If you want to call something a spade, you better make sure you know what a spade is. — Benkei

Oh poor Benkei. You are too far gone in this one it seems. You plant ice, you are going to harvest wind, and all that.

For the record, you are supporting/justifying an organization such as Hamas. And I can see you are unbiased very biased on this one. I would just like to juxtapose this with @Baden's response which recognized and condemned such an organization.

Just a few more things I see:

2. Palestine, which extends from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and from Ras Al-Naqurah in the north to Umm Al-Rashrash in the south, is an integral territorial unit. It is the land and the home of the Palestinian people. The expulsion and banishment of the Palestinian people from their land and the establishment of the Zionist entity therein do not annul the right of the Palestinian people to their entire land and do not entrench any rights therein for the usurping Zionist entity.

And right after that paragraph in question which is ambiguous at best and seems to be more about how they deal with the PLO/rivals:

Hamas affirms that the Oslo Accords and their addenda contravene the governing rules of international law in that they generate commitments that violate the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.Therefore, the Movement rejects these agreements and all that flows from them, such as the obligations that are detrimental to the interests of our people, especially security coordination (collaboration).

But the fact is, I shouldn't even have to give a shit about a terrorist organization changing a founding document. This isn't like we are quibbling over some random business contract. It's known explicitly and through the actions what the organization is about. How it is that you can be for human rights and equivocate on Hamas because you see Israel as X, Y, Z evil state, is beyond me.

If you are truly unbiased call a spade a spade, no matter who it is.

You mean the same charter that says this?

“Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine should be compromised or conceded, irrespective of the causes, the circumstances and the pressures and no matter how long the occupation lasts. Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea.”

I'd think you'd be unbiased enough to condemn an organization like Hamas :grimace:.

Also, with Baden, I asked a hypothetical scenario of what Palestine would be like under complete Hamas rule. It would resemble nothing protecting human rights. And you are unhinged, politically speaking, if you think they would.

I think perhaps Rabin was close to being an idealist. Sadly he was assassinated for it.

I've argued before in this thread that Israel's position in the region is and has been precarious. Perhaps that's why it can't afford itself much idealism. — Tzeentch

Agree with all of this. Don't forget Ehud Barak. I think he came the closest! But unfortunately, it was the failure of that summit with Arafat that, as far as I am concerned, that is the biggest starting point to the most recent conflicts (e.g. Israel's move to the right, Hamas taking over Gaza rather than moderates of some sort, negligible leadership of the PLO).

On the other hand, it's hard to see how Israel's blatant disregard for humanitarian law is benefitting it in the long-term. One could argue it's the idealism of Israel's hardline leadership that causing its ruthless policies vis-á-vis the Palestinians. A realist perhaps would sooner see the necessity of finding a modus vivendi, to avoid becoming diplomatically isolated in the region. — Tzeentch

For sure.

For purposes of definition, I consider Idealists as ones who put universal rights above nation, and follows globalized institutions like the UN rather than national interests. No nation is fully idealist. The more a nation is under threat, the LESS likely they will go the Idealist route for getting out of its situation. Rather, it predictably tends to go to the right.

Also, it is dubious to think "idealist" is always best. Global institutions, specifically the UN is also biased. No one is objective. No one is truly for "global" interests. And no nation is going to put some pie in the sky ideals above protecting its own people. Perhaps the made up Gandhistan I mentioned earlier.

When I look at it, perhaps by "idealism" I mean this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_internationalism

versus this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)

This might be better:
https://world101.cfr.org/foreign-policy/approaches-foreign-policy/idealism-versus-realism

Either way, the question you should be asking is, "Is there responsible actors on the Palestinian side that would be for a moderated peace, and knows how to compromise". Israel has historically had more compromise in this regard. All or nothing mentality is what kills any moderate actors.

Do note that while I am very critical of Israel, that doesn't mean that I am not also very critical of Hamas. I'd agree with Baden there. They're terrorists, and people who deliberately target innocent civilians in the way that they did deserve no protection. — Tzeentch

:up:

And while we may imagine what atrocities Hamas would commit if they were ever to gain power (which will hopefully never happen), in the case of Israel we need not imagine. Its list of human rights violations is unending. Human rights organisations have termed its treatments of the Palestinians as apartheid - a crime against humanity.

Hamas is being punished for its wrongdoings as we speak, sadly over the backs of innocent civilians. But when will Israel be held accountable? — Tzeentch

I guess my response is this:

What I do know too is that after WW2 and general European colonialism, all of its hopes and dreams for Idealism over Realpolitik is heaped on Israel. Its (Europes) failure in the 20th century to be imbued upon Israel, perhaps as a symbol of what could be, and what they never did. However, the Middle East has never been about some “shining city on a hill” where human rights are more important than nations, territory, resources, and cultural preservation. It’s a vision wide of the reality. And Israel acting in the interests of a nation that was attacked, whatever reasons you want to provide, will act in a way that shows it is doing something about situation. In realist fashion, it will retaliate and declare war on its enemy who attacked them. — schopenhauer1

That being said, yeah absolutely humanitarian relief into Gaza should have been part of Israeli policy in the form of food, water, services, etc. Don't forget though, Hamas would try to interfere with any of that. Israel blockaded the region so Hamas wouldn't smuggle larger weapons, as Hamas' main goal is to destroy Israel, which earlier, you agreed is what it is trying to do. So I agree, Israel has not properly balanced its security with humanitarian concerns. That is all on Israel's move away from any Idealist tendencies in the past 20 years (after the collapse of any deal under Arafat).

That being said, I joined this thread to root out biases on both sides. The Middle East/Israel is probably the most one-sided debates I see on these forums (and pretty much any forum). On this forum, the bias is certainly against Israel, so I provided considerations. I originally was engaging with @Baden on this, and he actually had a reasoned response here:

Yes, Hamas are extremists and I'd put nothing past them. Thankfully, they are not and will never be in that position. — Baden

So I stopped there regarding Baden, as I saw that he at least saw that reality (if Hamas was in power over Israel/Palestine rather than Israel). The broader point there is that Hamas' goals are not merely "justice for its people". Rather, "justice" for Hamas is utterly destroying Israel and cancelling any peace process, making it impossible for moderate Pals (especially in the West Bank). And of course, they don't allow Pals to vote them out. Don't forget, the main (realpolitik) reason Hamas did this was to stall peace talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia. They want to derail that, as they wanted to derail Oslo Accords with suicide bombings, etc.

At the same time, it is obviously clear that Israel has utterly ignored its larger existential question under Netanyahu's regime. He completely lost any thread of Idealism, thinking that if you ignore the issue, it just goes away. He has utterly fucked up the West Bank, emboldened settlers/crazies on his side, and thus, has weakened any moderates on Pals side. As far as Gaza, he should have tried to convince the Gazans against their extremism by providing direct aid and trying a campaign of hearts and minds of the (few) moderates there. That being said, being that the citizens would be shot under Hamas rule if they even so much as blinked towards Israel, perhaps they should have thought of ways to form a coup against Hamas.. Not sure how viable that was in any way shape or form.

I agree with you insofar that the other regional players haven't come to the rescue of Gaza either. But that's not their responsibility either. It's Israel's. That's why Israel has a nearly endless list of human rights violations to its name vis-á-vis the Palestinian people - human rights violations as determined by reputable international courts and organisations. — Tzeentch

See the rest of my post, as I think this was addressed.

That Egypt did not want Gaza back, and today refuses to let the conflict spill over into its region, is in my view entirely within its right and I see no reason why the onus would be on them to act when Israel has stubbornly refused to seek workable solutions for 50 years. — Tzeentch

But Gaza borders Egypt, not just Israel. Israel doesn’t occupy it in the sense it doesn’t have settlements nor political rule there. Rather, Israel made moves to constrict aid and funding to Hamas. I totally agree though that in an ideal world they would aid the citizens whilst constructing Hamas though.

My greater point is Gaza is not in a vacuum, and the region is fraught with RealPolitik over idealism, perhaps due to the precariousness of the region and the various religious, ethnic, and political interests.

What I do know too is that after WW2 and general European colonialism, all of its hopes and dreams for Idealism over Realpolitik is heaped on Israel. Its (Europes) failure in the 20th century to be imbued upon Israel, perhaps as a symbol of what could be, and what they never did. However, the Middle East has never been about some “shining city on a hill” where human rights are more important than nations, territory, resources, and cultural preservation. It’s a vision wide of the reality. And Israel acting in the interests of a nation that was attacked, whatever reasons you want to provide, will act in a way that shows it is doing something about situation. In realist fashion, it will retaliate and declare war on its enemy who attacked them.

Well put.

What do you believe Egypt should/could have done? — Tzeentch

As with the surrounding Arab nations, they should not have used the territories and Palestinians as a pawn. Accepted immigrants/refugees as full citizens and encouraged the formation of Palestine under Gaza and the West Bank. After the 1967 war, they should have agreed to take back the territories for greater peace.

A vacuum would be overstating it, but yes, I've seen no indication that Egypt bears responsibility for how the situation in Gaza developed. But maybe you know things I don't. I'm open to hearing another perspective. — Tzeentch

Look at the greater history of the region. Palestinians are not generally welcomed in other Arab countries for a variety of reasons. One reason in the past, as far as territory, it was always seen as a concession to not gaining all of Israel/Palestine. Pre Oslo it was Arab nations against Israel. Post Oslo, the sticking points have been more than mere trifles. Hamas represents a destabilizing force in the region to secular (even if authoritarian) regimes. It would want nothing less than complete destruction if given the means to do so.

In my opinion, when the Israelis point at the Egyptians they are refusing to take responsibility by asking other nations to clean up the disaster that they created. — Tzeentch

And this is the narrative you had. But who created whom and is it Israel in a vacuum?

I'm not sure what this is referring to. I followed the links but didn't find a clear explanation of what you mean by this. — Tzeentch

There were times pre and post 1967 where Egypt could have kept or took control back of Gaza.

You may have missed my broader point regarding Egypt and Hamas. You sort of got it with your brief and last mention there (of the real issue) which is they don’t want to deal with their Hamas anymore than Israel. In fact, they never wanted to have Gaza “free” it seems being they had control of it and never did anything with it, free it or otherwise.

I don't know if they would kill literally every Jew in that situation or if Netanyahu would kill literally every Palestinian if he got the chance. — Baden

But he hasn’t called for that obviously and you just changed the focus which seems a red herring. Just the fact you “don’t know” seems pretty telling (as I think you strongly suspect too the answer).

Hey @Baden, you didn't answer.

The current regime in Egypt isn't interested in caring for thousands of refugees, especially not if Hamas fighters are among them, given that Hamas is an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. — Echarmion

So is that the same moral equivocation of Hamas with the Palestinians? Granted it's realpolitik, but isn't that what everyone in that region engages in when it comes to preserving their interests? Israeli/Arab/Muslim/Jew?

They wouldn't need to bomb the Israelis if they controlled the land, no? They would simply call for every in the street to kill every Jew they saw, perhaps? The scenario is that they control all of Israel/Palestine (so I guess it would just be Palestine at that point), and there were Jews left in Israel.

I am wondering if that group (and similar ones. and perhaps even so-called moderate ones), would actually be in the business of not even moderation. That would be laughably naive of us to expect, but I mean that they literally wouldn't call for the murder of Jews on sight.

Anyhow, if that happened right now, yes. — Baden

Sorry, could you elaborate?

I would like to ask you though, being that you are not biased, do you think that if Palestinians had full control of Israel, every Jew would be in danger of their life that stepped foot in that land openly if ruled by Hamas, or other radical groups (and there are plenty of them in that tiny area)?

This is just a hypothetical as I would like to talk end games rather than the usual "war of grievances".

Why isn't Egypt taking in Palestinians? Are they going to open up borders?

The point that they are simply helping the Palestinians make a stand by remaining seems pretty dubious:
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-states-say-palestinians-must-stay-their-land-war-escalates-2023-10-13/

Why did they readily participate in the blockade and sealing off Gaza after Hamas took over the region originally?

Why wouldn't the 1967 borders be accepted for peace?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khartoum_Resolution

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Arab_League_summit#:~:text=The%201967%20Arab%20League%20summit,Israel%2C%20no%20negotiations%20with%20Israel.

Why didn't Egypt want (at least provisional) control of Gaza when they could have had it?

I guess I ask this in the idea that what is the end game here?

Netanyahu is a terrible dictatorial war mongering opportunist. That being said, his election was not in a vacuum. There were a series of things that push a population to the right. He ignored the existential situation.

That being said, Palestine offered no one of substance. Arafat was quite literally a bust. Abbas had potential perhaps if he actually took up the more brave position for peace. As per usual, he fears his own radicals. Also, the whole holocaust-denying doesn't really garner good will.

The inability to compromise will be the utter sticking point. As long as death and revenge is more important than simply living, it doesn't matter. It doesn't help that people on the sidelines encourage it, rather than call for moderation.

Yes, generally measured from 1993-1999. And they were fairly obviously aimed at sabotaging the process. Arguably, one of the reasons Arafat rejected an opening offer that included statehood was because he feared losing control over his own side with the escalating violence, although people also chalk it up to his own ideas about his "revolutionary soldier image."

It did not help that Kuwait deported their entire Palestinian population, a not insignificant 400,000+ in the early 90s, which ratcheted up internal tensions. And then Qaddafi expelled all of Libya's Palestinians because he was upset over Oslo, asking other Arab states, where 3.5 million Palestinians lived, to follow his example and make Palestinians "camp out in the wilderness."

With allies like that... — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: Insightful summary of the history of that period (pre/post Oslo and the resulting actions taken by Arab neighbors against Palestinians). And excellent point regarding Arafat's rejection. Was he ever going to take a deal in good faith? But the reasons you provided make sense regarding his mindset and the possibility that he wouldn't, short of 100% concessions. Even then... you can always find one thing that will cancel the deal.

But that wasn't a decision that came out of nowhere. It was the result of an, in retrospect, obviously counter productive terror campaign that in hindsight, seems to have been more about jockeying for power within Palestine than concrete ideas of how this would make Palestine better off or stronger. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wasn't that all the car/suicide bombings during the peace process during/after the Oslo accords in the 90s you are referring to?

I'd argue that the closing off of the Occupied Territories were a mistake for Israel and the attacks that motivated them a mistake for the fragmented Palestinian leadership. But more cynically, you could argue that allowing Egypt to take the Sinai back without also making them take Gaza back was a bigger mistake. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up:

:blush:

In a sense, yes. But in 1948 the Israelis were very effective at ethnically cleansing the territories they annexed (Nakba). In 1967 they evidently weren't. — Tzeentch

But again, that's changing the goalpost, as I was referring to before the 1948 war:

One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory. — schopenhauer1

Gaza has been under a blockade for over 15 years, and the Israelis have in other ways actively tried to prevent Gaza from developing.

Hamas didn't contribute to the prosperity of Gaza either, clearly. But there's two sides to the story.

It's even commonly accepted that at various points in the past the Israeli government low-key supported Hamas in order to reduce the influence of the PLO, and thus make a two-state solution impossible. — Tzeentch

I'm not sure that really answered the questions of Hamas' emphasis on para-military (terror) operations above prosperity for its people.

Do note the role of the Six-Day War in 1967. That is when Israel annexed the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.

A lot has been said about the Israeli claim to self-defense, since it utterly clobbered its neighbours' militaries in a matter of days and went on to annex huge swathes of land. It bit off more than it could chew, and it did so arguably on the basis of lies.

Now, over 50 years after the fact, those things are coming back to haunt them. — Tzeentch

Seems one can say the very same for Israel's formation in 1948, no? Didn't they accept the UN mandate (with much less land than after the 1948 war)? In 1967, wasn't there calls to wipe out Israel from Arab neighbor armies or something like this? What was the situation as far as the West Bank after Israel captured it in regards to Jordan gaining possession of it again?

Things to consider.. This is going to piss off both sides:

1) Violating your morals to punish those who violated morals, becomes its own contradiction.

1a) In a state of affairs of extreme violence, no one cares about this contradiction (1). Security at all costs and a response to the violence become default expectation (whether that is the Netherlends, England, France, Portugal, Brazil, Finland, or any country that thinks they are sovereign). No one is going to calmly reflect on the contradictions of using force directly after brutal attacks. No country has reached that state of blissful Buddhist repose (I don't know maybe Bhutan..Ghandistan (non-existent made up utopia)??).

2) Why didn't Hamas focus on making a prosperous Gaza for their population in terms of using support money to go to operations of daily living rather than funneled into military operations?

2a) A response I can see is that people will change the focus to the amount of aid rather than how the aid is being used, but I think this is dubious. For the people who want to make that argument, would you think things would be different if Hamas was known as a para-governmental entity that was known for administering their region properly and funneling energy into building infrastructure, economy, etc. (with whatever aid they get) rather than funneling it towards attacking Israel? Also, isn't the cycle of limited funding because it is known that the funding gets into the wrong hands in the first place, thus justifying not sending the aid in the first place?

3) Israel's problems always stemmed from its very formation. One side did not accept any concessions to the other (this was prior to even the 1948 war, meaning even prior to the "right of return" situation). In other words, one side has always thought the other side illegitimate even in theory.

I'm inclined to think gaining better understanding of our own natures would be more beneficial than more accurate understanding of our history, although the latter would surely contribute to the former. — wonderer1

:up:

Primates used logic to express immediate need. This led to further development of x part of the brain that mediates language, etc. Statements like this carry baggage, like for instance the idea of the individual narrative, the modern self, and the accidental. These are not particular to the quality of the science, but inherited by the form of the storytelling. — kudos

Indeed, I'd agree here. Evolutionary biology and anthropology can be a form of storytelling. You are making inferences that don't necessarily connect in a the way a physics experiment might, for example, But even physics also has the storytelling aspect. For example, what explains various paradoxes in quantum mechanics? There are various theories telling that story. Granted, biology as far as we know, has many more pitfalls of multiple causation due to complexity of organisms, environment, and history, but there are some models that seem to do a better job at organizing the data into a coherent understanding than others. There is getting data and there are theories that interpret that data.

If we are to have any value come out of the sciences, other than technology, it would be getting a better synthesis of what could have happened, or is the case, in regards to nature based on the evidence we have, and honing that or creating a better interpretation. This endeavor is likely to not end in some absolute consensus of interpretation any time soon, however.

So remember, this was specifically a critique of the Private Language argument. Wittgenstein's contention is that the foundation of language is communal, but this doesn't exclude the potential for internal reflection. Nonetheless, if we accept that meaning in language comes from communal understanding and practice, a misinformed or mistaken community could indeed perpetuate misconceptions and faulty language use indefinitely, mirroring the scenario where each individual might harbor a private language incapable of self-correction.

This skepticism illustrates how doubts about the accuracy of corrections can lead to an unsettling spiral of skepticism, that cannot get out of the solipsism of Descartes' doubt.

In other words, the communal theory of meaning doesn't overcome the same critiques as a private one.

In a way, I see a tie in with the Kripke thread about quus and plus. What happens if a whole community came across a book that said that "use" of plus was actually quus or whatnot?

See here:


Then you will inevitably snort and retort that this doesn't matter about accuracy. That is Witt's point, that correction, even on wrong use, is still a use, even if corrected wrongly.

My response would be that then, the person not being able to self-correct their private language would be no worse (or better) off.

There are two main theories as to how language evolved, either i) as an evolutionary adaptation or ii) a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. As feathers were an evolutionary adaptation helping to keep the birds warm, once evolved, they could be used for flight. Thereby, a by-product of evolution rather than a specific adaptation.

Similarly for language, the development of language is relatively recent, between 30,000 and 1000,000 years ago. As the first animals emerged about 750 million years ago, this suggests that language is a by-product of evolution rather than an evolutionary adaptation. — RussellA

Some refer to this concept as an "exaptation" rather than a specific adaptation. Chomsky supports this notion, suggesting that language's emergence was somewhat accidental in the way the brain evolved—a unique event not necessarily specifically favored through natural selection.

It could be a combination of both perspectives. Just as some dinosaurs potentially developed feathers primarily for warmth, later finding an advantage in their aerodynamic properties for intermediate stages of flight (with wings evolving from arms), language (or more likely a "proto-language" or basic aspects of language) might have initially emerged for a different purpose and then later gained significance and complexity through various evolutionary pressures.

I think Tomasello is developing important models and is rigorous in his methods. You turned me on to him last year (or so). — Paine

:up:

You acknowledge that such work is theoretical in a way that Wittgenstein's is not. Tomasello's work does not seem to cancel Wittgenstein's observations as other views might. Is your objection to Wittgenstein to say there is no such thing as a "non-theoretical" approach? — Paine

Wittgenstein is armchair philosophizing, of course it's not going to be the same kind of theorizing.

I have a few issues:

1) Wittgenstein engages in armchair anthropology and linguistics, primarily relying on contemplation rather than empirical evidence. If Wittgenstein's contemplations alone are considered valid, it would negate the necessity of disciplines such as anthropology, linguistic neuroscience, or cognitive psychology related to linguistics. Essentially, he suggests that we can think our way to answers that are observable and suitable for rigorous empirical study. I have no doubt that Tomasello drew inspiration from Wittgenstein, considering you can't avoid him when delving into the study of language. However, Tomasello's empirical approach to understanding how humans are evolutionarily grounded in their cognitive abilities holds more value.

2) Many individuals on this forum hold Wittgenstein in very high regard, bordering on reverence. Such strong admiration raises my natural skepticism. While we typically analyze and critique philosophers' ideas, comparing them with others or our own perspectives, the approach with Wittgenstein seems to be more of a desire to interpret him "correctly". There's a strong emphasis on precise interpretation of Wittgenstein's somewhat loosely connected philosophical expressions, almost as if accessing an absolute Truth. Few question or critique his ideas here, and I find this lack of critical examination reminiscent of disciples following a prophet.

3) Also, Wittgenstein's approach, characterized by presenting language errors and usage cases without explicit theory, can be seen as overly simplistic and aligned with common sense. It lacks the weightiness of a comprehensive theory and remains non-committal, catering to a specific personality type. It's as if there's an inherent depth that readers ascribe to it beyond what the author originally intended, akin to interpreting an I-Ching. People seem inclined to extract more significance from it than what the author has actually provided.

Willfully ignore, or be autistically oblivious to? — wonderer1

:smirk:

The

But this is not something Wittgenstein does, making his work incomplete and thereby ultimately unsatisfactory. — RussellA

Exactly.

I suggest that the 'subjective essence of experience' is one of the connotations of the term 'being' when used as a noun - that 'a being' is precisely the kind of entity that possesses the element of subjectivity, even if in rudimentary form. This is the point at which qualities of being a.k.a qualia start to become manifest. — Wayfarer

Sure, but when precisely that being begins, is the hard part. Is intentionality really qualitative? I would say it's a good contender for a point of view, but not necessarily qualities. An amoeba has reactions, but not intentions it would seem. Sponges have the most basic neural nets, but are insufficient for intention. Perhaps the most basic experience is found in the jellyfish and the worm as they perhaps move towards light and chemicals, though that gets murky between experience and stimuli. Perhaps we would have to start at mollusks or arthropods or insects for first real experiences. But then what is the differentiation here?

As you state with your quote, physical descriptions can only capture behaviors and morphology, not internal subjectivity. So I can imagine answer being something like "There has to be differentiation enough in the neural networks, such as to specialize and feedback to itself". But that is all descriptive and doesn't seem to confer why that is subjective, and the causal loop is closed off still.

Evolutionary Overreach: Midgley suggests that some scientists and science popularizers overreach by making broad philosophical or moral claims based on evolutionary theory. They treat evolution not just as a biological theory but as a complete worldview or ideology.

"Just-so" Stories: Midgley critiques certain evolutionary explanations, especially in the realm of sociobiology, as being akin to Rudyard Kipling's "just-so" stories – speculative narratives that seem more about confirming existing biases than rigorous scientific explanations. — Wayfarer

Just to be the devil's advocate here, but doesn't it seem plausible that only animals have the capacity for "qualities" (experience, a point of view)? And even amongst animals, doesn't it seem plausible that only animals with some form of nervous system have this capacity of qualities/experience/point of view? That being said, can there be some sort of Transcendental Theory of Neurofauna?

Also, not all evolutionary theories are "Just so", per se, but descriptive. A "just so" story might be something like, "Our ancestor's propensity for favoring the strongest alpha male, is why we have a strong tendency towards fascism". But, a theory that describes how language evolved in humans by examining various models that fit the evidence from artifacts, brain development and anatomy, developmental psychology, etc. might be a legitimately descriptive theory?

Here is a ChatGPT version of the evolution of language for example:
1. Primate Ancestry: Limited Communicative Abilities (Approx. 5-7 million years ago)

Our common ancestors with chimpanzees relied on basic communication skills, primarily using gestures, vocalizations, and facial expressions to convey simple intentions and immediate needs. Their communication was limited in complexity compared to the emerging human capacity.

2. Emergence of Shared Intentionality and Collaborative Foraging (Approx. 2-3 million years ago)

In the Homo lineage, around 2-3 million years ago, Homo habilis and Homo erectus emerged. These early humans started relying on collaborative foraging and tool use, requiring increased coordination and the sharing of intentions to hunt, gather, and cooperate effectively. Shared intentionality began to develop in response to the need for better communication during cooperative activities.

3. Enhanced Cognitive and Motor Skills: Adaptation to Varied Environments (Approx. 2 million years ago)

Around 2 million years ago, the Homo lineage underwent significant developments in brain size, cognitive abilities, and motor skills. Enhanced cognitive and motor capabilities allowed for more intricate coordination and complex motor planning necessary for cooperative activities, setting the stage for the further development of language-related brain regions.

4. Emergence of Basic Language Elements and Chomsky's Universal Grammar (Approx. 1.5 million years ago)

As Homo species faced complex cooperative tasks, basic language elements and rudimentary grammar started to emerge. Chomsky's universal grammar, a theoretical construct proposing inherent grammatical structures in the human brain, played a role in shaping the fundamental structure of early language.

5. Broca's Area Specialization: Language Production and Planning (Approx. 1 million years ago)

Around a million years ago, Homo species faced increasingly complex cooperative tasks that demanded precise planning and articulation of intentions. Broca's area began to specialize, enabling the production of structured language and grammatical rules, surpassing the communication capabilities of other primates.

6. Wernicke's Area Development: Language Comprehension and Understanding Intentions (Approx. 500,000 years ago)

Approximately 500,000 years ago, as cooperative tasks and cultural activities became more intricate, Wernicke's area in Homo sapiens specialized further to interpret nuanced meanings, understand shared intentions, and process an expanding vocabulary associated with complex cooperative tasks and cultural nuances.

7. Development of Self-Talk and Internalized Language (Approx. 100,000 - 50,000 years ago)

As Homo sapiens evolved, the ability to engage in self-talk and internalized language emerged. This capacity allowed for complex thought processes, reflection, and the development of abstract concepts, further enhancing communication and planning for complex cooperative endeavors.

8. Language Explosion and Cultural Transmission: A Distinctive Human Trait (Approx. 70,000 - 50,000 years ago)

Around 70,000 to 50,000 years ago, a significant leap in linguistic complexity occurred. Language exploded in its richness and complexity, enabling abstract thought, storytelling, and the transmission of culture across generations. Michael Tomasello's theory of shared intentionality played a crucial role during this phase, emphasizing the evolution of cooperation and communication, further enhancing the unique linguistic and cultural abilities of Homo sapiens.

Edit, added more.

As you say, first we come up with a few questions (which the Investigations does do), then we hypothesise a theory or two (which the Investigations doesn't do) and then we test out our hypotheses by comparing them to what happens in the world (which the Investigations doesn't do). — RussellA

I like this summation.

. The user of a scientific language game would not be able to judge the religious language game, and the user of the philosopher's language game would not be able to judge the language game of the ordinary man. — RussellA

While I agree to an extent on Kuhn's idea of a shift in how language is used in scientific revolutions, I don't know if incommensurability is quite as you are describing. I think of incommensurability as the inability to describe the world in an older framework because there weren't even ideas for the new findings. The geocentric world had epicycles and fixed points of light. The heliocentric had elliptical motions and such. This doesn't mean that the incommensurability was between understanding of the different worldviews, just the use of them to describe the natural world. In a world without relativity, there cannot be an understanding of gravitational distortions of space-time, or even space-time at all. It is just Newtonian three-dimensional space, etc. Light is not seen as carried by a packet of energy, etc.

Such would be exemplified by the instance of showing Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea to either a dog or cat, who would not even recognize that there was a different language game to the one they know. As Wittgenstein wrote: If a lion could talk, we could not understand him. — RussellA

This kind of incommensurability makes more sense for I think what you are saying with extreme relativism. I think you are trying to convey the theory that there are some language games impossible for people to penetrate unless they are already in that community (by birth or enculturation, one would assume).

The Investigations in moving between Language Games must be that of Moderate Relativism, whereby all Forms of Life are cognitively accessible. The problem is, of course, is that we don't know what we don't know, as was the case with the dog or cat when presented with a copy of a Hemingway novel, in that there may well be a language game outside of ours whose existence we cannot even contemplate. — RussellA

I would agree. I don't think Witt was posing any kind of failure to learn and perform language games, though this may break down for various participants in various contexts (people who are not academically trained in theoretical mathematics might not understand much from a theoretical math lecture aimed at mathematics professors, for example).

Each language game has a foundation that cannot be justified but must be accepted, and are, in effect, hinge propositions
PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." — RussellA

That's fine, it's usually historically contingent as to how it happened. It just takes a generation or two of users of the language game to make it an informal rule of that game.

My point about hinge propositions was that language itself can be studied further as to why we have language games, how it developed, what part of the brain is involved, how it evolved differently from other animals, what its evolutionary use was, etc. It is those ideas that I am more interested in regards to language. These are a combination of theory, observation, and experimentation to find the right model that seems to fit. Michael Tomasello's intentional theory of language is a good candidate for example.

Presumably, things like tool use, hunting, understanding the social standing of others was an evolutionary pressure and an effect of having the ability to be able to collaborate in a space of shared intentionality. It is this shared intentionality that is one of the main pre-linguistic frameworks for language. Now, if this can be proven to connect with not only behavior and child development, but also the regions of the brain that were necessary to evolve this cognitive trait, THEN you have a holistic theory of language.

You first have to define what the parameters for a working theory are, and then provide evidence that the model fits. For example, animals like dogs have a great capacity for associative learning. Is associative learning a substrate for linguistic learning, or is it another mechanism? That is an example of discerning where the boundaries of the parameter lies.

Apes can make tools, but it dies out in a generation. They don't have shared intentionality, so tool-use may be a substrate of language, but it may just be an effect of the substrate, or a dead-end in terms of its necessity for how language evolved.

Children learn words sometimes one at a time, but at a certain point, gain a greater context for word meaning without explicit instruction. There seems to be something akin to a grammar module in the brain (i.e. Chomsky's Universal Grammar module). Is this akin to the broca's and wernike's region interacting with the hippocampus for episodic memory formation? Were these regions developed in homo sapiens, homo erectus, homo habilis, etc? Why would they form in one and not the other? What were the evolutionary pressures causing the difference?

If the model is "shared intention", and we know that broca's region is involved in syntax formation let's say, are these ideas commensurate or do they have nothing to do with each other? If not, then how does the theory of shared attention account for the broca's region? Etc. etc. etc....

And speaking of use. Is there some sort of connection with motor functions. Did verbs come first, or nouns? Pointing to something or perhaps drawing attention to what one is doing (gathering, making tools, hunting technique, etc.). Did these words come together all at once or were they piecemeal? We do know that pigeons can turn into creoles, but that's after the capacity for language evolved.

I'm not seeing that you did provide any such answer. Sorry. Thanks for trying. — Banno

I believe I did.

Very clear. When there is no observer at a site then none of the derived features of the site brought into play by a human mind exist. — jgill

Drop the mic. Everything is solved.

Ok. I don't see how to respond; I don't see how this relates to what I wrote. — Banno

The demand is that either everything is physical, and mind somehow emerges therefrom; or that everything is mind, and the physical little more than a pattern. What puzzles me is why we feel obligated to phrase the discussion in these terms; why the juxtaposition? — Banno

You asked, I answered why the juxtoposition. I am explaining the juxtoposition.. meaning, presumably why we can't (seemingly) have both.