So our perception of time is an illusion — RussellA

So our perception of space is also an illusion. — RussellA

But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. On that basis, can Kant be branded as an Indirect Realist?

Tell me what you mean by ‘real’. — I like sushi

Only thing I have done was responding to your request.

Then I was asked to cut to the chase,

Again, cut to the chase please. — I like sushi

and then pops up with a senseless comment that this is a silly game.

You have not even answered my question.

if I see a flying elephant that is not actually there (everyone else denies it is there) then the elephant does not exist but is real for me - unless I am being gaslighted.
— I like sushi
What do you know about the flying elephant in your mind? — Corvus

Now who are playing a silly game?

I believe that Kant would say that he has both an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world, ie, the same as what an Indirect Realist would say. — RussellA

What do the Indirect Realist say about A priori concepts and space and time? Can these be mind-independent?

Tell me what you mean by ‘real’. — I like sushi

1. Real can mean physical existence. You are not just seeing something, but you can also touch grab feel use manipulate transfer and throw out physically.
2. Real can also mean genuine, not bogus, not look alike, not copy of the genuine.
3. Real means actual, not dream, not hallucinating, not illusion.

if I see a flying elephant that is not actually there (everyone else denies it is there) then the elephant does not exist but is real for me - unless I am being gaslighted. — I like sushi

What do you know about the flying elephant in your mind?

I feel like this is why you are probing? We know things because we can doubt them. — I like sushi

Probing helps us understand how our mind works, why we have beliefs on certain things and not, and the nature of doubting etc.

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular. — Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? The reason has to deal with two controversial cases in perception.

First case is, TI, that perceived objects appear in mind as internal representations, and even space and time must be regarded as internal forms of the mind. In this case, the perceived objects are treated as the existence in Thing-in-itself, and we are not supposed to know anything about them at all.

The other case is that objects in perception exist as external to the mind as real objects. You see the appearance, but you realise that they are actually the real objects, which you can grab, touch, feel and manipulate. Even space and time feels external, where space is the external existence and time is the external process. This is the case of material empiricism.

The pure reason has both sides to deal with, and both are true. Kant seemed to be NOT committing himself as either an idealist or realist at this part of CPR.

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL) — AmadeusD

Thank you for your post. It is always good to have more different opinions on the topic, which makes discussions more diverse and interesting.

Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think this is quite interesting point and also where there are different interpretations between the traditional and contemporary commentators on Kant.

From my understanding, Kant was elucidating the both side of pure reason i.e. TI side which assumes the perceived objects belonging to Thing-in-Itself, which appears in minds as mere representation of the objects into the schema of a priori form of space and time which are all internal. We don't know anything about Thing-in-itself, hence we cannot even ask about it.

And then there is material empiricism side of pure reason, which takes the perceived objects as the real objects in the external world as they are. The reason sees the appearance, which are the actual objects that one can grab touch feel and manipulate. Thing-in-itself is part of the world we don't fully know, but is conceivable.

Pure reason deals with this conflicting nature of our perception. That's why Kant is explaining about them in the section called "Antinomy of Pure Reason". Therefore Kant was not committing himself as either idealist or realist at all in CPR. His aim was to investigate what Pure Reason does, and how it does it viz. the limitation and methodology of Pure reason.

I am also in the middle of reading Kant, and trying to understand him better. I use read him a few year ago, but stopped for a while doing other things. Recently I have been trying to get back to reading him again.

The problem is then knowing what "direct" refers to. Does it mean causally direct or cognitively direct? — RussellA

Another case of linguistic aberration?

What are your definitions…..
— Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part. — Mww

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? I was under impression that he hadn't given out clear definitions on TI as such. According to your answer, it sounds like it is highly challenging or even impossible to come up with a clearcut definition of TI. But there got to be one, if you claim that yours is Kant's definition.

How do you want me too?

What kind of argument do you want me to present?

Note: I find no need to ‘prove’ it to myself. — I like sushi

OK, let's see it this way. Are sure all your sense organs are perfectly accurate?
How do you know they are? Or perhaps they are not?
Tell me what you are seeing as real in front of you.

Possibly. The Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism does give alternate names:
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences.

The problem is, is it possible to describe a theory about which millions of words have been written using just two words. — RussellA

Yeah, whenever I read "Indirect X", I always get curious, "Indirect" from what, how and why?

I think of "Indirect Realism" as a name rather than a description, as the Taj Mahal is the name of and not a description of a building. Similarly I think of "Transcendental Idealism" as a name rather than a description. — RussellA

Perhaps you could be right.

What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself? — Mww

It must be all the recent Kant commentators who pigeonholed Kant to be an idealist, realist, or phenomenologist etc etc, and we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? Maybe Kant had all those characteristic tendencies in his writings? It is just part and parcel of trying to understand Kant better suppose. Of course Kant was a Kantian.

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? — Mww

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant?

But comparing stones (or other such objects) with minds (res cogitans) seems to me a egregious equivocation of the idea of substance.
— Wayfarer

How so? — Lionino

Category mistake?

Could one perhaps say that the world as they experience it is real to them?
— RussellA

We do actually say that for everyone. — I like sushi

How do you prove the world that you perceive is real?

I would argue that Kant is in today's terms definitely an "Indirect Realist". — RussellA

Only thing about "Indirect Realism" is that, "Indirect" sounds a bit vague. Would it not be better called something like "Representational Realism"? Because appearance and sense-data represent the contents in the mind.

but to answer your question: squirrel live roughly 10-30% (2-6 years) of their natural life span in the wild. With the hawk, foxes, and cars around here not good odds for a house squirrel. — Vaskane

I never believed that squirrels can live in houses. I have seen a few of them in the garden sometimes. They are very fast, and agile. They quickly do their business and disappear into the woods.
I believe that animals might have beliefs in the existence of the world too. If they do, what would their beliefs be like?

Husserl seems central to Phenomenology. From SEP Phenomenology:
Still, the discipline of phenomenology, its roots tracing back through the centuries, came to full flower in Husserl. — RussellA

There seem different schools of Phenomenology. For example, Heidegger's Phenomenology is much different from Husserl's. Merlou-Ponty has again different Phenomenology in its methodology and subjects too. Hence framing Kant as a Phenomenologist needs close investigation i.e. first defining what Phenomenology is, then under what ground Kant is Phenomenologist or not.

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, I would say that Appearance and Sense-data are synonyms, where both are figures of speech, and are two different ways of looking at the same thing. — RussellA

I think this is a fair comment. Appearance and sense-data is very similar if not the same. Kant keeps saying Appearance and objects are the same in CPR. Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? Kant definitely says that TI is nothing to do with idealism in the Prolegomena.

So, to you, if someone loses their memory, they simply die and become another person? — Lionino

Not necessarily. One may only lose one's identity. Of course, this doesn't mean that one's objective identity is lost too. One only loses one's subjective identity with the loss of one's memory. The objective identity is intact as a fact whether one can recall who one is or not.

If you lost all your memory, I am sure you wouldn't know who you are. But at the time of one's death, all the memories of that life time will be flushed out into blank.

Hence when having been reborn into the secular world, one cannot recall the previous life's memories clearly. One can only scrounge the previous life memories via imagination and one's own dreams.

Are you actually saying that or this is some figurate speech I am not picking up on? — Lionino

As Kant said, any claims made on the Soul, also the opposite is true.

:cool: :ok:

We are not doubting the world, objects, things, pets or people when we are seeing them. We are doubting when we don't seem them anymore. If your pet is suddenly not there anymore having hidden somewhere in the house, then do you still believe in their existence in your house? Would you worry or doubt that they may not be there anymore having gone out the house, and lost their way back home? If you haven't seen them for weeks, would you still believe that they are with you?

Suppose someone sees a red postbox. — RussellA

If they were a Phenomenalist, the Appearance is the real world. — RussellA

If they were an Indirect Realist, they would say that although the postbox appears red, the postbox as a Thing-in-Itself is not necessarily red. For the Indirect Realist, although the Appearance is real, the real world is the unknown Thing-in-Itself that is the cause of the Appearance. — RussellA

1. Do the Phenomenalists claim to know the real world perceived as the appearance? Or is it unknown existence?
2. What would be the differences between Appearance of the postbox, and Sense-Data of the postbox?

:up: Interesting point, and great writeup. However, Appearance has hint of being the mental representation. Appearance is not the world either, is it?

I’m not sure how that proves you’re not perceiving the world. If you weren’t perceiving the world you wouldn’t hear the alarm clock. — NOS4A2

Should you not say that you were disturbed by the alarm clock, which woke you up involuntarily from your sleep, rather than you perceived the alarm bell ringing from the clock?

Even so, if you’re not perceiving the world, what are you perceiving? Are you perceiving nothing? Are you not perceiving? Or are perceiving something other than the world? — NOS4A2

When you are sleeping, I would say you were not perceiving the world, because you would have been unconscious during the sleep. Your brain would have shutdown from your normal perception taking rest. Maybe you might be having dreams in sleep, but no perception on the world for sure. If you were perceiving something in the world in your sleep, then it is likely you weren't in deep sleep, or you weren't asleep at all.

Given this, is it reasonable to doubt the existence of the cup when you were not looking at it? — NOS4A2

If you accept that your perception is caused by the external object, but for some reason, the object you were perceiving is invisible from your sight, then you have no perception because you don't have the object causing your perception anymore. In that case, it would be rational to have no belief in the existence of the object or the world.

We are not saying why you cannot doubt, or can doubt with all the evidence the other person produces to you with the films and videos what have you. We are saying, the cause of your perception is not existing anymore, therefore you have no perception of the object, therefore you have no reason to believe in the existence of the object or world.

you cannot say “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.
— Mww — RussellA

As Kant was not a phenomenologist, and believed in both Appearance and Things-in-Themselves, where the Things-in-Themselves are the cause of the Appearance, the Category of Causality cannot apply just to the Appearance but must also apply to the cause of that Appearance, ie the Things-in-Themselves. — RussellA

So then which world is real, Appearance or Thing-in-itself? Or are they the same world?

So specifically, I am searching for arguments, preferrably complete, even more preferrably in syllogistic form, for the belief that the self persists. Otherwise, I will remain in doubt, and in absence of any evidence of permanence, I will default to the position that it does not stay at all, and that we are constantly as always dying, as the comic posted in the first page depicts. — Lionino

I recall reading Plato saying that our innate abstract ideas on the world and objects, and the mathematical knowledge are from our recollection of our previous lives. So based on that perspective, I tried to come up with a syllogistic proof of the permanence of the human soul.

From Descartes famous declaration "cogito ergo zum", one cannot mistake one's own identity who one is, the identity of the human soul is one of the essence or properties of the human soul, therefore it stays the same no matter what happens to the body of the soul residing, or no matter how long time has passed since the birth of the soul.

The other properties of a person are subject to the changes through time or events of course such as the body will grow old, thoughts and views might change depending on the experience and age of the person etc, but the identity of the person remains the same no matter what changes have gone through to the whole body or thoughts, and the base of the identity is one's own memory of the past.

1. I have no recollection of the past experience of my previous life (if there was one) in my daily conscious mind, no matter how hard I try to remember them (it is just blank). But I can imagine my soul's existence in the ancient times, medieval times and 18 centuries. I was imagining meeting up with Plato, and having a chat in the sunny corner of the Roman square talking about the world of ideas. I can imagine myself walking along the medieval town of London dressed in the medieval clothing and a pointed hat going for a beer in the pub.

I am not sure how I can do these imagining if my soul had NOT existed in those times and NOT actually gone through in the real past lives seeing and encountering the images in my mind experiencing them personally. The people I see in my imagination are the ones I have never seen or met before in my real life or seen on TV or films.

2. On some days I have dreams in my sleep. The images I see in my dreams are the ones I have never seen before in my daily real life. The people I see and meet in my dreams are totally strangers to me, as well as the places I see are new and unfamiliar. I have absolutely no control of the contents of my dreams, and they are totally random in nature.

I often wonder why I dreamt these images and saw the people whom I never met or know, but there is no logical or causal explanation for the reasons. The only logical analogy I can come up with is that my soul had existed sometime in the past prior to my birth, and it encountered the places and situations in the images and people in my dreams. The only logical conclusion I could come up with is that all these contents of my imagination and dreams are my recollection of my past lives. If they are not, where else could they be from?

3. According to Descartes, soul is a different existence from body which is distinct itself, independent and composed of different substance to bodies. So it implies, souls can depart the body and keep existing transcending to some other possible worlds or universe for a while until finding a new born body to settle the new life in the body. When bodies get old the memory gets weak, and when the body dies the memory gets killed off too with all the other mental functionalities. But the soul is intact with its identity and all the latent memories, which survives the death, keeps existing, and gets reborn in the new body, which explains all the dreaming and imaginations which are based on its previous lives.

Therefore if one's soul had existed in the past outside one's body of the present life, then there is no reason why it shouldn't exist in the future when one's body no longer exists. The soul must exist throughout past, present and future permanently as long as the universe keeps existing, keep coming back to the profane lives whenever there is a match between a newly being born body and the body-less soul made up by God or coincidence - one of the laws of the universe.

Yes, figures of speech can be confusing, but as figures of speech are an inherent part of language, figures of speech and the confusion they bring is unavoidable. — RussellA

Yes, good point. Here is the summary from ChatGPT on the problems of OLP.

"1. **Circularity and Conservatism:**
- Critics argue that OLP can be circular in its reasoning. It sometimes relies on everyday language to define philosophical concepts, but this can lead to a conservative stance, where it merely reflects and reinforces existing linguistic practices rather than challenging or transcending them.

2. **Inadequacy for Complex Topics:**
- OLP may be criticized for its perceived inadequacy in dealing with complex philosophical problems that require more abstract and formal analysis. Some argue that it is better suited for addressing everyday language use rather than tackling deep metaphysical or epistemological questions.

3. **Failure to Address Non-Linguistic Aspects:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to focus heavily on language and linguistic expressions, potentially neglecting non-linguistic aspects of human experience. This limitation can be problematic when dealing with issues that go beyond language, such as emotions, sensations, or certain aspects of consciousness.

4. **Limited Cross-Cultural Applicability:**
- OLP has been criticized for its cultural specificity, as it is primarily based on the analysis of English-language usage. Some argue that the insights gained from studying ordinary language may not be easily translatable or applicable to languages and cultures with different linguistic structures and philosophical traditions.

5. **Development of Later Wittgenstein's Thought:**
- The later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, often associated with OLP, are complex and open to different interpretations. Some critics argue that later Wittgenstein's ideas are not a unified and coherent system, making it challenging to pin down a clear and consistent account of OLP.

6. **Neglect of Ontological Questions:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to be more focused on linguistic and conceptual analysis rather than engaging deeply with ontological questions about the nature of reality. Critics argue that it may sidestep important metaphysical issues.

7. **Evolution of Analytic Philosophy:**
- As analytic philosophy evolved, many philosophers moved away from the strictures of OLP. Analytic philosophy developed new methodologies and approaches, which led to a decline in the influence of OLP in mainstream philosophical discourse." - ChatGPT

Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant?
— Corvus

Because Kant was too subtle? — Wayfarer

In what way, was he so?

However, perception, world, internal, external and sense-data should all be thought of as figures of speech rather than literally existing, and as figures of speech only exist in the mind as concepts. — RussellA

Would you not agree that figures of speech can be confusing, and is illogical?

If we weren’t perceiving in our sleep we wouldn’t wake up when our alarm went off. Our senses have evolved to wake us even in the deepest sleep. At any rate, I see no coherent reason why any of it should be doubted. — NOS4A2

If you were perceiving the world while you were asleep, then you wouldn't need the alarm clock to be awakened by it. The fact that you set the alarm clock to be awakened by it proves that you don't perceive the world while asleep.

Think of the cup in your OP, the one you cannot be sure exists when you are not perceiving it. If you and someone else were sitting around the cup, and you look away, but the other person sees the cup has not moved or vanished or blinked out of existence, are you right to doubt the existence of the cup? — NOS4A2

While I look away, I wouldn't know if the cup exist, and I wouldn't know what the person would be doing either. The person could have looked away too, fell asleep, or walked out the room. Anyway, how can I believe in the existence of the cup when I am not seeing it, and base my belief in the existence of the invisible cup relying on the other person's perception, which is totally inaccessible to me?

As there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is therefore logically impossible to know the cause of an effect just from the effect itself. — RussellA

But could you not say that your perception is caused by your sense-data? i.e. the sense perception of the external world?

I mentioned a few reasons why we’d keep believing in the existence of the world. For one, we never stop perceiving it. But also, there is no reason to do otherwise. — NOS4A2

But do you keep perceiving the world while you are asleep? Are what you perceive always what you think you perceive? Was there any room for doubts, illusions or mistakes in the contents of your perception?

It’s why I ask the question. If you never stop perceiving the world, what are the grounds for doubting the existence of the world? — NOS4A2

For the above reasons.

Don't mistake that for not doing "Gods" work. I too am an Atheist, and understand that Nietzsche, in a sense, is much like Nebuchadnezzar, although not a believer still carried out a similar mission to give people a purpose. — Vaskane

Existence of God and proof is another interesting topic which is related to the topic of this thread.
Why do you believe in the existence of God? Or why not? How the existence of God differ from the existence of the world? or unperceived world?

Nietzsche found that "God is dead," to be highly problematic in the rise of nihilism. — Vaskane

Did Nietzsche thought God had been alive and existing before? But died suddenly or gradually?
Or did Nietzsche think that God had never existed at all?
Some say Zarathustra was the new God whom Nietzsche tried to depict as in "Thus spake Zarathustra", but not sure if it was.

Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.

Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your “I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper”, doesn’t hold true.

Or I just misunderstood. Dunno. — Mww

No probs. I don't have perfect memories. I am sure no one does :D
This thread is for any topic or issues which one feels related to the concepts "the world", "existence", "belief" or "reasons / grounds / justifications for knowledge" from their own ideas, or any of the historical philosophers' perspectives. It is not a declarative or presumptuous, but exploratory thread, to which, hopefully, some form of conclusion would be heuristically emerging from the discussions.

Because Kant allowed the illusion of God to continue for another 100 years or so. He was essentially just a Christian with his metaphysics. — Vaskane

Understandable. Nietzsche was an atheist.

So the question ought to be inverted. What are the grounds for believing that we are perceiving nothing, perceiving the extraterrestrial, or perceiving nothing at all? — NOS4A2

The point is not that we stop perceiving or not perceiving anything at all. But rather, how can we be sure about what we perceive is real or truth?

Or when we are not perceiving the objects we have been perceiving, due to not being present in front of the objects, what are the grounds for us keep believing the unperceived existence?

The idea that we can stop perceiving the world is a troubling one, but remains at the core of anti-realism. — NOS4A2

Not exactly anti-realism, but more to do with Academic Scepticism?

We’ve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest? — Mww

No no, I was just responding to your points. :)

You say reading in English got comfortable for you. I am not really sure how the philosophical scene is in East Asia or in languages like Japanese or Korean. Thinking that your native language is Korean, don't you think you would benefit from reading in it, even with less material published in it? And for that I will quote Nietzsche like Vaskane did: — Lionino

I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.

Likewise, how could the English language, alien, communicate to you in the same way that Korean, transporting concepts to you since a child, does? — Lionino

I have been using English since middle school times in the American High school in Indonesia, and have been reading in English for many years, and worked with English native speaking people, so it became like my main language now. It is not still perfect, but I would say it is par with my Korean.

Otherwise, I, like everyone else, also read philosophy articles written in English, as many important scholars of philosophy today write in English on peer-reviewed journals. But when it comes to classics, I believe that Korean has translated more in philosophy (Kant, Plato, Leibniz) than you could ever consume. — Lionino

Yes, almost every book in English has translated copy in Korean, and Philosophical academic interest in Korea is very high. There are people who are interested in the Western Philosophy, also Eastern Philosophies and Religious studies such as Buddhism. There are many seminars and study groups in the country with ardent passion and enthusiasm. There are internationally well known scholars such as the late JG Kim (USA), and a few working and teaching in Europe (UK and Germany). Here is the Korean Prof. H. Chang (Cambridge University UK ) presenting his paper on Realism.


There are many Youtube channels run by Koreans with Philosophical topics, which I watch sometimes.

This is a youtube channel run by a New Zealander working in Korea. He seems specialising in the continental philosophy. He has many Korean followers.

Intuitions (Kantian). — I like sushi

As you have suggested, intuition implies connection to knowledge, and indeed it is faculty for knowledge. Not imagination. Imagination is a faculty of its own. The nature of imagination is its freedom from the other mental faculties.

Note: I suppose we may have some other faculty yet to be unearthed. — I like sushi

What does Kant say about it?

Einflusse, den Kant auf die deutsche Philosophie ausgeübt hat, den Blick abzulenken und namentlich über den Werth, den er sich selbst zugestand, klüglich hinwegzuschlüpfen. Kant war vor Allem und zuerst stolz auf seine Kategorientafel, er sagte mit dieser Tafel in den Händen: "das ist das Schwerste, was jemals zum Behufe der Metaphysik unternommen werden konnte". - — Vaskane

Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant?

The propositions are always a priori constructs; the proofs for them, on the other hand, are always empirical. — Mww

Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. 5+7 itself is not a proposition until you add "="
and come up with 12. 5+7=12 is a proposition.