What is your question? You seem to be asking all sorts of questions but the title of the discussion refers to "a question."

And are only Christians allowed to respond?

Please advise at your earliest convenience.

sort of like identical twins. they are exactly the same until they aren't.

In place of this false unique — Isaac Kramnick

You seem to be asking us to choose between a post modernist view of the self or a "false" view of the self.

Is that not akin to seeking my opinion regarding which cookie is better, the good one on the right or the terrible tasting one on the left.

Why would I choose the "false" view?

Belief is connected to knowledge through rationality. — Hallucinogen

The epistemological status of belief is relevant only to those who insist it must be.

I have no problem with anyone (including Plato) presuming the moral perfection of the Gods without argument, especially an idealist such as Plato. Why would he waste his time arguing the perfection of that which appears to us as if it were shadows upon a wall in a cave? Is there a difference between the "ideal" and the "perfect" when it comes to the Gods?

Seems to me that free will is the ability which everybody has to choose
how to serve their Master, whether ego or conscience. — Piers

The self can be slave to ego or conscience, or the self can be master of ego or conscience. You have provided insufficient support for your claim that the former is necessarily the case.

Kaufmann, Walter A.. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton Classics Book 3). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

in tandem with

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Delphi Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (Illustrated) (Series Five Book 24) Delphi Classics. Kindle Edition.

modern philosophy appears above all as the construction of a technical jargon reserved for specialists — Dermot Griffin

Richard Rorty suggested to the effect that modern philosophy is more about "skillful" conversation and less about "interesting" conversation.

as Vaskane suggested, it is not a quote from Nietzsche. Instead, it is a scholar's "summarized" description of Nietzsche's overman/superman/ubermensch.

"The overman is the type approximated by Goethe—the human being . . . who has organized the chaos of his passions, given style to his character, and become creative. Aware of life's terrors, he affirms life without resentment." -- Walter A. Kaufmann

In: The Encyclopedia of of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Pages 504-514, Macmillan, New York. at page 511.

"To know thyself is the beginning of wisdom" - Socrates

and a reply in the post comment box at the end of the thread will refer to the original post only.

nature of existence — Philosophim

What does that even mean? What do you mean by "existence"?

Look at the logic I point out about being — Philosophim

I looked at your OP several times and it is void of your understanding of "being" and "nature of existence".

The notion of such a thing as a "logic of being" is interesting but hardly self explanatory. Many are likely to share an understanding of "logic" while not sharing an understanding of "being".

Simply put, there is nothing in your OP that explains your understanding of "being" and how your understanding of being and your understanding of logic are related.

A first cause is not logically necessary. — Banno

I agree. But that does not mean a first clause is precluded.

But logic in general is our best tool to analyze whether ideas fit in with the nature of existence as we know it. — Philosophim

this only begs the question. Even if "our" best tool required a first cause, then that would only mean that "our" best tool required a first cause. There is no basis for asserting that being or the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) must conform to "our" best tools.

Being is still not required to conform to logic even if logic is "our" best tool.

to say that "logic" necessitates a first cause is not the same as saying the "nature of existence" (whatever that means) necessitates a first cause. Being is not required to conform to our understanding of either logic or the nature of existence. Only we are.

Determinism is a tautology. If everything were exactly the same, then everything would be exactly the same. This is philosophy as industry. The freshmen love it.

If there is free will and you live as a slave to ego and conscience, then that is tragic.

If there is no free will and you live as if there is, then you could not have done otherwise.

I take little comfort in the notion that truth is either that which we agree to be true or that which is arguably true. It strikes me very much as another garbage in/garbage out situation.

I suspect that anyone unable to tell me what they mean by the terms they use does not know what they are talking about.

The word sensation does not come from Latin sensus. It comes from French sensation — Lionino

French is a Latin language.

Quine seemed to disbelieve that words have meaning yet to even say this he had to use the meaning of words. — PL Olcott

I suspect Quine would consider the process by which words are attached to meaning is far more organic than people prefer.

That is one reason why I am making sure to exclude them — PL Olcott

My bad.

I mistakenly presumed your post was about "Overcoming all objections to the Analytic / Synthetic distinction."

Good luck with that.

that can be verified as true — PL Olcott

or verified as not true. Cats are rocks. An analytical statement that is verified false is still an analytical statement. And the same can be said of synthetic statements. So again, whether a statement is true/false does not determine whether it is analytic/synthetic. Instead and consistent with your original post, the true difference between analytic or synthetic statements is the need for sense data.

We cannot have vagueness and ambiguity in the key terms that are being defined.
We must stipulate their precise definitions. — PL Olcott

You misunderstand. I am not saying your "definition" of either the analytic statement or the synthetic statement is ambiguous. Instead, "tokens" of the statement "type" synthetic are more prone to ambiguity than "tokens" of the statement "type" analytic.

A precise definition of "synthetic statement" will not render synthetic statements less prone to ambiguity than analytic statements. The world to which synthetic statements refer is more ambiguous than the world to which analytic statements refer. And you cannot define that difference away. You can try to account for it.

And besides, I think the definitions implicit in your original post are precise enough.

I believe turning the adjective into a noun-phrase does the heavy lifting for the dualist. But appending the suffix “-ness” to the word “conscious” doesn’t make a description of the thing a thing itself. — NOS4A2

Well said. But I suspect both materialism and dualism require "thing-ness". The "I" is subsumed by the "thing-ness" of the former while the "I" is ever more isolated by the "thing-ness" of the latter.

you may be correct in that the reliance upon sense data to configure the meaning of a statement renders the statement synthetic. But the truth value of either analytic or synthetic statements is irrelevant to that point.

"Cats are plants" may be an incorrect analytic statement but it is still an analytic statement. Similarly, the statement "there is a cat in my living room" when there is no cat in my living room may be an incorrect synthetic statement but it is still a synthetic statement.

The truth value regarding analytic/synthetic statements detracts from your central point. It is a classic red herring that only illustrates what is already known, i.e., synthetic statements are more fraught with ambiguity.

You cannot navigate without some kind of reference, point, line, star, compass reading, lighthouse, mountaintop, whatever. Definitions, then, at some point, essential. — tim wood

We are not bound by the already existing definitions created by others. We can use existing definitions, we can modify existing definitions, or we can create new definitions. A (the?) primary goal of philosophical discourse is to deepen understanding, not define it.

There is freedom because nobody is slave to ego or conscience. Please note I offered as much support for my refutation as you did for your claim.

First, Nietzsche did not say it worked. And second, there are more weak than there are strong.

are you talking about the actually real, the really actual, the really real, the truly real, the really true, the actually true, the truly true? Please clarify clearly or at least clearly clarify.

The term is inherently imprecise and any consensus regarding its meaning would render it useless.

I think if there's nothing there, there's no time. — frank

I agree.

never mind.

"the pursuit of truth" — Judaka

and

"a pursuit of truth" — Judaka

are not the same. I would agree that science is not "the" pursuit of truth.

Agreed. The purpose of science is to tell us what it can about nature, not to define it.

be all of that as it may, the manner in which relation, or interaction, or whatever you want to call it still needs to be explained. And I am not a dualist. I am simply pointing out that changing one form of substance ontology for another or calling it "relating" instead of "interacting" explains nothing.

And I certainly look forward to your putting this centuries old issue to rest once and for all. Good luck with that.

Interaction requires two or more things to interact. If we are one thing, which seems pretty obvious, this mis-states the question, and bad questions lead to bad answers. We can ask what is the relation between intentional and physical actions without assuming that that relation is an interaction. That is a sensible question and has sensible answers involving the origin and nature of such relations, not interactions. — Dfpolis

Because explaining how mind "relates" to entities not having the characteristics of mind is so much easier than explaining how mind "interacts" with entities not having the characteristics of mind?

Really? How contemporary is contemporary? Most people are monists these days, no? — bert1

When you say "most people" do you mean most "people" or most "philosophers of mind"? Either way, it seems to me that most "philosophers of mind" (including monists) accept the need to address the "interaction" between mind and entities not having the characteristics of mind.

Substituting one form of "substance" ontology for another does eliminate the issue?

I suspect that any feeling is an example of what it does "feel like to be energy."

there's a strong streak of "Let's find the ultimate truth about everything" in that tradition. — J

Agreed. And therein is the Chimera (ultimate truth). In a sense, Plato's idealism is premised upon the notion that we are incapable of any certainty regarding "the ultimate truth."