if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose"; the philosohper's job consists in recalling these purposes). I think that works. — StreetlightX

I believe the multitude of purposes is represented as a multitude of language-games at 130. Often a specific game has a particular object, goal or end.

But this is where we have the inconsistency which I've been discussing with Luke. He now (131-133) proceeds to talk about arranging and ordering the recollections for a particular purpose which he names as "clarity". This is to create an order, or hierarchy of purposes, not "the order", but one order out of many possible orders. But this act of creating an order is completely inconsistent with simply laying things out to view, with no explanation. Ordering for the purpose of clarity is explanation.

"Professional politicians" are not all liars — Bitter Crank

Here's an example of Trumpian logic. All professional politicians are liars. I'm not a professional politician. Therefore I'm not a liar.

The sad part ... many of his supporters seem to think it's valid logic.

I support that. But that's just an assertion.

You said that the business (work) of philosophy was the goal of philosophy, and I painstakingly pointed out to you that this was incorrect. — Luke

Despite your pains, there is no such error. If the work of philosophy is to do X, then the philosopher's goal is to do X. You are incorrectly arguing that if this work is used for some further end, then that end is the goal of philosophy. It is not. That further end is the goal of some other discipline which might use the work of philosophy toward that further end. The goal of each discipline is to do the work which is proper to that discipline, and nothing else. That's why these distinct fields of study are called "disciplines", we are disciplined not to have goals outside the boundaries which define the work of the field.

I supported this with quotes from a secondary source reading of the text. — Luke

There's a big problem for you though, none of your quotes support your claim. They support mine.

See the association of order and sense? — Luke

Yes, the association is exactly as I said, and as Wittgenstein said, sense is dependent on order. If there is a sense, then there is an order. But it is not the case that order requires sense. So order is independent from sense. Your quoted passages say nothing about the order, I did say something about the order. And if it is an order, something can be said about it.

Did you have any further defence for your claims about the goal of philosophy? I directly responded to your question. Don't insult me with this crap. — Luke

I pointed out that your response missed a key point. The so-called goal of philosophy requires a process, or work, described at 130-132, which is inconsistent with the described work of philosophy prior to 127. Why does that insult you?

It might surprise you that there is more to a sentence than its words; sentences also have a meaning or a sense — Luke

Meaning is use in the context of this book, and the way a sentence is used (therefore its meaning) is distinct from the sentence itself. We cannot say that the meaning is a property of the sentence, it is the use.

At §98, "order" refers to the sense/meaning of a sentence. (How many times do I need to say that?) — Luke

Order does not refer to sense or meaning, I went through this already. Order is what is required for a sentence to have a sense. 'If there is a sense there must be order' does not indicate that "order" refers to sense.

At §132, "order" refers to the arrangement of grammatical evidence. — Luke

Right, and at 98, "order" refers to the "grammatical evidence" of the sentence. That's why the two uses of "order" are comparable. If you read from 130 on toward 132 you'll see that this order, which you call "grammatical evidence", is understood by comparing language-games, similarities and differences.

Referring back to 98, how an individual composes a sentence, the choice and ordering of words, and what follows, the "sense" of the sentence, depends on the language-games which the individual is involved in. So the "grammatical evidence" (order) of the sentence (98), which allows the sentence to have a sense, is the very same "grammatical evidence" (order) which underlies our knowledge of the use of language: It is an understanding of the order of language-games which allows one to know the sense of a sentence, as well as to have knowledge of the use of language. Knowing how to grasp the sense of a sentence is the very same thing as having knowledge of the use of language.

That's a good question. I don't think I really know.

I don't sense extension, nor do I sense a point. That's why I asked for definition, to be clear on what you were asking. These are properties, like other attributes, which must be judged according to some definition, as I've been arguing.

There is a distinction to be made - which I have tried to make it in my previous posts - between the work of philosophy and the goal of philosophy. I think that the work of philosophy, per Wittgenstein, is to lay things out to get a clear view, but that this is not the goal of philosophy. The goal of philosophy is to make the philosophical problems disappear, which is achieved when we attain complete clarity (§133). The process of arriving at that goal (i.e. the work of philosophy) is not the goal. — Luke

You're missing a key part of the description, which is explored at 128-132. This is the method by which philosophy proceeds toward its goal of making philosophical problems disappear. And the method is an arrangement of the order (a hierarchy) in language-games. The method described by Wittgenstein is known as platonic dialectics. Prior to this point in the book, the strategies of platonic dialectics have been dismissed, because the method of philosophy described by Wittgenstein has been just to look at things and describe things. The point I'm making is that at 127 there is a shift in the description of the method of philosophy, from simply describing things and even doing things (laying things out) to provide a clear look at things, to now, actively arranging things for the purpose of clarity. The latter might be called explanation.

My reading: On the one hand, we don't need to provide some unexceptionable sense to our ordinary (vague) sentences or to construct a perfect language. On the other hand, the sense of our ordinary vague sentences is already in perfect order. So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest (i.e. in terms of sense) sentence. — Luke

Right, the sentence is vague in the terms of sense. I agree. Bit the sentence only has a sense because it has an order. The order, within the sentence is what gives it a sense. If it had no order it would have no sense.

It seems undeniable that even a vague sentence like 'There is something on the table' must have a 'perfect order' buried in it, one that pins down its meaning exactly. [...]

As I said, the sentence consists of words. If the order is not the order of the words, then what is it? To say that the order is somehow "buried in it" does not answer the question. We could break down a spoken sentence and analyze the individual syllables and sound patterns (which Plato actually did), or we could break down a written sentence and analyze the individual letters, looking for the buried order, but the point is that we ought not invoke some sort of mystical spirit to account for "the sense". "The sense" must be discoverable from the physical "order".

I'll just say that I believe the problem with this way of looking at "sense" is that it neglects "context" as contributing to the sense. So if we attribute sense to order, then we have to bring context into order, such that the context of the sentence is part of the sentence's order. Wittgenstein deals with context in terms of language-games, so now at 128-130, he is discussing the ordering of language-games which a philosopher might do. But this still does not give us everything which is necessary, to describe context in the sense of the particularities and peculiarities of individual situations.

The way you phrased the comment was "Due to the fact that these terms require definitions, this can not follow logically," as if any terms that would require definitions excludes those terms from arguments that follow logically.

If you just wanted definitions, you could have just asked that. — Terrapin Station

Seems you didn't read the entire post.

But aren't you familiar with the idea of extension(ality) in ontology? I'm asking because if this stuff is that unfamiliar/that new to you, it's going to be difficult to have the sort of conversation I was hoping to have. — Terrapin Station

Yes I am familiar with extension. That's why I asked for definitions You seemed to be saying that "extension" and "point" were mutually exclusive. But as I understand geometry, a line has both extension and points. So I didn't see the premises (definitions) which were required to make your conclusion.

He makes no mention of the "goal of philosophy" in either of those sections. If you want to pretend like you've already proven otherwise, then so be it. — Luke

109 We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems.
124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.
125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.

Take it as you will, but if "the business of philosophy" is to do such and such, then I would assume that its aim or "goal" is to do that. Don't you think?

If one describes philosophy such that the business of philosophy is to explain nothing, yet it is the goal of philosophy to clarify (which is to explain), there is a problem with the description.

Your claim that "he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence" at §98 is ridiculous. — Luke

A sentence consists of words and nothing else. If a sentence has perfect order within it, then that order must be the order of its words. If you happen to think that the "perfect order" which is "in the vaguest sentence", could possibly refer to something other than the ordering of its words, perhaps you could try your hand at explaining this.

Your criticism of my comment was based on something not following logically because terms used require a definition. — Terrapin Station

Right, I was saying that the logic you used could only be meaningful if you had some definitions. I was saying that you needed such definitions, requesting them.

So presumably, according to you, things only follow logically when terms used do not require a definition. — Terrapin Station

What? I requested definitions, saying you needed definitions for your logic to be valid. How does that lead to the conclusion that I'm claiming that logic can only proceed without definitions?

You could at least quote the parts of §125 and §126 which support your claim that "just laying things out" is the goal of philosophy. — Luke

I did. If you cannot understand, then so be it.

When he speaks of "order" at §98, he is talking about the sense of a sentence. This is quite obvious from the context of §98 and §99. — Luke

He says "On the other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect order". This does not say that the sense is the order. It says that order is necessary (as determined by some sort of logic) for there to be sense. The order, which produces sense, is what I described above. At this point in the book (130-133), we have moved from "sense", to what underpins sense (as has been determined to be required for sense at 98), and that is "order".

I get that you don't like Trump's style. — fishfry

Do you like Trump's style, of inciting hatred for the purpose of political advantage? I recognize that there is a style of "attack" which has become prevalent in politics, to focus on the weaknesses and wrongs of the other party, because it produces political advantage. But it also incites hatred which leads to division within the nation. Trump takes the "attack" to a new level, utilizing the divisions (national borders) already in place, to incite hatred of the others for the purpose of political gain. As if this were the way to produce a great nation.

This is your unsupported assertion. He never states this is the goal of philosophy. But maybe if you say it enough times it will become true. — Luke

I quoted 126 at least twice and 125 at least once. I'm not here, to teach you how to read. I would expect that anyone partaking in this discussion would have already ascended to a basic level in that. Making it possible to get a clear view of things (which is "the business of philosophy" 125), and, arranging things for the purpose of clarity (after 127), are two distinct things. These two are mutually exclusive.

These are different uses/meanings of the word "order". — Luke

Actually, the use of "order" in these two instances is very similar. At 98 he is talking about the ordering of words in a sentence. This order is given in the act of creating the sentence. At 130-133 he is talking about the ordering of language-games. This is an order given by the philosopher, who sets up the language-games as objects for comparison (the creative act known as platonic dialectics).

In each of these cases we choose from a vast selection of objects, arrange the selected ones in an order, and give them public existence for the purpose of saying something. In the first instance (98), he is talking about a selection of words which are given order as a "sentence". The person says something through the means of the sentence. In the second instance he is talking about the philosopher selecting language-games which are given order to create a "model" (131). The philosopher says something about "the facts of our language" (130) through the means of the model.

The problem is that at 98 he says that any order is "perfect", as if clarity is unimportant in the creation of sentences. And this is simply the way that language is, whatever order is necessary to serve the purpose is the perfect order. Clarity is not necessarily the aim, because language aims at efficiency (getting things done as unenelightened said), and clarity is not very efficient. Wittgenstein was stating in this earlier part of the book, that this is the way language is. That is his description. Yet at 130-133, when it comes to the philosophical act of modeling language-games for the purpose of demonstrating "the facts of our language", all of a sudden clarity is of the utmost importance to the philosopher.

If clarity is of the utmost importance to Wittgenstein the philosopher, then Wittgenstein is not adhering to the principles of description which he has himself laid down. He has described language as serving many possible purposes, and therefore being vague because of this, but when he moves to model language as a philosopher (stating that the philosopher ought to only describe), he appears to choose one purpose, one aim, the goal of clarity. If he has in fact chosen the goal of clarity, he is inconsistent. But, as I said in the earlier post there is still some ambiguity at 132 as to whether he has truly chosen clarity as his aim.

Okay, but I'm still hoping you can give an example. — Terrapin Station

I didn't see how this question was relevant. To me it seemed like you were trying to change the subject. Perhaps all logic requires definition, I don't know, this would dependent on one's idea of logic, but that's not what we're discussing. Since I haven't implied that some logic does not require definitions I see no warrant for your request for an example, and I am not interested in determining whether or not all logic requires definitions.

All I'm asking you about is the fact that you agreed that you can sense the tape measure, but you denied being able to sense some extension of it. — Terrapin Station

Right, until you explain what you mean by "some extension of it", I cannot say that I can sense some extension of it. If you are asking me whether I can sense a particular extension, and you indicate to me, the particular extension you are referring to, then I may be able to answer yes, but I definitely cannot sense the vague and indefinite "some extension of it".

As I implied in the last post though, to talk about a particular extension requires the assumption of non-physical points, to separate that particular part from the rest of the tape measure. So I don't ever really sense a particular extensional section of the tape measure as separate from the rest of the extension of the tape measure.

Complete clarity is the goal, for that is when the philosophical problems completely disappear. You originally said that the goal of philosophy for Wittgenstein was "just laying things out...to get a clear view". — Luke

Yes, do you see the inconsistency there? Complete clarity is what Wittgenstein says is the goal of philosophy after 127. Prior to 127 the goal of philosophy is just laying things out.

However, the process of getting a clear view is not the goal, for it is not the end of that process. The goal is the final achievement of that clear view: complete clarity. — Luke

The aim is complete clarity, as stated at 133. If you choose to ignore this that's your choice. If the complete clarity is for the purpose of something other than philosophy, then this further goal is irrelevant to this discussion of philosophy.

There is no "switching" or inconsistency. Arranging things into a particular order for a particular purpose is the process of getting a clear view. — Luke

Of course it's inconsistency, you seem to be in denial. At 126 it is stated that there is no need for "explanation". To "explain" is to make clear. Therefore to arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view, is the very definition of "explain". To arrange things for the purpose of getting a clear view is completely opposed to what is stated prior to !27.
"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

If you must, go right back to 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.". By what principle is one order better than another order? If a philosopher is creating an order for the purpose of clarity, then that philosopher is explaining. But Wittgenstein has introduced no principle whereby explaining is what a philosopher ought to do. In fact, he has explicitly denied that there is any need for a philosopher to explain. Any order is a perfect order, even the vaguest of sentences, and there is no reason why any philosopher ought to arrange things in any specific order, for any specific purpose, because all orders are equally "perfect".

Therefore all this talk which occurs after 127, about arranging things for the purpose of clarity, is completely inconsistent with what was said prior to 127.

Regardless, I have no interest in arguing over the word "explanation". — Luke

I know, because rather than take a good look at how "explanation" is used, you'd rather simply deny the glaring inconsistency.

I think we'd have to move to inductive logic, but inductive conclusions are debatable.

Anyway, you seemed to be applying deductive logic. Something like "It is not an extension, therefore it is a point". Do you agree that by standard geometrical definitions, the tape measure has both points and extension, and to mark off a particular segment of extension requires points, which by definition have no spatial extension and are not sensible?

You agreed that you can sense the tape measure, and you agreed that you can sense markings on the tape measure. But you denied that you can sense any extension of the tape measure--that is, some arbitrary segment of it. — Terrapin Station

Right.

So if you can't sense any extension, but nevertheless you can sense the tape measure, you must be somehow sensing a single mathematical point of it only, no? Because anything more than that would have some extension. — Terrapin Station

This does not follow logically, because both "point" and "extension" require a definition, they are mathematical terms, like numbers, things which are not sensed, but understood by definition. If we agree that what I am sensing is called a "tape measure", there is no point to asking whether that tape measure is a point, an extension, or both, without defining the terms. Saying that the tape measure is one or the other, or both, would be to assign properties to the tape measure. With definitions we can make the judgement as to whether the tape measure has those properties.

When someone says we are aiming at something, as is the case in 133, "the clarity we are aiming at", then that thing is a goal.

Whether this clarity aimed at is a means to a further end is irrelevant to the inconsistency which I am pointing out. The inconsistency is that prior to 127 Wittgenstein is describing philosophy as simply putting things in front of us, not explaining anything, but after 127 he switches to say that the philosopher will arrange things into a particular order, for a particular purpose. He then proceeds to identify that particular purpose as clarity at 133.

To arrange things into a particular order, for the sake of clarity is an act of explanation. To "explain" is to make clear, and this is obviously inconsistent with 126.

"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain."

The point being that there is a radical difference between laying everything out in front of us for the sake of observation, and arranging things in an order for the sake of clarity. The latter being a form of explanation.

Rather than being the goal of philosophy [your unsupported assertion], getting a "clear view" is a means to an end; — Luke

No, it is succinctly stated at 133 that clarity is the end of philosophy. "For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear."

I don't understand your question. Why would I judge a tape measure to be a point?

How would my eyes separate one section of the tape from another?

I'm simply asking you now if you can sense some length of the tape measure, that is, some extension of it, some section of it. — Terrapin Station

No, length is a judgement.

I don't sense numbers.

No.

How about sensing the tape measure stretched between the two rocks? — Terrapin Station

That there is a tape measure and there are two rocks is clearly a judgement rather than a simple sensation.

Do you sense the marking on the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Yes, of course.

Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense? — Harry Hindu

I see no need to bring in an infinite regress here. Of course a regress is possible though. If someone makes a judgement, and another asks for the reasoning, or justification for that judgement, then the judgement which follows in explanation, and so on, there would be regress. The regress would not be infinite though, because we are finite beings with finite capacities, so the regress would be limited to the point where someone would break it off and the issue would be left unresolved.

You have to realize that judgments are about things, and it is what those judgments are about that matter. Sure, it could be that judgments is all you can do and make of the world, but the aboutness of those judgments creates a relationship that we usually refer to as "accuracy", so judgments themselves have a property of accuracy where they are more or less representative of what they are about. — Harry Hindu

I would prefer to use "reliability" rather than "accuracy". Our judgements are themselves judged for reliability, but this again is a judgement.

Instead of "judgment", I think I prefer "interpretation". Our senses don't lie, but we can lie to ourselves by interpreting sensory data incorrectly. In interpreting sensory data, we are attempting to determine what they are about. What they're cause is. If they have no cause, then solipsism would be the case, which is what it seems that you are ultimately arguing for. — Harry Hindu

"Interpretation" implies explanation, and very often we judge things without explaining them, so judgement is a far better term here. We very often judge things with little or no understanding of them, and those judgements are likely wrong, but "interpretation" implies that there is some understanding of the thing, which is not required for a judgement.

How else can you explain similar judgments by similar minds? Think about it. If we are all separate minds without a shared world (if that makes any sense) then how is it that we came to similar judgments about our separate sensory data - like that there is an "external" world and that there are other minds, and that you are similar enough to be part of a group of similar entities called "human beings"? How is it that "norms" can even be established and referred to? How is it that language could evolve at all? There must be more to the world than just our judgments - or its solipsism, and I assure you that if solipsism is the case, then I'm the solipsist and you are just a judgment in my mind that only exists when I read your words. — Harry Hindu

Similar minds seeing things in similar ways is explained by "similar minds". I'm not denying that there is a "shared world", what I am denying is that what we (as similar minds) say of the world, is the way that the world is. Remember, I am not questioning the thing, I am questioning the properties. For instance, that the red of the apple is "a property of the apple, light and your sensory system". That is just what you say of the world, it is not necessarily reality.

As long as an individual is judged as within the norm, then that person is correct. But correct, as the norm, does not mean that this is the way the world is. For example, we see that the sun rises and sets, and we might conclude that the sun circles the earth. This might become the norm, the sun circles the earth, and this idea could be judged as correct and be the norm. Just because it is the norm, and correct, does not mean that it is the way that things are.

This seems to be the basis for your claim of inconsistency, but where does he describe philosophy as "just laying things out"? — Luke

"125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.
...
126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain."

Then, at 127 he shifts, to talk about "assembling reminders for a particular purpose". So here has already gone beyond simply putting everything before us, to talk about assembling things for a particular purpose. Assembling things for a particular purpose is completely distinct from putting everything before us.

Now, 132 presents the biggest problem because of some ambiguity. We want to establish a particular order, not the order, but one order out of many possible particular orders. To do this we give prominence to certain language-games which are not necessarily ordinary or common usage. This appears to be a task of reforming language. "Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible.

However, it appears like he might be dismissing such an effort altogether, by saying near the end of 132 "these are not the cases that we have to do with." And then he presents a metaphor, of an engine idling, implying that the cases we are looking for is cases when language is doing nothing. But this doesn't really make sense, because it's hard to imagine a case when language is being used to do absolutely nothing. And then at 133 he seems to go back to the earlier part of 132 again, looking for a particular order which will prevent misunderstanding, "complete clarity", as if this is the particular goal which when obtained, will solve all philosophical problems.

I see a move of inconsistency in this section. Prior to 127, he describes philosophy as just laying things out, "to make it possible to get clear view" -125. That would be the goal of philosophy, to lay things out for viewing, analysis, whatever. But then at 127 he says that this is done for a "particular purpose", so he introduces the notion that the philosopher is actually laying things out for a further end. "To get a clear view" is something general, and we might describe the philosopher as doing this. But now he moves toward what is the particular purpose of an individual philosopher, in doing this (laying things out), and this is something beyond "to get a clear view".

There is always intention behind the "laying things out", which influences the way things are laid out by the philosopher. So at 132 it is not "the order", but one of the many possible orders, which describes how the philosopher lays things out. So even in the philosopher's act of laying things out to get a clear view, there is a particular view (intended by that philosopher) which is behind the philosopher's particular way of laying things out.

Notice that from 130 he proceeds to talk about a comparison of distinct language-games, with the end goal (purpose) of producing a prominent order, "an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible" -132. So that when we obtain complete clarity there will be no more need, or urge to philosophize -133. Now he has moved to his particular goal, complete clarity, no need to philosophize, and he is no longer talking about the general goal of just laying things out.

The precise inconsistency is found at 132 where he introduces his particular purpose. If the goal of the philosopher were simply to lay out all the different language-games for analysis, this would be consistent with what is said about philosophy prior to 127. However, at 132 he starts to talk about a particular way (his way) of comparing language games, and this is inconsistent with simply laying things out "to make it possible to get a clear view". He has now stated that we lay things out for a further purpose, but that purpose is his, not ours.

Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. — Harry Hindu

My point though, is that this is all just a judgement.

We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. — Harry Hindu

That there are letters in front of you is a judgement.

If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision? — Harry Hindu

The doctor makes a judgement comparing what you claim to see, with a standard, the norm. Whether what is there is or is not really letters, is irrelevant, so long as what you say is consistent with the norm.

I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. — Harry Hindu

Categorization is clearly a form of judgement.

These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. — Harry Hindu

That the two different people are talking about the same thing needs to be established, that's why we have the law of identity. We identify the thing, in this case it is what we call "the apple", and we agree that this particular thing will be called "the apple". But how do we identify a property? I suggest that we do this with a definition, and this is why I say that we need to refer to some criteria (the definition), to judge whether the thing (called the apple) is ripe or not. If we do not agree on the definition of "ripe", which is often the case, then we are talking past each other.

When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table? — Harry Hindu

You are talking about the thing, which you have identified as "the apple". So "the apple" is the subject of discussion, and this subject is related to that object by means of identity. That it is "ripe", what you predicate of that subject, is your judgement, and this is in your mind, just like the subject, the apple, is also in your mind. So in your mind you have judged "the apple is ripe", an act of predication, and this relates to the thing you have identified, because that thing is what you call 'the apple".

You’re being absurd if that’s what you think I meant. The relation is observed and measured. Thus ‘laws’ are established and further refined.

I wasn’t saying anything outrageous. The OP is ridiculous. — I like sushi

You very clearly said, "the laws of physics are observed and measured", "and mathematical abstractions are then created". You did not say that events are observed and the laws are abstracted, you said that the laws are observed and mathematics is abstracted, which is absurd. If you did not mean what you said, you could have simply apologized for making the mistake, instead of accusing me of being absurd.

Do you sense the tape measure? — Terrapin Station

Sure, I see something which I call a tape measure, but even in calling it a tape measure, I am making a mental judgement. I think the point is that there is no sensing without mental activity. So I think it would be incorrect to say I see this, or I see that, as an act of sensation alone, without an accompanying act of mind. Mind is required for seeing, and I believe, any type of sensing.

Woah, cool. You're a psychic! — Isaac

I see with my eyes and read with my mind. If that's what you call being a psychic, then I'm beginning to understand why you have so much difficulty understanding the non-physical. You appear to have a very narrow mind, if you class reading as not the type of thing which your mind does.

I don't. I suppose I would be asserting where the origin of the pattern I'm talking about (which, as above, does not 'exist') physically is. Like a painting of a unicorn. I might say "the unicorn in that painting has black fur, that's unusual for a unicorn, and it looks like it's angry about something". Of course, the unicorn in question does not exist, neither do any of the unicorns I'm comparing it to in establishing it uniqueness, but that doesn't mean it's not relevant where the origin of my abstraction is located. Its about a presumption of shared experience. I see a shirt reflecting partly black, partly white light. I abstract from those light signals a pattern, as set of instructions (black....move an inch...white). I point out the origin of that abstraction, and even talk colloquially about its "being on the shirt" because I presume your mind is sufficiently like mine that you will form a similar abstraction. — Isaac

I really can't understand any of this. I don't see how you can see a shirt, and abstract a set of instructions from the shirt. That makes no sense to me whatsoever. I've never abstracted instructions from a shirt, unless there was something written on the shirt. I don't see much point in continuing this discussion. As usual the person defending physicalism proceeds toward making ridiculous statements in order to defend the ontology, instead of proceeding toward understanding reality. That's not philosophy it's fanaticism

So, the laws of physics are observed and measured (meaning not measuring some imaginary event!) and mathematical abstractions are then created - thought up - in order to make useful and applicable predictions about how experienced phenomena relate - or don’t relate! — I like sushi

That's absurd. How would one observe and measure a law of physics? An event is not a law.

There's little point in talking about one's personal life on an anonymous forum. I've done a lot more than vote. Out there in the world, in real life. But what is your point? — fishfry

I made my point. You compared your political activity to "the average person". But the average person only even votes sometimes, so that really doesn't say much. Just being diligent to vote at every election beats the average person "by a pretty good margin".

you don't sense what the tape measure reads at the other rock, etc. Is that right? — Terrapin Station

That's right, the tape measure doesn't read, I read the tape measure, and reading is a mental activity. I read the tape with my mind, not with my eyes.

Not sure I did, but I may have been careless with my language I suppose. I don't agree that there "is" a pattern on the shirt and one in the imagination (where 'is' is being used to convey existence). I think we can talk about the pattern of the shirt, and we can talk about the pattern of the imagination, but neither exist outside of what they both physically are (shirt and brain). — Isaac

Here's the problem right here. You seem to have agreed that we can talk about patterns without any judgement about whether or not these patterns exist. We'll just talk about patterns, and whether or not the patterns exist is irrelevant. So why do you want to make assertions about where they physically are? If the existence of the pattern is irrelevant to our discussion of it, then it doesn't make sense to make assertions about where it is, don't you think? Can we adhere to this? We'll just talk about various different patterns, acknowledging that where these patterns are, if they are anywhere, is irrelevant.

Have we identified two distinct types of patterns, imaginary patterns, and non-imaginary patterns?

No, and I'm not sure where you might have got that impression from. My understanding of the physics is that the theories at a quantum scale do not apply to objects at a non-quantum level (which neurons certainly would be), that the uncertainties resolve as soon as physical mass is obtained. We might have the particle which mysteriously changes properties depending on whether it is observed, but we do not have any objects which behave this way. — Isaac

What do you mean by "physical mass"? Do you believe that particles without mass are non-physical? There are such particles within, and interacting with the physical mass of the human being, so how can you deny the non-physical aspect of the human being?

How are you determining that the "neurons, synapses, and things like that" are not the pattern? Again, you're begging the question. You're assuming 'the pattern' is some existant thing (such that you can say that a collection of neurons aren't it) in a discussion about whether a pattern is an existant thing. — Isaac

As I said before, if the pattern which we are talking about is not an existent thing, then what are we talking about, and why are we having this conversation at all? We've already agreed that it is a pattern. We agreed that there is one pattern on the shirt, and one pattern in the imagination, two distinct patterns, that are somehow similar. Now you want to rescind that agreement and go back to where you were before that, claiming the imaginary pattern is non-existent, nothing. This is not progress. You agree on a proposition and then it leads you toward a conclusion which you dislike, so you withdraw the agreement.

No. Not a physical object, and not physical at all are two different things. Energy is physical, but it is not a physical object. — Isaac

Energy is not a physical object, it is an attribute, a property of moving objects, the capacity to do work. It is "physical" only in the sense that it is something attributed to an object. Energy is a property of an object. The problem here is that some people assign "existence" to properties without having any physical object to assign these attributes to and then they create the illusion that the attribute has existence all on its own. In this case someone would say that energy exists as something physical, independent of any object. But of course that's nonsensical to say that there is a property existing independently of all objects, unless we look at that property as a concept, then it is an abstraction, in the mind.

I'm starting to see a pattern now in your thinking. It appears like you want to say that the non-physical is real, so long as it is not consider to exist as physical objects. The imaginary pattern is real, but not an existing physical object, energy is real but not an existing physical object. For you, these things are real, and they are not physical objects. However, instead of recognizing that "not physical objects" means that they are "non-physical" you want to make the incoherent move of disassociating "physical" from "object", to say that these things are physical but not objects. Do you understand that "physical" is defined as "of the body"? This is why your move to disassociate "physical" from "object", allowing that things like energy, and imaginary patterns, are physical but not objects is incoherent, because it renders the term "physical" as incoherent and self-contradictory. There are things of the body (physical) without a body (object)

Yes, that's pretty much true in essence. I don't think physicists would use the term' dualism', but it certainly seems as though some very 'spooky' stuff is going on at the quantum scale. But it's not 'nonsense' at all to dismiss it at the human level. There is sound empirical and mathematical evidence for the 'spooky stuff' going on at the quantum level. There is none whatsoever for it going on at the human level. We do not require a 'realm of thought' to create useful models of the world (yet), so why invent one? — Isaac

Oh come on Isaac. Do you truly believe that there is no quantum activity in the human nervous system? Biologists have determined that the molecular structure of living cells is extremely complex. And these molecules are very active, so I would say that they are most definitely making use of quantum activity. Why would you say that there is "spooky stuff" going on at the quantum level, but no "spooky stuff" going on in the human cells.

Can you sense the measurement? — Terrapin Station

Of course not, the measurement is a judgement, in my mind. It is a comparison between the thing measured and the devise, or standard used for measuring. How would I sense the inside of my mind?

So, what are you saying - that there are no such things as properties - only judgments? Judgments about what? — Harry Hindu

We make judgements about anything. Do you recognize the difference between the thing and what is attributed to the thing (a property)? Or, the difference between the subject and the predicate? To say that something has a specific property does not mean that the thing actually has that property, the statement is a reflection of a judgement. It means that the thing has been judged to have that property.

What is ripe for you isn't overripe for your son. It is still in a state of ripeness that either you or your son prefer. It isn't that it is over ripe for your son, it is the same ripeness as it is for you, it's just that he prefer's his under ripe, whereas you prefer yours ripe. You aren't determining the ripeness of fruit. It is your judgment, or preference, of the current state of ripeness. Your judgment has to be about something, and it is about the current state of the fruit. You are committing a category error in projecting "good" or "bad" onto the fruit, when the fruit is only ripe, over ripe, or under ripe, not good or bad. Good and bad are properties of judgments. — Harry Hindu

That's nonsense. If it isn't a judgement which determines whether the fruit is ripe or not then how is the ripeness determined? Do you not see that there needs to be criteria as to what constitutes "ripe" and, that there needs to be a comparison of the fruit in relation to this criteria, in order for the fruit to be determined as ripe or not? If this comparison is not a judgement, then what is it?

This is the case when any properties are attributed to anything, it is a matter of judgement.

Your syllogism is correct, but I don't agree with (nor can see any reason for) the premise. Why would our ability to measure something have anything to do with its having a location in space? Surely all our ability to measure something tells us is our current state of technology, not anything ontological?

If you mean our ability to measure something in theory, then you're just begging the question by asserting that the pattern in the mind cannot be measured. That is the very issue at hand. — Isaac

Ok, you obviously do not like my claim that the imaginary pattern has no location in space, being imaginary. So perhaps you can offer a description or definition of what you mean by "location in space" which would allow that the imaginary pattern has a location in space. To say that the pattern has a spatial location inside a brain is really nonsense because the neurosurgeon will find neurons, synapses, and things like that, but not the pattern which is being imagined.

It is difficult to determine the spatial location of quantum particles, but as soon as they become physical objects their spatial location is not at all difficult to determine. — Isaac

So you believe that there is a time when a quantum particle is not a physical object? I suppose therefore, that at this time it is non-physical. If you accept that the quantum particle is at some times physical and at other times non-physical, then why would you have a problem with a physical/non-physical dualism? It seems like you accept dualism in the principles of physics, but not in ontology of the human being. Isn't this the type of nonsense which the op refers to? Dualism in physics is conventional, but the physicalist doesn't allow dualism in ontology. What's with that?

Not that "physical" is defined by "what we can sense," but you can't sense that something is, say, a meter to the left of something else? How do you figure out that something is a meter to the left of something else if you don't sense that? — Terrapin Station

No I can't sense that one thing is a metre to the left of another, that must be measured or in some other way judged. Senses don't make judgements, minds do.

For, despite the heavy critique of the Tractatus here (re: idealisation and so on), Witty’s understanding of philosophy remains strikingly similar. — StreetlightX

I agree, and I find this to be very odd. The TLP is extremely naïve in its simplistic representation of philosophy. In the PI Wittgenstein appears to recognize this naivety, and the fact that philosophy is much more complex than he originally thought. But for some undisclosed reason, he refuses to recognize, in his writing, the implications of these complexities. The glaring deficiency is that philosophy really does deal with morality, and how human beings ought to be behave, and language use is described by Wittgenstein as a form of human behaviour. So the fact that philosophy deals with how people ought to use language cannot be avoided.

Now he has created a real dilemma for himself. If he is to accurately describe what philosophy is, it is required that he include moral philosophy which prescribes what people ought to do. And if he excludes moral philosophy from his description, saying that philosophy ought not include this, then he is practising that very form of philosophy which he is saying ought not be done.

and that philosophy only ought to describe language — StreetlightX

Here is a fine example of the hypocrisy which Wittgenstein has forced himself into by refusing to bring his criticism of the TLP down to the root of the problem, its representationalism. Instead of beginning at the true base of language use, what he himself has exemplified as "orders", instances of telling someone what to do, he still wants to begin with representation, description. He now jumps the ought/is gap, to maintain his mistaken starting point of representation. But that jump is an act of hypocrisy.

Well not an exact copy, obviously. It will have some similarities and some differences. The key difference (which obtains no matter how accurate the representation) being the location in space. One is in someone's head, the other is on a shirt — Isaac

I don't think that the difference is a matter of "location in space". The pattern on the shirt can be seen and can be measured as occupying space, the one in the designer's mind cannot. The spatial existence of the two is what is different. If being able to be measured, and having spatial relations with other things is having a "location in space", then the imaginary pattern has no location in space. That, I think is the principal difference, the pattern on the shirt can be said to have a spatial location, but the imaginary one cannot.

This huge difference is why we're better off to move to something like what you mentioned, "instructions", or what I mentioned, a "plan" or 'blueprints", to understand the creation of the pattern on the shirt. We can say that the instructions have physical existence, on the paper, but this is a bunch of symbols which represent the ideas of what someone is supposed to do in order to create a shirt with a specified pattern. These ideas of what someone needs to do to create a specified physical object, are in minds.

There is no point in you and I discussing exactly where the pattern is, until we determine what a pattern is, because I think the pattern is what is specified about the shirt, and therefore is ideal, having no spatial location, and you think the pattern is what exists in the shirt therefore having a spatial location in the shirt. Studies in physics demonstrate that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign spatial locations to parts (particles) within objects. So I think that my position is much more realistic than yours. The pattern is what is specified about the shirt, it is not something within the shirt. Can you agree with this, or would you prefer to demonstrate how you think that it is more realistic to conceive of the pattern as something in the shirt, or on the shirt, rather than something which is said about the shirt?

That sounds like a lazy professor, getting the exam questions off the internet.

It's referring to the relation of the threads--the way they're situated with respect to each other extensionally (or we could more conventionally say the way they're situated in space). You don't think that the relation of the threads is nonphysical, do you? — Terrapin Station

Of course the relations of the threads are non-physical. How could they be conceived of as physical? The threads are physical things which we can sense, and spatial and temporal relations are not sensible so they are non-physical. That this thread is situated, in such a relation to another thread is purely a spatial concept, and therefore non-physical. Or do you think that space is a physical thing? If so, by what sense do you perceive space? And if you don't sense it how could there be a physical thing which you cannot sense?

You seem to be saying everything, including the physical, is non-physical since the only window to the world we have is our mind. It's kinda like saying an apple is the very same thing as light just because we need light to see an apple, which is incorrect. — TheMadFool

No I did not say everything is non-physical. I said that we interpret our sensations of physical things through the use of non-physical principles. Therefore our understanding of the physical is dependent on our understanding of the non-physical, and only as reliable as our understanding of the non-physical. This is why you are misguided in your assumption that knowledge of the physical is more "objective" than knowledge of the non-physical. In reality, the reliability of our knowledge of the physical cannot surpass the reliability of our knowledge of the non-physical. So your apple/light analogy is not relevant.

Are you aware of the tinted glass analogy. If you are looking at the world through a tinted glass, and you cannot avoid looking through that glass, then the tinting of the glass will affect how the colour of the world appears to you. Until you fully understand what the tinting of the glass adds or takes away from the appearance of the world, you will not be able to say how the colour of the world really is. The same is the case with the non-physical principles by which we understand the world. Our minds look at the physical world through these non-physical principles, and until we fully understand what they add or take away from the appearance of the world, we cannot say how the world really is.

No. I must have an image (or instructions) relating to a pattern in order to try to create another pattern just like it. Neither of them are the pattern in some way. They are two different patterns with many similarities. — Isaac

OK, let's say that they are two different patterns. Whether or not they are similar is a matter of judgement.

Yes. "Exists" is not the problem, "the" is the problem. There's no such thing as the pattern. There are patterns (which are just collections of properties we focus on), those patterns have similarities, that's all there need be to it. We don't need to then reify some archetype. — Isaac

If there is no such thing as "the pattern", then I see no reason to be talking about the pattern. But if you say that the shirt has "a pattern", then it is you who is trying to reified "the pattern", claiming that it is a real thing within the shirt. I see no principles whereby we might judge something, what you call "collections of properties" as "a pattern". Is any random thing a pattern to you? Can we agree that there is no point in talking about "the pattern", or "a pattern" if you insist that there is no such thing as 'the pattern", and to say that the shirt has a pattern is pure nonsense? if there is no such thing as "the pattern" which the shirt has, it is nonsense to say that it has a pattern.

But a tartan pattern, for example, is just as possible as apples to remove from the world. In fact, before the advent of weaving, there was a world with no tartan pattern. What you can't do is remove all the tartan patterns from the world but leave all the kilts exactly as they were, meaning that the tartan pattern does not exist independently of the thing it is describing. — Isaac

Talking about the world prior to the existence of some thing, is not the same as attempting to remove something already existing in the world, and then talk about that thing afterwards. These two are completely different. So this comparison is not useful. And since we have no premise to talk about the existence of patterns, as you have insisted there is no such thing as the pattern, we need to establish some premise whereby we can talk about patterns, before there is any point to making a claim such as the one you've made here.

No. A pattern existed in the mind of the designer. A different pattern exists on the shirt. Are you trying to claim that the exact same pattern has been removed from the mind of the designer and placed on the shirt? — Isaac

No, what I claimed is that a copy of the pattern which existed in the mind of the designer was made on the shirt. So we seem to have agreement here, maybe we can find a starting point. The pattern in the mind of the designer is not exactly the same as the pattern on the shirt. Let's say that there is a pattern in the mind, and there is a pattern on the shirt, and they are not the same, and neither can be said to be "the pattern". Do you agree that the pattern on the shirt is a copy of the one in the designer's mind?

The property of ripeness belongs the the apple alone, not redness. — Harry Hindu

That's strange I would think that "ripeness" is a judgement made by human beings, and not a property at all. When the banana is ripe for me, it is overripe for my son. Ripeness is not a property at all, it's a judgement, just like good and bad are not properties of moral and immoral acts, they are judgements of such acts. Come to think of it, redness, big, small, hard and soft, and everything that we call "properties" are just judgements made by human beings. When we say that such and such has X property, we are just making a judgement.

Properties are emergent, and properties are not "composed of parts". — Janus

As having properties is how we describe things. Where does the property emerge from, the human mind which does the describing? If you are direct realist, then the property is the thing, and it is therefore composed of parts.

Dangerously close to it; not to mention the fact that it closes all inquiry since the non-physical, by definition, can't be investigated in anyway. — TheMadFool

Why would you say that the non-physical cannot be investigated? It just cannot be sensed and so we must investigate it with the mind, logic. Magic is a performance, often associated with trickery, illusion and deception. When the method of an act of performance is unknown, it may be said to be magic. But the methods of magic may be investigated. I suggest to you, that the reason you associate the non-physical with magic is that you haven't taken the time to investigate the non-physical, and therefore the acts of the non-physical create the illusion of magic.

That said I see an opening for inquiry into the mind with the mind itself - a sort of self-examination which philosophy encourages. However I don't know how much objectivity, a necessity I presume, can be attained along such lines. — TheMadFool

Yes, that's the route, examine the mind with the mind. I think your concern about objectivity is misguided though. The mind is what is used to understand both sensible world, and the mind itself. But the mind is present to the mind directly and therefore has direct access to itself, while it only has a mediated access to the sensible world, through the means of the senses. So it only understands the sensible through the means of the principles by which it interprets sensations. These principles are not themselves sensible, they are non-physical, and are only understood directly by the mind. Therefore, all of our knowledge of the sensible world, the physical, is only as dependable, or "objective", as our knowledge of the intelligible world, the non-physical. And it is necessary to conclude that our knowledge of the physical is founded, grounded, and based in our knowledge of the non-physical, so it is impossible that our knowledge of the physical is more reliable, or "objective", than our knowledge of the non-physical.

This is why it is not very wise, and possibly dangerous to dismiss the non-physical as magic. The physicists, and other empirical scientists are using the non-physical principles in their performance acts of prediction. If we want to understand what they are doing in these acts, we must proceed towards an understanding of the non-physical principles. If we dismiss the usage of non-physical principles, and therefore the scientific performances, as magic, this is just a disposition of not wanting to know.

I'm not seeing the necessity here. How is our repeatedly using the same name to describe similar arrangements of colour and shape forcing a thing into existence? — Isaac

Do you know what it means to arrange things in a pattern? Would you agree that you must know the pattern, in your mind, prior to arranging the things according to that pattern? If so, then how can you not recognize that the pattern exists in your mind prior to the things demonstrating the pattern? If you are having a problem with the word "exists", then we might leave it out, and say that the pattern is in your mind prior to the things being arranged in the pattern. Do you not understand this, or see some reason to deny it?

If I asked you to imagine a world without apples are you seriously suggesting that the question doesn't even make sense until I can provide you with the details about how exactly I plan to destroy all the apples. Do you ask Putman how exactly he planned on making his vat? Do you require architectural drawings before considering Searle's Chinese room to have any meaning? — Isaac

The question makes no sense to me, but sense to you, because you and I seem to have a different understanding of what a "pattern" is. If "apples" were the type of thing which were impossible to remove from the world, as "patterns" are, then you would see that it makes no sense to ask someone to imagine a world without apples.

It's a thought experiment. Just presume I have some means of destroying things that exist in the realm of platonic forms (or whatever realm you're positing for this pattern). What would the shirt with alternating stripes now look like if I destroyed the pattern {alternating stripes} within the realm in which it exists? — Isaac

OK, I'll try this thought experiment for you. I remove from my mind, a particular pattern. Let's say I forgot it. Then I really cannot say what the shirt would look like, because I forgot the terms I would use to describe it. Maybe I could think up some new, random words to describe it, but what good would that do?

The real issue here, which you seem to have no respect for, is that the pattern existed in the mind of the designer, before it is expressed in the shirt. So it really makes no sense to ask me whether I can banish the pattern from the intelligible world, now, because the pattern was necessarily there in the intelligible world, at that time when the shirt, with that pattern, was created. Whether or not I have the capacity to recognize the pattern is irrelevant.

I didn't claim to be having any trouble imagining the pattern without the shirt. If you actually read my post I'm asking entirely about imagining the shirt (completely unchanged physically), but without the pattern. — Isaac

Unless you are direct realist, the pattern is not in the shirt, it is what the shirt is said to have. The designer has the pattern in mind, and makes the shirt as an example, or representation of that pattern. You can see this in all artificial physical objects, cars, planes, building, etc., they are representations of the ideas, concepts, used to construct them. There is a model, a blueprint, design, which the object is made to be a representation of. This is what is in Plato's cave allegory, sensible objects are a reflection of the ideas used to create them. That's how the philosopher comes to understand the reality of existence.