Hah, not you. Still, I'd say something like: a language game is conditioned by a form of life. So, in the 'context' of building something, 'slab' and 'block' mean something specific. In another context (maybe a certain board game say), the words will mean something different ('play the "slab" card'; 'play the "block" card'). A form-of-life has to do with the purpose one puts language too: are you a builder? A puzzle-game maker? In a situation of strife? A philosopher? And this in turn will condition how langauge is put to use for you: what language-game you employ. And what language-game another imagines you to be 'playing'. What action, what activity, what form-of-life are you engaged in? - this will condition the language-game in which words are used. — StreetlightX

I've reconsidered what I said yesterday about language-games taking the place of context. Language-games cannot completely take the place of context because there is always a multiplicity of language-games which each word is involved in. Therefore we have to appeal to context in order to determine the appropriate language-game. This is why, in the following section, Wittgenstein starts to talk about numerous possible purposes. If there was only one language-game it would be possible to understand meaning according to the game. But since there are numerous games, we need a procedure to determine which game is at play in any particular circumstances. So the second sense of "context", particular circumstances, cannot be superseded by language-games, because we need to refer to these particular circumstances in order to determine which language-game is at play.

Perhaps what you are challenging is whether it is ever possible for two objects to be perfectly at rest relative to one another. If so, fair enough. — andrewk

Yes, that's the issue, the inertial frame of reference is essentially arbitrary. Yet it is extremely important because inertia under Newton's first law represents the temporal continuity of existence, i.e. things that do not change as time passes. Newton's concept assumes that there is such a thing as an object with no forces acting on it, and this object will continue in time to be as it was. This a completely unrealistic assumption.

The opposite perspective (which I believe is more realistic), is that the temporal continuity of existence requires an acting force (traditionally that would be God). So the law of inertia, upon which the "scientific" definition of rest is based, takes what had been attributed to the act of God, the temporal continuity of existence (things which stay the same as time passes), for granted. This taking inertia for granted, assumes that the temporal continuity of mass is necessary (cannot be otherwise), requiring no forces, while the opposite perspective assumes that a force is required for temporal continuity. But if the temporal continuity of mass is not necessary, (and there may be good evidence that it is not, in QM), then this so-called "scientific" definition of rest is completely off track. And so we would need to assume some force to fill the place of "the Will of God", in order to account for what we observe as rest.

"Rest" is not a scientific principle. What rest is, has never been demonstrated empirically. That "rest" is relative to a frame of reference is an ontological principle adopted by relativity theorists, for the purpose of ease in calculations (as you described). That this is what "rest" really is has never been scientifically proven and therefore it is false to claim that this is a scientific principle.

On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"? — Luke

This would be done on the occasion of making a philosophical demonstration, as Fooloso4 points out, it's similar to when Moore says "here is one hand". Notice that Wittgenstein is trying to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". He is doing this by showing that a philosophical use (such as the demonstration of "this is here") is no different from any instance of ordinary use, each one being a particular instance, of "special circumstances". Each instance of use, whether philosophical, mathematical, scientific, mundane, or whatever, may be classed in the same category, as a particular instance of special circumstances. So the instance of philosophical use is no different in the sense of aiming for "the ideal", it is just another instance of use, and like any other, it has a particular purpose specific to itself.

A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game. — StreetlightX

Notice the two distinct senses of "context". I think that the second sense accounts for the kind of word by relating to the particular circumstances of use. Both senses of "context" are important to meaning, but you're right, neither can account for a word playing a role. So "language-game" encompasses and supersedes both senses of "context".

Where I think "language-game" really excels is in the fact that it refers to activity (movements within a game). We therefore attribute meaning to human actions, rather than assuming that meaning is associated with static, defined relations, like "context" does. The difference is significant because classically the act is understood as the means to the end, while the end is a static object (what is intended), but meaning was always associated with the end (what was meant, intended). One might say that classically the act only had meaning by being related to an end. "Language-game" gives us the principles whereby we can associate meaning directly with the act itself, rather than the end, so that meaning is inherent within the act, being derived from the game, not the end.

'Preferred' is a function of someone's mind - the person that prefers it. It is not ontological. For a given calculation there will often be a frame that makes the calculation simplest. Indeed, in GR, the biggest challenge is often in finding a frame that makes the calculations manageable. Again, that is a pragmatic, rather than an ontological consideration. — andrewk

The point though, is that "rest" is an ontological principle. Therefore the reason why one rest frame is preferred over another ought to be ontological rather than pragmatic. In scientific endeavours we ought to choose the best in relation to determining the truth, rather than what makes the calculations easiest..

There will be no universally preferred frame because a frame that is best for one purpose may be terrible for another. A laboratory-based frame is best for lab-based experiments. An Earth-centred frame is best for satellite management. A sun-centred frame is best for long-range space missions and predicting movements of solar system bodies other than the moon. — andrewk

Now you base "best" in what "makes the calculations simplest" rather than true ontology. As I said, the easiest is not necessarily "the best". Your use of "best" here is not based in the intent of finding truth, but in the intent of making calculations easier.

For a cabin attendant serving meals in a commercial jet, the preferred frame is that of the jet, but for an air traffic controller directing the flight paths for the jet and other planes, the preferred frame is that of the control tower. Neither would want to use the frame of the other. — andrewk

In many of our day to day procedures we settle for less than the best, that is obvious. But science ought to strive for nothing less than the best understanding of nature, and that is the truth. This requires adherence to solid ontological principles rather than pragmatic principles.

The point made by Wittgenstein was that if the sentence "This is here" makes sense to you, then you ought to question the special circumstances where it is actually used.

It appears like the sentence does not make sense to Luke, nor does it make sense to unenlightened, so these two move to deny that the sentence is ever actually used. The sentence does make sense to myself, and Fooloso4, so we move to question the special circumstances in which it is actually used, i.e. at 117 in the Philosophical Investigations.

When philosophers publish philosophical musings, like Wittgenstein has, they are full of things which make sense to some, but do not make sense to others. As he says, it depends on whether or not the words are being used in a way that you are familiar with. I am familiar with this type of philosophical statement, so "This is here" makes sense to me. But when I see algebra it does not make sense to me, because I am not familiar with it.

I don't know what "absolute motion" would be, perhaps you mean absolute rest? In any case, it's a matter of a preferred perspective, the preferred rest frame. Do you agree that it's better to model the movement of the planets as movements relative to the sun as the rest frame, rather than as movements relative to the earth as the rest frame? If the preferred rest frame makes sense to you, then why not allow that there is an ideal, or best rest frame (absolute rest)?

It is your problem, not the theory's problem. — andrewk

That depends on your ontological perspective, doesn't it?

You make it sound like speed is a property of an object. It isn't. I am not moving at some speed. I can only have speed relative to an arbitrary reference. — noAxioms

This is a problem with even the earliest forms of relativity theory. In relativity, velocity is not a statement concerning a property of an object, it is a statement concerning the object in relation to something else. So it is possible that there is something moving at 99.999% the speed of light relative to yourself right now, and therefore we could model you as moving at 99.999% the speed of light relative to this thing.

As I said, it's a problem with relativity theory, and that's because it robs us the capacity to determine real motions. Notice that relativity theory arose from the realization that the motions of the sun and planets could be modeled equally as heliocentric, or as geocentric. In reality, one model is more accurate than the other, and that's the case with all motions, and why relativity is deficient in its capacity to give us an accurate modeling of motions.

I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object. — Luke

Think of this. Someone could point to absolutely any object, at any particular place whatsoever, and say "this is here". Therefore, the sentence in itself, is very general in its usability. However, if or when, someone actually points to an object and uses the sentence, its meaning is very specific in its use, to indicate that special object in that special place.

So, the circumstances are not unique, or special at all, as they are in themselves, because it could be absolutely any circumstances. That is, until the sentence is applied, and this transforms the circumstances into something special. The sentence, in the context of the pointing, specifies this object in this place, creating special circumstances from circumstances which were not special at all. It is this act of individuating an object, "this here", which the law of identity is based. Following this the object may be named.

They were trying to build a Trump building even as the election campaign was going on. — ssu

The fact that they were hiding this, at that time, indicates that there was not complete ignorance.

Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances, therefore the circumstances in which it is usable are not "special" at all. But if it were used, as it is in the example, the use of it would make those circumstances very special.

Compare this to how he presents the form of a proposition at 114, "this is how things are". The one, "this is how things are" is a generalization, it creates something general. The other "this is here", creates something specific (special). Wittgenstein is directing us away from the use of language for creating something general (what philosophers do), toward its use for creating something specific (special). That's what ordinary language use does, creates something special, it specifies. Ordinary language use is very specific to the circumstances, we refer to particular things in particular locations, and that's where language's usefulness is based. Talking about specific things in specific places is ordinary use, and that's the foundation of language.

The philosophical type of language use, generalizations ("this is how things are", or "essences"), is a special type of language use, created for special purposes. As we'll see in 120-135 this dissolves the generalized idea that philosophy is done for 'a purpose', rendering it as philosophy is done for a variety of different special purposes. That's because all forms of language use are based in specification, as the foundation of language, mentioned above. Now what is specified is the particular purpose.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order."

The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. There's a sort of paradox involved because one might point to any object and utter that phrase, and it would make sense. Yet without context the phrase makes no sense . So it is not required that the circumstances are "special", because the phrase is applicable in all circumstances. However, it is only meaningful in the sense that it indicates special circumstances. You might say that the phrase (in the context) creates special circumstances.

When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general. — Fooloso4

In the example, "this is here" means nothing more than "this object is in this place", exactly as it sounds. Notice a pointing motion is indicated. The problem is that "this is here" is only meaningful if the special circumstances (the context of the act of use) are considered. When the special circumstances are considered (the pointing to an object), it refers to a particular object in a particular place. Without consideration of the special circumstances it could refer to any object in any place, and therefore looses its meaning. The phrase makes no sense outside the context of the special circumstances.

There's a sort of paradox indicated because the phrase is extremely useful (able to be used to refer to any object at any place), but it really has no meaning (makes no sense), other than what is given to it by the special circumstances of the particular instance of use. That's a peculiar aspect of language, the more useful phrases are the ones which are allowed to derive their meaning from the special circumstances of their use. This relates back to when he described the concept of "game" as unbounded. Being unbounded makes the word "game" very useful (may be used in many different cases), but we may create a boundary for a special purpose.

69...We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.)

This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician insists that she is using an expression in just the same way that it is used in an 'ordinary' circumstance (or what Witty refers to as a 'special circumstance'): "I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."

And Witty's response is something like: you can't just say this. If meaning is use in a language-game, the language-game needs to be in place if that 'same' meaning is to be preserved - and it's not at all clear that, in the metaphysician's use, that language-game (or any language-game) is in place.

This is why Witty is critical of the idea that the meaning of terms is retained in "every kind of use": but Witty's whole point is that there is no 'every kind of use': use is always 'language-game relative' - use in this or that language-game, not "every kind of use". — StreetlightX

"Language-game" is a substitute for "context" here. "Context" has two very distinct connotations, each of which are very important to meaning. The first is the position of a word in relation to other words in an act of use. The second is the special circumstances which constitute the environment of the act of use. "Language-game" as StreetlightX uses it here, acts as a substitute for both of these, "meaning is use in a language-game". So "language-game" provides us with a third sense of "context". "Context" does not refer here to a static position, or state of things in relationship to each other, it refers directly to the act, as a move with context, within a game.

The first sense of context (the positional relations of words) may be subsumed as part of the language game, a move within the game. The move is to put words in relations to each other. But as StreetlightX points out, the metaphysician's game is unfamiliar, perhaps as a sort of personally created, private game, though the metaphysician insists that the game ought to be familiar to you. When the game is unfamiliar to you, meaning cannot be determined by the first sense of context (positional relations of words), so we are left with context in the second sense, "special circumstances" as the only means to determine the meaning.

The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened

That is because it is the game we are familiar with. But if a philosopher used "supernatural" in a context (relation to other words) in which the invoking of Roman gods was out of place, and therefore the use of that word seemed like nonsense, then we'd complain that the philosopher was using the word in a nonsense way, because we couldn't understand that context. Then to understand what the philosopher was talking about, we'd have to turn to the "special circumstances" of that use. What exactly is it, according to the context of that particular act of use, in its special circumstances, that the philosopher is referring to?

All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and and have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics. — sime

So those mathematicians like Cantor, think that they have attained God's perspective, and this is the source of the giddy feelings?

Quantum mechanics provides conclusive evidence that the universe is not the type of system which is required for the heat death. That's why the many worlds interpretation is logically acceptable.

Energy is the ability to do work. If at maximum entropy there is no energy available to do work, then effectively there is no energy on that definition. — Janus

The problem though is that there is a conservation law, and entropy does not actually decrease the amount of energy. So at maximum entropy there is still the same amount of energy, on that definition. All you have done is created a contradiction, saying that there is energy, but it's no longer the capacity to do work, when energy has already been defined as the capacity to do work. That's why i am sought to change the definition of energy. It's what would be needed to avoid the contradiction. But i am's definition is nonsense, and the definition of energy has already been established as you can see.

The "heat death" is just nonsense, it assumes that the universe has the characteristics of an artificial system, created by human beings. Then it describes the capacity of that system to do work, from the perspective of the human beings who created it, for a particular purpose. So it's nonsense because it requires that the universe is a system created by human beings.

You're mixing up "medium" with the QM wavefunction. That's a linguistic mistake, which is understandable because the word "wave" is in there.

You also confuse the physical property of "energy", which can really only be defined in mathematical terms in specific contexts with what you say is its linguistic definition, "the ability to do work". — i aM

It seems like you have an aversion to discussing things "linguistically".

But even linguistically, that is still not quite right. Here is the first sentence from the Wikipedia article on "energy":

"In physics, energy is the quantitative property that must be transferred to an object in order to perform work on, or to heat, the object." — i aM

That's interesting, because Wikipedia doesn't even have an entry for "quantitative property". So by defining "energy" as a quantitative property, and not defining "quantitative property", the author of this quote has led me on a wild goose chase. Did you happen to read the footnote to that quote you produced? Some author of self-help books for high school students, Robert L Lehman, arguing that energy is not the capacity to do work. So much for your appeal to authority.

Sorry, you can count me out of your discussion because I discuss things linguistically.

We simply cannot proceed with any investigation if we hold such a high standard for 'the same'. We cannot talk about anything, because all terms are artificial groupings of things which are only similar, not truly 'the same'. In order to show the relevance of what you're saying here you'd need a supporting argument as to why the level of similarity in intent I'm referring to was not acceptable for the type of investigation this is. — Isaac

That's not true at all, "same" has a very useful purpose, it refers to one identical thing, one and the same. And, similar things can be members of the same group, so can different parts be parts of the same whole. But similar things are never the same thing. If two things are similar, then call them "similar", or perhaps members of the same group. There is no need to say that similar things are "the same", no purpose to that. We have two distinct words, "similar" and "same", each with its own purpose. What's the point in calling two similar things "the same" unless your intent is to deceive?

So, the very opposite of what you propose is what is really the case. There's no point in proceeding with any such investigation if we allow ourselves to refer to similar things as the same? All we could do is confuse ourselves. That's why we distinguish "similar" from "same", to avoid the confusion which results from thinking that similar things are the same thing. We need high standards of identity if we have any desire to make progress in a philosophical investigation such as this, and this means maintaining the distinction between "similar" and "same".

To reply to your claim then, no degree of similarity is acceptable for calling two distinct things "the same", because "similar" refers to a multitude of things and "same" refers to one thing. So it is impossible that similar things are the same thing. Therefore please do not say that similar things are the same, because we know that this is impossible.

There's a lot said by Wittgenstein in the upcoming section 137-200, about what you might call the "unthinkingly" way of doing things. I'm going to read that section again, and take some notes. I'll get back to you on this subject, perhaps we can discuss it further.

Of course I am referring to current scientific understanding of energy. Before the idea of entropy obviously energy was understood "separately form the second law"; unfortunately that doesn't support your incoherent position, since it is irrelevant. — Janus

It seems like you did not read the quote I posted from your referred site:

"Recall that the simple definition of energy is the ability to do work. Entropy is a measure of how much energy is not available to do work. Although all forms of energy are interconvertible, and all can be used to do work, it is not always possible, even in principle, to convert the entire available energy into work. That unavailable energy is of interest in thermodynamics, because the field of thermodynamics arose from efforts to convert heat to work."

That is from the site you referenced on "heat death". Notice, "the ability to do work" is the definition of energy, even today. Also, at the proposed "heat death" there is still energy, therefore the ability to do work. Speculators have simply taken some principles from thermodynamics, and have concluded in an extremely dubious way, that this capacity to do work (energy) becomes unavailable to do work through entropy, until the "proposed heat death" when all energy is unavailable. It is extremely dubious because that conclusion requires some completely unsubstantiated, and improbable premises, concerning the nature of time, human capacities to create systems, and the universe.

Then you don't have a model. Whereas special relativity is a self-consistent model that makes predictions that have been experimentally confirmed in numerous ways. See — Andrew M

Right, we went through this already, in this very thread. The Michelson-Morley experiments failed to determine the relationship between the wave medium and physical objects, and special relativity gave what appeared to be a simple and satisfactory way around this problem. However, the problems of QM, and wave-particle duality ought to indicate to you that special relativity really is not satisfactory. Without understanding the relationship between objects and the wave medium, we cannot establish the relationship between the wave and the particle in wave-particle duality.

Notice, that to produce the conclusion that there is no wave medium, from the Michelson-Morley experiment, requires the premise that the medium is independent from physical objects. But the conclusions from QM indicate that the particles (physical objects) are a feature of the wave function. So QM actually disproves the premise required to say that the Michelson-Morley experiment demonstrates the non-existence of the medium. Now we need to go back and determine the relationship between the particle (object) and the wave medium, to understand wave-particle duality. But this will never happen if physicists adhere to special relativity and deny that there is a medium.

Really? Why do you think it's 'sketchy' the London Marathon is run by a few thousand people each year, I think it's pretty safe to say they all at least have in common he intent to run as much as they are able along the set route. Unless you're going to get into some totally unnecessary sorties paradox, I don't see the problem with saying these people all have the same intent. — Isaac

Different runners run the marathon for different reasons, I've seen them interviewed. So I don't see any common intent there. Many may have a similar intent, but if we hold to a strict sense of "same" which is common in philosophy, and called for by the law of identity, their intentions are not the same.

Well. If you seriously think it would make more sense to say that it is the intent of a supernatural being who created a billion planets only to populate one of them, mostly with bacteria, but with one species whose main purpose it seems is to sing to him on Sunday, then you clearly have a very different definition of 'sense' to me. — Isaac

It makes more sense to say that a being who is assumed to have intention has intention (even if that being is fictional), than it does to say that a thing which is known not to have intention has intention. That is my opinion, and that is why "God" makes more sense to me in that particular context. The idea of panpsychism does not make sense to me, neither does the idea of a world-soul, or universal-soul make sense to me. Maybe you reason to think otherwise.

I've seen signs hung the wrong way round. — Isaac

OK, "wrong way round" implies that a mistake was made. Now who would you hold responsible for the sign being hung the wrong way around? Unless the sign-hanger was instructed to hang it that way, the responsibility for that mistake rests on the sign hanger. Or would you prefer to blame the state-soul? The state-soul made the mistake. Saying that the person did it "unthinkingly" does not remove the intentionality from the act. Habitual acts of human beings are still classified as intentional acts. "Unthinkingly" does not absolve one from blame.

Figuring out pi to a lot of precision doesn't involve hunting down an ever closer physical approximation to a circle. — noAxioms

How does one approach the figuring out of pi?

The argument was over the scientific definition of energy, which cannot be understood separately from the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but if now you just want to insist on your own definitions, then further discussion will be pointless. — Janus

My definition is the same as the one on your referred site. The laws of thermodynamics came into existence following the defining of energy. So you're wrong, energy was understood prior to the second law, and therefore separately from the second law. You really just blabber on, demonstrating that you have absolutely no understanding of this subject

As I said, I don't think we have the principles required to precisely measure the various motions of objects in relation to the motions of light because we have not yet determined the relationship between objects and the medium in which the light waves exist.

I don't understand the question. They see the thing which is emitting the light, as emitting light.

OK. So do you claim that the light emitted from the middle of the moving traincar towards the front is travelling at c + v (where v is the velocity of the traincar) from the train-platform observer's reference frame? — Andrew M

I don't think that the movement of objects can be satisfactorily related to the movement of light, in the manner suggested by special relativity, because the relationship between the objects and the medium within which the light waves exist, has not been properly established.

I told you, I don't believe in heat death. And I also told you that I think your description of it, as energy (which is by definition the capacity to do work), that is not available to do work, is contradictory. Why would I want to read up on this? It's like you're telling an atheist to go read some theology. What's the point?

You don't seem to understand, all energy is "the capacity to do work" whether it's potential energy or kinetic energy.

So, as I said already, and as indicated in the quote I brought from your referenced article, at the so-called heat death there would still be energy, as the capacity to do work.

MU seemed to have raised the zombie of personal intent creating the rule again with the ambiguous "The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.". It is important, I think, to stress (as you have done in your post) that a single person's intent does not make a rule. I realise we haven't yet reached the private language argument, but things have once or twice seemed to be heading down that dead end. — Isaac

The problem here is that only individual people have intent. We can generalize, take a vote or something, and say it is "the will of the people" or some such thing, but to say that numerous people have the "same" intent is very sketchy, and highly improbable. Here's a good example of that very problem in Fooloso4's post:

The intent is to regulate the flow of traffic. That does not change even if the standard by which the flow of traffic is regulated changes. To use one of Wittgenstein's tribe examples, a colorblind tribe would not have color coded traffic lights. They would have some other standard, but the intent would still be to regulate the flow of traffic. — Fooloso4

Whose intent is it to regulate the flow of traffic? It's obviously not the intent of the traffic lights. You might say that it's the intent of the state, or the city, but these aren't the type of things which have intent. It would make more sense to say that it's God's intent, at least god is supposed to be a being with intention. And as described above, a group of people do not have a single, "same" intent, so "it's the will of the people" doesn't make sense either.

I don't see intent having such a leading role. Imagine a sign actually being made and put in place. Who really intends for the pointy end to point to Dublin? I doubt very much if anyone involved actually does, they just do. If anyone really has an intent, it would be to get paid. — Isaac

The issue is that with "meaning is use", Wittgenstein has clearly referenced purpose and therefore deferred to intention. To understand a word's meaning is to understand its use, which means that we need to understand its purpose and therefore the intention behind it. Normally, in questions of intention (which are often moral questions), we hold a person responsible for one's own actions. Therefore the person who plants the sign is responsible for which way it is pointed. If it points to Dublin, then it is the person who planted it, who intended it to point that way. I don't see how you could think that the person who planted the sign just planted it randomly without intending to have it point the way that it does, regardless of whether or not that person was getting paid to plant it.

As I said in my earlier post, Wittgenstein has decided that the fundamental principles of language are moral principles, rather than logical principles. He has dismissed those elements of crystalline purity required (the ideal) for ideal understanding, to be replaced with "serves the purpose". But now, by describing language use as a human activity, intended to serve a purpose, he has stumbled into the field of moral philosophy. The fundamental principles which support language are the same principles which support morality.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.

Notice, he has not really dismissed "striving for the ideal". Our aim is complete clarity, which will make philosophical problems disappear. But now the philosophical problems have become much more complicated because we have to deal with "serves the purpose", and therefore intention. There is not one "purpose", but a complex, and philosophy takes the characteristics of therapy. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

No, the relative ordering of events necessarily follows from the invariant speed of light in different reference frames. — Andrew M

Right, that's the point. The assumption that the speed of light is invariant (which is essential to special relativity), is what produces these contradictions.


It's not a cop out. You can't just through phrases like "heat death" at me, and ask me a complex question concerning the event referred to, without providing me with some description as to what these terms refer to. I personally have no belief in "heat death", I think it's a misguided speculation. So your question is like asking an atheist a complex question about the nature of God. It's pointless.

I assume that there will be no human beings in existence at the "heat death". So if you interpret "the capacity to do work" as "the capacity to do work for human beings" (which is how you seem to interpret it, but not how the definition is intended to be interpreted in physics), then there would be no such energy at the time of the heat death, because there would be no human beings.

I can't answer that, I don't know the heat death scenario

Now consider the train-and-platform scenario (including the two traincar pictures). Per special relativity, the statement "The light reached the front and back of the traincar simultaneously" is true for an observer on the moving traincar while false for an observer on the train platform. — Andrew M

Right, we are talking about the temporal ordering of two events, when the light reaches the front of the traincar, and when the light reaches the back. Special relativity allows for contradiction in the ordering of these events. The "noon" example is just a name given to one event, so it's not a proper analogy. What I call "noon" you might call "midnight", and it's just a matter of translation, we are still talking about the same time under different names. Calling the same thing by different names is a matter of identity, not contradiction But in the case of special relativity it is a matter of predication. One event is predicated as prior in relation to the other, and to allow the opposite as well, is contradiction. Noon in Sydney is prior to noon of the same day in London, no matter what your reference is, and.there is no contradiction

And that's not the way it's modeled in QFT. In QFT, objects (including particles) emerge from the interactions of more fundamental fields. That is, the existence of the object is dependent on the existence of the fields. — Andrew M

Right, that's why I'm pointing this out as a problem with QFT. The way that fields are modeled, they cannot have reality unless the field is the property of an object. Remove the electromagnetic field from the object which it is a property of, and it's just a piece of theory. If QFT does not model its fields as properties of some object, or objects, they are theories without reality. Physics does not have the principles required to model free standing fields, from which particular existence arises, the fields are dependent on the prior existence of objects. That dependence needs to be included in the models.

Intended by whom? Not the signpost maker, he will have simply presumed, made a sign with a pointy end and pointed it at Dublin, because that's what one does. Not the town planner, he commissioned a sign to be made without even specifying which way the pointy end should point. — Isaac

I suppose it must be the intention of the sign-post maker we're talking about, maybe the intention of the town planner plays a role too, and even others. Is there a common intention? I don't think It's God's intention because the sign-post is artificial. Wittgenstein clearly talks about the sign-post fulfilling its purpose. (87..."The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils
its purpose.") I don't see any way that there could be a purpose for that sign-post being there unless it was put there with intention. Perhaps someone might just randomly plant the sign, but that's not what Wittgenstein is talking about, he's talking about purpose. It's very simple, "use" implies intent. There is no "using" without intent.

What if a moronically stupid sign maker had decided that the blunt end would point to Dublin, and he expected that one follow that. Who's made the mistake, the person now walking away from Dublin, or the sign maker? — Isaac

Then the sign-post did not fulfil the purpose. Right?

Who or what determines the meaning? What is said may mean different things to difference people. If I am the speaker and you take what I said in the wrong way then what you thought what I said meant was an improper meaning, it was not without meaning. — Fooloso4

StreetlightX seems to have an allergic reaction to "intention", breaking out in rash statements any time the word is used. Generally, Streetlight would prefer to change the subject to intension, thereby removing the end from intend. But in the context of this text, "intension" does not serve Wittgenstein's purpose. It's quite clear that the sign-post must be read in the way intended in order that it serve the purpose. The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended.

Meaning is in no way predicated on intention in Witty, and this includes when it doesn't conform to intention. — StreetlightX

"Use" implies "for the purpose of", and "serves the purpose" plays an important role in the Philosophical investigations. In everyday usage, to say that something serves the purpose is to say that it does what it was intended to do. Wittgenstein makes no attempt to divorce "intention" from "purpose".

You are mixing together, the definition of energy (the capacity to do work), with the relative condition of "available". Whether or not the energy is available to us has no impact on whether or not it is the capacity to do work. Energy on the other side of the world is not available to me, yet it is still the capacity to do work. Here's a quote from you referenced article:

"Recall that the simple definition of energy is the ability to do work. Entropy is a measure of how much energy is not available to do work. Although all forms of energy are interconvertible, and all can be used to do work, it is not always possible, even in principle, to convert the entire available energy into work. That unavailable energy is of interest in thermodynamics, because the field of thermodynamics arose from efforts to convert heat to work."

Entropy has no affect on energy's capacity to do work. The condition "available" just reflects the limits of the system used to harness the energy. Various different ways of harnessing energy (converting it from one form to another in a controlled manner), have differing degrees of efficiency. There is no such thing as one hundred per cent efficiency or else we'd have perpetual motion. The fact that some of the energy is lost into unharnessed forms does not mean that it is not energy. When a system has 85 per cent efficiency, the remaining 15 per cent is still the capacity to do work (energy), despite the fact that it is unavailable, it has just slipped into unharnessed areas because of the limitations of the system..

That certain energy is not available to a human being with the desire to use energy, does not mean that this energy is no longer the capacity to do work. That would be contradiction.

Exactly so. That's why it is called the theory of relativity and not the theory of objectivity. It's only a problem if you add that additional premise as you are doing. — noAxioms

Adding the premise doesn't make it into a problem, it's the thought that there ought to be an objective reality which makes it into a problem. If you don't mind an ontology with no objective reality, then there's no problem.

I didn't really understand most of what you wrote, so I will just try to focus on this passage. What you seem to be ignoring is entropy; which is the continual dissipation of the capacity of energy to do any work, which in theory culminates in so-called 'heat death' the total absence of any potential for energy to do any work. Remember that matter and energy are equivalents, and the form of energy only obtains provided there are differentials in potential which allow energy to "flow'. — Janus

No, entropy is something completely different. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. Entropy cannot rob energy of this unless it left energy as something other than energy. And entropy does not violate conservation laws.

But, why would it not be correct to say that potential energy is actualized? If, as in your example of water held in a dam that is not doing any work, the water is released and does the work of turning the turbine, should be not speak of the energy potential being actualized? — Janus

That's just the way it's been conceptualized, energy is a property of something moving, just like momentum, and motion does not just disappear, or become something other than motion, as described by Newton's laws. So modern physics does not employ the ancient concept of potential being actualized in the case of the concept energy. There is potential (energy), and this potential remains constant as it takes many different forms.

"Potential" in the sense of "potential being actualized", really has only a philosophical meaning, because its ontology is considered as dubious. Here, "potential" means a possibility rather than a capacity (or power), as in energy. When there are numerous possibilities, and one is actualized, we might say that this specific potential is actualized. But to bring those possibilities into reality, rather than just logical possibilities requires a denial of causal determinism. This is why we need to keep the "potential of energy, as capacity or power, separate from the "potential" of "actualizing a potential", because physics does not have the ontological principles to relate these two. Notice that the former refers to "potential" in a general or universal sense, and the latter requires a particular "potential", so category mistake could occur.

And to repeat my earlier point; it would seem to make little sense to say that energy is the potential to do work, and yet energy is not capable of doing any actual work. Yet you seem to want to say this, and have as yet, given no argument or explanation for why you want to say it. — Janus

This is that ontological gap which we have no principles to form a bridge. To do "actual work" is just a matter of perspective. When is the work actually done, when the water turns the turbine, when the electricity is transmitted through the wires, when it runs the compressor on my fridge, when the cold keeps my food fresh? So, we keep the potential of energy (the capacity to do work) as completely separate from any work actually being done, in order that the conservation principles are maintained. It is important to understand that the concept of "energy" was produced as a conservation principle to compete with Newton's conservation of momentum. The reason why the thing which is conserved, as time passes, has the nature of "potential", goes back to Aristotle's concept of matter, as the thing which does not change as time passes, and matter is designated as potential. So the conceptual structure was already there, by which potential remains constant as time passes.

In the context of QM, consider that the wave-function is analogous to the potential of energy (capacity to work). It must remain constant, continuous, as time passes, according to conservation laws. Then there is a so-called collapse of the wave-function, and this is analogous to actual work being done, a potential being actualized. We cannot relate these two because "actual work being done" would remove potential and violate the conservation law. So we have a gap between the potential, which must always remain constant according to conservation laws, and the "actualizing of a potential", which would remove some of that potential placing it into a different category of "actual", thus violating the conservation law.