You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.

Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. I have raised two objections that no one has refuted. You seem to accept my objection about the multiverse. I needn't show that multiverse is more likely than God, just that it is equally likely.

there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers.

Agreed, but consider the implication. The hypothetical open-minded agnostic approaches the argument on the fence, neither affirming nor denying God's existence. If the argument is consistent with both his existence and non-existence, then it doesn't shift his position.

You are conflating science with physicalism (as a metaphysical theory). A physicalist believes that only physical things exist, and this is based on the observation that every aspect of the world is explainable in physicalist terms, and that the physical sciences are the means for exploring the nature of what exists. A physicalist will ask: why assume immaterial things exist, if reality is fully describable in physicsl terms? It violates the principle of parsimony.

That's been debunked by just about every economist as a temporary blip initiated by Trump’s failing trade war, which is already requiring billion dollar bailouts. Anyone who thinks the US will have grown by 4.1% by the end of the year, in other words that this is "very sustainable" in Trump's words, needs to be provided with a very tight jacket and locked in a room with bouncy walls.

Don't overlook the possibility of higher GDP growth this year, even if it's not 4.1%. Lower taxes have historically been stimulative. The problem is that this growth is paid for by running up more debt, and this debt will be unsustainable because deficits have grown (increasing the debt) and interest on the national debt rises with interest rates. Interest on the debt will eventually overwhelm the budget at this rate. This is a booby trap for the next (Democratic) president, who will unavoidably have to raise taxes, which will be a drag on the economy.

Again, it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That can be the starting point in understanding anything else.

You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does.

Dfpolis: "We only have to consider actual evidence "
Relativist: "Then this removes God from consideration."

No, it does not The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration

Your wording is loose. The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. This is abductive reasoning, specifically: inference to the best explanation. A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives.
If there's a God, it's reasonable to infer that the "finely tuned" constants may be an act of intentionality by God. But if there's no God, there are two sub-possibilities: 1) there are many universes, each with different constants, so it's reasonable to expect some would be life permitting. 2) life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance.

Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. With regard to #2, the only response I've noticed is your claim that life entails a coincidence - but you haven't specified anything that life is coincident with.

Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."

Clearly, it does.

Assertion without evidence. You quoted Carr, but all he does is to put the God hypothesis on par with multiverse - indicating both are metaphysical claims. Carr hasn't even considered #2, so I'll give you another quote:

“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams)

Relativist:" it is also possible that the world is simply a brute fact"
Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation.

Every phenomenon is explainable because there is natural law. How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact.

I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness

All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives.

It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God.

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot.

2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.

The persuasiveness of your claim is similar as Johnny Cochran's persuasive case for O.J.'s innocence: convince the jury to ignore the full picture. "if the glove does not fit, you must acquit"; "God provides an answer, so look no further." Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented.

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility

I have no idea what you're talking about.

More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God.

Perhaps there are, but we're discussing the failure of the FTA specifically.

I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.

Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science is equivalent to saying the multiverse is (narrowly) physically impossible (a modal claim). Then you proceed to claim this makes a persuasive case for the God hypothesis, despite God also being physically impossible (your solution must be implicitly "possible" to be considered, but clearly it's not the same modality of possibility). I admit you hadn't couched it in these terms, so I'm happy to rephrase the error as a special pleading if you prefer.

Yes, but since we can show that God exists, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.

We can show God exists?! Are you referring to some other, unstated argument? I'd be happy to discuss these at some point, but let's first complete our FTA discussion, and clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence - that would be circular. We have to approach it abductively, but then you need to meet the challenge of comparing it to the 2 "not-God" hypotheses.

I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God

That would be interesting to discuss, but I'm discussing an evaluation of the FTA without presumption - and it is presumptive to assume God exists when approaching the FTA. If you're willing to agree the FTA fails such an evaluation, then we can move on to the evidence you have for God outside the FTA.

The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a
planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.

Regarding snowflakes: snow and liquid water are not in the form of individual snowflakes any more than humans are just a hodgepodge of water and hydrocarbons. Regarding sandstone: Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae; quartz (silica) particles are the predominant mineral in standstone, but the quartz has been particalized and compacted over time- which depends on a series of activities and environments.

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out.

Relativist: "every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. "

Thank you for sharing your faith.

I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption.

You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept <human>. Still, to know that you're human, I don't need to know about your DNA. So, while DNA is a cause of what you are, it's not part of most people's concept <human>.

If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed.

It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.

The postulates are well thought out, but they are postulates nonetheless. Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. See what I mean about assumptions?

Relativist: "Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity. "

The logical conclusion to make, exclusively based on probability, is that life is not the result of random process because God created it.

I am addressing the argument from incredulity that arises from considering only the two endpoints: the quantum fields (as an example of what may be fundamental) and the existence of conscious life. It's hard to imagine how life could have just "happened" from random behavior of quantum fields. However, if one considers the natural processes that give rise to increasing complexity, it's not so incredible after all.

In order to set one level of complexity, random materials are randomly working with other random materials, through randomly set "laws of nature", with the probability for that random process to result in a new, more complex and consistent unit of reality being near 0% or an absolute 0%.

Laws of nature are not "randomly set, " they just are what they are, although they may manifest themselves differently depending on the context.

A metaphysical investigation should start with what we know (in the loose sense of "know"), and we know that there are laws of nature. There is nothing impossible, or even surprising, about the fact that these laws of nature (as we know them) led to the existence of complex, functional entities. Hydrogen is more complex than the quantized quark and electron fields from which it arises. Stars are more complex than the hydrogen of which they are mostly composed. The heavy elements produced by novae are more complex than the lighter elements that fuse to form them. Planets are more complex than the individual elements that coalesce into them. ... No laws of nature are broken anywhere in the chain, and yet complex functional units arise. And it's wrong to call this a product of randomness - because they occur as a consequence of the laws of nature.

For example, we haven't observed a single case where a non-human being evolved into a human or other being with 100% observable and demonstrable human-like consciousness and abilities that result from that level of consciousness.

You're going from a bad argument to a worse one. I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed.

Notice that in his conclusion, Ellis says:
"Nothing is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it "

i do not claim belief in God is irrational, but I do think many of the arguments for God's existence (including the FTA) are problematic. It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation.

That said, it can still be reasonable for a theist to look at fine tuning as the point at which God's hand in our existence can be seen. But recognize that this interpretation follows from a belief in God, it doesn't establish such a belief.

I think the counter to that is for anything to emerge, there has to be at least some order.

The best explanation for the order is the existence of laws of nature.

the point of the fine-tuning argument, as far as I understand it, is that the order that is observed in the Universe ultimately derives from a very small number of fundamental constraints

That is not correct. The FTA is based on the obsevation that life as we know it would not exist had the constants been different.

Relativist: "Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse?

No, but I do suspect that those terms are essentially meaningless in this context

Then you should agree that the FTA has no persuasive power.

'existence' is the wrong term for 'God'. Even if 'God' is real then God is not 'something that exists' in the sense that you're naturally inclined to understand by the term 'existence'. There is not anything 'out there' that answers to the name. This is the meaning of 'transcendent'.

This seems a nuance one might consider after deciding there is a God.

The point is, again, 'God' is not one term in an empirical hypothesis, not a cause in the sense that fire is the cause of heat or water the cause of rust. So, an appropriate theistic answer to the question of what evidence there is for God, is the fact of existence - that God is the reason that anything exists whatever.

That's great rationalization for the absence of evidence for a God if he exists, but it doesn't provide a reason to think God, rather than (for example) multiverse is the reason for the alleged fine tuning for someone who is open to both possibilities (God's existence and nonexistence).

Regarding Dawkins: I have no interest in discussing his polemics.

"I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis"

Do you understand that it is still an argument intended to persuade someone that God exists? Arguments needn't be deductive to do this. The FTA is presented as an abductive argument- an inference to the best explanation. God is an explanatory hypothesis, offered to explain "fine tuning". That is a reasonable approach, but to be persuasive it must be shown to be a better explanation than alternatives. In this case, an alternative is a multiverse. Of course, if you approach it with the prior belief that God exists - you will see no need to look further. I have no objection to that. But if you are going to claim this has some power of persuasion, you have to show why it's a better explanation.

"As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy."

It reflects bias to dismiss one possibility due to lack of evidence, while embracing another that also lacks evidence. So it would be poor reasoning for an atheist to claim there must be a multiverse, and equally unreasonable to claim it must be God. We should therefore agree that both are possible, as far as we know. Right?

You might just as well say: create an algorithm which produces random strings of alphabetical characters and then set it to run indefinitely.

You are missing my point. There's a tendency to incredulouly look at life as magically appearing from primitive substances. But this overlooks the development of increasing complexity. So while it is highly unlikely that a living creature would come to exist from random processes applying to simple things, it is not unlikely for something more complex to arise from something that is somewhat less complex.

"The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness."
Hardly. Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse? My impression is that theists jump to the conclusion they already "knew" to be correct, while dismissing all alternatives. Earlier, someone said "yeah, but there's no evidence of a multiverse" - and yet they have no problem suggesting the answer is something else that lacks evidence: God.

A stone's sentience is only a bare possibility, and that's insufficient reason to take that possibility seriously.

Where in Brazil? (I have friends in Curitiba, one of whom is named João).

I'm very impressed with your English.

-tchau

We have an idea of what intelligent behavior is from introspection, psychological study, and philosophical investigation. For example we know that humans engage in intentional behavior - they decide to do things, and (sometimes!) actually do those things. Decision making is a product of deliberation, based on dispositions (from long term passions, to short term impulses) and beliefs (from the tentative to the certain). These aspects of intelligent behavior go well beyond Turing's simple test, but are sine qua non for human-like intelligent behavior.

It may be feasible to build AI's that behave intentionally and deliberate, because we can describe it. That which we can't fully describe (like consciousness) isn't going to just happen - we need to understand it first.

"A Human Life is a set of experiences from birth to death. "

The shape of a rock is a product of the many factors that formed it, and influenced its current shape. Those factors could be said to be the set of experiences it had. How is human experience different?

"I wrote this already on another thread: AIs just "work". There is absolutely no point in discussing what an AI would need to be to make a human judge a picture as aesthetical pleasing, interesting or whatever."

This seems similar to the "Turing Test." The Turing test doesn't entail true intelligence, nor would the development of aesthetically appealing pictures entail having a true sense of the aesthetic. AI is mostly about simulating intelligent behavior, not about actually engaging in it.

That said, there are some aspects of AI that seem aimed at truly engaging in some components of human-like intelligence - in particular, the work with artificial neural networks. But the big obstacle will always be the "hard problem" of consciousness. I'm not predicting it will be impossible, but we'd first have to figure out a physicalist theory of consciousness to have have something to work toward.

"I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process."
Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity.

Consider the old claim that monkeys banging away randomly at keyboards would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare. The probability is low that monkeys hitting on keyboards will randomly produce Hamlet, but it is highly probable that they will accidentally produce some words. Imagine randomly selecting sets of words: it is improbable that random collections of words will organize into a play, but less improbable that phrases and then sentences will be produced, and so forth. As long as each stage of increasing complexity is viable, able to exist and be combined, further organization becomes inevitable.

Does anything ever get destroyed in the world?

It depends on how you define "thing" in "anything". If your iphone is dropped from a tall building, it's constituent parts will still exist, but they will no longer be the constituent parts of a functional iphone.

It is logically impossible for AI to take all jobs. AI would have to become self-sustaining, so that software and hardware maintenance and construction required no humans. AI would have to develop a sense of aesthetics, one that is superior to humans, to take the place of artists of all sorts. This latter seems impossible, because aesthetics is related to human experiences by humans, and to a human perspective of qualia.

Your analysis depends on the assumption there is something objectively special about life. It's true that the odds are against the existence of life (unless there is a multiverse, which can't be ruled out), but the odds of any specific sort of existent is also extremely low.

"The FTA is a probability argument that says what is more likely. For life as we know it to exist the odds of all the requirements happening as the did is astronomical on the orde of 52! "

The problem is that it's post hoc reasoning. Here's another post hoc analysis: you would not exist had your parents not gotten together and produced you. Each of your parents wouldn't exist had their parents not gotten together and so on- back through the generations of both your human and nonhuman ancestors. The odds are extemely low that all those specific pairs of indiviuals would have gotten together and produced the line of offspring that resulted in you. Your existence is therefore extremely unlikely.

The existence of life is similar: post hoc analysis show how unlikely it is, but had life not come to exist, other things would have existed. What's so special about life? It's special to us (just like your existence is special to you), but life (nor you) is not objectively special.

It seems to me that "me-ness" is derived from our innate point of view, not something learned or inferred. Same with "other-ness" - that which is not me. If one were to then infer the universe is part of the other, that indeed seems a false inference.

The issue is about probability for created unit of reality to exist.

I assume you're using "created" in the sense of a contingent being that is the product of causation.

With any other potential world, the issue is the same. Was that world created through a process or does that world exist as is in eternity? In any case, though, we exist and we are created. That means that there is practical or an absolute 0% probability that we are created through some random unconscious act of some other prior potential world.

Eternity can simply mean existing at all times, which is consistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and cannot have been created: because for a thing to be created, it had to have not existed prior. There is no "prior" to the existence if time.

If something has to exists, as you say, that includes possibility for God to exist, not exclusively some undefined world or worlds. And then, just taking into account randomness in our reality, we can conclude that there is practical or an absolute 100% chance that God, conscious creator of our reality, exists, since there's opposite probability that we exist as a result of randomness.

I agree it is epistemically possible that god exists - this is just another of the "random" possibilities. I see no basis for claiming a god is more probable than a brute fact that results in our coming into existence. In fact, by your reasoning, it seems that "god" is nothing more than this brute fact that entails our existence.

"Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. "
The prior probability of any specific world existing is infinitesmal (not strictly zero) and yet some world would have to exist, since SOMETHING has to exist.

You have not convinced me of the cogency of your objections.

For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. No belief is held in isolation, and this makes it difficult to judge an argument the same way a non-theist would (even an open-minded agnostic who is open to both God's existence and non-existence). The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs.

BTW, I haven't mentioned my own position. I call myself an "agnostic deist." This means that I consider it possible that there exists some sort of entity that created the world, but it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact. My reason for thinking a "deity" is a distinct possibility is the existence of consciousness - which is difficult to account for under materialism. It actually would have bearing on my position if the FTA were at all convincing. I try to look at it as objectively as I can, although I'd never claim I'm better than anyone else at this.

there are definite ends (aka "final states" -- which need not be "final") to which physical processes tend... If we then say that any source of intentionality is, by definition, a mind, then a mind is responsible for the laws of nature

Interesting perspective, but I have two questions about it:
1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future?
2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it.

I agree, that is why there is no scientific support for a multiverse...

There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. This is inconsistent.

Relativist: "if we're including God among the possibilities to consider, we have to consider all metaphysically possible worlds"

No, we don't. We only have to consider actual evidence

Then this removes God from consideration.

Possible worlds talk is just a way of injecting baseless speculation into philosophical discourse.

Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. You are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. You could use epistemic possibility (as far as we know, there might be a God), or conceptual possibility (God is conceivable, and therefore possible), or broadly logical possibility (God's existence entails no broadly logical contradictions). But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. Clearly, God is not physically possible, so you can't use this.

(re: sandstone and snowflakes) The existence of the required elements (H, O, Si) does not require nuclear fusion in stars and so is far less constrained than the existence of life.

Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements, planet formation, atmosphere, liquid water on the planet surface, evaporation, a narrow range of atmospheric and surface temperatures, dust in the atmosphere.
Sandstone also requires a planet with certain minerals present, water flowing - and thus the presence of sufficient water so that it will pool and flow, a narrow range of temperature on the surface, and in the atmosphere. Silicon only exists because very large stars previously existed that could fused it and later when supernova. Water itself is dependent on the production of oxygen by stars as well.

Snowflakes and sandstone are probably more prevalent than life in the universe, but their existence is still dependent on prior conditions - conditions whose probability is indeterminable.

No, again. God is a metaphysical necessity. The only possibility that can be attributed to God is epistemological -- due to ignorance. The evidence for God's existence is all being. If anything is, we can conclude, with metaphysical certainty, that God is.

More correctly: it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. The only modality in which the possibilities for both God's existence and non-existence can be evaluated is epistemic modality. But a multiverse is also epistemically possible - you admitted this.

While I don't deny the biological importance of DNA, your genetic coding doesn't enter into my judgement that you're human and Fido is a dog.... What does that have to do with anything?

The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing.

I don't see that you've shown that there is no basis in reality for saying that a thing is (existence) or what it is (essence).

You're forgetting that my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. I didn't claim it was incoherent. Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. This seems so trivially true, I can't understand why you'd deny it.

I showed that it is not a postulate, but names something found in reality -- i.e., the objective basis of essential definitions -- what it is about concrete individuals that allows us to apply our species concepts to them.

No you didn't! You denied the concept is related to DNA, even though you earlier claimed species entailed essential kinds. That is contradictory. Now you've claimed it's not just a sortal of accidental properties, and made the vague assertion "what is essential to my concept of humans -- a concept that is largely transcultural". What exactly does essence refer to? Identify something about dogs that set them apart as an essential kind from wolves, that is not simply the accident of DNA variation.

Relativist: " Aquinas paradigm also postulates: act, potency, form, substance, and accident."
All of which we find in our experience of reality and its conceptualization.

Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? It is a way to account for the things that exist. Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. I'm not going to argue that Armstrong's account is true and Aquinas is false, because they both account for everything - they are simply different, unproveable paradigms.

the fact that we have one reality based conceptual space that can be used to analyze reality does not, by any means preclude the possibility of other, equally reality-based, conceptual spaces that can be used to analyze reality. Given that reality is far too complex to be exhausted by the stupid human trick of abstraction, the more ways we think of reality, the more projections we use, the better.

What you call a "conceptual space" is what I'm calling a "paradigm" - but other than this, I agree completely. But there's an important corollary: one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. Thomistic metaphysics is popular with theists because it entails a God, but if someone claims this constitutes an objective proof of God's existence, they are ignoring the epistemically contingent nature of the Thomist paradigm.

I don't think Rudy's going rogue here- Trump wants Cohen painted as a liar. Team Trump considers this the lesser of two evils. The greater evil is that Trump lied about having knowledge of the infamous meeting. It remains to be seen if Cohen's allegation will be corraborated, but this reality show is getting interesting.

Rudy Giulliani said Cohen is a "pathological liar."

“I expected something like this from Cohen, he’s been lying all week. He’s been lying for years,”

Why did our beloved, law-abiding president have a pathological liar working for him? What is the positive spin on it?

These beliefs are consistent with a natural origin. All living beings have to interact with the world to survive and reproduce. I don't even think there's anything special about our intrinsic beliefs vs that of other animals.

Here's a related perspective. Christian Philosopher (and epistemologist) Alvin Plantinga has defined "properly basic" as follows:

where "p" is a belief and "S" is a subject holding belief p, and "warrant" = the conditions a belief must satisfy to constitute knowledge if p is true:
1. p is properly basic for S in with respect to warrant if and only if S accepts p in the basic way, and p has warrant for S.
2. A belief has warrant only if the cognitive process that produces it is successfully aimed at truth - that is, only if there is a high objective probability that a belief produced by this process is true (given that the process is functioning properly in the sort of epistemic environment for which it is designed).

Plantinga's purpose is to argue that belief in God constitutes knowledge, but his analysis makes as much (or more) sense in terms of innate beliefs about the world. Our perceptions about the world have been shaped through evolutionary history in a way that is (in a real sense) aimed at truth - where truth is a correspondence between our image of the world and the actual world. Consequently, they satisfy his definition of "properly basic" and arguably, are sufficient for some knowledge of the world.

Here's my theory:

Foundational beliefs are those non-verbal beliefs that are innate, and form the basis for the way we perceive the world. For example, we see before us a red ball and a ripe strawberry. We recognize a commonality: redness. Recognizing this quality is not a product of deduction, nor of semantic analysis. Rather it is hardwired in our brains. Similarly, we naturally perceive a distinction between ourselves and the external world (as well as the existence of distinct objects in that external world). This explains why there are no solipsists.

Your account is plausible, except for your comment "there is no such thing as reason" - that's overly strong. We do have foundational beliefs that are not the product of reason, but we still apply reason to derive additional beliefs, albeit that they are contingent on those foundations.

Just replacing Mark with the Russians doesn't make it a crime.

I believe it would be a crime if Trump encouraged Russia to get information illegally. That would mean he was conspiring with the Russians. He actually did ask Russia to find Hillary's emails, and reportedly this prompted activities to do just that. Had Russia actually delivered the emails, then I think Trump might be held guilty of a crime. They didn't, but it's dancing close to the fire. Also consider the "nothing burger" meeting between Don Jr and the Russians - again, nothing came out of it, but had something come out of it, it would possibly have been a crime.

It would also be a the crime if someone hinted or promised relief on Russian sanctions in return for information.

"Not sure what made you think I'd want to discuss this since I didn't so much as mention it."

Well, I had the impression you were criticizing me for making an "unargued-for assertion", so I was offering to support that assertion. Perhaps I misunderstood

While it's true that the PSR has traditionally been pressed into the service of theistic arguments, that it necessarily entails a 'causally efficacious necessary being' is just another unargued-for assertion. In any case, 'brute fact' plays right into the hands of fideism anyway, so the alignment of the one with theism and the other with atheism is largely a forced and unconvincing one.

Yes, I made an assertion, and I didn't present an argument. My assertion is based on prior discussions I've had on the topic. If you'd like to discuss whether or not the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument makes a good case for God's existence, I'm happy to do that, but this would mean you'd have to show why belief in the PSR is justified (which you previously said you weren't interested in doing) and compelling (because if the argument isn't compelling, it's pointless).

Regarding your comment about playing into the hands of fideism, I really don't understand your point. Are you suggesting an atheist is having faith in atheism, or that this sends theists into expressions of faith?

"No idea what you're talking about. "
Same here. But let me know if you have any specific questions.

"Without the assumption that God must necessarily have all 3 of the characteristics that you list, you don’t have an argument that would be a helpful argument for Atheists arguing for Atheism."
Then you don't understand atheism. Atheism entails the belief that X doesn't exist, and for this to be meaningful - "X" must be well defined. X = an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being.

As I said, this doesn't preclude something else existing. But it is relevant what that is. Suppose there's an indifferent "God" who is omnipotent and omniscient. This doesn't imply there is an afterlife, or a "reward" for having faith in this being, nor does it means we ought to "worship" this thing. It becomes irrelevant.

I haven't previously mentioned what my position is, so I'll tell you. I am an "agnostic deist." By this, I mean that I think there's a possibilty that there is some sort of "deity" that is responsible for the physical world and the existence of consciousness. It's only a possibliity: I can't prove it true, and I can't prove it false. But I see no good reasons to think there is an afterlife (other than wishful thinking), so the hypothetical existence of this being isn't really very important - except for explaining certain aspects of the world (e.g. why there is consciousness; the nature of a metaphysically necessary first cause).

"There is no "free will" so your argument is wrong in premises 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Maybe 6 is technically true but since it would be detrimental to reality, as I understand it, if God created beings with free will, I don't think that God even weighs the option of creating free will beings."

That is a reasonable objection to my argument, but it has another problematic implication: why would God bother to create people on earth who have a capacity to sin? Why not just create "slaves" in heaven, and avoid the pains he causes in this life - a life that is extremely brief, compared to spending eternity as a slave.

Right, but I'm inclined to go with more of a sure thing than to hope for another anomaly.

I greatly admire Barrack Obama as a person, and for what he tried to do. But his progressive agenda resulted in the conservative backlash that led to Trump getting elected. A moderate Democrat has a better chance of having a lasting, positive, and beneficial legacy.

I'm with you on the insider/outsider thing being a detriment for Clinton vs Trump, but that was irrespective of being a moderate or progressive. Perhaps Bernie would have beaten Trump had he been nominated, but we'll never know. Regardless, we've now seen what being an outsider gets you, so I don't think that can work again.

That is an interesting observation, but it not quite the same thing. To get elected, one needs to be well known. It can be very expensive to become well known. Michelle (as well as Bushes, Kennedy's, and Clintons) get notoriety for free. Trump also got it for free. There's been controversy about Hillary since Bill's presidency (I remember Rush Limbaugh accuse her of orchestrating Vince Fosters killing). There's no controversy about Michelle, and - given her impressive speech about "going high" - she would be the perfect person to go against him.

That's an interesting observation. There was definitely been a realignment of the parties in the 60s. There used to be "liberal Republicans" (remember Rockefeller? for that matter, Nixon was a liberal in many respects). And consider what happened to the segregationist Democrats- they left because of the Civil Rights legislation under LBJ. I will forever remember my red-neck cousins, former Democrats, saying they would no longer vote Democrat because they said the "Democrats did too much for the ni___rs".