Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.
I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself. I understand an epistemological claim to mean a claim about whether or not one is justified to have a particular doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief, degree of belief, suspension of judgement, etc) toward a particular proposition.
Classical physics seems to make ontological claims, or claims of the form “a particular set of particles exist and move about through space-time in a particular way”. However we know that classical physics is incomplete in that it does not accurately describe reality at very small scales. — Bearden
Mathematical models are descriptions of a system using mathematical concepts and language. As such they are, in the end, interpretations of reality. We tend to use the models that are most useful to us.Of additional relevance is the idea that science cannot reveal the underlying, fundamental nature of reality, but only its (mathematically describable?) structural relationships. I found this in Brodie’s book Farewell to Reality. I think I may have also seen referenced in a Chalmers paper. If you have any insight on these topics I would be very grateful to hear it. — Bearden
I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”
Quantum mechanics seems to make claims of the form (and please further my insight if I’m wrong) “if some particular measurement is taken, there is some particular probability that the value measured will be...” — Bearden
E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions. — Relativist
As in many discussions of this sort, you pose a question about the philosophy of science, and then seamlessly slip into discussing physics (and only physics). Not all science is as abstract or heavily mathematized as is physics. Does, paleontology, for instance, make ontological claims? I would say almost certainly so: theories in that field postulate the existence of long-dead creatures who lived and interacted in a world every bit as "real" as ours. — Arkady
No: my understanding of the use of the term "ontological" is in line with the very first sentence of the OP:You are conflating what it means to exist, with what it means to say that something has existed. The paleontologist makes no ontological claims (claims about what it means to exist). If it claims that certain things "existed", it assumes an ontological meaning of "exists" as a given, or as taken for granted. — Metaphysician Undercover
But we don't have to commit to the existence of quantum fields, just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions.E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions.
— Relativist
I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is. — Metaphysician Undercover
The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects. — Relativist
Ontology is the philosophical study of being. More broadly, it studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence, reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.
Etymology
The compound word ontology combines onto-, from the Greek ὄν, on (gen. ὄντος, ontos), i.e. "being; that which is", which is the present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, i.e. "to be, I am", and -λογία, -logia, i.e. "logical discourse".
In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories, properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities that substantiate one, many, or all domains.
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things. — Relativist
A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7". — Relativist
We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. ... — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.
Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...). — Relativist
A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist. — Relativist
I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist. — Relativist
You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion. — Relativist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.