It's hard to judge your premises 4 to 6 without a clear definition of "explanation". — Echarmion

OK, an explanation in this sense is an agency that effects what is to be explained.

Having an explanation is certainly nice, but I fail to see how it would be necessary. — Echarmion

Knowing the explanation is nice. Having an explanation is necessary. I can think of three arguments for this.
1. Practically, if we allow any phenomenon to be a "brute fact," we undermine the logic of the scientific method. Unless we hold that the need of an explanation is universal, no observation, however carefully made, can be taken as evidence of an underlying dynamics. Instead of definitely confirming or falsifying a hypothesis, our observation could merely be something that "just happened" with no relation to the relevant hypotheses.
2. Phenomena come to be and pass away. That means that they have no intrinsic necessity, for it they did, they would necessarily be as they are -- always. Yet, once they are, they necessarily were then -- they no longer cannot not have been. So, they have a retrospective necessity. As this necessity is not intrinsic, it must be derivative and extrinsic -- implying the existence of an explanatory agency.
3. Finally, nothing can act prior to its actual existence, so anything that is transitory must have been brought into actuality by something already operative/actual -- its explanation.

Similarly, your justification for premise 6 does not convince me. — Echarmion

Could you say why you are not convinced? What you see as a lacuna? Or a counterexample?

I do not see how a limited specification of acts can entail an indeterminate capacity to act, or how what a finite the is could entail that it is. At the very least all finite things we know seem to have come to be -- so what they are cannot necessitate that they are.

When you earlier (and correctly, I think) noted that existence is always distinct from essence. — Echarmion

No, I said it was distinct for finite beings: "What limits is not what is limited, viz. existence, the bare capacity to act."

The existence of a finite being might still be unlimited in time, for example. — Echarmion

Possibly, though we know of no examples. Still, infinite duration is not infinite capacity to act. The argument is existence has no intrinsic limitations -- to exist means that a thing can act in some indeterminate way in reality. A finite being's essence (the specification of its possible acts) limits this inderminate capacity, making it determinate. Since it is a limitation on existence, it can't entail existence. (If it did, every possible kind of thing would necessarily exist, and no finite being could cease to be.)

Or finite beings might explain the existence of each other. — Echarmion

I addressed this by noting that any collection of finite beigns is finite.

you never specify why the explanation for a being needs to be another being — Echarmion

An explanation acts to effect the explans, and whatever acts, exists.

A usual formulation is that God can do anything not contradictory. Yes? No? — tim wood

Yes, but since contradictions cannot be instantiated, (by the ontological principle of contradiction) they are not possible. So, the formulations mean the same thing.

I assume that as an "infinite" being God is, now - exists. If that is so, then on your definition God could not exist now, at the same time he exists. — tim wood

I do not follow your thinking here. Things that come to be cannot act before they come to be and so have limited being. The point I was making is that the necessity things have once they come to be is not intrinsic.

That leads back to the God who can do anything not contradictory. Which itself means that God is limited, which throws us back to the definition of God as infinite, as opposed to finite. — tim wood

What is contradictory is outside the scope of being and so not a limit on being. Having limited non-being (not being able to instantiate contradictions) does not entail having limited being.

If "no possible act is negated by its specification," then either his non-being is possible, or if not possible, then this God is god is not limited to thenot, per definition, infinite. — tim wood

Again, this is a confusion. The non-existence of a necessary being is not possible. So a necessary being ceasing to be is not a possible act.
.

Implies God is neither in nor of the univeedrse. — tim wood

In a way and in a way not. Yes, God is not limited to the physical multiverse. Still, that does not preclude God from acting in the cosmos.

There is something deeper here, viz. the identity of action and passion. The act of an agent operating on a patient is identically the passion of the patient being operated on by the agent. Thus, the cosmos being held in being by God is identically God holding the cosmos in being. This identity, however, applies to the operation, not to the beings involved. So, while God is immanently active in the cosmos, He is not identical with it.

Whatever part of God that is in the universe would necessarily be a part of some collection of things in the universe, therefore finite. — tim wood

This assumes that God is extended (has parts outside of parts). Since God is infinite, you argument shows this is a false assumption. To be able to act at many points does not imply intrinsic extension. The laws of nature, for example, act throughout the cosmos, but have no parts outside of parts.

we might have a problem in limiting the number of Gods to one: why one? It would seem there would have to be very many, an infinite number, of Gods. — tim wood

For the count of Gods to be more than one, we need to be able to differentiate the second from the first. Since God is infinite, this is impossible. Any differentiating factor would imply the existence of an act one could do and the other could not (i.e. that of properly eliciting the concept of the differentiating factor). That implies that at least one is not an infinite being.

Does God have location? — tim wood

No, because having a location mean that God would exist (and act) at one place and not another, and so not be an infinite being.

In as much as God can do anything(?) he can sometimes be not there. — tim wood

No, because any "there" needs be defined relative to a finite existent, which would necessarily imply that God was active in maintaining its existence -- and so "there" operationally.

What is

the intrinsic necessity of God's existence — tim wood

It means that God's existence is not contingent on anything extrinsic.

The argument is a proof of God's existence I've posted elsewhere. I'll post it here.

I mean that the measure number does not preexists the measurement, the proper length quantity preexists the measurement. — Devans99

That is fine as long as we agree that it is not a actual number, only a measurable.

Aristotle had sufficient information in his possession to conclude time must be finite — Devans99

If by "time" you mean the age of the universe, Aquinas disagrees and I disagree. We must agree to disagree.

If an observer measures less than Planck time between two events, I would have thought the events are concurrent from that observer's perspective? — Devans99

Times less that about the Planck time might be unmeasurable, and thus undefined. Still, two events cannot be one event.

A good example, but I feel it can still be argued that essential causality and accidental causality are synonymous at a lower level: — Devans99

They are related, but not identical. Accidental causality is the time integral effect of the essential of the laws of nature. Thus, essential causality is primary, and accidental causality derivative.

- The fact that God created spacetime suggests he is not of spacetime. — Devans99

Yes.

- If God is immanent and can interact with the world, that suggests a physical component that maybe bound by the laws of physics. — Devans99

The laws of nature are essentially intentional, and are a primary means of God acting on the physical world. I have argued elsewhere that the continuing operation of the laws of nature is sufficient evidence for the existence of God as maintaining them in operation. So, God is the source of those laws.

- To evade the fallout from Big Bang, God may need to be non-material or extra-dimensional, but both concepts are hard to swallow from a materialist viewpoint. — Devans99

Which is yet another reason materialism is irrational. (The primary reason is that the a priori exclusion of what is logically possible is unscientific.)

His involvement in the universe is over; maybe moved onto bigger and better things - his presence is not required to 'support' space time. — Devans99

This view is unsound because only something intrinsically necessary can continue in being without the ongoing actualization of its potential by an agent already in act. Since the universe is continually changing, it is not necessary. Thus, its continued existence requires the ceaseless operation of God.

Relativistic length yes, proper length no. Two observers in the same reference frame as the object always get the same measurement results. — Devans99

How does that show the measure number to pre-exist the measurement operation? There is no way to prefer one frame of reference to another, and so no way to prefer one measure number to another. Each is the joint result of intrinsic properties and the details of the measurement operation -- as should be expected given the relational nature of measurement.

Measurements are means of relating the measurable to some standard. If either the means or the standard vary, so will the resulting number.

The past is finite. — Devans99

I agree that our universe is finitely old. That does not mean that given the data available to Aristotle, it was irrational to think otherwise. When Fr. Georges Lemaître first proposed his primordal atom (big bang) theory in 1927, it was opposed as "too biblical." Most scientists thought the universe had always been and many continured to believe in continuous creation as a counter to observations showing the universe was expanding.

With continuous motion, they are all actual subdivisions. — Devans99

There is no point in my arguing further on this. We must agree to disagree.

I would have thought events would be simply concurrent if there is less than Planck time between them. So it would not effect the normal understanding of causality. — Devans99

If you have distinct events, there is not concurrence between them. Being concurrent means there is only one event.

I find Aristotle's terminology a little confusing. I am happier with cause always preceding event. I think what Aristotle calls an 'essential cause' is actually a non-temporal conditional and it has nothing to do with the modern view of causality. — Devans99

In their ignorance, most modern philosopers do not realize that there are two kinds of efficient causes (accidental and essential). Aristotle and the Scholastics did. You may do as you choose.

Building a house is a number of sub-events. For each sub-event, the cause always temporally precedes the effect. — Devans99

Only if you choose to close your mind to essential causality. Sawing and being sawed are concurrent. Every doing is concurrent with someting being done.

God cannot exist throughout all spacetime; parts of spacetime are receding from each other at FTL speeds; that would mean God is causally disconnected from himself. — Devans99

God is not a physical being, and so not subject to the laws of physics. God is an intention being. Aristotle called Him "Self-thinking thought." As intentions are not measuable, they cannot be quantified and so are beyond the competance of mathmatical physics.

God created spacetime; he does not act in spacetime, all the proofs based on his action in nature are indeed ill conceived IMO. — Devans99

The space time manifold has no intrinsic necessity. If God did not act to maintain it in being, it would cease to be.

It is often said that logic provides our paradigm for necessity, but this does not mean that all necessity is logical necessity. For example, it is also often said that causation is physical necessity. So (setting aside Hume) the impact of one billiard ball upon a second billiard ball renders the movement of the second ball necessary. But this is physical necessity, not logical necessity. — Theologian

I agree that logical necessity is not physical necessity. Still, I think that physical necessity can be explicated by appealing to logical necessity. I see logical necessity as formal, as what links validly derived conclusions to the premises from which they are derived. So, a conclusion can be false, but still a logically necessary consequence of some set of premises.

The motion of the ball is dictated by initial conditions and the laws of motion. So, I think it is reasonable to say that an event is physically necessary if we believe that it is a consequence of we understand to be the laws of nature and the initial conditions. Further, when we are asked what we mean by "consequence" we are likely to frame our response in terms of logic.

Still, I think you've hit on an important point. There are many physical problems for which we cannot logically deduce a solution. Examples are as simple as the gravitational interaction of three bodies and as complex as atmospheric and oceanic turbulence. That is why I hedged and said "we believe that it is a consequence" rather than saying "it is a logical consequence."

So, perhaps a formulation would be that we see a consequence as necessary if we believe it follows from the operation of the basis. (I have no objection to your "certainly." I just think that if something really follows it certainly follows.) I do think it is important, if math and logic fail us, that we admit that we are falling back on belief.

I don't disagree that certain entailment can be applied to different bases, but... so what? — Theologian

I wrote this post because I was unable to convince a symbolic logician that his supposed rebuttal of the cosmological argument was based on an equivocal use of the "□" (necessarily) symbol. Specifically he was confusing the intrinsic necessity of God's existence with the contingent necessity of a finite being having an essential cause. Thus, I thought necessity worth reflection.

And the fact that we may apply this concept to different things does [Edit: Oops! I meant DOES NOT] suggest multiple meanings. — Theologian

My experience with the equivocating logician suggests that it does and we need to be alert to its precise nuances.

Cardinal numbers are predicated univocally to sets of different things. Claims of necessity need not be. A determinist might say that an act of killing was necessary, while a libertarian moralist might deny that -- with neither realizing that they were using "necessary" equivocally -- as expressing distinct concepts.

Just out of curiosity, what book? — Theologian

God, Science and Mind: The Irrationality of Naturalism

Question: would you argue that God is necessary for the argument so far, or would you allow it could be established on secure ground on belief alone, or possibility alone, or the ethical stance, i.e., reason, alone? — tim wood

I think everything I've said in the thread, including the existence of God and the nature of the good, can be established by reason alone.

That would be "good for," yes? If we let yours go as a definition of the good, then lots of bad things become good. — tim wood

One needs to look at the issue in context. What is locally good, may be evil in a larger context. Using a good poison to murder is morally evil. Why? Because it prevents the victim's self-realization. In my view rights are based on the conditions of self-realization, and so a violation of rights is evil because it precludes or inhibits self-realization.

As a theist, I see human potential as God-given, and think that God would not sustain a potential in being that had no legitimate actualization.

I will put a longer post together.

What that means is that the analogies do not necessitate certain results, but they allow for a certain amount of ambiguity and creativity. — Hanover

I agree that most of our practical thought is based on reasoning by analogy. I discuss analogy at some length in considering the rules of evidence in my book. If there is interest I could post a discussion here.

I do not believe that whether some macroscopic real world quantity is measured or not effects its value in any way — Devans99

Before a quantity is measured, It does not have a well-defined value to be affected. That is why the measure number of length, for example, depends the relativistic frame of reference.

The measure of the object is intrinsic to the object and measurement just makes that known to an observer. — Devans99

This belief was falsified by 20th century physics.

But with past eternity and a counting, backwards travelling, time traveller, we have a measure of eternit — Devans99

But with past eternity and a counting, backwards travelling, time traveller, we have a measure of eternity - any number we can think of, the traveller must have counted it. — Devans99

At no determinant point is this true.

A particle moving along a real number line continuum must pass through every possible sub-division (sub-segment) of the line over time. — Devans99

Possible subdivisions are not actual subdivisions.

The act of movement - positional change from one moment to the next - creates the sub-divisions. — Devans99

I deny this claim.

I trust my senses and experience more than Hume on this point — Devans99

That is why God blessed us with a rational mind. One cannot argue from general truth to necessity without further justification.

Two events would not be able to share a cause and effect relationship if they are separated in time by less than Planck time? — Devans99

Accidental causal relationships are undefined in such cases because times less than the Planck time are undefined. If you can't measure the interval between events, space and time are ill-defined. Thhis is a major problem for a quantum theory of gravity.

This problem has no effect on essential causality because essential causality does not link separate events, but analyzes single acts.

Concurrent events cannot share a cause and effect relationship anyway. — Devans99

Really? So the builder building is not the cause of the house being built?

{God could not exist in time, but his presence seems necessary, so he must exist outside of time. — Devans99

If God does not exist throughout space-time, He cannot act in time, and all the proofs based on His action in nature are ill conceived. That does not mean that God is bound by or confined to space-time.

E.g., should we kill Bob? Well, if all killing is wrong, then no. If murder is wrong but some killing right, then maybe. And if under our understanding of things, Bob should be killed, then yes. I'd like to think we can do better - do you see a way? — tim wood

Well, I do think there is an objective basis for ethics, but that is a topic quite different from modality.

I hinted at the basis I see above, in touching on the analogous nature of the good as the realization of intrinsic potential -- but that is a topic for a different thread.

So is Aristotle saying when we measure it time exists (measured change); when we don't, it does not (unmeasured change), so a past eternity is possible without accepting actual infinity in reality? — Devans99

He is saying that change has the potential to yield time, and that when we measure change according to before and after, we actualize that potential. This is because he sees time as a number, and numbers as existing only in enumerating minds.

Granting for the sake of argument that measuring does not change what is measured, it still actualizes a relational potential in the measurable. The measurable has a potential relation to minds that can know its measure number, but that relation is not actual because until it is measured, there is no measure number to be known. Further, the measure number depends on how we measure. We get different numbers using centimeters or inches, in different frames of reference, and, in QM, by using different operations. Measure numbers do not pre-exist measurements, because they are determined jointly by the properties of the measurable and the details of the measurement operation.

IMO he should have concluded the past cannot be eternal. — Devans99

If a thing can't be measured because it has no starting point, that doesn't preclude it having indefinite extent.

So Aristotle is saying because we are not conscious of the division of space, it is not happening? — Devans99

There is no actual division in a continuous extent. There is only a potential mental division. In other words, we can think of it having a first part and a second part. If we do, it has mental parts, but is still a physical unity. If we do not divide it in thought, a unity has no actual parts, only potential parts.

I think actual infinity cannot be regarded as a purely intellectual construct; it represents a fundamental characteristic of the continuum. — Devans99

Potentially, yes. Actually, no. We can divide indefinitely, but at any point in time, we will only have done a finite amount of division.

The fact we do not compute the divisions mentally does not mean they are not happening in reality. — Devans99

What is the operation that makes them "happen," if it is not mental or physical? Note that moving is not dividing, even though motion can be divided mentally.

It is like he is saying actual infinity is an artefact of the measuring process, along with number in general I suppose. — Devans99

Exactly! If we are talking about numerical infinity, it can apply only to numbers. If we are talking about being unbounded, but not a number, Aristotle would agree that we can have operations, such as division or thinking back in history, that can be continued indefinitely. It is just that at any actual point, they only go so far.

But maths mirrors reality and true continuity of spacetime surely requires something physically equivalent to actual infinity? — Devans99

How would we know? We have no capacity to experience such a thing.

Also, in mathematics, infinity does not work like an actual number. You can't operate with it and get a well-defined result. What is ∞ - ∞? Or ∞/∞?

the time traveller must have counted every number if the past is infinite. — Devans99

There is no finite "every number." The traveler keeps counting finite numbers endlessly -- going forward or backward.

I see all the cosmological arguments as either explicitly or implicitly time-based. Causality and time are inextricably linked; movement and time are likewise linked. — Devans99

Only accidental causality is time based, and as Hume showed, it lacks intrinsic necessity.

Essential causality is concurrent. The builder is building only when the house is being built. The law of conservation of energy is only conserving energy when energy is being conserved.

As a side note, there seems to be a point (the Planck time) at which time can no longer be defined. Beyond it, accidental causality is meaningless. Essential causality remains meaningful.

There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible — Devans99

The priority here is ontological, not temporal. It means first in order of actualization. A builder, for example, must be actual (ontologically) prior to any actual building work -- even though the actuality of the builder is co-temporal with the actuality of building operations.

Can you explain how the actualisation order could be different from the temporal order? — Devans99

I just did.

The possibility of intervention by God? — Devans99

Not necessarily. I drop a ball and expect it to hit the ground. Then, an asteroid hits and the ball is vaporized. While this my be far fetched, the possibility of intervention shows a lack of necessity and separation allows intervention.

I thought that Aristotle had God as external to the universe, existing in the heavenly spheres - a deist view of a non-interventionist God. — Devans99

Aristotle's God is not physical, but "Self-thinking Thought," and has no location. His view was deist in that he believed the unmoved mover had no interest in human beings, "There can be no friendship between God and man."

If something never started existing, it does not exist. — Devans99

That would mean that God could not exist.

These examples seem like they're all the same. Aren't they really only saying "A (the necessary thing) implies B?" — T Clark

Not quite. Typically one says that the existential situation (A) necessitates B. What is really meant is that A and some basis implies B. That makes necessity analogously predicated. The similar part is implication, the different part is the basis of the implication.

Also, A need not be a necessary thing. What is necessary is the relation between A and B, given the basis.

Which implies not-necessary with respect to another set of premises, and perhaps even necessarily-not with respect to even another set. — tim wood

Quite possibly. I can easily envision a conflict between a claim of physical impossibility made by determinist and one of moral necessity made by a moralist maintaining free will.

My guidance would be to clarify the basis of modal claims.

First, it's nice to see a longer post here that's well-written. — Terrapin Station

Thank you.

I think we can observe possibility in at least some cases. — Terrapin Station

Of course it is, nor was I suggesting the contrary. The point is that anything we actually know, we know from experiencing the one real world. Parsimony suggests that we do not add to the experiential basis of our knowledge (the one actual world) a set of object that can neither be experienced nor known to be self-consistent (possible worlds). This especially when we have an adequate foundation for modal concepts based on the world we can observe.

it doesn't seem to me that necessarily vs possibly might easily obscure equivocations in modal logic. — Terrapin Station

That point is a result of a dialog I had with a modal symbolic logician about the cosmological argument. In it, the person equivocated on logical and ontological necessity insisting that a formally valid symbolic manipulation proved that cosmological arguments was unsound. My dialog partner was unable to see, or unwilling to admit, that "□" was being used equivocally.

I think that no matter how close we may get Aristotle remains foreign. — Fooloso4

Aristotle and we share a common purpose -- to understand reality. By standing beside him and looking at what he was looking at, there is every chance that we will see what he saw -- if he saw rightly. Of course, we have different conceptual spaces than he did, but there is no reason that we cannot expand our spaces to include his concepts, just as we expand it any time we delve into a new subject.

As knowledge is a subject-object relation, we will never know in exactly the same way as Aristotle did, but then neither can we know in exactly the same way our contemporaries do. Still, in both cases, there is much we can learn by looking in the same direction form the same standpoint.

There are some who hold to what Gadamer called a fusion of horizons and others who like Strauss strive to understand a text from the perspective of a reader at the time of writing. I think this is best understood as an attitude or stance one takes in approaching the text rather than what one thinks is accomplished. — Fooloso4

My approach is to try to stand next to the author and see what he or she saw.

Time is not IMO 'unmeasured change'... time has a start so it must be physical. — Devans99

We are discussing Aristotle's consistency, so we have to use his definitions. Aristotle defined time as the measure of motion according to before and after. So, for him, time is a measure. "Unmeasured change" is how I would think Aristotle would describe the unlimited prior history of the cosmos -- as to have any kind of time would require a measurement.

The very act of attaining the goal would seem to me to infinitely divide the distance to the goal — Devans99

That is not Aristotle's view. I also think it is factually incorrect. We do not do division into parts (which is an intellectual operation) when we run a race, and if we did, it would take forever to do the actual dividing which is why Aristotle is denying actual numerical infinities. The same applies to time. You can only measure from a beginning to an end, and if change has no beginning, you can't actually measure all of it.

His stance seems strange. Does a falling tree make a sound if no-one is present? — Devans99

This is a question that Aristotle has elaborated position on. He distinguishes the sensible from the sensed and the intelligible from the understood. So, he would say that the result of the tree falling is audible, but not heard. If you define "sound" as audibility, then it makes a sound, but Aristotle would requires the completion of actual hearing for an actual sound. So he'd say it was an audible event, but not a sound.

Does time or space have duration or distance if no-one measures it? Surely yes to both questions. — Devans99

Aristotle says that quantity as a property is either discrete or continuous, but neither is an actual number unless counted or measured. This is because numbers are quantity as understood (as it exists in the mind). So, unless there is an enumerating mind, there are no numbers. There is, however, actual extension = parts outside of parts.poten

it is inconsistent to hold a believe in past eternity but to deny actual infinity. — Devans99

It is not inconsistent to hold that something can be potentially infinite, but always actually finite. That is how counting is. There is no intrinsic limit to a count, but actual counts are always finite.

The cosmological argument is fundamentally a time-based argument so we are talking about a time based infinite regress - which is impossible - which is what Aquinas says in the 5 ways. — Devans99

There are cosmological arguments based on accidental causality, such as the Kalam argument popularized by Craig, and arguments based on essential causality, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas. The Kalam argument is persuasive, but logically unsound because, as Hume argued, accidental causality has no intrinsic necessity.

The fact that X exists means that it is intrinsically necessary that a prior cause of X existed. — Devans99

Ontologically prior (first in order of actualization), yes. Temporally prior, no. There is can be no logically necessary connection between events at separate times and places. This is because there is always the possiblity of intervention. There is no possibility of intervention with essential causality because the agent actualizing the patient is (identically) the patient being actualized by the agent. (The builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.)

I do not see how Aquinas can reject a time ordered infinite regress and maintain a belief in an eternal cosmos - the second implies a time ordered infinite regress. — Devans99

Aquinas is open to infinite regresses in time and rejects the Kalam argument. That is why creation in time is a faith claim for St. Thomas.

that would imply matter with no temporal start, which in turn implies the matter does not exist. — Devans99

Asserting that something has no beginning does not entail that it does not exist.

That makes sense, thanks. — Devans99

You are welcome.

I think we agree. When I study a text I also read a number of translations and commentaries. I wasn't suggesting that there is no need for grammar. I'm saying that using a dictionary can help us see the associations and alternate meanings of terms that are translated by a single English term, often with entirely different associations.

The past is complete, it has actually happened. Past eternity implies a greater than any finite number of days has elapsed - an actual infinity - which is impossible. — Devans99

I think that in virtue of his discussion of quantity in the Metaphysics, Aristotle would say that infinity is a property of numbers, and unmeasured change, however extended, is not a number, but a measurable -- and therefore not an actual, but a potential infinity. That is how he resolves Zeno's half-the-distance paradox. He argues that while the distance to the goal is infinitely divisible, it is not actually infinitely divided. His stance seems to be that to have an actual infinity requires someone to actually count or measure and infinite quantity. We might say that applying "infinite" to something that is not an actual count or measure is a category error.

My understanding of Aquinas is that he rejects a time ordered infinite regress. From the prime mover argument — Devans99

That is the error Kant makes in criticizing the cosmological argument. The argument is based on essential, not accidental, causality. Aristotle defines change/movement as the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency. For a potency to be actualized requires an agent to be concurrently active -- here and now, not in the past.

Aristotle's paradigm case of essential causality is a builder building a house. As long as the builder is building, the house is being built. When the builder is not building, the house is not being built. That is why all cases in the regress must act concurrently with the observed change. If they did not the potency defining the change could not be actualized.

On the other hand, as Hume noted (and as was known to the Scholastics), accidental or time-sequenced causality has no intrinsic necessity. Thus, "proofs" based on accidental causality lack necessity.

Aquinas says explicitly that there is no philosophical reason to reject Aristotle's view that the cosmos is indefinitely old. Creation in time is, for Aquinas, an article of faith, not a conclusion of reason.

I think Aristotle's message on a time ordered infinite regress in not clear. From Wikipedia: — Devans99

The Wikipedia is wrong. Aristotle believed that each circular motion mathematical astronomers were then finding was caused by a distinct "intelligence," later Christianized into angels. He is quite clear that the intelligences do this because constant circular motion is the closest they can come to the nature of the unmoved mover. Further, he calls the causality linking the intelligences to the unmoved mover "desire," thus seeing it as a species of intentionality.

Yes, translations of Aristotle usually have some degree of interpretive spin. The Loeb Classical Library Edition is useful because it has the Greek and English on facing pages. Used copies are cheap, and with the aid of Lindell and Scott's dictionary, looking at the Greek often clarifies disputed issues. Once you've mastered the alphabet, Aristotle's Greek is not that hard.

I think that Aristotle is the greatest mind known to history, and that most of the errors in contemporary philosophy can be corrected by one familiar with his work.

On the time issue: Aristotle defined time as the measure of motion according to before and after. In his discussion of quantity in Metaphysics Delta, he points out that there are no actual numbers in nature, but that natural things have quantity in virtue of being countable or measurable. He would see an endless succession of natural change as measurable, but not measured. Thus, the associated time, as a measure, is a potential, not an actual, infinity.

With regard to an infinite regress of causes, we must distinguish, as Aristotle does, essential or concurrent causality from accidental or time-ordered causality. Aristotle and Aquinas reject the possibility of an infinite regress of essential causes, but allow the possibility of an infinite regress of accidental causes.

"Transtemporal symmetry" is my term, but it is based on the formulation of the exchange principle in Dirac's many-time formulation of relativistic quantum theory, which you can look up.

The control typically exercised over detectors in EPRB/Aspect type experiments is to change their orientation. If we change the orientation, then, of course the measured spin will be up or down the new orientation, not the old one.

Still, changing the orientation does not exert control over the details of the detector's electron wave function. The details will be controlled, in part, by the exchange principle and resulting constraints.

Alice's observations can inform her of conditions at Bob's location. If she performs her obseervation, she is informed, but if she does not, she is not informed.

How could an experiment at Alice's location inform us of conditions at Bob's location? Before I try to answer this, it is important to note that it does. Once Alice has measured spin up, she knows that conditions at Bob's location are such that he will measure spin down. Further, it does not matter if she learns of the conditions at Bob's space-time location in a reference frame where she learns of it before Bob does his measurement, or after. All that is important is that an observation at Alice's space-time location can inform us of conditions at Bob's.

I am suggesting that the reason Alice's observation informs her of conditions at Bob's location is symmetry. If we lived in a model world in which Bob's observations must mirror Alice's, then Alice would be able to predict Bob's results from hers without a hint of non-locality. The actual case is more complex, but the principle is the same.

No, I am denying spooky action at a distance. Instead, I'm saying all detectors, anywhere in the universe, are constrained by transtemporal symmetry. In effect, this means that detectors are pre-syncronized. When you set the orientation of a spin detector, you change one and only one degree of freedom, but the multi-electron wave function has an uncountable number of degrees of freedom (as do all continuous forms). If the detector system has n electrons, the anti-symmetry condition imposes n!-n constraining equations (each of which spans all space-time) on the system wave function. (Note that n is typically in the order of Avagadro's number, ~10^23). This links the "separate" detectors, so they are anything but independent -- vitiating an essential premise of theorems like Bell's.

if the settings on one of the detectors is changed randomly, before a particle has reached it, but not soon enough for any subluminal signal to have reached the other detector...what? — i aM

When we change the macroscopic setting of a detector, the microscopic details of its multi-electron wave function (our ignorance of which we call "randomness") remain constrained by transtemporal symmetry -- and that wavefunction interacts with the incident quanta to produce the detection event.

The "control" you object to is to prevent the unjust from violating the just rights of others. — Dfpolis

You mean preemptively? Because no one's rights are being violated simply because someone says something, or dresses a particular way, etc. Not that I really frame anything in terms of rights, but I'm just sayin'. — Terrapin Station

The Social Justice Movement is not a movement against free speech or free expression -- unless it is expression as part of criminal action. In characterizing it so, you demonstrate that you do not understand what social justice is.

The "control" you object to is to prevent the unjust from violating the just rights of others.

The best to you.

1) Information (a decoded message) is the result of communication (data encoding, transmission, conveyance, reception, and decoding). And,
2) I communicate my hopes, beliefs, and desires to others.
Then:
My hopes, beliefs, and desires are information possessed by those recipients who have decoded my message(s). — Galuchat

That does not mean that hopes, beliefs, and desires are information, only that they are intelligible -- part of the state of the world we can be informed about, just as we can be informed whether a rock is sandstone or limestone.

A definition of information in terms of possibility can only be a definition of mathematical information. It is unsuitable for use as a general definition which also pertains to physical and semantic information. — Galuchat

Clearly knowing about physical or semantic realities does reduce what is logically possible. As I just indicated, when we know a stone is limestone, the possibility that it is granite is gone. When we know a sentence is in Russian and speaks of the soul, the possibility that it is in English and does not speak of the soul no longer exists.

Yet, physical and/or semantic information is produced every time the message is decoded. — Galuchat

No, what is produced is the intelligible fact that the message is so decoded. Something being intelligible means that it can be informative, but it is not actually informative until someone is actually informed.

Your example does not rebut my position. The pressure wave produced but the doorbell is not information until its heard and understood. Before that it is merely audible and intelligible. Once the subject is informed, the logical possibility that bell is not ringing no longer exists. As a result the subject can combine the new information with prior learning and infer that someone is ringing the bell.

Than ALL structures of human thought are by their own nature information limiting in total. For instance the scientific method is a wonder structure for investigating the universe, ordering thought, and determining a more reliably consistent cause effect relationship. Far better than the Theology led structure of the catholic church — Aadee

Of course, knowledge is informative, limiting the possibility of contrary states, but hopes, believes and desires are not informative, as they assume noting about extramental reality.

I do not see that your position stands in opposition to theology. As you may know, Christian theology sees the Second Person of the Trinity as the Logos -- the principle of rationality and order in nature, the Tao of Eastern thought.

The citation for the actual experiment is: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.05080

As bulk matter (such as cats and quantum detectors) is held together by nonlinear electron-electron interactions, the superposition principle does not apply to them. So, Schroedinger's cat is either alive or dead and never both.

Thanks to calling my attention to this thread. I note that the cited article does not fully describe the experiment, and says in one paragraph that the experimenter is Caslav Brukner, and in the next that the experiment is the work of Proietti and co. Thus, one must not rely on the article too heavily.

As Mark Twain said of reports of his death, the conclusion that reality is inconsistent is greatly exaggerated. Let us begin with a simple observation. Assuming that the experiment has been adequately described, there is no dispute over the observed facts. Everyone reading of the experiment will agree that the observations on each side are exactly as reported. There is no evidence supporting the claim that reality is self-contradictory -- because no one has observed that what is, is not.. The contradiction lies in the conclusions drawn from the two sides of the experiment. As these conclusions are based on interpretive assumptions made about self-consistent facts, it is these assumptions, and not reality, that is drawn into question.

As I have not yet read the original work, but only the cited MIT Technology Report article, I can offer no detailed analysis of the experiment -- as I have for experiments allegedly supporting the "Delayed Choice" and "Quantum Erasers" myths. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-PAjJcRVCs). I suspect that my response to the detailed experiment would rest on the fact that quantum observations do not reveal the prior state of the "observed" system, but the interaction of that system with the experimental apparatus. Thus, in Wigner's Friend experiments, neither Wigner nor his friend obtain unambiguous information about the prior state of the system. Rather, each obtains information about the interaction of that system with their (different) local measurement apparatus.

In response to a recent question on my quantum erasure video, I outlined by views on quantum entanglement, which may be relevant here:

Let us begin by saying what quantum entanglement is not. It is not any kind of causality or spooky, instantaneous action at a distance. How do we know this? Because, theoretically, entanglement is a consequence of relativistic quantum theory, and relativity precludes this sort of interaction.

Yes, I know that there is no information transmitted faster than the speed of light in entanglement experiments, but that is not way relativity precludes spooky action at a distance. Imagine a EPRB-type experiment with two observers, A and B, equidistant from the entangling event. In our frame of reference A and B detect the spin simultaneously, so, if action at a distance were involved, it is indeterminate whether A's detection event is acting on B's, or B's on A's.

However, that is not the worst of it -- for if we consider the problem in a frame of reference in which A is moving toward the initial event, then A will detect the spin first and, if action at a distance were involved, necessarily, the detection event at A would have to act on that at B. If we consider the experiment in a frame in which B is moving toward the origin, the reverse is true. Thus, neither can be acting on the other and there is no sort of action at a distance.

So, what is going on here? Two factors are neglected by the usual analysis: (1) Detection dynamics and (2) transtemporal symmetry.

First, the result of a spin observation is not the spin of the quantum prior to observation. Consider a spin-0 quantum that decays into two quanta with spin. Let the EPRB detectors be set at right angles. Then, no matter what spins are detected, the sum of the detected spins cannot be zero! So, the detected spins are not initial spin (which was zero). This would seem to violate conservation of angular momentum, but not if we consider the detectors as well as the observed system. Obviously, the extra spin comes from the detectors. Thus, the detectors must be considered as well as the observed system, and the observed spin is not the the prior spin of the system, but the result of the interaction of the system with the detectors.

There is no time limit on quantum entanglement, so, we must acknowledge that EPRB detectors are not isolated and independent, but synchronized and entangled -- and the material in them has been entangled since the Big Bang. Thus, part of the answer Aspect-type experiments is to apply the idea of quantum entanglement on a cosmic, rather than a local, scale.

Second, none of the analyses I've seen consider transtemporal symmetry. Every case of entanglement involves some conservation law. The original EPR paper involved conservation of momentum. EPRB and Aspect-type experiments involve conservation of angular momentum. By Noether's theorem, all conservation laws reflect dynamic symmetries. Conservation of momentum reflects translational invariance and conservation of angular momentum reflects rotational symmetry. This suggests a deeper reflection on symmetry.

When we consider translational and rotational symmetry in different relativistic frames of reference, we wind up connecting points at different times, because the points that are symmetric in different frames have different times.

The most relevant application of transtemporal symmetry involves the Pauli exchange principle. In non-relativistic quantum theory, when we exchange the spatial coordinates of two Fermions (such as electrons), the multi-Fermion wave function changes sign. In the relativistic formulation, we must consider the Fermions not only at the same time, but each Fermion at its own time (this is Dirac's multi-time formulation). That means that world wave function, the joint wave function of every similar Fermion, has symmetries that link it not only at a given time, but at all times since the Big Bang.

This confirms what I said earlier about the non-independence of detectors in Aspect-type experiments. The detector wave functions are related and constrained by a transtemporal symmetry extending through all space-time. So, entanglement does not involve action at a distance, but transtemporal symmetry.

If a message is transmitted but not fully received means only a more contained unit of information was either transmitted or received than was requested or offered. — Aadee

It meant in my example that the reception is not yet complete and has little to do with the choices of those communicating.

Logic and semantics are simply the agreed upon structure with which information exchange can occur. — Aadee

Logic is not a convention, but reflects the nature of reality. If we want our conclusion to describe reality, then the premises must be true and our logical moves must reflect the nature of existence/being.

Semantics is conventional, because language is.

Are you talking about the Conservation of Energy law? Then that is a law that has been proven to be true in all cases of Scientific experiemnts and observations that have ever been done. That isn't to say that an exception will not be found someday. In anycase the Stone is never the same Stone it was just an instant ago. It is always changing, heating up under the Sun or cooling down at night. Just these simple Phenomena slightly change the Stone every day. So what actually is constant? — SteveKlinko

The fact that the law of conservation of energy is empirically verified makes it (the conservation of mass-energy) a phenomenon to be explained. If, at come later time, we find that the law, as we now articulate it, is only an approximation, then the true law still needs to be explained.

Persistence is not immutability. It just means that the stone continues in being as an observable object. To say that an object is "the same" object as it was a moment ago is to say it is has the same essential character and is dynamically continuous with the object a moment ago, not that it is identical. It is an equivocation to confuse these two meanings of "the same."

Why does the Energy in the Universe keep on existing? But a Deeper question is: What is this Energy in the first place? — SteveKlinko

The first question is that which I pursue in the argument and answer by saying that we must ultimately come to a self-conserving meta-law which answers the dictionary definition of God.

The second question is answered by the rather complex operational definition of energy. It is that measured by the specified operations.

Exactly how do you define a Meta-Law? — SteveKlinko

A meta-law is a law applying to a law. As I know no law requiring the existence of energy, I also know of no corresponding meta-law.

I don't see why it all necessarily has to lead to some sort of God. — SteveKlinko

The dictionary defines "God" as "the supreme being, creator and ruler of the universe." Surely what ultimately holds the universe in being is supreme. What is responsible for the laws yielding the cosmos is its creator, and the source of its laws is properly called its ruler. So, what the reflection discovers meets the dictionary definition of God.

Also if God is directing Evolution then it seems absurd that we had 200 million years of Dinosaurs. What was he thinking? — SteveKlinko

That dinosaurs are worthy of existence.

It has been pretty clear that we've been discussing proving God's existence and to do that you need to apply scientific facts and theories. — Christoffer

No, we don't. If you had read either of the proofs I suggested, you would know this.

The laws of physics govern everything. Do you mean to say that everything is causally connected? I once read a book on logic that showed, as an example of coincidence, the correlation between priesthood and murder rates - both seemed to have increased. The author then went on to say that this is simple coincidence i.e. there was no causality in the data. — TheMadFool

Recall that I asked you to define "coincidence," and you replied that "Coincidence means an absence of causality." So, we're discussing what "coincidence" means.

Since you brought up correlation, I assume that you do not mean that no causality is involved, but that two events are coincident if neither causes the other. I don't think that's enough. Many species of flowers bloom in the Spring with no species causing another to bloom. Still, this is not a coincidence because they all bloom in response to common causal factors. So, for events to be coincident, it is not enough for them not to cause each other, they can't result from a common cause.

The problem is, all purely physical events are the result of the laws of nature operating on the initial state of the cosmos. Futher, quantum entanglement shows that they continue to be related. So, strictly speaking, there are no coincidences. Still, it is meaningful to speak of "coincidences" because we do not mean to trace events back to their ultimate causes, but to more proximate cases that are apparent to us.

This means that being "coincident" is inescapably subjective. We decide how far back we wish to trace the causal chain. If the common causes are not apparent to us, then we call events "coincident." While this is fine for common purposes, it is inadequate for philosophical analysis -- for we know that all purely physical events are the result of common causal factors.

You've heard of the maxim "correlation doesn't mean causation" — TheMadFool

Yes, I have. We do not have mere statistical correlation between initial and final states in physics. They are completely determined (caused) by the laws of motion.

Coincidence means an absence of causality. Teleology requires a causal connection. — TheMadFool

As physical determinism requires that all purely physical events be caused, by this definition, there are no coincidences.

Physics has proven theories and they haven't proven anything to support any unification theory. — Christoffer

What has this to do with what we are discussing? Nothing!

If you can't combine physics with your conclusion, you are essentially ditching science for your own belief. — Christoffer

You continue to wander in the wilderness of self-imposed confusion. My meta-law argument is based on the laws of nature studied by physics, but you do not realize that because you are not open enough to even read a proof.

I am tied of wasting my time on someone who refuses to make any effort to inform themselves.