I have a lot of respect for Charles Peirce, but from what I've read, he misses the mark with his ontology of "the object". This might be due to a desire to disprove nominalism, but he allows unintelligibility to be an essential aspect of "the object" and this leads to the acceptance of vagueness as an ontological principle.

He posits an unnecessary separation between sign and object. For example, the sign is the numeral 2, and the object is the number two. There is no need for "the number two", as the numeral might serve as both the sign and the object. This unnecessary separation produces an unnecessary layer between the sign and the interpretation of the sign, the unnecessary layer being "the object".

That produces an inaccessible, unknowable, relation between sign and object. Therefore both the object and the sign, lose their otherwise assumed to be necessary identity, as identity being the same as the thing itself, by the law of identity. Neither the sign has a necessary identity, nor does the object have a necessary identity, as there is merely an undefined relation between these two. The result is that the object is no longer restricted by the law of identity, because of the assumed relation between the object and the sign which is not a relation of identity, i.e. the sign is other than the object. So if the sign, and the object are both present to the mind, these two are distinct, not the same, and there can be no necessary relation between the two, unlike when the sign and the object are one and the same by an identity relation.

I believe that phenomenology, especially as developed by Derrida, provides a better ontology of objects by allowing that the sign is the object.

I'm trying to picture what it means for temporal experience to be distinct from a world timeless. If the present is outside of time, how can observations, which take time to be made, be carried out from its perspective? — ucarr

Imagine standing still, and watching something pass you from right to left. You, in your perspective, or point of view, are "outside" that motion, being not a part of it. You can, however, choose to act with your body, and interfere with that motion. Or, you can simply observe.

This is what I mean about your point of view at "the present". You can watch from that perspective, as the entire world around you, passes you, proceeding from future to past, while you maintain your perspective at the present. You might choose to move your body, and interfere in that temporal world, or you might just choose to observe the temporal world as it go past. The meditative position is to do neither, observe nor interfere.

Since neither past nor future can approach the present, how does past become present, and how does present become future? It seems common sense to think the past and the future somehow connect with the present. Is this not the case? — ucarr

As I said, "present" is distinct as referring to that position from which the passage of time may be observed and interfered with. The only connection is through observation and interference. These two, observation and interference, are intertwined in experimentation, and this forms the base of "the connection". That is how the past and future "connect with the present". The meditative position, mentioned above disconnects the present, so that the future simply becomes the past, all around the meditating subject, and the subject has removed the connection by neither observing nor interfering.

Do I exist in the past_present_future, abstract concepts, outside of time? If past_present_future all exist as abstract concepts, where does my physical life occur? — ucarr

Your "physical life" remains the unknown. All that is known, is known through the means of abstract ideas.

You're saying we observe and act with free will within a timeless realm called "the present?" — ucarr

Yes.

You're saying that when I act with free will, I'm doing things outside of time, but somehow my actions crossover from the outside of time to the inside of time? — ucarr

Yes.

Explain "...outside of time (to the inside)." — ucarr

I thought I did explain this. Time is the world of change, which we experience as external to our mind or consciousness. The immaterial, nonchanging perspective of the mind, as "the present" is deep within us, as internal. This perspective, being the nonchanging "present", is outside of time (timeless). But since this timeless perspective is internal, and time is external, then it is "outside time to the inside".

Consider the existence of a physical object for an explanatory analogy. We may posit an external boundary to that object, and this serves us as a means of judging that object's activities relative to other objects, it's relative motion. We might model the object as a bounded area of space, or we might model it as a center of gravity, a point, but no matter which way, its external relations determine its changing position, and this provides for what we know as its temporal existence, its position relative to other things. Now the present, as I described, is derived from our experience of an internal principle. The internal principle provides the perspective of "the present" which is demonstrated as necessarily outside of time, but to the inside of the subject. So this produces the need for an internal boundary to separate the temporal (external) from the nontemporal internal. If the material body is modeled as a point which marks the center of gravity, then the boundary which provides for the non-temporal must be internal to the point.

By what means is a point of separation established and maintained? — ucarr

This separation, as any theory, may be established and maintained, through expression of the principle, and validation through experimentation. In other words, the principle "there must be no time within the point of separation between past and future, in order for temporal measurement to be accurate", is expressed as a principle (theory), and then it may be verified by experimentation. The success of relativity theory helps to verify that principle.

Since the immaterial aspect is non-dimensional, how do you go about ascertaining its position "deep within us"? — ucarr

This is verified by experience. But it doesn't really matter if it is inside or outside, as we could turn the whole thing around, and argue that everything we experience as external is really internal. Then, what we experience as internal, our perspective of "the present", is really external, flipping the whole thing around. This turn around assumes s true, the skeptic\s claim that the external world is entirely an illusion. It is all internal. Everything, the entire physical world, is within, and there is nothing outside us whatsoever, as we ourselves form the outside boundary, as the static, unchanging "present". Then all physical existence is internal to us, and also inside time, while the immaterial, that which is outside time, is properly external to this. Therefore the skeptic's claim that the external is an illusion might actually provide a better representation of reality, as it allows for what is outside time, to be properly external.

Does our free will and intellection connect to our brain? Are you talking about our everyday thoughts and decisions? — ucarr

The free will and intellection, being immaterial aspects of the immaterial "soul' (for lack of a better word), which has the timeless perspective of "the present", are connected to "the brain", as a temporal, physical aspect. This way of connection is described above. There are two aspects of the connection, observational, and active. The meditative mode moves to disconnect both.

The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. — Mapping the Medium

I think we need to distinguish between doubting the means, and doubting the end. Notice that this passage takes the ends (desires) for granted, so that the doubt being talked about is doubt of the means.

"It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires;...".

When the belief 'satisfies our desire', as the means to the end, then we are not inspired to doubt the means because the result, end, is insured as that satisfaction. So long as the desire itself, the end, is never doubted, and the means are observed to be successful, then doubt is only relative to the efficiency of the means. Now means are empirically justifiable, as we demonstrate that action A produces the desired end Z. Then various ways of producing Z can be compared, A, B, C, analyzed, and the resulting "settlement", which method best produces Z, can obtain to a level higher than mere opinion.

However, such justified settlements rely on taking the end for granted. It is only relative to the assumption that the end Z is what is truly desired, that the means are in this way justified. Doubting the end itself puts us squarely into the field of opinion, unless the end itself can be justified as the means to a further end. In traditional moral philosophy there is a distinction made between the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is nothing but personal opinion, but the real good is assumed to somehow transcend personal opinion.

The fault in the quoted passage is the following:

" And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort."

This statement inverts the real, or true, relation between the being with knowledge and the object of that being, which is its goal or end. Knowledge, as justified opinion, explained above, is always justified as the means to the end. But the end which justifies the knowledge is simply assumed as an opinion, and this places "our object", which is the goal that motivates us, as outside of knowledge itself, as unjustified opinion. This is what Plato demonstrated in "The Republic", "the good" must be apprehended as outside of knowledge.

So the statement incorrectly asserts that the motivating object, the end, or the good, cannot be outside "the sphere of our knowledge". A proper analysis indicates that only the means to the end can be justified as knowledge, while the object itself, the end or good, must be apprehended as outside the sphere of knowledge. Therefore moral traditionalists characterize the apparent good as opinion, and the real good as understood only by God. This places "our object" as firmly outside "the sphere of our knowledge".

Making this switch produces a completely different understanding and conceptualization of the division between active and passive elements of reality, outlined by Aristotle. Notice in the quoted statement, that the mind must be "affected" by its object, to be motivated by it. This characterizes the end, or object, as active, and affecting the mind. But when the end, or object is understood as opinion, then it is necessary to assume something within the mind which is other than knowledge. Opinion is not knowledge. Being created within the mind, by the mind, opinion is the effect of the mind, and improperly represented as affecting the mind, with "the motive for mental effort".

This reversal is what allows us to doubt the object, or end. Being created by the mind, it is within the mind, and therefore can motivate, but being unjustified leaves it outside of knowledge. Therefore it ought to be doubted. In other words, the mind creates its object, goal, end, or good, and this created object "acts" as the source of motivation for knowledge, and the means, as human actions in general. When we take the object, goal, end, or good, for granted, we represent this as the object affecting the mind to produce knowledge in the form of means. And this is what is expressed in the passage. But to properly understand, we need to doubt that which is taken for granted in this representation, the object, goal, end, or good. Therefore we ought to doubt, that which is taken for granted in this passage, the object, goal, end, or good. And this exercises the mind's true capacity to actively create the object, rather than simply allowing the object to affect the mind, by taking the obect for granted.

And when we get beyond this assumption, of taking the object for granted, we learn that the mind actually creates its own object, goal, end, or good, in a field which is other than knowledge, the field of opinion. Then the "motive for mental effort" is not something which affects the mind, but something created by the mind, and this places that object firmly within the mind, but outside of knowledge. And of course this validates, the self-evident truth that the motive for mental effort, the existence of the unknown, is outside the sphere of knowledge.

If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose. — RussellA

OK, I'll accept this as what you are trying to say then. By "determinism" you mean that a person chooses but they have no choice in what they choose, i.e. something is chosen without a choice having been made.

And I'll present this as very good evidence of what I said before:

"This is why any rational person will reject determinism."

— various sources including Wikipedia — Wayfarer

"Various sources"? What does that mean, that it's an AI generated piece of crap, compiled from cherry picking sites most often visited? Isn't that just internet mob mentality?

If Determinism is the case, their choice had been determined, not by themselves, not by someone else, but by the physical temporal nature of the Universe. A Universe of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time over which no person has control. — RussellA

As we discussed, and you agreed, choice is impossible if determinism is true. Simply put, "choice" is not an appropriate word in this context, otherwise we'd be saying that water makes choices, rocks make choices, etc.. But we don't say that, because we recognize the difference between the moves which these inanimate things make, and the moves that a human being makes.

Do not qualify yet. Once infinity and it's opposite are well defined (and infinity isn't just taken as an axiom), they likely would be Platonic objects. At least I have enough belief in the "logicism" of mathematics that it is so. — ssu

The point though, is that "infinity" and "infinitesimal" refer to completely different things. That "infinity" refers to a Platonic object does not imply that "infinitesimal" does.

Another meaning of "choice" is "a person or thing chosen", such as a person chose the option to stay.

If Determinism is the case, in one sense people do make choices, such as do I stay or do I go, but in another sense cannot choose, as their choice to stay has already been determined. — RussellA

So if determinism is true, then someone made the choice for the person? Who would that be, God?

So, time -- if it exists, and it may not -- can only approach the present from the past, or from the future, without arriving. You say the present is outside of time. — ucarr

Being outside of time, the present would be categorically distinct from the future and past which are the components of time. So neither can be said to "approach the present". "The present" refers to a perspective from which time is observed. Think of right and left as an analogy, where "here" is similar to "the present". Right and left are determined relative to the perspective which is "here".

According to my understanding, I exist in the present and not in either the past or the future. By this understanding, the past and the future are abstract concepts that occupy my mindscape as relativistic things; I know mentally, but not existentially, both the past and the future in relation to my existential presence within the present. — ucarr

The first sentence here is good. You, as the observer, and the free willing agent, exist in the present. But the next part appears to be confused. "The present" is an abstract concept, we use it to substantiate our existence. But so is "future and past" an abstract concept. The future and past are what we attribute to the external world, what is independent from us. But since it is the way we understand the world, it is still conceptual.

And since the future and past are time, this is what makes us outside of time. But we are "outside" time in a strange way, because we understand time as external to us, and this makes us "outside time" to the inside. Our position at "the present", from which we observe and act with free will, is beyond the internal boundary, This makes us outside of time to the inside, beyond the internal boundary.

If the present contains no time elapsed, then must I conclude my perception of time elapsing occurs in response to my existential presence in either the past or in the future? — ucarr

Imagine your perspective, at the present, to be a static point, and everything is moving around you. It is this movement around you which provides the perception of time passing. But your point is not necessarily completely static in an absolute way, because you can act, by free will. This act comes from outside of time, to the inside.

What does it mean to say we live in the past or in the future only? It suggests we aren't present anywhere. The pun is intended because presence denotes the present, but I don't immediately see how there can be presence of a thing in the past as the past, or in the future as future. Is it not so that wherever we are, we are there in the present? Where are you now? How can you be present in your own past? — ucarr

I'm not saying we live in the past and future. I am saying the opposite, that we are at the present. This is our perspective. But this puts us outside of time (to the inside). It has to be this way in order that we can measure time passing. If our perspective was not outside time, then any measurement of time passing would be tainted because there would be time passing within us, just like judging colour through a tinted lens.

If the present is timeless, how does it maintain the separation of past/future? Maintaining the separation implies an indefinite duration of time for the maintenance of the separation. Also, separation implies both a spatial and temporal duration keeping past/future apart, but spatial and temporal durations are not timeless, are they? — ucarr

There must be no duration of time in the point of separation. If there was we couldn't have an accurate measurement of time. Imagine if the duration was a day, then our measurements would be accurate to within a day. If it was an hour, our measurements would be accurate to within an hour. If the duration was a minute, our measurements would be accurate within a minute. And so on. If there is any time within the moment of the present, this would affect the accuracy of our measurements by the amount within the moment, because there would be a corresponding vagueness in the start and end point of the measurement.

How does a material thing sustain its dimensional expansion, a physical phenomenon, outside of time? Consider a twelve-inch ruler. Its twelve inches of extension continuously consume time. Relativity tells us the physical dimensions of a material thing change with acceleration of velocity accompanied by time dilation, so we know from this that physical dimensions consume time. — ucarr

It is the immaterial (nondimensional) aspect, deep within us, what is responsible for free will and intellection, that is outside of time, not our physical bodies.

I'm asking if infinitesimals exist in the sense that would satisfy mathematical platonism. — Michael

Have you still not answered this question? I think it's very clear that "infinitesimals" do not qualify as Platonic objects, because they do not have the "well-defined", or even "definable" nature which is required of a Platonic object.

This creates a schism in mathematics because calculus requires infinitesimals, while set theory assumes Platonism. So instead of employing infinitesimals, set theory views infinities as well-defined objects.

Of course mathematicians will not admit to an inconsistency between calculus and set theory, they would just claim that one is an extension of the other, just like many physicists would not admit to an inconsistency between Newtonian laws (governing objects) and Einsteinian laws (governing spacetime) . What they do instead, is veil the inconsistency behind a whole lot of extra axioms and principles, designed to smooth out the bumps, and hide the inconsistencies which exist between different applications which use different principles.

Simply put, "infinitesimal" refers to the continuity (like a "dimensional line", or space) which is assumed to lie between discrete objects (which may be infinite in number), as required to maintain separation between the assumed objects, making them discrete.

So the two, infinitesimal space, and infinite objects, require completely different accounting principles. The infinite objects are given by Platonism, but they require a "space" to be, in order to account for them being discrete objects, and since the objects are infinite, the "space' where they exist must be infinitesimal. Notice that "infinitesimal" refers to what is outside the Platonic objects.

Not true.

If a person believes in Determinism, not only i) do they believe that their choices have been determined but also ii) it has been determined that they do make choices. — RussellA

You agreed with my argument which showed that having both of two contrary ideas in the mind, at the same time, is a requirement for making a choice between them. This is necessary to be able to compare and choose between them. Then you said, if determinism is true, choosing is not required: "3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm."

Therefore you contradict yourself. You admitted that people do not choose if determinism is true, based on my explanation of the requirements for "making a choice". Now you claim a premise which contradicts this. You say "it has been determined that they do make choices". Clearly, it has been determined that if determinism is true people do not make choices, if we adhere to what has been agreed to, about what constitutes "making a choice".

Sure, and working out complex problems is where the use of symbols is very effective, for the reason I just explained. That's why mathematics, which employs symbols, is the means by which very complex problems are worked out.

But I would say that the use of symbols is what enables advanced thinking to work with entirely different types of ideas at the same time. And that's exactly what complex mathematics is doing, combining completely different types of thoughts by establishing relations of value. So, I believe that "higher levels of complexity" in a sense, actually refers to "thinking entirely different types of thoughts" at the same time, if we allow the condition that the different thoughts are just represented by symbols, rather than the whole idea being thought of in completion. For example, "mass" and "acceleration" are completely different types of ideas, which are combined in the conception of "force", which is a complex concept, but made quite simple, and easy to use with f=ma.

I'm mulling over the idea that time as you describe it above doesn't exist at any time: the present exists outside of time; the past, once the non-existent present, continues to be non-existent as time gone by; the future derived from the non-existent present, does not yet exist until it becomes the non-existent present and then continues its non-existence as the past. — ucarr

The question of whether time exists or not is not relevant here, it's just a distraction. What is relevant is that all of time is either in the past or in the future, and the moment of "the present" separates these two and contains no time itself. This make the present outside of time.

I glean from the above you think a first cause exists outside of time. — ucarr

No, I think "first cause", without serious explanation and manipulation, is an incoherent notion. However, "final cause" is not incoherent, and can be conceived of as outside of time in the way I described.

Does time pass within the present? This is an issue because if it doesn't, the question arises: How does the present become the future?; coming at this same issue from the opposite direction: If time doesn't pass within the present, how does the present become the past? — ucarr

In the model I described, the present does not become the future, nor does the present become the past. The present is outside of time, and time consists of future and past. The future becomes the past, as time passes, and the present is a perspective from which this is observed. Also final cause acts from this perspective, as a cause from outside of time, which intervenes in the events which are occurring as time passes.

This is a description of causation outside of time? Consider: The accumulation of falling snow on the roof caused it to cave in. Is this an example of timeless causation? — ucarr

No, causation outside of time would be the freely made choice (free will act) which causes a shovel to be picked up and the roof to be shoveled, which would be an intervening in the "accumulation of falling snow on the roof", preventing the roof from collapsing. The being with free will, observing from the perspective of "the present" which is outside of time, makes a choice which causes the event of the roof being shoveled, and this would prevent the roof from collapsing. The cause of this event, shoveling the roof, is outside of time.

Time is a universal context, unless you can think of something that exists outside of time. — ucarr

The present, "now" exists outside of time. All existent time consists of past time and future time, whereas the present, now, is a point or moment, which separates the past from the future. So all of time has either gone by (past) or not yet gone by (future), and the present is what it goes past. This means that the present is "outside of time" by being neither past nor future.

The upshot of what I'm saying is that time is relevant to everything, even the supposedly totally self-sufficient first cause. If first cause pre-dates everything else, doesn't that put first cause into a temporal relationship with what follows from it? — ucarr

It doesn't make sense to speak of that which is outside of time, as pre-dating everything, because that is to give it a temporal context, prior in time to everything else. So "first cause" is not a good term to use here. This is why it is better to think of the present as that which is outside of time, rather than a first cause as being outside of time. The latter becomes self-contradicting.

This provides a perspective from which the passing of time is observed and measured, "now" or the present. Then also, the cause which is outside of time, the free will act, is understood as derived from the present. But, you should be able to see why it is incorrect to call this cause a "first cause", or a cause which "pre-dates everything else". It is better known as a final cause.

Finally, I'm saying the practice of cons of any type involves elapsing time, so that includes cons_creative. — ucarr

I agree, the practices of con-creative, i.e. its actions, necessarily involve elapsing time. However, the cause of those actions, the free will act itself, may occur at the moment of the present, and this need not involve any elapsing time; the moment of the present being outside of time as described above.

You make a strong argument. — RussellA

Thank you RussellA, I take back what I said about you refusing to acknowledge things which are contrary to your belief.

If Determinism is the case
1) It has already been determined at 12.50pm that I go at 1pm
2) This means that no decision needs to be made at 1pm whether to stay or to go, as the decision has already been made prior to 1pm.
3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm. — RussellA

This is why any rational person will reject determinism. It means that choice is not real, and this implies that we do not need to deliberate or weigh options. And if we do not do this we will be overcome by various forces, and rapidly exterminated.

However, Determinism can also account for my going at 1pm without any necessity to fuse two contradictory ideas into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, but believing in determinism is by this description, a belief that choice is impossible. This would also mean that only an irrational person (a person who believes that doing the impossible is possible) would even attempt to make a choice if that person believed in determinism. Therefore the person who believes in determinism, in order to be consistent with one's believe, would not choose to do anything, would be overcome by forces, and would be dead very soon.

By Occams Razor, Determinism is the simplest explanation, as it doesn't require the metaphysical problem of how two contradictory ideas may be fused into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, and not choosing to do anything is simpler than having to choose, and dying is simpler than having to stay alive. Therefore by Occam's Razor we should all believe in determinism, choose to do noting, be dead soon, and get it over with.

I'm sure it can be done to at least some degree, even if not to that which people generally assume. — Patterner

Having a multitude of different thoughts at exactly the same time, is exactly what a complex concept is. Consider a relatively simple complex concept, like "right angle triangle". That concept consists of "triangle", which is itself complex, and also "right angle" which is complex. So there's a number of different ideas tied up in understanding "right angle triangle". Now consider "Pythagorean theorem". This consists not only of "right angle triangle", but a bunch more ideas about the relationships between the lengths of the sides of that type of triangle. It appears that to adequately understand "Pythagorean theorem", a person must be able to have all these ideas in one's mind at the same time.

But this brings up the issue of the use of symbols. One symbol can adequately replace a complex concept, which consists of a number of united ideas. So the spoken word "triangle" for example is one aural symbol which represents a number of ideas. Then, when we think in words, the one word can stand in for a number of ideas, instead of needing to have all those ideas in the mind at the same time. I think that this, in a sense, is "the meaning" of a word, a complex relation of ideas which the word itself substitutes for in the act of thinking.

Both indecision and deliberation require consecutive ideas. Perhaps I will stay, no, perhaps I will go. — RussellA

That you are wrong, is logically demonstrated in the following way:

Consider our example, "should I stay, or should I go". Suppose I think first "should I go?", then I relegate this thought to memory, and I start to think "should I stay?". According to your stipulation, each of these thoughts could only occur while the other is in memory, one following the other, without the two ever intermingling. This means that no thought could ever be produced which includes both of these two. Accordingly, the two could never actually be compared to each other.

One would consider "should I go", and all the merits and reasons for going, independently from "should I stay", and all of its merits and reasons. But the two distinct groups of values could never be compared, or related to each other in any way, because that would require having both of the two contradictory thoughts united within the same thought. Of course this would completely incapacitate one's ability to choose, because a person could never have the two distinct, and incompatible sets of values within one's mind at the same time. To think of one the other would have to be completely relegated to memory, Therefore the two could never be compared.

Obviously though, we do actually compare and unite contradictory thoughts within the same idea, when comparing the value of each, in order to decide. Ideas are often very complex, having many distinct ideas, as elements, united within, and nothing prevents the imaginative mind from uniting contradictory ideas. So when the person in the example, compares the value of staying as value X, and the value of going as value Y, and is able to decide one over the other, it must be the case that the two have existed together, in thought, at the same time, or else no comparison could have ever been made.

We can see this very clearly in simple arithmetic. The value assigned to "1" is inconsistent with, or contrary to the value assigned to "0". When a person says "1 is not equal to 0", it is necessary that the two contrary ideas, "1", and "0", must exist within the person's thinking, at the same time. Otherwise the person could only state the value of "1" at one time, then the value of "0" at another time, and never be able to actually compare the two, and understand that the two are contrary values. In reality therefore the entire complexity of mathematical ideas, which is constructed to compare inequalities, relies on the coexistence of contrary ideas. Without such coexistence of unequal values in one's mind at the same time, no one could understand or do any mathematics.

You are saying that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Yes, that is what I am saying. And, I think that any degree of serious introspection will reveal that any type of decision making would be impossible if the contradictory ideas could not actively exist within the same mind at the same time. In fact, if distinct ideas could not coexist then no relations between ideas, or comparisons between them could ever be established. But that is exactly what complex ideas consist of, comparisons and relations made concerning distinct ideas.

So the most simple logical demonstration that you are wrong, is this. The simple judgement, that two distinct ideas (such as should I stay and should I go) are contradictory, is itself a relation established between the two distinct ideas. In order to make such a judgement truthful, or accurate, the two ideas must be compared (i.e. exist together in the mind at the same time) or else any such judgement would be arbitrary or random. Therefore if one contrary idea could only come into the mind after the other left, it would be impossible to even judge, in any way other than a random guess, that the two are contradictory. To judge them as contradictory requires that both actively coexist within the mind at the same time, to be able to decide that the two fulfill the criteria of "contradictory".

I don't know, you'd have to put that into context. Anyway, "time", and "cons-creative" are not at all the same thing, so I don't see how that would be relevant here.

I still cannot understand how a person can feel a pain and not feel a pain in their finger at the same time. — RussellA

You are changing the subject we are not talking about what the person is feeling, we are talking about the ideas that at a person has. So, as I said, if the person is just learning the word "pain", the person might have a feeling, and consider both thoughts at the same time, "this is pain", "this is not pain", not knowing whether it is pain or not pain, and trying to decide which it is. You should have no problem imagining this, in the case of a tickle or something like that, for example. The person might at the same time think "this is pain", yet "this is not pain" being unsure whether it ought to be called "pain" or not.

That is exactly what I am saying, attention is switched between events, first one, then the other. But not at the same time. — RussellA

I noticed your quoted passage from Wikipedia mentions "little" conscious effort. Little effort is still effort. So these cases of multitasking where the secondary action requires little effort, and the primary action requires much effort, refute your claims and support mine.

That's my position, where attention is directed towards one activity only. — RussellA

If one activity requires a lot of attention, and the other a little attention, this does not mean that all the attention is directed at one activity.

Even if it were impossible, as I think it is, to have a single thought about two contradictory events, this raise the question as whether it is possible to have a single thought about the relation between two contradictory events — RussellA

Again, you are changing the subject. We were talking about having contradictory ideas, at the same time, concerning one event. I don't see why this is so hard for you to understand, It's called "indecision". It appears you want to deny the obvious just because it's evidence against what you believe.

I totally agree that people have contradictory ideas within their memories, but not that they are thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time is commonly called "deliberation". The example was "should I stay or should I go". Your counter argument was that because we state these ideas one after the other, this implies that we must think them one after the other. But, as I explained, this is a faulty conclusion because thinking and stating are two very different actions with different limitations. So. I'll tell you again, you deny the obvious because it's evidence against your belief.

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined
P2 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P3 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought may or may not have been determined

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined,
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has not been determined

P1 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has been determined

Having a thought is not sufficient evidence for either Determinism or Free Will. — RussellA

I don't see the point to any of this. As I said, free will concerns the capacity to act, in general. Thinking is one type of act, and the question is whether having contradictory thoughts at the same time is evidence of free will or determinism. You fear that it is evidence against determinism, so you deny the obvious, that we have contradictory thoughts.

2. The determinator catches up and re-determines from when an improbable act occurs. — Barkon

What's "the determinator", the hand of God? Is that like if your clock gets left behind, you have to reset it or else all your actions get at the wrong time?

If it were possible to have two contradictory thoughts at the same time, then I could feel pain in my finger and not feel pain in my finger at the same time. — RussellA

One example of contradictory thoughts, which you personally would not have, does not prove that contradictory thoughts, in general are impossible. As I said, contradictory thoughts are present in deliberation. Accordingly, if a person does not know whether oneself is feeling pain in the finger or not (perhaps that person is just learning the meaning of "pain"), and the person is deliberating on this, one could be considering both thoughts, I am feeling pain in my finger, I am not feeling pain in my finger, as real possibilities, at the same time.

A cyclist multi-tasks when they pedal and watch the road ahead at the same time. But thoughts about the road ahead should not be confused with the muscle memory of pedalling, which doesn't require thoughts.

A student multi-tasks when writing an essay and listens to music at the same time. But thoughts about what to write should not be confused with an instinctive pleasure in hearing music. — RussellA

Muscle memory does not exclude conscious thought. People whistle while they work. The work clearly requires conscious thought, but so does the whistling, just like pedaling a bike, and walking require conscious thought. We do not pedal, or walk without any conscious thought.

The issue is that when we multitask in this way, we prioritize one action over the other, paying more attention to one than the other. However, if you have ever taken a look at how this multitasking actually occurs, you'll see that there is constant switching of which act receives priority. So if whistling while you work involves a difficult aspect of work, attention will be focused on the work, but if the work is significantly mundane, effort can be focused on practising the whistle. In general, there is a continuous balance of priority between the two, enabling both efforts to flow smoothly, but the moment that a difficult aspect of one or the other is apprehended, more attention is focused in that direction. Notice, that's "more attention", not all of one's attention. this is the way that goals and intention work in general, we prioritize things.

I agree that there is ongoing debate amongst neurologists etc., concerning how many different tasks a person can "focus" on. But the problem with most experimental data available is that the scientists involved in these questions start with a faulty premise of what "focus one's attention" means. They assume the phrase to mean directing one's attention toward one activity only, and they judge experimental data from this perspective, neglecting the other things of lower priority, within one's field of attention, assuming the one thing is the only thing focused on . However, this excludes from the outset, the possibility that "focus one's attention" means to prioritize a number of things within one's field of attention. From that faulty premise, the prioritized activity becomes the only activity within one's attention.

I have many memories, none of which I am actively thinking about at this moment in time. — RussellA

This does not resolve the problem. The issue is the existence within a person's mind, of contradictory ideas. You deny the reality of this fact, so you point to a person's actions, and say that a person cannot express, or demonstrate, through speaking, or writing, contradictory ideas at the very same moment. But all this really does, is demonstrate the physical limitations to a human beings actions.

So, I have proposed that we look at a person's memory, where we can see very clearly that a person very often holds contradictory ideas within one's mind, through the use of memory. You reply by saying that you are never "actively thinking" about all your memories at the same time, again appealing to the limitations of activity. However, your appeal does not provide the argument you need. It is very clear that we actively think about a multitude of ideas at the same time, that's exactly what the act of thinking is, to relate ideas to each other. The use of memory allows us to increase the number of ideas currently being thought about, by relegating those with lower priority at a specific moment, to memory, then bringing them back when priority demands. Further, it is very clear that we "actively think" about contradictory ideas in the process of deliberation.

What has become very clear, is that when we include memory as part of the mind, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that a person can have contradictory ideas within one's mind. However, since you are unwilling to accept the reality that people have contradictory ideas within their minds, you have now proceed to exclude the memory as part of the mind. All your are doing is demonstrating that you will take ridiculously absurd steps to support an untenable position.

Philosophy has as its purpose the desire to learn. If your prejudice is so strong, that you are forced into absurd assumptions to support this prejudice, instead of relinquishing it, to adopt a more true path, I consider you are not practising philosophy at all, but professing faulty ideas.

If I had not been born, then I would not be writing this post
I am writing this post
Therefore I was born

If Determinism is the case
then all thoughts are determined
I have the thought that my thoughts are not determined
therefore my thought that my thought has not been determined has been determined — RussellA

To make a proper comparison, you would need to say, as the second premise in the first argument, "I have the thought that I am writing this post". But then you do not have a valid conclusion. So, to be consistent in your analogy, and to have valid conclusions, we have to state the second premise of the second argument as ""my thoughts are not determined".

This is why the words in the proposition "should I stay or should I go" are sequential. First one asks "should I stay" and then at a later time one asks "should I go". — RussellA

Speaking is a physical act, and that requires a choice to say one or the other first, as I said. However, the fact that they cannot both be said by the person at the same time does not imply that the person cannot have both ideas within one's mind at the same time.

Clearly people multitask, so they are thinking different ideas at the same time, required to do a number of different things at the same time, even though they cannot say everything that they are doing, all at the same time. S o why can they not have contradictory ideas at the same time?

The fact that people have many different ideas in their minds at the same time (required for multitasking) demonstrates that the subject matter of your criticism is just a limitation on the physical capacity of speaking, not a limitation on the capacity of thinking. How do you account for a person having many different ideas, in one's memory, all at the same time, which one cannot all say at the same time? Not being able to say everything which one has in one's memory, all at the same time, does not imply that the person doesn't have all those ideas in one's memory, all at the same time.

If Determinism is the case, and determines all our thoughts and actions, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined. — RussellA

Sure, you can state irrelevant conditionals, just like I can say that if I was not born yet, I would not be writing this right now, but such conditionals are not relevant to reality.

The question was, how does introspection reveal to you that determinism is the case, and free will is an illusion. Your if/then statement reveals nothing more than "if I was not born yet I would not be writing this right now" reveals. How do I get from this to believing that I was not born yet? And how do you get from your if/then statement to believing that determinism is the case?

This is what you are saying: it was determined since the beginning, thus I have no control. That's false. What's true is that if it was determined since the beginning, it's probable that the acts that follow are the determined ones. — Barkon

In this form of determinism, how do you account for acts which fall outside of being probable, the acts that occur which were not probable? These would not be deterministic, and there would be a whole lot of acts which follow from each improbable act, all not determined from the beginning.

Cons-creative, itself, must have a cause, and therefore is not the first cause.

Are you positing cons_creative as the first cause? — ucarr

No, like I said, it's the cause of cons-reactive, not necessarily the first cause. This makes the rest of your post seem irrelevant

Therefore, free will only applies if I choose between picking up the cup of coffee and not picking up the cup of coffee at 1pm exactly. — RussellA

This is a faulty argument because your designated time of "1pm" is completely arbitrary, and not representative of the true nature of time. As indicated by the relativity of simultaneity a precise designation of "what time it is", is frame of reference dependent.

But this means that at 1pm I have two contradictory ideas in my mind at exactly the same time. But this is impossible, meaning that free will cannot be a valid theory.

I have seen evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas consecutively, but I have never seen any evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

As I explained in my last post, having two contradictory ideas at the same time is exactly what deliberation consists of. "Should I stay or should I go". The Clash, a fitting name.

"Critical thinking", and philosophy in general, is all about comparing contradictory ideas. A philosopher holds these contradictory ideas within one's mind, at the same time. It is the judgement, the choice to act on one or the other, consequently the physical action itself, that results from the judgement, which cannot be both. Furthermore, denying that people can hold contradictory ideas at the same time, denies the reality of much human misunderstanding.

The problem here, is that you are treating a human subject as if one is a material object, to which the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle), apply. This is a mistake of sophistry which Aristotle keenly exposed, and he demonstrated the misunderstanding which this sophistry propagates, thousands of years ago. The reality, as shown by Aristotle, is that if we adhere to the three fundamental laws of logic in cases involving human decisions, sophists can logically prove absurdities. The "sea battle tomorrow" is his famous example, of why the fundamental laws cannot be applied to subjects. In more recent times, C.S. Peirce has done considerable work on this issue.

You have described a world where things obey the laws of nature, but I don't see where you have explained why things obey the laws of nature. — RussellA

Why would I even try to do that? What I explained, is that some people use "laws of nature" to explain why things behave in a consistent way, describable by the laws of physics. This is a sort of governance, similar to the governance of "God". What's the point to even asking why matter obeys God, if you do not even believe that matter obeys God. That would be a ridiculous question to ask. You'd be asking why does Y follow X, when you do not even believe that Y does follow X. Any one who tried to answer you would be engaged in an exercise in futility.

I thought free will referred to our being free to have whatever thoughts we wanted — RussellA

Free will is the ability to choose freely.

I agree that a person can have two contradictory thoughts consecutively, but it would be impossible for a person to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously. — RussellA

Do you agree, that by the special theory of relativity, event A could be prior to event B from one frame of reference, and posterior from another frame of reference? Since a human being is composed of many different parts, moving in many different ways, many different frames of reference are available within one human body. Therefore your stipulation of "contemporaneously" is completely unwarranted, and nothing but an arbitrary, fictional condition, imposed for the sake of your argument, when it's not a truthful representation of reality in any way.

How do you know that we are free to choose?

How do you know that we don't live in a causally determined world, where our actions have been causally determined? — RussellA

I know that I am free to choose, from introspection, analysis of my own experience.

Here's a simple experiment you can try yourself, in the comfort of your own home. Hold a small, soft object in your fingers, extended at arms length, and decide that you will drop it at some random time in the near future. Hold it for a short time, and notice that you can decide to drop it at any random time, without any causal influence, just a freely willed choice to let it go.

Unlike a pool table, where, once in motion, the balls can only end up in one exact arrangement, due to the laws of physics. — Patterner

However, someone can at any moment, reach in and stop the balls from moving in that predetermined way. And this demonstrates that free will has superiority over determinism, a phenomenon known as "the hand of God", which renders "miracles" as other than impossible.

Grab them by the pussy and see if they let him force himself on them, while the peanut gallery enjoys vicariously.

No. Suppose a person has the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

On the one hand, assuming free will, a person can have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee. On the other hand, assuming there is no free will, a person can also have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Having an idea is nether evidence for or against free will. — RussellA

I don't see how this is relevant.

My point has been that I don't accept that a law of nature precedes an event and makes things act the way they do. — RussellA

Then you do not accept my explanation.

At 1pm a person has the thought to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Free will means that at 1pm that person could equally have had the thought not to reach out for the cup of coffee. — RussellA

Free will is not about the thoughts, it concerns the acts.

It is not possible to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously, both to reach out and not reach out. — RussellA

Yes it is possible, and your example demonstrates this. The person, at 1Pm, entertains both, the thought of reaching out for a coffee, and the thought of not reaching out for a coffee. That's what choice and deliberation is all about, having contradictory thoughts at the same time. From this condition, a choice is made. And because it is possible for the person to choose either of the two contradictory ways of acting, we conclude that the will is free. It is not forced by any cause, in one direction or another. There is a cause of the act, which is the will itself, but the will is not caused to choose one or the other.

It seems that if free will is equally free to act on the thought of reaching out rather than not reaching out, then it is equally free to act of the thought of not reaching out as rather than reaching out. — RussellA

Right, doesn't your own personal experience demonstrate the truth of free will to you? You are equally free to reach out for the coffee, or to not reach out for the coffee. You are free to choose.

I don't believe in particular that thoughts can cause themselves, and I don't believe in general in spontaneous self-causation.

One reason for my disbelief in spontaneous self-causation is that it is something I have never observed.

When I see a billiard ball on a billiard table start to move for no reason at all, then I may change my mind. — RussellA

Haven't you seen parts of your body start to move without being acted on by an external force? If the "reason" for movement is an immaterial "idea", then this is evidence of free will. Isn't it?

Law of nature has more than one meaning. — RussellA

I was the one who used "law of nature", and I gave you the explanation of the sense in which I was using it. It makes no sense for you to say that you want me to have been using it in a different way, because that would better support what you belief in.

One of the reasons I don't believe in free will is that it requires self-causation, where the thought one has is contemporaneous with the decision to have the thought. — RussellA

The concept of "free will" does not involve self-causation. I don't see where you get that idea from. Thoughts are the property of a being with free will, just like arms and legs are. We do not decide to have thoughts, just like we do not decide to have arms and legs, but this doesn't mean that we do not also have a free will.

When you talk about the conflict between cons_creative and cons_reactive, you invoke an implication there is something that cons distorts when one of the modes is embedded in the other mode. This distortion implies something causal to cons that cons, in its effort to perceive it, distorts. This causal something seems to be Kant's noumenal realm. — ucarr

What is distorted when cons-creative is embedded within cons-reactive, is cons-creative. This is because that embedding is a fundamental misunderstanding which requires a distortion, of cons-creative, to allow for that model. The "something causal" is cons-creative itself, and attempting to understand cons-creative as embedded within cons-reactive is a misunderstanding because it fails to recognize the priority of cons-creative, and the fact that cons-reactive is a creation of con-creative.

My main premise in our dialogue says that Russell's Paradox shows how logically there can be no unified and local totality. I infer from your argument you posit cons in the position of first cause. In the context of our dialogue, this looks like a version of panpsychism, since you think cons exists at the level of elementary particles. Although this seems to be an argument for cons as first cause, Russell's Paradox, by my argument, forestalls cons (and everything else) as first cause; it shows that logically there is no first cause. — ucarr

It only produces the conclusion of "panpsychism" through equivocation between less-restrictive definitions, and more-restrictive definitions. This problem, I pointed out earlier. That is also the base of Russel's paradox, equivocation of "set". In one sense, "set" means a collection of objects, in another sense, "set" means a defined type. The latter sense allows for an empty set, the former sense does not.

A man might imagine the problem of getting through a rough mountain pass is solved by human flight over the mountain range. This act of imagination, however, will go nowhere if it's not eventually supported by facts, science and engineering. Can you show how facts, science and engineering support free will and immaterial soul? — ucarr

I told you how free will is supported. All you did was insist that free will may be an illusion. I invited you to take a look at the support and explain how it is possible to apprehend free will as an illusion. I'm still waiting for that.

Introspection
If a person has free will, through introspection they are free to reject the idea that they have free will, and conclude that they live in a deterministic world.

If a person has no free will, during introspection, it may have been pre-determined that they accept the idea that they have free will.

Introspection is no guide as to whether free will is an illusion or not. — RussellA

The issue is not "whether free will is an illusion or not". It is whether the person believes in free will or not. If you can demonstrate to me how introspection revealed to you that free will is an illusion, and you live in a deterministic world, and how this introspective perspective inclined you to believe that free will is an illusion, I will listen to you. Perhaps I misunderstood my introspection which inclined me to believe that free will is true.

It depends what you mean by "Law of Nature", because it has two possible interpretations. — RussellA

That is why I have been very explicit in explaining to you the meaning which I intended, and I even quoted a reference.

Possible meaning two is the reason why an object at rest will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force — RussellA

This is not a possible meaning for Newton's first law. It would be a misinterpretation, a misunderstanding. No "reason why" is given for that law, it is stated as a descriptive fact, just like "the sky is blue" states a descriptive fact. And to interpret "the sky is blue" as giving a reason why the sky is blue would be a misunderstanding of what is stated, just like interpreting "an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force" as giving a reason why an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force, would be a misunderstanding of what is stated.

If this Law is external and prior to any particular object, and applies equally to all objects in space and time, then this raises the practical problem of where exactly does this Law exist?

If the Law is internal and contemporaneous within particular objects, and all objects in space and time follow the same Law, then this raises the practical problem as to why all these individual Laws, both spatially and temporally separate, are the same?

How exactly can there be a single Law of Nature that determines what happens to objects that are spatially and temporally separate? — RussellA

Yes, these are problems which could be discussed. However, I see no reason to discuss them if they are just proposed as reason to accept the illogical premise of contemporaneousness. Once you reject contemporaneousness as illogical, I'll be ready to discuss these other issues.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is lost. Though meaningless, the symbol still exists.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is known. The rule can be read and understood. The logic supporting the rule can be read and learned. Where in this sequence is something created from nothing? — ucarr

Who said anything about "something created from nothing"? I said that the rule, for using the symbol, is prior in time to the symbol's existence, as the reason for its existence.

Consider that in our dialogue, as dialogue, there is nothing prior to consciousness. Can there be something prior to consciousness? — ucarr

How does this make sense to you? You are asking me to take as a premise, that there is nothing prior to consciousness, and then asking me if there can be something prior to consciousness. That would be blatant contradiction.

If creativity means something from nothing, that's the paradox of nothingness being an existing thing. If creativity means re-arranging pre-existent things, that's equating creativity with permutation, a false equivalence. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. — ucarr

I think the problems that you have with this issue are due to the conditions which you set up for yourself. Why do yo see the need to set out conditions such as these? Just like the above example where you asked for a blatant contradiction, this makes no sense to me. Why do you insist on "something from nothing" as a condition?

Distinct and incompatible are non-equivalent. — ucarr

Sure, but I am explaining them as incompatible. And "distinct" is a form or type of "incompatible". Incompatible is the broader term, with a wider application, and "distinct" is more specific.

Reverse engineering has no problem recreating the creation of the apparatus from the opposite direction: final state →
→
initial state. — ucarr

Perhaps, but that doesn't address the point, which is to get to the reason behind the existence of the thing, what is prior to the initial state. Consider the title of the thread, "what does consciousness do". I answer that it is an act which produces "the initial state". If reverse engineering looks at "states", it does not apprehend the activity which produces the states. Therefore reverse engineering does not apprehend the activity prior to the initial state. This issue is very evident in quantum mechanics. The engineering produces "particles" (states), but it does not apprehend the activity which produces the particle (referred to as wave function, and wave function collapse).

The will to create pre-supposes a sentient. The existence of a sentient in turn pre-supposes an environment from which the sentient is emergent. — ucarr

Again, you are just employing contradictory conditions. Why do this to yourself? You impose terms upon yourself which create an impossible to solve problem.

The issue here pertains to accessing Kant's noumenal realm of things in themselves, i.e., "being" without encountering the problem of the perceptual distortion you describe. If what you say is something you know, and not merely conjecture, then it must be true that you can do this. Show me that you can. — ucarr

I never said anything about "Kant's noumenal realm". Again, you are imposing terms designed to create difficulty in understanding. Why do this to yourself?

What do you make of Russell's Paradox as it relates to the origin boundary ontology you equate with omnipresent mind?

Note - The paradox shows that, logically, a set cannot be a sub-set of itself. In order to overthrow "existence precedes essence," you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox. It's the uncontainability of the paradox that explodes establishment of an internally consistent origin of existence.

The problem is the reason for a posited material reality independent of mind. It's this originating part of the Big Bang science can't reach. — ucarr

Now, you describe things in terms of Russel's paradox, and set theory. Then you say "you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox". But why do you even refer to set theory at all. By defining "objects" in terms of "sets", all you do is impose extremely difficult conditions on yourself. These conditions are designed to place "objects" outside our capacity of understanding, by making the constituent elements of a set unintelligible, and telling us to simply take them for granted.

Again, why use terms which create difficulty for yourself, rather than looking to actually understand the issue?

I'm wondering how a zero-mass apparatus could be built by the positive-mass agency of humans. — ucarr

If you believe in free will, and the immateriality of the soul, then you would not represent the agency of human beings as "positive-mass". Therefore this would not be an issue.

See what your post demonstrates? You reject the terms and conditions (free will, immaterial, soul) which are specifically designed to make all the aspects of these problems you bring up intelligible, comprehensible, and solvable. And you insist on employing terms which create contradictions, and paradoxes, creating unsolvable problems. Since we construct and choose our premises and axioms, why not take the ones designed to solve the problems, which the other ones create?

I think it is more likely that Free Will is an illusion than an actual thing. — RussellA

Personally, I don't see too much point in discussing philosophy with someone who doesn't believe in free will. The entire discussion would then have to revolve around persuading the person that they have the power (free will) to change that belief. And this "persuading" would have to carry the force of a deterministic cause, to change that person's mind, which is contrary to the principles believed in by the person who believes in free will. This makes the task of convincing a person of the reality of free wil an exercise in futility. The only way that a person will come to believe in the reality of free will is through introspection, examination of one's own personal experiences.

The question is, is it strictly true that "descriptions of the way the world is" are posterior to events and "principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world" are prior to events? — RussellA

The answer to that question is "yes", by the reasoning I gave.

There is an overlap in Laws of Physics and Laws of Nature. — RussellA

No, there is no overlap, for the same reason that there is no overlap of the map and the territory. An overlap would require that the map is mapping itself, but that would produce an unintelligible infinite regress, like looking into a mirror with a mirror behind you.

The Laws of Physics are the map (description), and the Laws of Nature are what is supposedly described by the map, as explained in the article I referred.

By observing many times that the sun rises in the east, by inductive reasoning, I can propose the law that "the sun rises in the east". It is true that this law is posterior to my observations. But it is equally true that this law is prior to my observing the next sun rise.

When does a law become a Law of Nature? — RussellA

OK, so take your example here. "the sun rises in the east" is the inductive, descriptive "law", which is posterior to your observations. The proposed "Laws of Nature" are what forces the earth to spin the way that it does, causing the appearance of the sun rising in the east.

If for hundreds of years hundreds of scientist have observed that F=ma, then this is sufficient for F=ma to become a Law of Nature. — RussellA

Not at all. The proposed "Laws of Nature", are whatever it is which causes bodies to act in that consistent way, the way which makes F=ma appear to be true.

Speaking in a parallel, I don't believe grammar, an organizing principle that takes words and organizes them into sentences, paragraphs, chapters and books, creates written language. No, grammar organizes written language. The organized sounds of the spoken word get organized into written signs that can be interpreted by a standardized organization, i.e., grammar. — ucarr

I think you need to look at written symbols independently from written words. Then you'll see that there is necessarily "a grammar" behind any writing of symbols. The written symbol may be essentially a memory aid, or something like that, and there is necessarily a rule, as to what the symbol represents. Without that grammar, which tells one how to read the symbol, the symbol would be useless. Likewise, in the organizing of letters to create words, there is a grammar required. Generally, in English, each letter represents a sound. You'll notice that in some languages, a written symbol often represents an idea, and hieroglyphics is taken to be a combination of these two. In an acronym each letter represents a word. These are all different "grammars".

You might wish to restrict the meaning of "grammar" to a more formal sense, so that this type of rule does not qualify as "grammar", but then we still have to account for the reality of this type of "rule", which is used to create written language.

Likewise, as I'm saying, consciousness takes partially independent material objects that, at the quantum level, exist prior to consciousness - itself a construction from parts - and organizes them into navigable environments. So, consciousness is a material phenomenon that provides a function that parallels the syntactical function of grammar. — ucarr

This analogy does not work. As demonstrated above, with the reality of written language, the parts themselves, each mark or symbol, is created according to a rule or rules. So if we wish to maintain your analogy with quantum particles, we must say that the "material objects" are not independent, they are created intentionally, according to some rules. So if you want to maintain the principle that these parts exist prior to consciousness, then we need to allow intention prior to consciousness, as what creates the parts. Then we have a formal meaning of "consciousness", as what arranges the parts, just like the formal meaning of "grammar", as what arranges the symbols, but we still need "intention" as prior to the parts, creating them, just like we need "rules" as prior to the symbols.

First, you say there are aspects of reality consciousness can work with. That's consciousness in reactive mode. — ucarr

Working with something is not the reactive mode, it is the creative mode. This is evident from the fact that we can work with completely passive things, moving them around to build something. That you interpret what I wrote, in this way, demonstrates misunderstanding.

Didn't you already say consciousness_reactive and consciousness_creative are fundamentally incompatible? Doesn't this imply that consciousness can only be one or the other, with switching between the two modes being impossible? — ucarr

No, I meant that the descriptive principles, the descriptive modes are fundamentally incompatible. If we describe consciousness as reactive, that description is fundamentally incompatible with a description of consciousness as creative. This is a feature of the rules which apply to making such descriptions. Consider the difference between describing a past event, and describing a future event for example. We use the past tense of verbs to describe the past, and future tense to describe the future.

Notice how the incompatibility between the two descriptive modes is understood as an incompatibility between two features of reality. This is a product of the reactive mode. All such "representation of reality" is the reactive mode. So adherence to the reactive mode produces the appearance that "consciousness can only be one or the other". This is because the reactive mode cannot apprehend the creative mode except by analyzing the effects of the creative mode. This is what I described as observations through the apparatus. This approach cannot understand the creative mode which built the apparatus, because it always interprets through effects, what have occurred, the past.

From the perspective of the creative mode, however, both of the two apparently incompatible features of reality can be understood, as incompatible due to the descriptive modes employed, and these are created. This means that the supposed independent reality does not necessarily consist of incompatible features, only our (created) modes of representing reality has produced this appearance. This leaves the consciousness itself as capable of understanding reality. The required separation is not between the consciousness and the independent reality, as an independent reality is only "supposed" by the consciousness, as part of its creative functions. The required separation is between the will to create, and the effects of this, the creation.

The will to create, itself, does not require the assumption of a separate independent reality, as it takes absolute freedom as its premise. And absolute freedom denies any external constraints. It is only after the act of creating, when the consciousness observes what has been created, that the constraints of the external world are observed, in their effects, that the consciousness is inclined to create the two incompatible representations, one representing the will to create, in absolute freedom, and the other representing what has been created, as having been restricted.

If I'm not mistaken, there is no continuity between incompatible things. By this reasoning, past and future must be compatible given the natural continuity between them. Clearly, the functional present, when seen relativistically as the future in relation to the past, contains overlap with the past. If there were no compatibility between the two - not to elaborate on the problem of them existing as such only in relationship to each other - it seems to me there could only be an eternal present. An eternal present is hard to make sense of when we entertain the concept of progress. — ucarr

The issue outlined here helps to demonstrate that the problem of incompatibility is a problem with the representation, not a problem with "reality" itself. The concepts of "past" and "future" are aspects of the representation. The incompatibility exists here, within this conceptualization. The "being" of consciousness, at the present, demonstrates the continuity between the two, and that the incompatibility is somehow an incorrect representation.

The problem can be seen to be the assumption of an "independent reality". Placing reality as "independent" removes the consciousness, and its creative acts, from "reality", leaving only the observed "past" as "reality". Then the consciousness's creative acts are interpreted as reactive. Modeling the consciousness's creative acts as reactive rather than creative is what produces the incompatibility. This misplaces the creative acts, as "at the present" instead of modeling them as "in the future" with an overlap of future and past, as you describe. The reality of the overlap of future and past is what allows for the incompatibility to be resolved. But this idea necessitates a breakdown of "independent reality", which is what "special relativity" accomplishes. Then we are left with the consciousness only, no assumption of "independent reality", and we must start with a primary premise which respects the reality of the consciousness itself, as the will to create.

This argument seems to contradict your prior argument: "...the past in its reality, is incompatible with the future, in its reality." — ucarr

That is what happens when we assume an "independent reality". We assume the consciousness to be at the present. The independent reality is the past and future, and all of temporal existence, as distinct from the perspective of the consciousness, which then is understood as a "point in time", which provides the grounds for temporal measurements. But the "point in time" then is distinct from the "independent reality", which is a requirement for the idea of "independent". Now, the "point in time" is an eternal principle, as distinct from temporal existence, which the consciousness can insert anywhere into the supposed independent temporal existence, to produce temporal measurements.

However, this "point in time", which is derived from that assumption of "independent reality", is really a faulty principle, as "special relativity" indicates. Now the "point in time", which is representative of the consciousness's "present", as distinct from "independent reality", must be reworked, to allow that "the present" is actually a duration of time combining both future and past. This is the way to dissolve, or resolve, the apparent incompatibility between past and future. We take the consciousness's "present" as a combination of the will to create, and the experiencing of the effects of this will to create, without the need to assume any "independent reality".

Your above statement contains an issue. Inertia can be overcome, and it is overcome too many times to count. Einstein's equation, by explaining change of momentum through mass/energy equivalence,
establishes the fact that where's there's inertia, there's also energy, and thus past and future, being consistent along the channel of mass/energy equivalence, are not incompatible. — ucarr

We do not need to discuss this, but the incompatibility is evident in the difference between invariant (inertial) mass, and variant (relativistic) mass.

I take your above statement to be a logic-based attack upon E=MC2

=


2
. As I see it, the gist of your argument says: the equation tries to make a claim based on Mode A interpreted in the context of Mode B, but this must be a faulty claim because Mode A and Mode B are incompatible. — ucarr

Yes, the problems of E=MC2, as demonstrated by the difference between invariant mass and variant mass, demonstrate the incompatibility between the Newtonian (mass) perspective, and the Einsteinian (energy) perspective.

Can you show how inertia examples determinism? — ucarr

The inertia perspective, is derived from Newtonian laws of motion, which state as the first law, that a body will continue to move in a regular way, as it has in the past, indefinitely into the future, unless forced to change. That is the determinist perspective, that a cause of change is required. Notice that the way I stated it, as "indefinitely into the future" the determinist infinite regress of efficient causation is signified.

Are you assuming the human individual can exist untethered from mass/energy? — ucarr

I don't understand the question. These are temporal concepts, "mass", "energy". We do not need to employ them. In theory we could completely annihilate them, and build a different conceptual structure.

We know that consciousness sees and understands the many events that populate the history of the world. This is consciousness reacting to its environment.

Is consciousness only reactive?

What about the possibility of consciousness acting in the role of a transitive agent impacting and changing the objects under its influence?

I claim that consciousness performs a variety of functions that affect the boundaries of material objects in various ways:

• Time dissolves boundaries

• Space platforms boundaries

• Spacetime extends boundaries

• Consciousness oversees these three boundary negotiations — ucarr

There are two very distinct ways of looking at this. You describe consciousness as reactive here, the other way is to describe consciousness as creative. The two are fundamentally incompatible, because the former assumes a world already made, which is irking the consciousness, while the latter assumes that the consciousness is producing "the world", in its creativity. Then you attempt to describe the consciousness as constructive (creative) within the incompatible premise that the consciousness is reactive.

To deal with this incompatibility, lets assume two distinct aspects of reality, those which the consciousness can work with to create, and those which the consciousness does not have the ability to alter, so that it can only be reactive to these. Basic experience defines these two categories as past and future. We look at the future as having the possibilities to create, and the past as what we do not have the ability to alter. I believe that this is the most productive way to frame that fundamental incompatibility, the past in its reality, is incompatible with the future, in its reality.

Now the human being is fundamentally an intentional being, so its primary perspective is toward the future of possibilities, and it observes, notes, and remembers the past in relation to the primary perspective, which is the creative perspective, looking toward the future. Therefore, I ask you to reverse your perspective, and place the consciousness as fundamentally creative rather than reactive. The consciousness is always moving forward in time, creating, constructing, and the means by which it "reacts" is through the structures it has already created. So all of its "reactions" are already conditioned by its creations, the creations being prior to the reactions, as required for "a reaction". This is demonstrated by the scientific method, we test hypotheses with experiments, build an apparatus, and see how it reacts. Notice that the "reaction" is fundamentally conditioned by the apparatus built. And it is required that there is an apparatus to produce a reaction.

As described by Einstein's equation: E=MC2

=


2
we're navigating our way around a reality populated by the mass/energy binary. Mass is the particle form of energy and energy is the waveform of mass. Under this scheme, consciousness, like your word-processing program, organizes raw data. — ucarr

Notice how the past/ future categorical separation is represented by the mass/energy binary". The "mass" perspective is a conceptual creation expressed in Newton's laws of motion. We describe past existence with "mass" which has inertia as a fundamental property, and this is "resistance to change". Resistance to change is what is basic to "what we do not have the ability to alter", and this is mass. "Energy", on the other hand is "the capacity to do work", and this is an expression of the view toward the future, "the possibilities to create". What we have then, with this expression of mass/energy equivalence, E=MC2, is a principle designed to convert "what we do not have the ability to alter", the inertia of mass, into the malleable energy, "possibilities to create".

However, we need to respect the basic incompatibility between the past and future, which defines these two categories. Because of this basic incompatibility, we can know that this supposed mass/energy equivalence is defective It is an attempt at doing what is impossible, taking the determinist principles of inertia, "what we do not have the ability to alter", and expressing it in the free will perspective of "the possibilities to create".

The problem is that we need to assign priority to one over the other, and fit the other within that perspective. And, as I explained above, the primary perspective of the human being is intentional, the view toward the future, so this must have priority. However, the entire sense apparatus of the human being has bee constructed through evolution as reactive, the view toward the past, and sense observation is what is used to validate "science". This means that science is critically disadvantaged as a tool to guide us in this endeavour. What this implies is that we need to create an observational capacity, an apparatus, which is not reliant on mass/inertia principles. In other words we need an apparatus which is entirely created of possibility without matter or mass. We cannot call this use of pure possibilities "energy", due to the faulty mass/energy equivalence.

I observe a hundred times that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud then lightning occurs. I can ask why.

I can conclude that there is a Law of Nature such that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud lightning occurs. — RussellA

Notice that I distinguished between a law of physics, and a law of nature. What you describe is an inductive principle, like a law of physics. That is a descriptive principle. In the way I used the term, the law of nature is what the law of physics is supposed to represent, it is what is supposedly described by these inductive principles. Check the "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" for reference.

Within metaphysics, there are two competing theories of Laws of Nature. On one account, the Regularity Theory, Laws of Nature are statements of the uniformities or regularities in the world; they are mere descriptions of the way the world is. On the other account, the Necessitarian Theory, Laws of Nature are the “principles” which govern the natural phenomena of the world. That is, the natural world “obeys” the Laws of Nature. This seemingly innocuous difference marks one of the most profound gulfs within contemporary philosophy, and has quite unexpected, and wide-ranging, implications. — Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/

My usage was the latter sense of "laws of nature".

My question is, is it in fact the case that a Law of Nature precedes the event it describes, or is the Law of Nature contemporaneous with the event it describes. My belief is the latter. — RussellA

A "law of nature" in this sense necessarily precedes the event, because the laws of nature are what makes things act the way that they do. So they are the cause of an event occurring the way that it does, a way that is describable by laws of physics. Notice in the quote, that things "obey" the laws of nature, so the laws must be prior to an events, as the events will necessarily obey the laws.

Some argue that Free Will is an illusion. — RussellA

Yes, they have the freedom to do this. I don't believe that, do you?

There is a particular lightning strike, and being a particualr instance is a token. Several lightning strikes would create a class of events, The Lightning Strike, which would be a type. — RussellA

Yes, this is the issue which Plato addressed. When a lightening strike occurs, there has already been many events of the same type (lightening strikes). This implies that there is a form ("formula" if you like), which preexists the particular event, and determines what it will be.

In modern days we understand this as inductive reasoning, cause and effect, and laws of physics. This inclines us to think that these formulae are abstractions, the product of human minds, existing as ideas in human minds. And this is correct, but this way of thinking detracts from the need to consider some sort of "form" which preexists such events, and determines their nature.

A common way of representing the difference between the two types of "form" are as the laws of physics (human abstractions), and the laws of nature (what the laws of physics are supposed to represent, which causes things to behave the way that they do). Aristotle provided much guidance for separating the two senses of "form", the causal as prior to events, and the human abstractions as posterior to events.

In practice, can anyone give any explanation, other than in the mind of God, where a Lightning Strike could exist prior to a lightning strike? — RussellA

This is why "God" and "angels", are the most common explanation for the immaterial Forms which are necessarily prior to material existence, as cause of the orderly existence we observe. The prior Forms (laws of nature), are "idea-like", but they are prior to material existence rather than posterior to it (as abstractions are), being what causes whatever we determine as the fundamental elements of material existence to be, in the way that they are. Since the prior forms are "idea-like" as immaterial, and the cause of things being the way that they are, in much the same way that human ideas cause artificial things to be the way that they are, through freely willed activities, we posit a divine mind, "God".

Therefore, the form of the lightning strike must have existed at the beginning of existence. Similarly the form of every event must have existed at the beginning of existence.

In other words, according to Aristotle, the form of this post, which has a form unique to itself, must have been determined at the beginning of existence, 13.7 billion years ago, which is a scary thought. — RussellA

The issue is not so simple, because you are applying determinist principles here. When we account for the reality of freely willed events, the entire way that we understand "time" needs to be altered. Then we do not get this infinite regress to "the beginning of time". Free will allows a new, undetermined event to enter into the chain of causation determined by the past, at any moment in time.

The chain of causation is an abstraction, inductive principles derived from the observation of continuity in time. A thing, object with mass, will continue to be as it has been, in the past, unless caused to change. This is the basis for Newton's first law, and the "cause" of change here, was traditionally understood as another massive object (f=ma). The freely willed cause, however, as an immaterial cause known as "final cause", is free from that determinist causal chain. The freely willed cause must even escape the concept of "energy", because of the relativistic equivalence between mass and energy which renders "energy" as inertially deterministic.

Simply put, when we allow for the reality of freely willed events, we allow as a fundamental principle, a break in the continuity of being, between past and future, a break at the present. This is the lack of necessity between cause and effect, and in inductive reasoning, pointed to by Hume. Things do not necessarily continue as they have. This implies that the entire world of being, all that exists relative to our observational capacities, must be created anew at each passing moment of time.

That means that "the form of the world", consequently "the form of each event", as time passes, is produced (by what was referred to as the mind of God above), at each passing moment of time. This is the basis for the idea of divine "Providence", and the idea that God must act continually, at each moment to maintain His creation. The laws of physics, like Newton's first law, depend on "God's Will", as it is required that God actively recreates the world at each passing moment, and God having a free will, could recreate the world at any moment, in a way which is not consistent with determinist cause/effect.

es. That's the problem.

But every word in language refers to a concept, in that "fundamental" is a concept, "particle" is a concept, "and" is a concept, etc.

It can also be argued that every word in language should be taken as a figure of speech rather than literally. For example, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote the book Metaphors We Live By 1980. In science, Andrew May in Science 2000 argued that even Newton's second law, F = ma is a metaphor. — RussellA

When you recognize the requirement for "idea-like" Forms, as explained above, which exist independently from human minds, this so-called problem is turned on its head. There is ideas internal to human minds, and ideas external to human minds. And, there is a supposed "material world" as a medium between these two. The material world, as it appears to us, is a representation of the consistency (temporal continuity) within the independent Forms. The key point is that this consistency is not necessary as the determinists represent it. It simply appears to us in this way, as the aspects of the independent Forms which appear to our senses as "the material world", are the parts which demonstrate such consistency. Consequently this constitutes the features of the material world which appear intelligible to us.

But concepts don't exist outside the mind.

Therefore, the problem is that language is using concepts which only exist in the mind to describe a world that exists outside the mind, where such concepts don't exist.

I agree that I am using the concept of "force", which exists in my mind, to describe something in the world, even though the concept "force" doesn't exist in the world.

And this is true for every word in language.

Language as a whole is using concepts, including the colour red and number, to describe a world where those concepts don't exist. — RussellA

So, try this. All words refer to concepts in human minds, as you say. And, outside of human minds there is another sort of "concepts", in another sort of mind (God's). These are the Forms. In the same way that words appear to you within the material medium, as alterations in its consistency which you can interpret as the representations of ideas in other human minds, allowing you to extract meaning, the consistency of physical objects, and the entire physical world, exists as representations of the ideas which exist in that other sort of mind.

Imagine that the other sort of mind is speaking an entirely different language, a language which utilizes consistency of the medium whereas human languages utilize the inconsistency of the medium. Being a sort of inverse language, in relation to our type of languages, it is very difficult to interpret these ideas. However, there is a key to interpretation, a principle, which if adhered to, it will guide the way. The key is the way that time passes, and the fact that everything which occurs at the present, the passage of every material event, has an immaterial (unobservable) Form prior to it in time, as the cause of that event. So, for example, when someone speaks, there is an immaterial cause of those words, within the mind of the speaker, and the material world is just the medium of passing time, which displays the communicative features. The human mind which makes that statement exploits a deficiency in the consistency of the medium, which provides free will the capacity to state that message, while the consistency itself is representative of the other sort of ideas.

Or, maybe "force/s" in that context means 'cause of motion' ? — Kizzy

What could be the cause of motion other than the passing of time? Time passing is what causes things to move. Is "force" the passing of time?

My premise is that ideas only exist in the mind. This would lead to the paradox that if I am able to successfully communicate my ideas using language, then it follows that, as language exists outside the mind, these ideas now exist outside the mind, thereby negating my original premise. — RussellA

Here's another related problem, which was given much consideration by the ancient Greeks, like Plato and Aristotle. Plato thought that since things exist as types, then the form, or type, idea, must be prior to the thing itself, to cause it to be the type of thing that it is. Aristotle showed that since a particular thing has a form unique to itself, which must be prior in time to the thing itself to account for it being the thing that it is and not something else, forms must be prior to material things. This indicates that there must be something similar to ideas, forms, which are prior in time to material existence, therefore outside of human minds.

I believe a world outside the mind exists, but not a world of objects, whether chairs or wavelengths, but rather a world of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time. — RussellA

Isn't "force" just a concept?

When I observe a postbox, I know that the colour red exists in my mind, and science tells me that a wavelength of 700nm exists in the world. — RussellA

How could a wavelength of 700nm exist in the world? Wavelength is a measurement, or a complex idea which serves as a standard for measurement. As such, any statement of wavelength is an expression of an idea. Measurements are just a matter of projecting your subjective experience of numbers onto the world.

A measurement has the appearance of being "objective" because we apply "standards", "rules", "conventions", or "norms", which produce what some call "intersubjectivity", and others call "objectivity". Whichever of the two terms one chooses, it's generally employed as a means for taking the agreement which supports the "existence" of the standards, for granted.

It appears like neither one of us is understanding anything which the other is saying at this point.
Break time.

I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. — Dan

As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you?

It's becoming very clear why you and I have completely different ideas about what it means to "understand one's choice". For you, to "understand one's choice" simply requires a description, what you like to think of as an "objectively true" description. For me, to "understand one's choice" requires the choice be given a position within one's wants, needs, desires and goals, the person's subjective value structure. The former, your sense of "understanding" is a description of what the choice is. The latter, my sense of "understanding" is to know why the choice was made.

In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about. — Dan

That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged.

There is no "property of wrongness". How would we sense that property? And if we do not sense it, how would we decide whether or not a thing had that property, except by a judgement? And if the decision of "wrong" is made by judgement, without any wrongness being evident through sensation, wrongness only being present to the mind that judges, how could the wrongness be anything other than the judgement itself?

We can go further, however, and ask about the judgement. This would be to ask about the wrongness which was determined. This requires a definition of "wrong" and an explanation of how the act fulfills the criteria of that definition.

I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. — Dan

You have provided a conditional proposition. And, the "conditional proposition" provides a rule for logical procedure. In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true".

Your sophistry is to introduce another sense of "true" which is hidden within your usage as "something that is true". This would be a sense of "true" which is independent of the logical procedure, and judgement of the conditional. In other words, the conditional proposition lays rules for a judgement of "true", while you also speak of "something that is true", independent of that judgement. Your statement conflates the two distinct meanings of "true" in an invitation to equivocate.

The invitation to equivocate is the sophistry. The conditional should be properly stated as "if we know that something is true, then we are not mistaken". The way you state it " if we know something that is true", is incoherent if analyzed. This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true.

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability.


This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective?

Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch. — Dan

You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes.

Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference?

You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me.

Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple.

I suppose one's attitude toward migrants depends, somewhat, on the attitude of the migrants. If the migrants arrive with the attitude of conquer and rule... Then again, the attitude of the migrants may depend, somewhat on the attitude of the occupants. If the attitude of the occupants is Keep off!...