The criticism I began with is that if you set out those criteria, if you set out your expectations for a good hypothesis, then what you are in effect doing is choosing only the hypotheses that meet those expectations; I somewhat hyperbolically called that "confirmation bias" - you get what you want, an so perhaps not what you need.

On this approach, is any theory that does not meet one's expectations a conspiracy theory? Seems to be so, unless there is some additional criteria. — Banno

In answer to the question: we could dispense with using the term "conspiracy theory" entirely, and simply apply good epistemic judgement to any theory that comes along. Let's consider some factors that affect this judgement.

1) I contend that more credence should be given to claims that are supported by evidence, than those that are purely speculation. Often, the evidence is insufficient to establish the claim beyond reasonable doubt (or some other standard we might apply). So it is of course possible the speculation is true, and the one supported by evidence is false. But have we made an error of judgement? Possibilities are endless, so if we dwell on all possibilities, we will never make a judgement - we'll be lost, wandering through a forest of possibilities. We can make a judgement, while remaining open to revising it when we learn more. Maybe evidence supporting the speculation will come out.

2) Plausibility is a factor in epistemic judgement. This will be a function of background beliefs, but it's grossly impractical to start from the ground up when judging every claim. I've said it's implausible that hundreds or thousands of people could maintain a conspiratorial secret for any extended period of time. It would entail unwavering commitment to the cause, and perfect competence by all. I can't claim it's impossible, but I judge it to be grossly implausible. I apply this as a background belief when judging a claim. But because it's possible, I could be missing an exception by ruling it out prematurely,. But again: possibilities are endless, so if we're going to make a judgement, we need to narrow down the possibilities.

Feyerabend,...His argument gets a bit deeper than that, but there's a start, since this is counter to the naive view of abductuion as choosing the best theory. — Banno

His case studies do not entail choosing a best theory. I'll interject Kuhn's "scientific revolutions" concept - these entail a sort of selecting of a better theory. It's a process that is gradual and collective, not an individual sitting down and juxtaposing the respective theories and applying some rules, but the process has the same net effect.

There's another issue that is unique to science:"The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, mistakes, and so on. On closer analysis we find that science knows no "bare facts" at all but that the "facts" that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be as complex, chaotic, full of mistakes..."
[Feyerabend, "Against Method", p 3).

I can't find the quote, but elsewhere he discusses the fact that scientific theories are invariably inconsistent - they entail come contradictions or other clear falsehoods (example: the cosmological constant problem). This provides a strong reason to set aside the commonly accepted theoretical framework, at times (let's not forget that progress is also made within current theoretical frameworks).

These issues don't apply to everyday epistemic judgments. Of course, you COULD point to various metaphysical theories that could call everything into question (e.g. idealism, solipsism), but such an approach is as unpragmatic as you can get. It's hard enough to navigate the world just in the way we commonly view it, so (IMO) it's silly to be paralyzed by these various metaphysical possibilities.

Now some care is needed here. We agree that we do "make judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion". what I am baulking at is calling these judgements "abduction", if what is meant is that they are correct, or true, or worse, necessary. — Banno

I agree, and that's why I'm referring to them as "epistemic judgements". It would be unwarranted to claim a judgement made through abduction constitutes knowledge, in the strictest sense, or that it entails necessity. Even more so than the lip-service we give to the epistemic status of scientific theories: they can only be warranted as provisional. The "best" in "inference to best explanation" isn't an absolute claim that there can be no better explanation. It's simply a judgement that the selected hypothesis is best, among the options considered.

Does that fill the hole you mentioned?

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mind. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?
— Relativist

Of course. — apokrisis

Then appreciate how this relates to what I'm saying about IBEs. My explanation is "better".

In the modern world, is your anti-conspiratorial stance still the legitimate thing? Can the truth even be secured without accepting a dash of conspiratorial doubt given the fact that even the well intentioned have reason to gloss over or edit the facts as they might exist. — apokrisis

I don't have an "anti-conspiratorial stance". Conspiracies certainly occur. However, large scale conspiracies involving hundreds or thousands of people, particularly over many years, with 100% adherence to maintaining the fiction is implausible. Faking the moon landing would require this. A "false flag" operation by the US government in taking down the WTC on 9/11 would require this. It's an inherent implausibility in many conspiracy theories. Real conspiracies are apt to be exposed when very many are involved- some will screw up; some may have second thoughts.

Anything is possible. So the burden shifts to what - by logical constraint - remains credible.

We can pretend life is a science project or learn to assess situations in more pragmatic fashion. A skill becoming more necessary everyday it seems. — apokrisis

Absolutely! That's exactly what I'm talking about.

But again my point is how even for conspiracy theories, it cuts both ways. We are in a new media era where there is vastly more individual capacity to data mine and fact check. We can find out what is real about public events to a degree that we couldn’t before. That should be a good thing. And couple that power to a general rationality - an ability to step back with a world view that asks, well what are the odds - then conspiracy thinking could morph into something valuable. Producing needed social change. — apokrisis

Absolutely: we have an abundance of easily accessible information. In a perfect world, everyone would apply good epistemic judgement when trying to make sense of the information. In our imperfect world, we can at least strive to do this ourselves. This means trying to avoid being overly influenced by our biases (as in the case of my sister-in-law); it means valuing evidence over pure conjecture; it means considering the plausibility of claims; it means being willing to reevaluate our assumptions instead of tenaciously rationalizing our initial reactions. We can also attempt to persuade and to discuss the need for good epistemic judgement, but we also should be open to being persuaded by good reasoning.

I’m not giving Candace Owen high marks as yet. — apokrisis

I don't know much about her, so I checked Wikipedia. Apparently she promotes a variety of conspiracy theories. From this, I infer she has poor epistemic judgement, and thus I would'nt gain much but listening to her. It would be foolish for anyone to uncritically accept the claims of anyone with that track record.

There's a reason the term "conspiracy theory" has evolved to entail being irrational: they entail a set of common errors of epistemic judgement. Don't take my word* for it, but do examine the basis for any theory you find intriguing.

* The wikipedia article on conspiracy theories is worth a read.

What's your point? Are you just acknowledging what I said about background beliefs being involved in our epistemic judgements?

But again, if nothing is certain—even conceptually—then you can't weigh anything as more or less certain. — Leontiskos

Suppose you can't find your car keys, one morning. What possibly happened to them? Did it fall into an interdimensional portal; did a poltergeist hide them? Did a monkey come through an unlocked window and take them? Was there a glitch in the matrix? The possibilities are endless. But only a few are truly worth consideration, like - maybe you. left them in the pants you were wearing, you dropped them, left them on the kitchen table, or in the car.

More generally, it is often the case that we would consider some possibilities more credible/plausible/likely than others. Examples:

-It's quite plausible for one person to keep a secret, but less plausible that hundreds can keep the same secret for decades with no noticeable slip-ups (this is one common problem with conspiracy theories).

-Suppose you have 2 alternative possibilities, but there is supporting evidence for only one. Evidence gives a good reason to treat it more credibly.

If someone's theory is bad, then you should say why it is bad in a way that would be convincing even to them. — Leontiskos

That assumes the other person is reasonable. I actually did explain to my sister-in-law why her belief that Trump staged his assassination attempt was flawed, and she just responded that I give Trump too much credit.

Another factor: background beliefs. They are factors that influence our judgements. Of course, they can be challenged, but how deep do we ever go? People are apt to get frustrated or pissed off before a meeting of the minds is reached.

Yet another factor: Some people are more apt to make clear epistemic judgements, and some are more apt to reserve judgement. There's no objectively correct point at which judgement is deemed appropriate, although one ought to try an be consistent. This is a factor in past judgements that are within our background beliefs - so there's an abundance of reasons why 2 reasonable people may disagree.

if you have a number of different explanatory kinds in your belt, and one of them is IBE, then labeling one of your explanations an IBE is intelligible vis-a-vis the differentiation it provides. — Leontiskos

Agreed.

Or riffing on my parasitic idea from earlier, you can't talk about an "inference to the best explanation" if you aren't able to tell us what an explanation is. — Leontiskos

In this context, an explanation is a conclusion someone is drawing from some set of evidence and background facts.

There are a number of folk on this forum who reject all substantive approaches to causality and explanation, substitute in their term "inference to the best explanation," and think they have won the day. But this is a rather confused move. If there are no real explanations, can there really be any best explanations? If I don't have even a conceptual understanding of what counts as an explanation, then how am I to know how to identify better or lesser explanations? — Leontiskos

I don't know what your talking about regarding "causality and explanation". But I'd say that an IBE is always a conclusion, but it may simply be a conclusion to reserve judgement. For example: is there a "best" interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? IMO, no- because they are all consistent with the measurements- there's no objective basis to choose one, so I think we should reserve judgement.

We often don't have multiple, distinct "explanations" to choose from; we're just assessing whether or not there's sufficient justification to support an assertion. We examine this justification and decide whether to affirm it, deny it, or reserve judgement. It's the same process, whether or not we choose to label it abduction.

Is the argument that abduction can be used to pick out which theories are conspiracy theories? — Banno

No. Rather, abduction would tend to rule out theories that are commonly called conspiracy theories, but it's irrelevant whether they've been labelled as that.


As far as I'm concerned, anything goes when it comes to proposing an explanatory hypothesis. Brainstorming works best when unconstrained. But applying abduction results in sorting out from consideration those hypotheses that have the weakest support.

a conspiracy theorist may just insist that the conspiracy is the more reasonable conclusion. — Banno

You can lead a horse to water....

But not really relevant. I argue that we think abductively all the time: we make epistemic judgements based on data too sparse to draw a deductive conclusion. This isn't about trying to convince anybody, it's about ourselves thinking critically.

Of course, it does help to review one's hypothesis with others, to invite criticism - hearing different perspectives on the body of facts (adding, removing, revising), exposing our biases, and hearing alternative interpretations. But ultimately, we all make our own epistemic judgements.

If our case IS sound (in an abductive sense), then it probably would convince others, but that's a byproduct.
.

My point is that: 1) we can draw some conclusions based on the information that IS available; 2) some conclusions are more reasonable than others; 3) (obviously) it's contingent upon the information being correct.

I gave my family member's reasoning, and mine. Don't you agree mine is more reasonable?

Shots were definitely fired, an audience member was killed, and so was the shooter. The shooter had the actual gun. Trump's injury was minor -evident from the absence of a visible scar. At one point, the FBI director suggested the injury may be from shrapnel, such as a richocheted bullet fragment or from something a bullet hit. Trump verbally attacked him for this.

A family member of mine considers 3 "facts" to be proof positive it was staged: 1) Trump's injury was minor 2) he capitalized on the attempt in his campaign- including making out his injury to be worse than it was. 3) Trump's an asshole.

IMHO, that is not sufficient basis to draw that conclusion. It also overlooks the fact that the Secret Service (and FBI) identified negligence by the Secret Service.

So I think the evidence points to this being a genuine attempt on his life, although his actual injury was minor. Trump is apt to exaggerate, and he's adept at taking political advantage of anything. It played well to his devoted followers who consider him an emissary from.God.

I’m watching this happen in real time after Charlie Kirk’s shooting. And the process is not so simple.

The problem is that we do live in a world where everyone is telling self-interested stories. Governments - even when their intentions are good - will edit the facts to make them palatable for public consumption. — apokrisis

There are elementary errors being made. Two in particular: bias and too little evidence.

A dearth of evidence implies a plethora of possibilities. Bias narrows the possibilities one considers.

Consider the Trump shooting last year. Some on right jumped to the conclusion that there was a leftist conspiracy. Some on the right thought it was contrived by Trump. Investigations have exposed no such conspiracies. Of course, coverups are possible, but possibilities are not evidence.

Any citizen who starts to dig into the facts as they are presented will always seem to find more and more that does not fit the narrative.

And some will rationalize the evidence that doesn't fit. For example, by claiming it's contrived by the conspirators. "This is what they want you to think." So it becomes further "proof" of the conspiracy, in their minds.

We may have different notions of abduction. My conception of abduction certainly doesn't preclude novel thinking or "thinking outside the box". — Janus

In the relevant cases, the "outside the box" means going in directions that are contradicted by current theory. In terms of abduction, the hypothesis is falsified before it's investigated. Even if this can be rationalized to abduction, the broader point is that they aren't being guided at all by abduction - but by something on the spectrum of idiotic wild-guess to brilliant insight.

But I still don't think this is the whole picture. There's still the matter of gaining broad acceptance. Einstein thought outside the box with his insight, but broad acceptance still depended on demonstrating how his theory was "better" than alternatives.

I often hear it said that science doesn't progress through cumulative knowledge and understanding, but through paradigm shifts. I don't think it's entirely one or the other and I don't think the 'paradigm shift' paradigm is an accurate picture except at the broadest scales. How many historical scientific paradigm shifts can you think of ? — Janus

Kuhn came up with the "paradigm shift" view, and he discussed some historical examples that made sense to me when I read his book 40+ years ago. Examples I recall are Newtonian Gravity to General Relativity, and geo-centrism to helio-centrism. But I think you're right that these are rare.

Our brains are thankfully just rather good at such pattern processing. They are evolved to separate signal from noise. — apokrisis

Yes, pattern recognition is our strength, but it can also lead us astray at times. Just because we see the shape of a puppy in the clouds, doesn't imply there's anything truly dog-like up there. Just because we see a pattern of dice throws, doesn't imply the next throws are predictable. Just because some particular alignment of planets coincided with the nature of some type of event , doesn't imply there's truly a cause-effect relationship.

On the other hand, I suspect that great insights also come from pattern recognition. Einstein didn't work out general relativity by starting with a set of equations and see where they'd lead. He had a hunch, an insight that led him to mathematically connect the dots.

The formulator of, what becomes, a conspiracy theory - may see a pattern. In itself, that's perfectly fine. But errors creep in when he starts to apply confirmation bias, and fails to challenge some of his own assumptions. They stop trying to solve a problem, and begin just rationalizing their hunch. The problem accelerates when other like-minded people embrace it, and contribute to the rationalization, and praise each others' brilliance. The process is quite different from past, brilliant insights that have proved so fruitful. It's a corruption.

Of course scientists are creative. Calling there creativity "abduction" and locking it down to Peirce's simplistic schema is denigrating that creativity. Positing abduction as a response to Hume's scepticism is piling obfuscation on top of misunderstanding. — Banno

I didn't do that. I brought up creativity to distinguish it from abduction.

I'm reading "Against Method", and so far - it's confirming what I thought. He is NOT denigrating abduction; he's just saying it is not a process that is appropriate for advancing science- for a variety of very good reasons. New theory could never emerge if it were constrained to the old theoretical framework. It's necessary to think outside the box.

But this has no bearing on the reasonableness of utilizing abduction to make epistemic judgements to justify our beliefs in everyday life. It is absurd to give equal credence to every possibility on the sole basis of logical possibility- stronger epistemic support is needed. Abduction can provide that.

Let's look at an example. The government is hiding evidence of alien landings. This asserts the existence of some thing - alien landings - but nothing is said here about where or when. However the government responds, it is open to the believer to maintain their position. If they open area 51 to inspection, the theorist can say that the evidence has been moved elsewhere. If they deny that there is any evidence, that reinforces the idea of a conspiracy.

Where is abduction here? — Banno

The hypothesis of alien landings is not an inference to the best explanation of all available facts. It could be a reasonable initial reaction to some report, but further analysis ought to expose problems with the theory. Are alternative explanations sought? Has the feasibility of long-distance space travel been considered? Should technologically intelligent life be deemed sufficiently common in our sector of the galaxy to consider their presence plausible?

What about the conspiracy itself? How many individuals would have to be involved? Is it plausible that all of them would keep the secret?

Implausibilities and disconfirming facts are ignored and the merely possible is treated as plausible. The repeated rationalizations implies the conspiracy theorist is not reconsidering the hypothesis as more information comes to light.

There's invariably a demand that naysayers "prove them wrong"- which is an absurd standard - since they are also not provably right. It's possible that hundreds of people are behaving perfectly at keeping the secret, and taking the secret to their graves. It's possible Einstein is wrong about speed of light limitations on travel. But the many implausibilities should have bearing on ones's judgement.

Almost nothing in life is provably true, but we can still weigh facts and evidence - and strive to do this as reasonably as possible- that is all abduction is. It is about justifying ones beliefs. Believing one proposition to be true, solely on the basis that is is possible does not entail a rational justification, and it only gets more irrational when the basis consists of a conjunction of many propositions that are mere possibilities.

The point is that there are common patterns that conspiracy theories follow that reflect poor reasoning. Yes, they can individually be debunked, but common reasoning errors can also be identified. I mentioned a few in the post you responded to.

Science doesn't progress solely via abduction, but it certainly could not progress at all, or even get off the ground, without it. — Janus

Agreed.

Prompted by claims made in this thread, I have begun reading Paul Feyerabend's "Against Method". His focus is on the advance of science through creative processes that are at odds with abduction. For example, scientific breakthroughs often depend on thinking outside the box and dropping theory-laden assumptions. He makes good points about this, but he's not making arguments against the reasonableness of abduction as an epistemological methodology for comparing hypotheses.

Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. "Inference to best explanation" is utterly hollow, until one sets out what a best explanation is.
— Banno

This is right, as I was trying to point out to Relativist elsewhere. — Leontiskos

I never said that abduction PROVIDES explanations. I said it entails process for SELECTING an explanation.

And I DID outline some criteria:

Abduction entails drawing a non-necessary inference from a set of data (intended to be all available, relevant data), that consists of an explanatory hypothesis for that data - one that is deemed to explain the data better* than alternatives.

The inference is defeasible- it can be falsified by new, relevant data (previously overlooked or newly discovered) that is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Alternatively, it can be supplanted by a new hypothesis that demonstrably provides a superior* explanation.
________________
*[see next quote ]
________________ — Relativist

Methodology is indeed key. Some basics: explanatory scope and power, parsimony, more plausible than alternatives (consistent with more facts that are commonly accepted), fewer ad hoc assumptions (ad hoc suppositions are assumptions that are not entailed by the data and other commonly accepted facts). Biases entail ad hoc assumptions. It also entails consideration of other hypotheses.

Ideally, an abductive conclusion ought to be only as specific as the information warrants, otherwise it will include ad hoc assumptions.

Finally, the level of certainty ought to tied to the strength of the case. For example, consider a jury verdict based on a preponderance of evidence vs one based on "beyond reasonable doubt". A chosen "best" explanation may still be (arguably) unlikely. There's always the risk of choosing "the best of a bad lot"- which would tend to be the case when the data is sparse.

It's useful to solicit and receive feedback from others with divergent views. This can help identify overlooked, relevant facts, challenge assumptions that are ad hoc or reflect bias, and identify alternative hypotheses for comparing. — Relativist

I also pointed out that the errors made by conspiracy theorists is that they are not properly applying such principles.

The criticisms directed at me all pertain to the advance of science- that it isn't made through abduction. This is irrelevant to my general points - that it is reasonable to apply IBE in our epistemic judgements, and that we all do this every day - most often, in a superficial way. When we challenge each others' opinions in this forum, we often dig deeper to justify our claims: we're defending our beliefs on the basis of the factors that lead to our (abductive) judgement.

It is not irrational to believe in conspiracies. — Banno

False equivalence.

A conspiracy is any covert plan involving two or people. One could have a theory that a conspiracy has occurred, but the term "conspiracy theory" has come to have a special meaning. It refers to irrationally jumping to the conclusion that there is some absurdly widespread conspiracy behind some perceived issue. Examples:
-9/11 Conspiracy theories
-Pizzagate
Faked moon landing
Big Pharma Conspiracies
UFO Conspiracy Theories

In all cases, they are based on biased speculation, cherry picking of facts, ignoring or rationalizing discofirming evidence - i.e. bad epistemology.

So there's good reason to question the use of abduction hereabouts.
1h — Banno

You haven't provided one. You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed.

Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. — Banno

Abduction doesn't provide explanations, it COMPARES explanations. I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction.

From what I know of Feyerabend, he appears to be discussing the creative processes of scientists: they are not following an abductive script. Rather. They have hunches/insights that they pursue in their research and sometimes these bear fruit.

However, if we focus on the process of new theory becoming generally accepted as true, abduction does apply. Theories DO get falsified, revised, and replaced - consistent with abduction.

So if we're focussing on advancing knowledge, creativity is critical. But more often, in everyday life, we are making epistemic judgements on incomplete data - and there ARE objective means of evaluating the possible explanations - as I discussed in my last post. If you deny the efficacy of abduction, then you have no basis to reject conspiracy theories.

I am writing this thread because I struggle with the 'here and now', especially fearing the future. — Jack Cummins

This strikes me as a psychological issue, or perhaps a personal philosophy of life issue. I question whether you'll find the sort of peace you seem to be seeking, by pursuing it from more generalized philosophy. You might consider asking others how they deal with the sorts of issue that you struggle with. Maybe something will click for you.

Science is not equivalent to what individual scientists say. I'm referring to commonly accepted theory.
— Relativist

And individual scientists do not talk about commonly accepted theory? — unenlightened

Irrelevant to the point I made: you accept some things as true, despite the possibility it is false.

Really, what do you imagine needs your stalwart defence here? Are you having a battle to see who understands science better? Enough already!

Not all all. Up to now, you seem to have been arguing that if a statement is POSSIBLY false, then it cannot be assumed true. That is what I was challenging.

Accepting science means you treat the body of scientific information as true, despite the fact that it is possibly false — Relativist

No it doesn't. — unenlightened

Then explain by what you meant by "I believe in science."

Scientists are not all equally scrupulous, and are subject to peer pressure, the persuasion of big pharma et cetera, and the need to get funding. Some science is biased and some is slapdash, and some is bullshit. It's not supposed to be religion where you just believe what the high priests say. — unenlightened

False equivalence. Science is not equivalent to what individual scientists say. I'm referring to commonly accepted theory. How we deal with the potential for bias by scientists is another matter.

Accepting science means you treat the body of scientific information as true, despite the fact that it is possibly false. IOW, the mere fact that a scientific "fact" is possibly false is not sufficient reason to withhold judgement on it.

To be consistent, apply this more broadly. It's reasonable and rational to draw conclusions based on incomplete information. That's what abductive reasoning is all about. I discussed this in my last 2 replies to Banno (1. Here and 2.here).

Better" - an improvement on "best", but suffering the same ambiguity. If abduction is going to tell us which of the innumerable possible explanatory hypotheses to choose, then we need more than an asterisk and a deference. We need the basis for that choice. Otherwise abduction falls to underdetermination, to the Duhem–Quine problem. — Banno

If a conclusion were "determined" (not underdetermined) it would be a deduction- a conclusion that follows necessarily.

Of course, as you said, deduction would be preferred, but in real life (including science) we rarely have sufficient information to make a deduction. But there is often sufficient information to support some hypotheses more than others.

So it comes down to how you cash out better/superior.

And hence my original point, that whatever criteria you choose, you are subsequently just reinforcing that choice. — Banno

Methodology is indeed key. Some basics: explanatory scope and power, parsimony, more plausible than alternatives (consistent with more facts that are commonly accepted), fewer ad hoc assumptions (ad hoc suppositions are assumptions that are not entailed by the data and other commonly accepted facts). Biases entail ad hoc assumptions. It also entails consideration of other hypotheses.

Ideally, an abductive conclusion ought to be only as specific as the information warrants, otherwise it will include ad hoc assumptions.

Finally, the level of certainty ought to tied to the strength of the case. For example, consider a jury verdict based on a preponderance of evidence vs one based on "beyond reasonable doubt". A chosen "best" explanation may still be (arguably) unlikely. There's always the risk of choosing "the best of a bad lot"- which would tend to be the case when the data is sparse.

It's useful to solicit and receive feedback from others with divergent views. This can help identify overlooked, relevant facts, challenge assumptions that are ad hoc or reflect bias, and identify alternative hypotheses for comparing.

Your claim that abductive reasoning entails "reinforcing that choice" is false. That would be a corruption of abduction, such as occurs with conspiracy theories. The criteria I listed are sufficient to reject conspiracy theories. They depend on biased (ad hoc) assumptions, cherry-pick facts, instead of considering all relevant facts, reject or rationalize facts that are inconsistent with the theory, and a person's conviction toward a theory tends to gain strength by seeking endorsement others with similar biases, while alternative hypotheses are rejected on the basis of bias and/or an unjustified faith in the conspiracy theory.

OK, I'll bite. I'll give a general idea of abduction.

Abduction entails drawing a non-necessary inference from a set of data (intended to be all available, relevant data), that consists of an explanatory hypothesis for that data - one that is deemed to explain the data better* than alternatives.

The inference is defeasible- it can be falsified by new, relevant data (previously overlooked or newly discovered) that is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Alternatively, it can be supplanted by a new hypothesis that demonstrably provides a superior* explanation.

This is consistent with the de facto means by which science advances through theory development, verification, revision, and replacement.

________________
*I'm deferring discussion of what makes an explanation better/superior.
________________

I could go into more details, but this suffices as a general description. Describe what what you disagree with, and provide what you consider a correct description.

Of course not. A rejection of one way that philosophers have claimed science works is not a rejection of science. That scientific theory is developed through abduction is a theory about scientific method. Pointing out the problems with that theory is not pointing out problems with what scientists do, but with what philosophers claim that scientists do. — Banno

OK, then you know what abduction is, and claim that science doesn't actually use abduction. Tell me what science actually does that lends it credibility, that is lacking with abduction.

You didn't answer my question about conspiracy theories- are they credible? If not, why not?

I didn't ignore randomness. I pointed out that (true) randomness is something outside our control. So it could account for a different outcome, but it's not a different outcome due to an act of will- it doesn't entail libertarian free will.

But is there actually true randomness involved? This would be impossible to establish. I mentioned the role of physical and emotional state, conditioned responses, and of subtle factors in the environment. These could constitute subconscious factors that determine the decision. It's impossible to know. .

Abduction is not an answer to Hume. Indeed, at its heart, it remains unclear what abduction amounts to; and as such, it is ineligible as a grounding for rational discourse. — Banno

Do you reject everything science teaches? Scientific theory is developed through abduction, and it has proved successful.

Do you consider conspiracy theories credible? If not, why not?

if they are all nothing more than the resolution of interacting/competing/conflicting bioelectric (autocorrect said "buttercream" the first time :rofl:) currents running around the brain. — Patterner

Assume the mind is not equivalent to the brain. Could you have chosen differently? You still had a set of background beliefs, a set of conditioned responses, a particular emotional state and physical state, were subject to a particular set of stimuli in your immediate environment, and you had a particular series of thoughts that concluded with the specific ice cream order that you made. Given this full context, how could you have made a different choice? You'd have to introduce randomnness. Randomness entails a factor not under our control.

But for the purposes of Philosophy, intention is essential. For example, a pool table with neatly stacked balls is static & causeless, until the intentional act (first cause) of the shooter inputs both Energy (causation) — Gnomon

The fact that humans engage in intentional behavior implies only that some causation is the product of intent. Not that all causation is.

What is objectionable about this, is not just that it fails as any kind of defence of the rationality of induction... — unenlightened

I wasn't addressing induction. I was addressing rationality in general. I addressed induction in another post, and quote it below.

This is the desperation, to attempt to defend one's rationality by projecting one's irrationality. — unenlightened

I gave examples of guidance that most people would consider poor bases for a decision. This was to show that, at least at the extremes, there are sharp contrasts. You sidestepped the point by identifying a possibility that (were it to come to pass) would negate the scenario. My point stands, that there are choices that are clearly irrational. This includes basing any decision on astrology, fortune cookies, or California Psychics.

I addressed the induction problem in another post:

"All swans are white" is a necessary truth if swans are defined as "white aquatic birds with long necks and xyz". But let's suppose someone inferred it a law of nature that whiteness was physically necessary in birds with some set of other characteristics. First, I wonder how that would be justified, but let's just assume there was a good justification. The discovery of a black swan would falsify that theory and lead to theory revision. What exactly is the problem with that? Would you toss out the teaching of science on the basis that every theory is provisional and there's always a chance it will be someday disproven? — Relativist

In short: the answer to the problem of induction is: apply abduction.

"Scientists are now seriously asking if humans were seeded by aliens. Here's why"
https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/humans-seeded-aliens-panspermia — RogueAI

it's obviously possible, but this doesn't seem like the most proposing hypothesis to pursue. If I follow this correctly, they've merely observed the presence of amino acids in asteroids - the same sort of thing that Urey-Miller showed to be feasible in the 1950s, and more recently has been shown to be prone to occur due to natural electrostatic action in water (see this).


It seems to me more attention to panspermia would be justified only if MORE complex prebiotic chemicals is found in extra-terrestrial environments.

If the article is correct, should guided evolution also be taken seriously?

I see no logical relation between the two. What connection are you making?

The thing is, it used to be a necessary truth, "All swans are white." Philosophers dined out on it for years. And then there wasn't 'a black swan event'; that could have been dismissed as a sport, an aberration, the exception that proves the rule or some such. No, there was a whole fucking continent of overtly black swans, unapologetically swanning about like they owned the place and had always been there. Cue much coughing and mumbling into beards. — unenlightened

"All swans are white" is a necessary truth if swans are defined as "white aquatic birds with long necks and xyz". But let's suppose someone inferred it a law of nature that whiteness was physically necessary in birds with some set of other characteristics. First, I wonder how that would be justified, but let's just assume there was a good justification. The discovery of a black swan would falsify that theory and lead to theory revision. What exactly is the problem with that? Would you toss out the teaching of science on the basis that every theory is provisional and there's always a chance it will be someday disproven?

Look chaps, I can claim very little credit for any of this; it is seriously ill advised in my estimation to try and contradict Hume. he is The Man. — unenlightened

Hume's view have been challenged by a number of philosophers. I'm just borrowing from them. A good exposition of this is in Causation (edited by Sosa & Tooley).
(A few years ago, I found a link to a PDF of it, so I have a copy).

Here's a link to an article by Tooley.

Causation without Intent is what we call Accident. — Gnomon

That may be what YOU call it. I just call it causation. You can choose to believe there is intent involved in all causation, but you cannot possibly show that causation requires it.

IS THE CAT DEAD OR ALIVE OR BOTH? — Gnomon

All answers depend on some unverifiable intrepretation of quantum mechanics. Which one is correct seems likely to remain a mystery, even though many are unwilling to accept that.

Nevertheless, "quantum causality" is well represented by a wave function - a Schroedinger equation that depicts the deterministic evolution of a quantum system over time.

So what's the alternative? — Relativist


Attribute regularities to will rather than law, maybe. — bert1

Why think that, other than that it's possible?

That is indeed a fine and attractive explanation for past regularities, and "as a rule" I myself have found that heads and tails come up about equally, and so on. But what leads you to apply this rule of the past to the future? — unenlightened

Same answer: it's a law of nature, and laws entail necessity. I'll clarify what I mean by a law: it is a relation between two TYPES of things (or among several types of things). Electron A repels Electron B because it is a law that "-1 electric charges" induce that repulsion. Any instance of 2 electrons, anywhere in time, would necessarily have that effect.

So what's the alternative? — Relativist


Indeed. And you call this 'rationality'? Not 'desperation'? — unenlightened

Suppose you have a retirement account and you're trying to invest the money to grow large enough to enable you to one day retire. Would you consider taking guidance from astrology, fortune cookies, and California Psychics? If not, why not - if all "rational" choices are simply acts of desperation?

Therefore, rationality is not decisive in this case. — unenlightened

But rationality WAS decisive for both of us. Contrast our rational choices with IRRATIONAL means of making a choice: basing it on the alignment of the planets, consulting a Ouija board, or basing it on an inscription in a fortune cookie.

neither of us is entirely certain in our estimation of the odds, and even if we were, we might still be unlucky. We could do a much more detailed survey — unenlightened

Yes, and that would have been even better, but in our example it's not worth the effort. In other cases, it might be worth the effort, but we don't have the time. But in all cases, we can make a rational choice based on the imperfect set of information that we have.

But what I have not seen in all this pragmatism is any answer to Hume. His claim is that one of our "background beliefs" seems to be that the future will be broadly the same as the past, and this is something we cannot have any evidence of whatsoever because the future is always beyond our experience. — unenlightened

Here's how I approach it: some explanation is needed for the constant conjunction of past regularities. I judge that the "inference to best explanation" for this is that there exist laws of nature that necessitate this behavior. Inferring a best explanation is rational - it's a form of abductive reasoning.

So what's the alternative? Remain agnostic based SOLELY on the possibility that there will be some future "black swan" event? What's wrong with that is that it is no more than a bare possibility (i.e. it's logically possible, but lacks evidence or any other rational basis for considering it more than that). If you're going to withhold judgement on EVERYTHING on the basis that it's logically possible that you're wrong, you'll be completely indecisive about everything in life. If you only apply this extreme skepticism selectively, then you are being inconsistent - which is irrational.

It is therefore plucked out of the total vacuum of unknowability and it is on this literally unreasonable assumption that all this "pragmatic rationality" is founded.

With the strictest definition of knowledge (belief that's true, and justified so strongly as to eliminate the possibility of being wrong), almost nothing is truly knowable - so it's a pointless goal. It's perfectly reasonable to commit on our judgments. Surely you do this in everyday life.

I agree that it is impossible to know with 100% certainty. — Truth Seeker

Yes, and this implies determinism can neither be proven, nor disproven, by appealing to free will.

:up:


You can only employ your own rationality, and I can only employ mine.

Your rationality is more likely to lead you to conclusions that are consistent with your background beliefs. If those background beliefs are true, they will be directed toward truth. The same applies to me.

Suppose you and I reach different conclusions. We could then both profit from having a discussion to identify differences in background beliefs and the reasoning we each employed. We may then adjust our beliefs and/or revise the sort of reasoning we employ.

So rationality doesn't work as a decision guide. — unenlightened

That does not follow. Rationality is not an oracle guaranteed to lead to a truth. But rationality is more likely to lead to truth than irrationality.

We rarely have enough information to prove something true beyond all doubt, so navigating through life entails making informed, rational predictions and decisions. Occasionally, wild guesses work out, but informed, rational decisions are more apt to do so. Example: for any given vaccine, it's possible it will do more harm than good, but we can look at studies (or trust those who've done so) to weight the good vs the bad.

When we say that water freezes at 0 °C, it seems like an objective fact about the universe. But from my perspective, this predictability arises perhaps because we have structured reality with concepts like temperature, phase, and measurement. The water itself doesn’t carry the law of freezing; it only behaves in ways we can recognize once we impose these distinctions. What we call a ‘law of nature’ is therefore not an independent feature of the universe, but a pattern we have stabilized within an otherwise indeterminate reality.. — Tom Storm

My position is that there are laws of nature that account for the order in the universe, and that these exist independently of us. I acknowledge I could be wrong, so I'm interested in exploring the perspective you offer.

My perspective is consistent with everything we "know" about the universe. The alternative, the "mind-created order" that you suggest seems to lack all explanatory value - it raises more questions than it answers. It does seem possible, but that's about it - there's no other reason to think it's true, as far as I can tell. Surely, it's at least possible that our traditional view is correct.

Is it really just a coin toss between these two possibilities? I don't think it is, but I'd like to hear what others think. What am I overlooking?