I would appreciate if you could explain how rules can determine use but not meaning. — Luke
Use comes first. Rules are established by use. — Fooloso4
The rules maintain that use, that is, they determine the common use, how you or I will use that word according to its established use. — Fooloso4
The rule is the standard, but it is the use not the subsequent rules of use that determine meaning. — Fooloso4
You seem to be reading 125 as saying that a person's intention has some bearing on the 'proper' meaning of a word, — Isaac
he is no longer describing language. He is talking about the effect of laying down a set of rules (of our own devising) and then, when those rules do not produce the result we expect, we claim "I didn't mean it like that". — Isaac
So the reference to a personal form of "that's not what I meant" at 125 is not intended to give authority to intention ... — Isaac
I didn't claim you did. I said, your exposition is littered with caveats which are not present in the text. 109 says we must do away with all explanations. — Isaac
Eh, i don't think either of us are going to particularly budge on this. I'll settle for noting that the idea of 'improper meaning' simply appears nowhere on any page of the PI. — StreetlightX
'Us' being the key word, not me, or you, not the air stewardess or the passenger, but some collective of us. — Isaac
Intention within a language game, however, is an individual thing, not a collective. The intention of the builder might be to obtain a slab, the intention of the builder's mate might be to pass up the correct object. The intention of the community of language users in that game is to build a wall. — Isaac
So the intention of the air stewardesses in using the word "pull" gets to play a part in the development of what the word 'means', but it doesn't get an executive role. — Isaac
The meaning of the word "pull" has already been established. There is nothing novel in her use of the word. It is actually not even her use, she is repeating the rules for how to proceed if one needs to exit the plane. — Fooloso4
The 'metaphysical use of language' imagines that there is an essence/ideal of language which the actual use of language must/ought/should conform to. By contrast, the everyday use of language is any use of language which does not have this requirement. That's it. — StreetlightX
has excluded its actual use by real people? — Luke
Street, what do you think is outside of Luke's conception of 'everyday language' that he's not accounted for? — fdrake
All of which is to say, once again, that the 'everyday use' of language has nothing to do with an empirical use of language. — StreetlightX
Are you using "anthropological use" differently from "empirical use", or are these the same? — Luke
On the one hand you say that everyday use has "nothing to do with" the empirical use, i.e., excludes the empirical use. — Luke
After all, Witty consistently and repeatedly stresses that what he has to say has nothing to do with discovering new facts, nothing to do with the empirical, and bears entirely on the understanding. — StreetlightX
To say that everyday use has nothing to do with empirical use is not to exclude it. — StreetlightX
So - If not this [i.e. empirical use], then what? What is an 'everyday use' if not an empirical use of language in an anthropological setting? — StreetlightX
I'm looking at what Wittgenstein says from a wide range of his texts, not just what's in those particular quotes. I try, unsuccessfully or not, to look at his writings from beginning to end. And I'm sure all of you are trying to do the same thing. — Sam26
Meaning is in no way predicated on intention in Witty, and this includes when it doesn't conform to intention. — StreetlightX
Only a very small proportion of Wittgenstein's writing was published — Isaac
Many of the notebooks contain Wittgenstein's 'wrong turns' — Isaac
If we trust the man to give us insight we may not ourselves have found, then we should also trust him to discard that which is not so insightful, and yet with his notebooks we have not afforded him that opportunity. — Isaac
The first half of 'On Certainty', for example, was written during a time when he himself describes his philosophy in very negative terms, and if you remove the first half from the second, the overall conclusion of the work is markedly different. — Isaac
The same could be said of the Tractatus. — Fooloso4
The Philosophical Investigations were published posthumously. — Fooloso4
I do not want to get sidetracked with a discussion of OC, but I see no plausible reason to divide the text based on what he said about his frame of mind at the time. I question the idea that there is an overall conclusion. There are a great many books that if you divide them in two the conclusions one draws from them would be different. After all, half the book is missing. — Fooloso4
Part 1 was completed by 1946, so there's every reason to think it his final draft. — Isaac
Part I, consisting of 693 numbered paragraphs, was ready for printing in 1946, but rescinded from the publisher by Wittgenstein.
It hardly comes into the same category as the notebooks. — Isaac
Who or what determines the meaning? What is said may mean different things to difference people. If I am the speaker and you take what I said in the wrong way then what you thought what I said meant was an improper meaning, it was not without meaning. — Fooloso4
It's quite clear that the sign-post must be read in the way intended in order that it serve the purpose. The only way we have to judge whether a person followed a rule or not is to judge whether the person behaved as intended. — Metaphysician Undercover
Intended by whom? Not the signpost maker, he will have simply presumed, made a sign with a pointy end and pointed it at Dublin, because that's what one does. Not the town planner, he commissioned a sign to be made without even specifying which way the pointy end should point. — Isaac
What if a moronically stupid sign maker had decided that the blunt end would point to Dublin, and he expected that one follow that. Who's made the mistake, the person now walking away from Dublin, or the sign maker? — Isaac
What if a moronically stupid sign maker had decided that the blunt end would point to Dublin, and he expected that one follow that. Who's made the mistake, the person now walking away from Dublin, or the sign maker? — Isaac
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.