If the distance between two immediate points on time is absolutely zero then these points are simultaneous. — MoK

If there is 0 distance, it is the same point.

Moreover, the number of points on the real number line is known to be "c" so-called the cardinal number of the continuum.

Apples/oranges. The cardinality of the set of real numbers is not a member of the set of real numbers. Transfinite math is only relevent to comparing sets (e.g. the set of natural numbers to the set of real numbers). It has zero bearing on the discussion.

Yes, each point of time corresponds to an indivisible duration. But that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about two consecutive points on time. — MoK

If time is continuous, there are no "consecutive" points of time (there are no consecutive real numbers- just a "less than"/"greater than" relation.

If time is discrete, then the smallest unit of time is a duration, and there's no correspondence to points. (More apples/oranges).

Philosophim Well, we just disagree. — Sam26

Philosophim provided a well-reasoned rebuttal, in his post, and your response is simply that you disagree. I hope you can see that he was spot on, when he said:

Sam, I'm reading your future posts to others after our discussion ended, and an observation is that you don't address the criticisms people are levying against your points
... — Philosophim

All events lay on the same point if there is no gap or the gap length is zero. — MoK

Non-sequitur, and confused.

If time is continuous, it maps to the real number line. There are no "gaps" in the real number line.

If time is discrete, then each point of time corresponds to an indivisible/unmeasureable duration (relative to the real number line) - each unit abutting the next. Still no "gap", as you've described it.

I don't have a problem with that. I have a problem with your assumption there's a "gap" between points of time.

I can agree that: change iff time elapses. An event is any point in time (excluding an initial state, if there was one).

The gap exists in the discrete time as well as the continuous time. The gap however is arbitrarily small in the continuous time. If the gap is zero then all points of time lay on the same point therefore there cannot be any change in time.

If time is discrete, it still doesn't entail a gap, so it's an unsupported assumption. — Relativist

If time is discrete then it entails a gap. That is true since time exists on a discrete set of points with an interval between which there is nothing. — MoK

Sorry, I don't buy it. It seems a contrivance to lead to some desired conclusion, or the product of naivetee. But of course, I haven't yet seen your argument that shows it metaphyisically necessary that a gap exists. Got one?

My understanding is that Einstein believed in a non-personal, non-anthropogenic "law giver", and denied there existing a life after death. I suspect he felt this way because he could think of no other way to account for laws of nature. Metaphysics has advanced beyond that, so that doesn't sound as reasonable now as it might have back then.

There have been occasions on which I though that it was possible such a god existed, although it is didn't seem likely because it depends on the rather unparsimonious assumption that such a being just happens to exist. Even if it did exist, it would have no relevance in anyone's life - so it would be irrelevant.

Therefore, X and Y must lay on two different points of time. This means that there is a gap between X and Y. By gap I mean an interval that there is nothing between. But the substance in X cannot possibly cause the substance in Y because of the gap. That is true since the substance in X ceases to exist right at the point that the gap appears. Therefore, a single substance cannot undergo a change. — MoK

If time is continuous, there's no gap. If time is discrete, it still doesn't entail a gap, so it's an unsupported assumption.

What is "substance"? If the world is a quantum field, evolving over time consistent with a Schroedinger equation, what is the "substance"?

Let's see if we could agree on (2). We can move forward if we agree on (2). — MoK

Looks like we can't move on.

When I think of "spritual" I relate it to my childhood Christian faith. I was told to interpret various feelings a certain way, and I bought into it. So I think I have some grasp of what you're saying, but I know longer accept that paradigm.

Quantum indeterminacy can be interpreted as probabilistic causation: effects are still the consequences of causes, and the range of effects still predictable while the specific outcome (the eigenstate) is only preditctable probabilistically from among that range and the associated probability distribution.

1) Change exists — MoK

Actually, change occurs. What exists is the present, and its propensity to change - arguably because of laws of nature.

2) A single substance, let's call this the first substance, cannot undergo a change

What's your basis for claiming there is such a thing?

3) This means that we need another substance, let's call this the second substance, to cause a change in the first substance

Clearly, you have some metaphysical paradigm in mind, but you're only giving vague references to it. Maybe (just maybe) it's coherent, but you need to show why this paradigm should taken seriously, while explicitly defining it
...
The rest of your argument depends on the above.

What about matter creating the spiritual — Gregory

Why should I think "spirtual" refers to something that exists?

Being is the unity of what subsists and for him thoughts are being. The world is becoming, but our thoughts are eternal. — Gregory

I'm a materialist, and can't accept that a thought (nor abstraction) is truly a part of the furniture of the world. I don't insist everyone agree; I'm just defending the coherence and plausibility of materialism, based on Armstrong's materialist metaphysics.

I assume my car has an individual identity. Suppose my neighbor has a identical make and model, and we gradually start swapping parts. Eventually, the car in my driveway has none of its original parts and all of my neighbors parts. Is it now the neighbor's car? If so, how many parts had to be replaced to constitute the transformation?

Leibniz's law:
if, for every property F, object x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.

This means identity implies identical in every way. Any other definition of identity depends on an arbitary set of necessary and sufficient properties that persist over time - or the assumption that identity is some metaphysical thing that could take on any form (your identity could exist as a cat, a stone, a quark, or a gust of wind.)

Under strict identity, the car in my driveway today is causally connected to the car that was there yesterday so I can claim it as my car from day to day. There's no metaphysical core that makes it so, it's just the way I choose to identify "my car"

Identity (i.e. true identity, consistent with Leibniz' law) doesn't endure over time. Rather, we can identify a perduring identity, as a causally connected series of temporal parts.

Yes and no. I am saying that there is an ontological relation that is being identified, but not claiming the semantic conventions are relevant.

I'll add that there IS a bit of arbitrariness to what we identify as a "state of affairs" (i.e. an existent) in terms of what we choose to consider. We could rightly say the universe is a single existent, or we could say it consists of the set of all galaxies, or the set of all stars, or the set of all quarks, leptons, etc. But any object(s) we identify is still a state of affairs - something that exists, and it fits the framework (a thin particular+intrinsic properties+relations to other objects).

¬(A→B) = It is not the case that ("all bluebirds fly" implies "Fred is a duck")
— Relativist

is not true. — Lionino

The statement "It is not the case that ("all bluebirds fly" implies "Fred is a duck") IS true. But you're right that it's not equivalent to :
¬(A→B)

But why isn't it? It's because there is no material implication. The formula (A→B) cannot be used in all semantic instances of "if A then B".

I don't think I ever realized this before. When I took sophomore logic (50 years ago!), we concentrated on formulaic proofs. But the mapping to semantics is critical.

Thanks for this - I haven't read Heidegger. I did find this description of his use of the terms:

The ontic concerns concrete properties and characteristics of an entity, in contrast to the ontological which pertains to the specific way an entity of a certain kind has its characteristics.

I was not using the terms this way. I used "ontic" and "ontological" interchageably to simply identify something as actually existing in the world. The chair I am sitting on actually exists. A concept or perception of a chair (or anything else) does not exist in the world. So I would have said the chair I occupy is ontic or ontological, but my mental concept of the chair is not. Heidegger's distinction doesn't seem to apply to Armstrong's metaphysics, but to avoid confusion, I'll just "existent" or "existing in the world".

You can infer A from ¬(A→B) by De Morgan.
¬(A→B)
¬(¬A∨B) (definition of material implication)
¬¬A∧¬B (de Morgan)
A∧¬B (double negation) — Lionino

I concede your point, but what you have proven is that:
¬(A→B)
Implies A
(Which I confess seems counterintuitive - see below*).

You had said: If A does not imply B, and B is false, A is true

That second premise(¬B) is superfluous to the conclusion (A).
--------------------------------------

*Now suppose we apply the logic to these statements:
A=All bluebirds fly
B=Fred is a duck

¬(A→B) = It is not the case that ("all bluebirds fly" implies "Fred is a duck")... which is certainly true because the antecedent has no bearing at all on the consequent
(¬A∨B) = "not all bluebirds fly" or "Fred is a duck"
...
A∧¬B: All bluebirds fly and Fred is not a duck

Problems:
Despite the fact that ¬(A→B) is a true statement...
1) it is NOT true that all birdirds fly (hatchlings don't fly),
2) My pet duck is actually named Fred.
But the logic conclusion says otherwise.
Something ain't right. I had to dig out my 1973 Logic textbook to understand the problem, but I'd like to see if anyone can identify the problem on their own.

If the system we live in isn't just physical determinism, but physical determinism + soul determinism (or whatever independent realm he thinks the mind exists in), that's just... determinism. — flannel jesus

Pretty much, except that under physical determinism, it is (in principle) possible to predict all future decisions given perfect knowledge of initial conditions and laws of nature (set aside quantum indeterminacy). Not so with soul determinism: God isn't algoritmically figuring out what choices will be made, he just "knows" by magic.

Why the mental gymnastics? : to rationalize various theistic beliefs. IMO, these tortured rationalizations are good reasons to reject the nonsense.

I've even met people who argue for libertarian free will, and then upon some investigation it turns out all of their intuitions about free will are compatibilist too (but that's a bit rarer). — flannel jesus

Are you familiar with Molinism? William Lane Craig is a Molinist, insisting that we have LFW despite the fact that each choice could not have differed from what it actually was - because you can't do something contrary to what the omniscient God knew you would do. He nevertheless insists choices are freely willed: God just happens to have magical knowledge of what freely willed choices you will make.

In other "possible worlds" you might have made different choices, but that would be because the circumstances were different. This is nearly identical to compatibilism. The only real difference is that Craig assumes the mind/will operates independently of the deterministic forces of the universe. So although one's past "determines" (loosely speaking) ones choices, the determining is not exclusively due the necessity of laws of nature.

Well, of course, which we get through physical sensors that display information through light on a screen to your eyes. — Lionino

Maybe we can agree with this: all our knowledge of the world is grounded in our physical senses.

I'm late to the game, and I'm sorry if this has already been brought up. But just in case it hasn't, here's my response to the Op:

However, what about ¬(A→B)? What can we say about this in English? The first thought is "A does not imply B". But here is the trouble:

if ¬(A→B) is true
and B is false,
A is true. — Lionino

No, your conclusion (A is true) is not valid. You seem to be interpreting “¬(A→B)” as: “¬A->¬B”, and that’s invalid. “¬(A→B)” just means that the truth value of A does not give us a clue as to the truth value of B. A better English translation of ¬(A→B) is : it is not the case that A implies B

Consider these substitutions:
A=All bluebirds fly
B=Fred is a duck
This is consistent with ¬(A→B) being true. If we discover Fred is a pigeon then B is false, but it tells us nothing about whether or not all bluebirds fly.

There's plenty of evidence. I find that most people don't seem to be able to evaluate evidence properly, or they have an epistemological view that puts too much emphasis on science or a certain scientific view. Epistemology is more expansive than just science. Most of what we know is through the testimony of others. — Sam26

Do you agree that the best case you could possibly make would be an abductive one (i.e. an inference to best explanation)? In earlier posts, I've accused you of making an argument from ignorance - but you can avoid that by casting it as an abduction - arguing that your hypothesis is the best explanation for all available data. Why don't you do that? Fair warning: expect me, and others, to point out facts that you may be overlooking and the ad hoc nature of some assumptions you may be making.

*edit* I want to comment on this:

I'm not assuming anything. I'm making an inference based on the testimonial evidence that has been corroborated by doctors, nurses, family members, and friends. — Sam26

The correct inference should be: these people had some mental experiences, not that these mental experiences were of actual events. A mental experience COULD be associated with an actual event, but there's no evidence of it.

You have treated the state of the person (e.g. "near death"/comatose/ etc) as somehow implying the person must have had an actual experience, but that does not follow. Slightly stronger, but still deficient - you've suggest that measurable brain activity is nonexistent (or nearly so), and therefore the mental experience cannot be due to brain activity. Wrong again, because this depends on the assumption that these sort of mental activites would necessarily produce measureable brain activity. Brain measurements do not detect all neuronal activities. Again, it's POSSIBLE, but you haven't showed this possibility is the best explanation.

Being that we are physical beings who receive information through physical senses, one wonders if evidence of the non-physical is even possible. — Lionino

Fair point, but it only points to the logical possibility that something nonphysical exists --and that's insufficient to justify belief in it.

I'll add that we aren't JUST limited to information we receive through our senses. We can't physically sense quantum fields, but we have inferred their existence based on theoretical models that have great explanatory power and scope.

Given the pattern in scientific research and models, I can't see how there is the possibility to falsify the idea 'if we discovered something non-physical' we would change our model to include dualism or pluralism as real possibilities or the case. — Bylaw

I'm not just referring to the prevailing scientific models, but also to an individual justifying a belief. The relevant belief we're discussing is life after death. I interpreted that as being dependent on dualism, but I grant that is debatable- but I also think that is irrelevant to the issue at hand: do the anecdotes of NDEs suffice as evidence to justify belief in a life after death? I think the answer is no.

Do you mean that we perceive these as different, our perceptions of such objects are different? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm discussing an ontological theory: they are truly different, irrespective of what we perceive.

That these angles of degrees are an accurate description of what is really the object, is highly doubtful, so we're best off to just recognize that these are descriptions of what we perceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was intended only as an example of an ontic property, to illustrate that properties do not exist independently of the objects that have them - in this ontological theory. If you don't happen to believe there actually exist objects with angles, it's irrelevant to the point. If you simply want to contrast this theory with some alternative theory, you first need to understand this one- then you can contrast it.

We discussed in this thread the necessity of brain to function to have a consciousness. We concluded that consciousness does not exist outside of a functioning brain.

That is a false conclusion. Our consciousness may exist after death, but since it is not bound to any body, there is no physical evidence that it exists. Likely they don't exist, but possibly they do. — god must be atheist

You'd have a point if this were a deductive conclusion. It's not. It's abductive: it's the best explanation for the set of known facts. Abductive conclusions do not prove the converse is logically impossible, and they are falsifiable. Physicalism could be falsified by clear evidence of something nonphysical existing. But in the absence of evidence, it's ad hoc to assume dualism (even though it's logically possible).

When you say existence is a state of affairs, do you mean an "event" as in Process and Reality — Gregory

No. I'm referring to David Amstrong's use of the term. "State of affairs" is the term he uses to refer to any ontic object. If X exists, then X is a state of affairs.

He uses this clumsy term in order to stress that everything that exists has 3 types of constituents, and the constituents never exist in the world independently of a state of affairs.

The 3 types of constituents are: (thin) particular*, (intrinsic) properties, and relations (=extrinsic properties). They constitute a state of affairs.

* A state of affairs can also be referred to as a particular. This is a "thick" particular. "Thin" particular is just an abstraction of a thick particular (=state of affairs) minus the properties and relations. He does this because he denies that existents (states of affairs) are simply bundles of properties.

These conventions are semantics, and do not erase the fact that there is a ontic relation. An object with the relation labled 90 degrees is logically and ontologically different from an object that we label 45 degrees (under the same set of conventions) - and they are different irrespective of how we choose to abstractly divide a circle.

What is instantiated is what we sense as particular things, and that something has a 90 degree angle is a judgement we make. So "90 degree angle" is not an instantiation of the particular, it is a judgement which is made by human beings, produced through measurement — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying the relation of 90 degrees, that we measure, does not describe an objective fact? Of course, we define "degree" and "90", but the relation we identify as such is not mere opinion - it describes an ontological relation (setting aside the inherent error of making measurements). Do you disagree?

God should teach them how not to make unserious arguments. — Lionino

:rofl: :rofl:

[

Do you still believe you see the world as it is? — Gregory

I believe we perceive a reflection of the actual world, one that is functionally accurate - i.e. it enables us to successfully interact with the world - which is mandatory for survival. I believe ontological theories (like the one I referenced) are theories about the way the world actually is - foundational aspects, at least.

Still, all our knowledge and theories are grounded in our human perspectives (this is actually the "relativism" I based my screen name on). I also don't think this is actually a problem, or at least not a problem worth worrying about.

What are we adding to our conceptual scheme by speaking of universals that modern materialism is missing? — Gregory

I think nominalists and Humeans are missing something. Properties are ways things are, and there do seem to be multiple objects that have commonnalities in the way they are. IMO, Humean regularity theory doesn't have a satisfactory account of laws of nature. Armstrong (a modern materialist) improves upon these.

I think it's useful to consider a "soul" as a person's essence: that core of a person that actually persists over time throughout life and possibly beyond into an afterlife.

I don't actually believe in souls, an afterlife, or that there exists an ontological "essence", but focusing on essence helps to identify the problems: if there is no essence, then there is no soul.

Consider the set of memories you have. This can't be essential (part of your essence) because the set changes over time - we both add memories, and lose them. Further, there's strong evidence memories are "stored" physically in the brain, which implies they cease to exist at death. If some invisible essence (soul) of mine continues to exist after my death, it seems rather irrelevant if it lacks my memories. (When I've brought this up to Theists, they suggest God could basically copy your memories into some immaterial form that attaches to your soul. To an atheist like me, this seems an ad hoc rationalization).

To me the question is whether what we exprience as "matter" is purely material and nothing else. Aristotle doesn't believe forms are purely abstractions but reside inside, or maybe for properly "around" matter, as well as existing within the mind. — Gregory

My view is mostly consistent with (physicalist) David Armstrong's metaphysics: everything that exists (an existent) is a "state of affairs" which is a particular with its properties. Properties do not exist independently; they exist only imminantly - instantiated in a state of affairs.

The same property can be held by multiple existents, therefore a property is a universal. Example: -1 electric charge is a property held by every electron (as well as other objects), so it is a universal. Universals are anything that can be multiply instantiated, which includes sets of properties (consider the complete set of properties that an electron has; so "electron" is also a universal).

We mentally identify properties through "the way of abstraction": conceptions are formed by considering the common features of several objects or ideas and ignoring the irrelevant features that distinguish those objects. Obviously, the abstract concept of a -1 electric charge is not the charge itself.

This makes the most sense to me because it parsimoniously accounts for everything that exists, while rejecting nominalism. It even provides a framework for laws of nature.

What the framework doesn't do is to treat abstractions as having some direct relation to the objects to which they apply. There is only the indirect relation of the way of abstraction.

I'll defer to your knowledge of Aristotle, but that still doesn't make it so - that abstractions have actual, independent existence. It's unnecessary to an ontology.

I'm not a relativist in any traditional sense.

Universals have to do with forms, which are immaterial. — Gregory

That is a platonist view. The alternative (and my preference) is immanent universals: they exist exclusively in their instantiations.

Example: a 90 degree angle is instantiated in objects that have this angle. "90 degree angle" doesn't exist independently in some "platonic heaven".

I do agree that sensory experiences are not dependent on sense organs. — Sam26

You misunderstand if you think I believe that. I don't. My point is simply that IF one gives credence to those handful of NDE+OBE claims, wherein the individual purports to have seen/heard events (say) in another room, clairvoyance (perceiving events without the use of sense organs) would not be unreasonable. I'm skeptical this has truly occurred, but I know there are NDE enthusuasts who are convinced they have. They, of course, jump to the conclusion that dualism is true and the spirit lives on after death. That's non-sequitur.

You pointed to Eban Alexander, so I found and read an article he'd written. A decomposed brain is truly "mush" - it's physical structure is destroyed. Alexander's brain wasn't mush, it was sick. He was in a coma, he hadn't even died in the clinical sense you are fond of referencing. It appears that his sick brain generated some vivid mental experiences, which he interpreted as veridical heavenly experiences. I'm not impressed.

You're assuming that because the brain is still in some sense alive the experiences must be coming from that lower functioning state. There's no good evidence that that's the case. — Sam26

Argument from ignorance: neuroscience hasn't explained something, so it must be dualism. There's no evidence of anything unnatural, so it's ad hoc to propose it here. In no sense is the brain of a comatose patient dead, contrary to what you wish to believe.

Many who believe in a life after death in heaven, tend to consider these anecdotes as "proof". They made the fraudulent book "The Boy Who Came Back From Heaven" a best seller.

You can choose to believe this stuff, if you like, but if you think you have an objective argument for NDEs proving dualism, or a life after death, you are fooling yourself.

The evidence, as my argument concludes, is that there is enough consistency and corroboration of the reports to conclude reasonably that consciousness is not dependent on the brain. — Sam26

Non-sequitur. In 100% of cases, there is still a functional brain. An optimistic (yet debatable) interpretation of the evidence is that sensory input is not dependent on sense organs.

But they did. — NOS4A2

No, they didn't. Clinton was presented information purported to establish a secret communications link between Trump and Russia's Alfa Bank. She approved the proposal to make this public. No one lied, they were simply mistaken.

Funny you'd bring this up, since this incident led your hero, Durham, to prosecute Sussman for making a false statement to the FBI (one of those "process crimes" you complain about, when it involves a Trump loyalist). But it was shown at trial that Sussman believed what he told the FBI. It also came out that no one in the Clinton campaign approved taking this to the FBI. If you were consistent, you'd be complaining about the injustice done to Sussman. It never should have gone to trial.