"Long term > short term, so long term is the most important; we should strive to make the ‘right’ / ‘good’ decisions."

How do you feel about eugenics?

". Tax cuts do not automatically stimulate the economy. "
It's a virtual certainty that a cut in corporate tax rates will have a positive short term impact on the economy: it means there will be a higher return on investment. More prospective investments will meet a hurdle rate. The question is still: how much impact does it have, and was it worth it on the long run to run up the deficits.

On the other hand, the trade war is bad for the economy. How high an impact is uncertain.

"I am happy to instead to change the game and replace the unobserved object with the observer-created relata. "
That seems an unjustifiable belief, that observers create. Reminds me of devotees of the Copenhagen interpretation of QM who consider observation to cause wave function collapse.

Post hoc fallicies are endemic to politics. But tax cuts should be expected to boost the economy, so the claims are not unreasonable. Less reasonable is the generic claim that any good economic news is a consequence of the party (or person) in power.

But back to the tax cuts, although these are stimulative, this doesn't mean they are necessarily worth the cost, and the timing is questionable. We risk deficits that are unsustainable (i.e. if intetest on the national debt grows faster than the economy, that is an unsustainable path). Further, cutting them during a period of growth constrains you from cutting them (or taking other actions that increase the deficit) when the economy is tanking.

Immigration reform is needed, the question is: what should it look like? What problems are we trying to solve?

"Predominantly I have been hearing how this violence is related to Trump's speech. Now, I am no fan of Trump, but, how is it that anyone can know that Trump's speech was a cause for these violent acts?"

You have a good point pundits are going too far if they're claiming Trump caused the violent acts. Who has actually said this? I haven't heard that exactly, but I can get how you might infer that from what has been said.

Trump's rhetoric incites passion in his supporters. Some of those supporters are racists, and some of those racists are sufficiently unhinged that these passions could spur them to unfortunate action. This seems plausible, and what I've heard from anti-Trump pundits is consistent with this. Maybe I've just missed it.

The SEP article proposes:

" So one way of thinking about structural realism is as an epistemological modification of scientific realism to the effect that we only believe what scientific theories tell us about the relations entered into by unobservable objects, and suspend judgement as to the nature of the latter."

That sounds the most reasonable to me, and it's consistent with what I'm terming being agnostic to ontology.

Whi actually makes such an argument? What I think is going on is affirmation.

"the remission rate around here if we are to believe philosophy as therapy?"
That's your mistake. Philosophy is a symptom, not a cure.

"But why take that view when mathematical physics has added so much to what we know about fundamental reality? Why would you suddenly lose faith in metaphysics right at the point science is delivering so many answers?"
Ontology must be consistent with our knowledge of the world. Our knowledge of the world, in terms of fundamental physics, is not settled. Should we treat quantum fields as fundamental? Quantum field theory is not even complete, since it doesn't include gravity. Are points in spacetime "individuals"? Do we depend on haeccity for individuation? What about string theory?

If physics doesn't have a firm answer, how can ontology? Hawking used the term "model dependent realism" which never was actually realist ontology. It seemed to amount to pretending the particular model you're working with is "real." That doesn't make for a good ontology, but it's a good description of where physics is.

"I see no philosophic difference at all between faith based theism and faith based belief in a multi-universe"
I agree. The fact that some atheists feel compelled to propose multiverse as a naturalist alternative to God shows they have fallen for some faulty logic. If the universe was not designed, then we exist by chance. The fact that there is a narrow range of values that are life permitting has no relevance if we're the product of chance. It only has relevance if you assume the universe was designed for life: it suggests God had to be careful in crafting those constants.

I recommend reading the article at the SEP. It is a good survey of the various flavors of SR, and identifies objections to each.

My takeaway is that there's more reason than ever to be agnostic to ontologies.

It would still be possible in the atheistic many-universe hypothesis that we live in a world created by chance. There would be many universes that could exist that could sustain human life. "

We can live in a world that is a product of chance even if there is just the one universe. The fine tuning argument depends on the unstated premise that life is a design objective.

If there is no design objective then we are a product of chance. So what?

"The slogan is 'relations without relata'. Reality exists by conjuring itself up out of a pure holism of relations."
That is an extreme (eliminative) form of Ontological Structural Realism. At the other extreme is Epistemic Structual Realism, and in between are flavors of the ontic that still believe relations must have relata. Even if you're right that "structural realism has to be the fundamentally correct ontology" rather than just the right epistemic attitude, it remains to be seen if the eliminativist version will blow away the others.

"You can't get from knowledge of physics, to the underlying laws of logic or maths, and indeed you must already grasp logic and maths to some extent to even begin to understand physics."
That's epistemology, and we can account for the epistemology with either ontology, and platonism entails reifying epistemological concepts.

"whilst reducing every human trait to 'what works', it also removes any sense of there being a purpose for survival, other than propagation of the genome"
It has the explanatory scope needed. Your rejection seems based on affirming the consequent. The facts are consistent with, but do not entail, a teleological goal.

"Why am I me?"
False assumption. What makes you think you ARE?!

"2" is a property of certain states of affairs (such as your state of affairs "orange and orange"). It has no independent existence. We can think abstractly about it the same as we think abstractly of colors.

The brain is master of the body. Everything that happens inside the body is caused by signals from the brain, and almost all of this happens subconsciously. — Tzeentch

I sympathize with your general position, but you have overstated it. The brain controls some things and merely influences others. The immune system is not controlled by the brain, but the efficacy of placebos is suggestive of the brain having a degree of influence.

Are you also fideist?

Some of us consider a college degree a doorway to a well-paying job. It would be irrational for a philosophy major to make that assumption. We don't need any more irrational philosophers, so have a realistic expectation about what you will get for your trouble.

I reject the argument because it conflates moral autonomy with perfect knowledge of moral truths. Unlike a hypothetical God of religion (the sort of God that is worthy of worship), we are not omniscient. I am not relinquishing my moral autonomy by placing trust in a God who knows all moral truths, and is all-good, so would not steer me away from goodness.

Thanks for the reference. It seems to me that the premise could be considered contrary to reason if the omniscience is incoherent or unintelligible.

If so, that sounds self-defeating.

You seem to be defending your metaphysical perspective. I was not challenging the (assumed) fact that it is coherent. I was challenging the notion that it's the only metaphysical framework that is coherent and presumably complete. I tried to do that by describing Armstrong's framework, and you simply rejected it based on your own ontological commitments. Believe whatever ontology you like, but if you are convinced your's is the only coherent one, or even that it's the best, then you're fooling yourself if you haven't seriously explored alternatives.

But they all say that the mind can only be understood in terms of neurobiology, which amounts to almost the same. Sure the 'eliminativists' are more apparently radical, but all materialism must deny the primacy of mind - that's what makes them materialist, after all! — Wayfarer

It would be overstatement to say the mind can only be understood in terms of X, for x=physicalism OR dualism (OR any other theory of mind). Some aspects of mind are easier to account for under physicalism, others are easier to account for under dualism. Being easier to account for doesn't make it true.

computers can be programmed to reason. — Relativist


Computers are instruments of the human mind. They can indeed be programmed to emulate the processes of logic - that is fundamental to computation, after all - but they're artifacts. — Wayfarer

Are you arguing intelligent design? My point is that the mental process can be accounted for under physicalism. The evolutionary development of a mind is another matter, but I don't see why that would be a problem. Traits that have a survival value are consistent with natural selection.

Irrespective of whether you consider this normal, I've encountered numerous theists who present Alvin Plantinga's ontological argument as proof of God's existence. Plantinga's argument utilizes this premise:

Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world

The way I express it is that the natural numbers (and the like) are the same for anyone who can count - hence, they exist apart from minds  — Wayfarer

What exists apart from minds are the properties "1", "2", "3",... but that doesn't imply they exist detached from the states of affairs that have these properties. 7 marbles exist, 7 forks exist, and we can abstract out the property "7" from each of these states of affairs. There's a logical relation between the abstracted properties of "7" and "4", but that doesn't entail the existence of numbers except as mental entities.

3+4=7 because any state of affairs with property "3" when combined with a state of affairs with property "4" will necessarily result in a state of affairs with property "7". This fact does not depend on 3, 4, and 7 existing independent of states of affairs. It just means properties can have relations to other properties, and these relations obtain irrespective of which states of affairs they are instantiated in.

That is why strictly physicalist philosophies of mind, like Dennett's, must deny that there actually is any mind. The very existence of mind defeats their philosophy. 

Physicalist theory of mind needn't deny the existence of mind. Certainly Armstrong didn't, nor do Jaegwon Kim and Michael Tye.

Reason is easy to reconcile with physicalism: computers can be programmed to reason. Physicalist theory of mind is not without problem (in particular: consciousness) but every theory of mind has problems.

The principle of parsimony applies to ontology: we should assume no more types of existent than necessary to account for that which we intuitively know exists, and which we infer exists. Alleged platonic entities are explainable as constituents of states of affairs, so there's no good reason to claim they actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. We shouldn't be fooled by our intellectual powers of abstraction.

"To give existence to the individual parts requires dividing the whole, and this annihilates the unity which makes it a whole."
Incoherent. Existence isn't "given". Consideration of parts doesn't entail dividing it. The universe exists. Does that preclude YOU existing? The universe has parts, and you are one of them.

I see that you don't actually want to understand, so we're done.

The problem here, as I see it, is treating a number - 6, in this case - as ‘an entity’ in the same sense that an object is an entity. — Wayfarer

That's not done in Armstrong's metaphysics. Remember that what exists is a state of affairs. 6 doesn't exist distinct from a state of affairs that has the property "6" .

But it can be said to be an object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. an 'intelligible object'.

How about as an "abstraction?" That fits the bill. The only possible point of contention is how we consider abstractions. If we treat them as mental objects, produced by the way of abstraction, that's consistent with physicalism. When we start treating them as existing apart from minds, that's platonism.

But I argue that there's a very deep problem of recursion in any naturalistic account, as we must already be able to count and to reason in order to even begin to develop such an account. That is the sense in which number (and the like) transcends a strictly empiricist account;

I don't see the problem. The only "transcendence" I see is that universals exist, and relations between universals exist. This seems transcendent, but doesn't really entail true transcendent existence. We could explore this further.

I don't think science actually explains the laws themselves;

Agreed, and that's where metaphysics comes in. A lot of anti-physicalist analysis just counters the Humean tradition. The modern tradition (exemplified by Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa) isn't subject to those problems.

So again, the platonist attitude is that such laws pertain to a different level or mode than the domain of phenomena; that being the 'formal realm', although that is not an expression that is in wide circulation. They don't exist - in a sense, they 'subsist' or underlie and inform the phenomenal domain, although the sense in which they are real is difficult to express in the current lexicon of philosophy.

The attitude you express seems consistent with physicalism. We kind of pretend "4" and equations exist, but they don't ACTUALLY exist apart from the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.

Some ants debate the existence of God. A theist ant can't expect to persuade an atheist ant by mere assertion and handwaving. The converse is also true, so perhaps we can just agree that God is a hypothetical possibility.

there have been elaborate arguments developed about ‘the indispensability of mathematic — Wayfarer

Mathematics is essential to understanding much of the world (i.e. physics), but that doesn't change under physicalism. Physicalism just implies that the things that exist stand in relation to one another in ways that are describable mathematically. It seems more parsimonious than to think equations exist apart from the physical things they describe. Which brings up another of set of Armstrong's contributions: his theory of universals and his theory of natural law.

BTW, I'm not claiming Armstrong's metaphysics is necessarily true. I'm just claiming it's coherent and sufficiently complete in its accounts.

there are very many mathematical physicists who are indeed Platonist of some variety, with some of them adopting such views because of the discoveries associated with quantum mechanics — Wayfarer

Since when did physicists become good at metaphysics? A Platonic interpretation of mathematics is a consequence of the way it's conceptualized - it's an intellectual convenience.

How does the platonic entity "6" become get involved in the building of a collection of 6 objects, from smaller collections? Physicalist account: Collections having the property 3 can be merged into a collection having property 6. The 3 (or 6) property is inherent in the states of affairs; the 6 property is necessitated by two collections with property 3.

Some platonist accounts treat equations (which are abstract objects) as causally efficacious. That seems problematic. Causal efficacy is more easily understood by physicalist account.

ll, Armstrong’s major thesis was ‘A Materialist Theory of Mind.He certainly was no crackpot, but his philosophy stands or falls with materialism, and I don’t think his style of materialism is defensible, knowing what we now know from physics. — Wayfarer

His materialist theory of mind was only a component of his comprehensive metaphysics. Indeed it "stands or falls" with materialism - his comprehensive metaphysics aims to show that materialist metaphysics is coherent.

I mean, there are far too many unanswered questions about the nature of matter itself; his philosophy seems to assume a pretty simplistic kind of atomism,

Not really. It's consistent with atomism, but it's also consistent with quantum field theory.

That's a fine attitude to couple with faith. On the other hand, arguments for God's existence depend on conceptual analysis, so words like "omniscience" have to to be taken to mean something.

You seem to be reading meaning into the word "object" that I didn't intend. I was just referring to existents - anything that can be said to exist. An oxygen atom can be said to exist. An oxygen molecule (consisting of two bound oxygen atoms) can be said to exist. This does not entail "dual existence." It is mereological.

Do you want to try and understand it, or are you hell bent on finding some reason to dismiss it? I don't mind spending time explaining it to you, but not if you're going to be combative. David Armstrong was a well-respected Australian metaphysician, not a crackpot whose framework is a house of cards that falls with a faint breath.

The mind-body problem is specific to dualism. Physicalist theory of mind has its own problem the "hard problem" of consciousness,

This seems to be your fundamental error:
"This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence."
Then you are aren't understanding, because it does not entail this at all. Oxygen molecules exist, and so do each of the oxygen atoms that comprise the molecule. This is not "dual existence" - it is simply a consistent mereological account.

If you want to try to understand Armstrong's ontology, you have to let go of your current ontological commitments and accept his account. Consider it a stipulation that everything that exists is a state of affairs. Every object of experience (e.g. your computer, your chair, yourself) is a state of affairs. Each is composed of smaller parts, but each part is also a state of affairs. It's states of affairs all the way down, but stopping at the atomic states of affairs. Once you understand it, you could perhaps try to find something incoherent - but you'll never understand it if you just dismiss the basics because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of reality.

As you noted, I was highlighting the tension. At least one of the following seems likely to be false:
God is omniscient (where omniscient entails knowledge of the future)
Libertarian free will exists
A-theory of time is true
Brute facts don't exist

Omniscience could be revised to mean only that God knows everything that is knowable. This would imply he can only know elements of the future that are the product of strict determinism.

Perhaps brute facts exist (God knows the future by brute fact) but this undermines some important reasons to believe a God exists (i.e. the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument).

Perhaps compatibilism is true, and therefore determinism is true, although this undermines a common theist response to the problem of evil.

Perhaps B-theory is true.

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. ... — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).

In Armstrong's ontology, everything that exists is a State of Affairs (which I've been referring to as a "thing"). A SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular, properties, relations. None of the constituents exist independently of states of affairs. A SOA is a (thick) particular. ("thin" refers to the abstract consideration of that constituent of a SOA that is neither a relation nor a property; "thick" particular equates to a SOA, and "thick" is usually omitted).

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...).

A neutron is thus a second order SOA composed of those ASAs, while an atom is a third order SOA composed of neutrons, protons and electrons. The properties of the higher order SOAs are determined by the properties of their constituents (i.e. Armstrong is a reductionist).

A gaggle of 7 geese is a state of affairs as well - it has properties (such as mass, volume of air they displace,...).

Armstrong accounts for universals: they are multiply instantiated properties and relations. Multiple objects can have a -1 electric charge (e.g. each electron that exists), so "-1 electric charge" is a universal. Similarly, multiple states of affairs can have the property of being a conjunction of 7 lower order states of affairs. "7" is the property they have in common, and this is a universal.

Your statement, "We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. " has no apparent meaning in this ontology. A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist.

Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion.

"An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. "
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7".

7 exists, not in a platonic realm, but in states of affairs composed of 7 objects.