Ok bot. Same sarcastic remarks when a point is made you don’t like. What’s funny is you anyone can play that game all day on anything. Posturing at its worst.

I commented based on what I thought.

Can’t follow at this point. Can you give the gist in easy way?

Who said they are looking for exact certainty of someone’s pain? It’s an assumption we are not zombies and that pain is roughly negative in similar ways.

I feel like this is built on a lot of straw man assumptions about philosophy

Actually no, @RussellA has a point. He said:

The foreman may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Y, they would be aphilosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to say "bring me X". Similarly, the assistant may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Z, they would also be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to bring X.

In order for something to happen, for there to be an activity, there must be all the following:

1) There must be an X in the world
2) X must have been named "X"
5) The foreman must say "bring me X"
3) The something X that the foreman looks at must give rise to his inner concept Y
4) The something X that the assistant looks at must give rise to his inner concept Z — RussellA

Unless I am reading him wrong, this parallels an idea I had when answering in the Kit Fine thread:

When I hear "meaning is its use", I sometimes see this as a normative statement, and not a descriptive one. If everyone were zombies, and/or if no one had an internal understanding of a word that roughly corresponds to the concept, but its use (outward behavior way they expressed and acted when they spoke or heard the word) was always correct, would you really say that people understand the "meaning" of a word? — schopenhauer1

You cannot compare your authentic subjectivity with anything else without first objectifying your authentic subjectivity.
This comparison is what Harman makes with his OOO. — Angelo Cannata

So Harman I believe is trying to say that objects (other than humans or even animals) have their own way of being in the world. He doesn't discount our subjectivity, he is only saying that this is one level of interaction in the world amongst a multitude. Imagine a ball rolling down a hill. Can that be an interaction unto itself without a human observer? Is there something the ball retains without a human to pick out its properties or qualities? Is what that interaction is with the hill a sort of interaction whereby the ball retains its essence, whilst it interacts with the hill, or does lose all properties, or retain only some? Which ones? He is saying there are vicarious (intermediary) ways in which the object interacts with the hill, but there are withdrawn (essential) ways in which it can never fully interact with anything but itself.

I am open to being corrected here with what Harman means, as I too am trying to understand it. But that's my take so far.

But notice his four things he is trying to argue against that are predominant in modern science:

Physicalism- everything must be physical
Smallism- everything must exist must be basic/simple
Anti-fictionalism- everything must be real
Literalism- everything must be stated accurately.

Object is:
-anything that can't be reduced downwards or upwards
-undermining (no)
-overmining (no)
Leads to flat-ontology.

Though that doesn't tell you whether the reference relation between the words "my car's catalytic converter" and the car's catalytic converter could be sustained or set up, even in principle, without there being an understanding of a (not just my) catalytic converter's essence. Even if not by the speaker. — fdrake

When I hear "meaning is its use", I sometimes see this as a normative statement, and not a descriptive one. If everyone were zombies, and/or if no one had an internal understanding of a word that roughly corresponds to the concept, but its use (outward behavior way they expressed and acted when they spoke or heard the word) was always correct, would you really say that people understand the "meaning" of a word?

Generic Information (more inclusive than Shannon), which influences the world through its "causative interaction". — Gnomon

My guess is Harman would say this is the "vicarious causation" or "surface level interactions" but not the essence. He is very much non-process (contra Whitehead who actually is very similar in the focus on speculative metaphysics). The object is not to be "overmined" for its interactions, otherwise there would be nothing there that is changing, because everything is changing. There is some "thing" that withdraws whereby it could never be truly interacted otherwise there is no differentiation (all is the one) and there is no change (all is different).

It seems to me the nth attempt to bring back to life metaphysics, realism, objectivity, by using a false interpretation of subjectivism to support it. They say that, with relativism, the subject is taken back to the centre of the universe, but this is not true. When we say that everything is subjective, it doesn't mean that the subject is the strong reference point that determines everything. A critical relativist knows perfectly that, once we say that everything is subjective, we also know that the subject is completely unreliable, otherwise it would not be a subject, it would be an alternative source of objectivity. So, the subject is not the new centre of the universe in relativism, postmodernism, weak thought. The subject is just the outcome of the self-demolition that metaphysics cannot avoid to get. As such, the subject is just an intuitive experience, not an objective entity able to be the centre of the world. — Angelo Cannata

While I agree with you about relativism, I think the point is that speculative realism is trying to refute "correlationism". In this framing, which is essentially Kantian, "The idea is that we can only understand or access reality through our subjective experiences and mental structures." So no metaphysics can be had about things like other objects, because it is all about "objects-for-us" and not objects qua objects, or metaphysics "proper". This is trying to say that philosophy can convey metaphysics without resorting to "for-the-observer". Thus, it is always "speculative" because, though the human "form of life" so-to-say can never be avoided when conveying these concepts, the content of what is conveyed can be "about" the non-human forms of life, if you will. I take it to mean that, just because the form of the communication has to be in intelligible human constructs, this doesn't mean the world follows suit, and this "world" can be discussed in regards to how it is, in its non-human form, even if by way of the human.

In the PI he finds that there is rationality despite not being purely logical; he finds our ordinary criteria which embody our interests in the different kinds of things we do, in different situations, filling in the areas set aside by him (and by Kant), and learning why we are compelled to see the world as either pure or unknowable. — Antony Nickles

It's almost as if Witt, in his enthusiasm for Frege's new project of logic realism, (during Tractatus period), took the opposite approach to Schop. For early Witt, all is phenomenal. Anything that cannot be discussed in an observable way was meaning-less or non-sense. Of course, if he read Schop's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, he might save himself the whole Picture Theory.

But anyways, Schop's books are all about understanding the "inner" part of existence (subect-for-object), and how that is that the internal and external interact, etc. Early Witt, could not stand philosophy venturing into the internal aspects. But that's my point is that one does not need a precision of "sense and reference" to describe one's metaphysical theory. One does not need things to be observed. One can describe abstract ideas and felt sensations, intelligibly. Now, later Wittgenstein, might grant this, but then say that one can always be in error of what one really means, understands, or thinks they said. But I don't think that this disproves that communication about abstract ideas (non observational), are thus irretrievably hopeless. Rather, as perhaps you are getting, it is your "responsibility" to see if there is insight there (for yourself, regarding the world).

So he’s not telling you “his insights”; he’s “showing you” examples of what we say (in a context), in a sense to ask: “can you see this for yourself?” in order to grasp why we desire a single standard (or give up); so you must change yourself, your “need” (#108), not what you think. He shares his style of autobiographical confessions with Montaigne, and I thought perhaps Schopenhauer, though maybe not. — Antony Nickles

Ugh, this is now your problem. You (Witt perhaps) seems to be fitting all philosophers in this idea of trying to find a single standard, which creates a strawman that the Great Wittgenstein can then "show" is in error.

Besides the fact that this whole "showing and not telling" is besides the point to my point (because insights can be demonstrated to the audience in many different ways.. as I have been trying to convey regarding Schop), I can tell you that because we might have various ways of viewing words that might be in conflict, it doesn't mean that we turn off our ability to think about the bigger questions of life. Schopenhauer was all about the bigger questions. The way you phrase it, if you are not reading an engineering manual or learning a sports game, or talking about last night's dinner, you are a fool. And you know what, for the pedantic fool who thinks we should go back to pedantic banter and minutia, well they can do something with themselves. They can keep their self-important heads right up their ass, as they seem to like it there. Either way, Wittgenstein is sharing his in-sight... Whether you think through some clever demonstration of language-games or through clear and eloquent exposition (often on abstract/subjects like unitary Will.. like Schopenhauer).

But Witt’s method is not to impart knowledge; it’s to get you to see the world (yourself) differently. — Antony Nickles

And this is what most good philosophers are trying to do! Witt is not special. Sorry.

So when I say there is more to our relation to the world than knowing it, I am not saying it is unknowable. For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. P. 225. This insight is a shift in our attitude (as a position in relation to others), a realization of our responsibilities. — Antony Nickles

That is just describing forms of empathy.. Witt's hatred for psychologism (Frege's influence especially) is seen throughout early and later Witt, to his detriment, I'm afraid to say.

"Stuff" is what exists without an observer. Actually, reality would be reduced to two-dimensional world without an observer. Do you agree? — L'éléphant

I'm not going to make a commitment on any of those, but as you see, the question is open-ended and perplexing.

What is existence without an observer? What’s the relation of observer with the world. These kind of things.

Right, these were interesting ideas as well, and I think "overmining" relates to Fine's article to some extent. A lot of this resonates with Aristotle. — Leontiskos

Indeed, in a sense the idea that something tangential to the object itself (causal connection or the set of itself or something like that), seems to miss the mark perhaps with these modalists? There is a level at which the object is and overmining and undermining can be tricky not to miss it altogether.

I hope Harman is careful about this, because there is a danger of reacting to current problems in philosophy rather than setting out an ontology that can stand on its own. — Leontiskos

Good point. If I remember, his ideas are influenced by Heidegger's idea, but a completely object-oriented inverse of it. Heidegger I think stays within the correlationism of the "human being". It's also clearly has some Aristotlean/Medievalist influences (vicarious causation for example).

For Harman, Heideggerian Zuhandenheit, or readiness-to-hand, refers to the withdrawal of objects from human perception into a reality that cannot be manifested by practical or theoretical action.[9] Furthering this idea, Harman contends that when objects withdraw in this way, they distance themselves from other objects, as well as humans.[1] Resisting pragmatic interpretations of Heidegger's thought, then, Harman is able to propose an object-oriented account of metaphysical substances. — OOO Wiki

Neither is there an overemphasis on epistemology. — Leontiskos

Yep true. You can almost see the break in approach at Aristotle vs. Plato as the seeds for later analytic vs. continental traditions.

You are combining both the questions about whether the world exists (or whether there is existence) and how do we know that the world exists.

"How is it that the world exists without an observer". Asking this question entails that existence depends on our knowledge (the observer).

Tell me, are you asking "how do we know the world exists?" — L'éléphant

I am not saying that the world doesn't exist without an observer (necessarily), but the explanation of what that is (ontologically).

I saw a similar start of an approach in the quotes schopenhauer1 posted, which I began to flesh out here. — Antony Nickles

Students and scholars of all kinds and of every age aim, as a rule, only at information, not insight. They make it a point of honour to have information about everything, every stone, plant, battle, or experiment and about all books, collectively and individually. It never occurs to them that information is merely a means to insight, but in itself is of little or no value. — Arthur Schopenhauer

Yes, I think this accords with what you were saying of Witt's idea of "responsibility" perhaps.

This mirrors Wittgenstein’s insights about the limits of knowledge, and our desire to have knowledge be everything, that knowledge might equal virtue, will be an answer in place of us, of our responsibility to see for ourselves, to expand our vision; that the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. This is why I’ve been saying we have a desire to have knowledge (purity) replace our other relations to the world (and others) beyond it, apart from it. — Antony Nickles

Indeed and this goes right to the heart of what I am trying to convey about why philosophies like Schop's allude the criticism of "certainty". That is because the very essence of his philosophy was about an intangible unknowable(s). The artistic genius has "something" (a sort of attunement to the Forms) in his conception. Music has "something" (it's as if the "thing-itself" (Will) personified in representational form. Will is only ever discussed as a subject-for-object, but cannot be fully understood in its unitary state as Will-proper, etc. See this whole discussion.

That is to say, this resembles nothing of the kind of "certainty" of a Russell or a Kant. Thus, this critique:

My guess is that Schopenhauer gets mixed up somewhere along the way, as others do (Plato, Kant, Descartes, Hume, etc), not because their inquiry is totally misguided, or otherwise useless, but because of the prerequisite they have for an answer (before the “first step” that “escapes notice” Witt says #305]. This might strike Witt as an inability to notice subtlety (only focused on purity), and thus the critique: “crude”. — Antony Nickles

Schop has an "answer". Perhaps he was overly ambitious with his construction, but I see it more as an attempt for holistic understanding of reality, and is trying to elaborate on an insight he has (in his synthesis of Kant, Plato, other philosophers in the Western tradition, and Eastern philosophy, mainly). That is to say, philosophy is about one's (hopefully well-thought out) way of conveying one's insights and not so much a project of understanding "certainty". Wittgenstein himself was sharing his insights. So that is more the project.

Are you wanting an answer for why Witt admired..., or indirectly showing your dislike for wanting to learn any Schop (or at least his influence)? I know it's the latter, but you were on the verge of having an interesting conversation. Sigh.

That's not addressing my question. — Banno

I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly. — Banno

This looks promising:

Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. The Logical Positivists, who believed that only the phenomenal existed, took this as the paradigm for their philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, moved away from it and proposed a new and different analysis in his book Philosophical Investigations, and this became the most influential text in linguistic philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies, each of which influenced a whole generation that remained largely oblivious of its Schopenhauerian origins. — Bryan Magee

I do enjoy Brian Magee's analysis of Schopenhauer, and wrote some well-known secondary literature on Schop, so he is a good place to start. I get Tractatus, but I'd be interested to know where the influence is in Later Witt.. especially in light of that (Witt) quote.

Not that Stackexchange is any authority, but this answer seems apt:

No one can enter Wittgenstein's mind of course, there is however a bit of history to it. In his youth Wittgenstein was enamored with Schopenhauer's epistemology (largely inherited from Berkeley and Kant), but when he became interested in logic and mathematics he found it wanting on account of their nature and role. In particular, he was impressed by Frege's critique of "psychologism" about logic and converted into his conceptual realism. Youthful disappointments cast a long shadow. — Conifold

But just as anyone can take potshots at anyone, it is well to consider this next comment on that same thread:

Late Wittgenstein wrote that because he was very critical of Schopenhauer's philosophy. You may think his criticism was maybe too strong, but it is natural among philosophers to employ that kind of strong criticism. Wittgenstein has also been heavily criticized by the philosopher Mario Bunge, who said "Wittgenstein is popular because he is trivial" (Bunge 2020). So no philosopher, not even Schopenhauer or Wittgenstein, are free of that kind of "rude criticism". — James Walker

On a quick search, I wasn't able to find the source of this. Is it apocryphal? Does anyone have the original location? — Banno

Many philosophers shit-talked each other. That doesn't prove much. Schop on Hegel!

I agree with you on your summation of Wittgenstein, great mind though he was, he appeared more concerned with language use then actual philosophy perhaps giving birth to philosophy of language in the meantime slightly inflated his reputation as a philosopher at the time and although significant in his own way he holds nothing to say Locke, Hobbes, Hume or Kant imo. — simplyG

Recognizing that this is all personal sensibilities and such but... :up:

My critiques of Witt proper had to do with ideas that his critique of certainty really made sense more in the context of early analytics and logical positivists. I was saying that folks like Schopenhauer were already concerned with everyday things (the human condition) and things such as this... Other philosophies that aren't looking for a kind of certainty whereby language precision is paramount. I remember reading about Carnap and Ayer and such making fun of the Continentals for not being precise, for example. So there are other traditions that don't rely on such. Thus the critique about certainty, to me, becomes less relevant (as far as language precision), the more a philosophy is about "what is going on", in a more holistic sense.

But what about him are you familiar with that you think "bears littler remembrance"?

And the Wittgenstein I have read and read about is unrecognisable in ↪schopenhauer1's version. — Banno

I was commenting on Linguistic Idealism there, not so much Wittgenstein proper.

And within Linguistic Idealism topic, I was offering an alternative idea, contra Linguistic Idealism...

Linguistic Idealism is a philosophical concept that explores the relationship between language and reality. It posits that our language is not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense perception. Instead, it suggests that our language determines the kind of contact we have with such a reality and our conception of it. Linguistic Idealism is not a form of realism or idealism, but rather an attempt to undermine certain presuppositions of the realist/idealist debate.

In observing the world, we perceive different colours when looking at different wavelengths of light. For some inexplicable reason, even though we perceive the colours from the wavelengths 620 to 750nm as different, we find some similarity between them, and arrive at the concept that can be named "red". This is in a sense Idealism, as our concept only exists in the mind. But in another sense is Realism, as our concept depends on real examples of wavelengths existing in the world. As with Linguistic Idealism, the word "red" is a function of both concepts that only exist in the mind and examples that only exist in the world. — RussellA

Got it. Yeah, I was looking at it this way:

Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. That humans in a way, "can't escape it" as the mediator for how they view the world. But evolution, and pre-linguistic considerations point to perhaps a "way out" of that. That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. Or perhaps, looked at only by way of what we do now with language it is, but on further investigation, is not the case.

Perhaps, for example, with linguistic anthropology, or investigations into cognitive neuroscience, we see how human intentionality, human sociability, and the like, tool use, shared intersubjectivity (or alternatively, if Chomsky is somehow correct, "self-talk") and the like are more foundational ways humans interact with the world. These are shaped by forces that our species demanded in evolutionary terms. In the sense that it is very much a part of the "great outdoors" of the world outside our minds, it is "real" and not just all "in our linguistic use" that is the case for how we interact with the world.

Even more interesting, perhaps "use" has foundations in a sub-layer of "use". Imagine that for example, our ancestors "used" tools or gestured to the mouth for "food". Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". This is more than just inter-contextual language as we know it now. This is directly correlated with "the world".

Embodied embedded cognition (EEC) is a philosophical theoretical position in cognitive science, closely related to situated cognition, embodied cognition, embodied cognitive science and dynamical systems theory. The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world.[1] The world is not just the 'play-ground' on which the brain is acting. Rather, brain, body and world are equally important factors in the explanation of how particular intelligent behaviours come about in practice. — Embodied embedded cognition Wiki

I mean this is essentially what I’m saying I just add that one can synthesize one’s own philosophy, using one’s own ideas or ideas from others too. All of this equals insight. It’s not just that one gets the “right” interpretation but how you integrate and or use it and evaluate it to then synthesize it and weigh and evaluate underlying ideas about the world using your own reasoning and against other ideas etc.

Purely interpreting the author means nothing to me other than you understood the authors idea (although this opens up bigger ideas of if this can be the case or even if this should be the case…Depending on genre).

I don’t see that at odds.

God, or the event, determined the initial conditions for evolution. But then, at some point, intentionality emerges because, well, here we are. Good and evil don't seem like coherent concepts unless intentionality and subjectivity exist, so they emerge within intentionality.

We can always tie everything back to ultimate causes, and in this way we can say "God authors evil," or "the universe fundementally produces evil." But it's in the immanent unfolding that everything interesting happens and that the very intentionality that defines evil exists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean, now we are just word-parsing but "evil" can mean many things. Some common ideas:

1) Evil is a judgement about certain acts or intentions people do or have that either result in someone else's misery or negative experience. To act with malice intent or disregard for suffering.

2) Evil is any negative experience whether man-made or non-manmade (accidents, natural disasters, and someone's negative actions towards others).

3) Evil is some sort of metaphysical "stain" on one's being (this is very much a Christian/Augustinian/Pauline conception) by simply being born a human whose nature is sinful or some such.

So there are a lot "family resemblances" here. The way your OP set it out, it seemed all 3 of these could be on the table. Either way, since the OP mentions a God, I was assuming that was necessary. I still think you have not fully addressed these ideas I had from previous post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/838906

[reply

I would say the crux of analytical philosophy has been the battle with skepticism, “moral relativism”, and the like. I can’t think of examples that don’t other than what people call “continental” philosophy, which I would categorize as: accepting the world and just investigating how it is (Foucault, Arendt, etc.)—more of just a social commentary. — Antony Nickles

This seems a bit dismissive... But I will grant you analytical philosophy. But look at someone like Schopenhauer.. His philosophy though somewhat technical and architectonic, is also very much about the everyday human condition, and one's own individuation in reality. I think his philosophy is one whereby Witt's ideas on philosophy don't quite fit.

This is when he is saying classical philosophy abandons our responsibility to ourselves by abstracting to ensure myself, my relation to the world, to others. — Antony Nickles

But do all "philosophies" really do this, or just some? There are some that are all about the immediate, personal, social, etc.

The next step in improving the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language is to begin to incorporate the principles of Linguistic Idealism, and to clarify the consequences to language of the distinction between Indirect and Direct Realism. — RussellA

I guess defining Linguistic Idealism as saying that language is what shapes our understanding more than pre-linguistic or meta-linguistic faculties (like cognitive frameworks that might be posited in a Kantian philosophy let's say), then I would imagine that is the case. However, I would argue there are things that need to be in place for language to even be a thing for Witt- social arrangements of humans, the ability to have language in the first place, perhaps even intentionality, a history of human evolution leading to the ability to use language as humans do. So in this sense, I would say that leads to a sort of "realism" that gets to a world that has preconditions for his Language Idealism to be a thing. I am not sure what that really means for a theory of idealism, realism, or something else.

This is an incorrect formulation of the ontology-epistemology question, which I've seen quite often. With the "How is it that the world exists" you really mean to ask "how is it that we know that there's anything that exists. Very different questions.

Your question, as you posted it here, is about the "why" does the world exist. Epistemology deals with our knowledge of existence. Which one are you asking? — L'éléphant

I'm not sure how you are getting a "why" from the quote. I think we are saying the same thing? I can't really see where your critique is coming from, and if it's just a misinterpretation. As I stated the problem:

much of philosophy revolves around how it is that the world exists without an observer, or sometimes formulated as a human observer. — schopenhauer1

So is there a problem with the word "how" or "without an observer" or "that the world exists without". In other words, where is the "incorrect formulation" stemming from, and why do you think it implies a "why"?

I have been pondering Michael Sugrue's claim that Anglo-American philosophy starts from the external world and can never manage to bridge the gap to the mind, whereas continental philosophy starts from the subject/mind and can never manage to bridge the gap to the external world. He makes it, for instance, in this video on Husserl at 44:59. It seems like this discussion is somewhat related. — Leontiskos

Indeed, a lot of philosophy can revolve around this issue. I've listened to some of his lectures and generally like his survey of the philosophers, though I thought he was a bit too dismissive of Schopenhauer due to his pessimism. But fairly enough, I think he does that to all the philosophers giving his critiques as he goes. It's easy to try to psychologize Schopenhauer and his philosophy, but if one reflects internally, one sees the logic of much of Schop's project in WWR.

But anyways, to the broader point, much of philosophy revolves around how it is that the world exists without an observer, or sometimes formulated as a human observer. It would appear that idealists like Kant have priority of the representation before anything else can be posited of the world. Realists are willing to speculate about the world, not caring how representation formulates the empirical evidence, per se. That is to say, most forms of "realism" seem to essentially follow the lines of the scientific method for picturing the reality. However, this quickly becomes problematic when we factor in the fact that there is already an observer in the equation. It becomes quickly a "naive realism". For most layfolk, this is not a problem. They go back to watching their sports, going to their jobs, eating their food, etc. However, for philosophy-minded people, this should give great concern. So, the next move is to figure out some way that it "exists" in some way. Of course, the great debate in the middle of this is the Hard Question of Consciousness. However, excluding that major issue (which really is at the center of it, once all is said and done), you have small contingents like the so-called Speculative Realists (like Harman), who try to speculate about a reality beyond human conceptions of it. It is speculative because it obviously can never prove that reality, but it is believed one has the ability to speculate from the perspective of the human. They are not allowing this to hamper their ability to speculate.

It is a de-emphasis of both phenomenological approaches (like Husserl let's say), who only focus on what can be "known" via human cognition, AND linguistic approaches (like Wittgenstein), whereby one can only focus on what can be "said" via human language. Is this misdirected? Well those two schools of thought might say it is because they say that you can never get beyond the human. Thus metaphysics proper is almost impossible for them it would seem.

A basic question here is: What provides the surest starting point? Harman's objects? Aristotle's substances? Wittgenstein's linguistics? — Leontiskos

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? As I do think it more than indirectly deals with essences, by way of defining objects and their ontology.



What I think is interesting here is that Harman treats all objects the same, or what he calls "flat-ontology". That is to say, supposedly "physical objects" and "abstract objects" big and small can be treated as their own entity. The Dutch East India Company and a quark are not in any hierarchy, and humans have no privilege as to "for-the-observer".

I also think that his idea of "undermining" and "overmining" an object is useful here. Undermining would be reducing to separate constituents. Overmining would be how it is related to every other thing, more-or-less. There is some midground where you get the object.

The interpretive challenge is made evident by the fact that interpretations vary widely. He can not possibly mean all these different things attributed to him. One's jumping off point may be at odds with what the author says and means. If that is not a concern then I question the extent to which you are discussing Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

But, it seems since Wittgenstein's "method" is not direct, this will always be more of a problem, and especially so for his particular brand of philosophy. It's a philosophy that touts its inability to be directed, but then pretentiously condescends to those whom the Wittgensteinians think have not "really" understood.. Pick a lane.. Either its non-interpretive and up for various interpretations, or the author truly wanted you to see something, in which case, I am going to say shame on him for not explicating his ideas and thus making it a hipster-parlor-game for the "in the knows" who "really" understand Witt.

If one has little concern for what the author means then to what extent is this a participatory thing? If I say "ABC" and you respond as if I said "XYZ" in what way is talking passed each other iterative or participatory? — Fooloso4

Did I say that one was to not understand the author? When did I say that?

In my opinion, one of the greatest values of reading certain philosophers is that through our attempt to understand them the teach us to think. — Fooloso4

Rubbish. While I agree to a certain extent that you can learn from various philosophers and their writings, that to me is a dead-end if you just read a philosopher and you don't do anything with it for yourself. Also, these people aren't prophets or gods. It's narcissistic dogmatic self-limiting to think you can't "think" past the "published works" of the "great philosophers".

I agree with the second part, but see it as part of interpretive practice. As to the first part, all too often what one agrees or disagrees with their own misunderstanding of the author. — Fooloso4

Dude, I never said that one shouldn't try to understand the author. This is a strawman.

When discussing a particular philosopher or particular work of that philosopher, to use it as a jumping off point, however valuable that might be, is a jumping away from what that philosopher says and means and intends for us to examine. — Fooloso4

No you can understand what they intend to examine, see how they examine it, critique it, and offer your own alternative. One can get a picture of what the author is saying and then evaluate it. I see "philosophy" as an iterative, participatory thing, unless one is purely just trying to interpret or analyze a work without doing anything else with it, even if perhaps at a later point. The author themselves shouldn't be a substitution for one's own thoughts. Even if you agree 100% with the author, it's the evaluation and integration part that is yours.

It seems easy to read the PI as Linguistic Idealism, whereby language is the ultimate reality, and if this is the case, then language cannot be said to have any pragmatic use outside of language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language. — RussellA

Yeah, I like your analogy there. So I think you are correct. He is caught in the "web of ecology" and is trying to demonstrate various ways that language is vague or breaks down. He really wants you to see that.

As far as how this can be "used" outside of seeing that things are only family resemblances and forms of life, I don't know what else you can make of it other than, a collection of language breakdowns.

It seems you want to provide a framework and structure to something he just didn't do himself and perhaps is trying to show is the wrong approach anyways because language to him, will just elude your trying to define it. Perhaps your idea of Linguistic Idealism doesn't work in various cases.. You can imagine Witt presenting you with a host of language games that breakdown when applied to his theory where it doesn't apply, etc. That is I guess part of his point. So yeah, you can try to pin his theory down in a grand theory of epistemology and ontology, but he would probably say it's a lost cause or something like that.

Wittgenstein might be more hard lined on than I am, but as I look at it, the problem is not theorizing but when the theory stands in the way of seeing something. The theory is accepted and what does not fit the theory is missed or ignored or downplayed This is similar to the problem of a picture holding us captive. — Fooloso4

Sure, I'd agree with that, but I am not sure the whole PI was what convinced me of this. There might be some personality types this is useful for- one's he worked close with perhaps?

I think the idea for example of Will is an intriguing one.. But then I see flaws in how it is contradictory or incomplete, and unprovable, etc. So, that doesn't mean there isn't some sort of interesting truths or gleanings that one can gather from the idea or use as a jumping off point, etc. I mean, isn't that practically what all of modern philosophy is? You take a previous philosopher, you discuss it, then you critique it, and often you offer what you think might be a better solution, and so on.

But this is creating a vision of "reality" because it is required ahead of time to meet a certain requirement, which I am going to stop calling "certainty" because you are conflating it with the sense of being confident, or something like that.

They are using "forms of life" if you will, to convey their message, and there is no error had with any above and beyond demand for "certainty".
— schopenhauer1

Forms of life is not how, say, my ideas are conveyed, as some kind of way of talking for a certain thing, that we might, then, create or abstract. It is just all the stuff we share in common that is necessary to even have language (but not how it is conducted or ensured).

Stanley Cavell will put it like this:

[Being able to, for example, project words into new contexts] is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”.

@Banno has a good Austin quote that amounts to the same but I can’t remember where that is.

In terms of what a “language game” is, look at the examples of "concepts" that Wittgenstein investigates, the list of which is above in a response to RussellA--these are just things we do that he uses as test cases. He will of course invent contexts and imagine worlds in which what the philosopher says might fit.

What I mean by Certainty (what Wittgenstein is getting at in saying "purity") cascades from an occurrence of things not working out; creating doubt in morality, others, and even physical objects; taking that as a rift (between words and meaning, words and the world, appearances and essences, logic and emotion, etc.); wanting to never have that happen again; requiring there be a way to solve (intellectually) ahead of time what is seen as this "problem"; which creates a prerequisite of a single standard which necessitates a generalized application (universalized, known, predetermined, dependable, etc.). It is basically the age-old problem of skepticism and responses to it, based on knowledge. Schopenhauer, Hume, Kant, Plato, Descartes, on and on, are wrestling with skepticism. Positivism, Moore, Russell, and Frege are just one instance of a response; another is the belief that neuroscience will resolve the "problem". — Antony Nickles

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Ironically, you are trying to convey some sort of "certainty" about WIttgenstein's philosophy to me :snicker:.

I just "love" how the usual discourse in Witt goes though.. Cause the next move for you to say is that, "Well no, I am just doing my best to convey to you what cannot be conveyed because you just have to "get it" from this therapeutic demonstrative approach.". So you can spare me that next line.. I still claim you are trying to instill some "certainty" about Wittgenstein :razz:.

Also, I get what Forms of Life are.. But I see the philosophical tradition as it's own Form of Life that it has generated through the years and thus, in a way, its context is within that tradition. Even you said that Witt relies on this understanding of Western history to "get" it.

I just don't agree with the premise that philosophers are working to solve skepticism necessarily. I know I am not when I am "doing" or "reading" philosophy. There can be all sorts of reasons to philosophize. If we define philosophy as generally "thinking about the bigger picture", we all at some level, at some times in our lives, "philosophize". We might ask, "What's the meaning of it all?". And you might say, "Aha! That is skepticism!". Fine, then skepticism is anything with an open-ended answer.. But that is a lame way of using skepticism, because it is so broad. The skepticism you seem to be intending for Witt is something akin to skepticism in knowledge if something is true. But, even that is not necessarily an implicit drive for philosophical inquiry. I don't study Schopenhauer's Will because it answers questions of claims of knowledge, for example. I don't think Will will help me understand how a toilet works, or how it is that humans evolved brains that have the ability for language, for example. But if I was to inquire about that, I might research evolutionary biology or anthropology, and the like. I might look at and evaluate various theories for how and why language evolved. And yeah, none of those answers are going to necessarily be "the" right answer, just more convincing based on arguments and evidence presented. But it takes a personality-type that "needs" certainty for this to be an issue, and I don't think all philosophical drives or philosophers (whether academic or not) are completely taken by the idea that they will find "one universal answer". Rather, the search for Truth itself is something that seems motivating in some way.. A search for answers to abstract questions. And thus, there may not be a final answer to any of them, but there are ones that accord with what makes sense. And those theories become "THE theory" because you have either agreed with its sensibility for answering the question, or you yourself have constructed the theory to what you view as sensibly answering the question.

So this is all to say, none of this really strikes some sort of profound truth to a personality that never had the demand for certainty in the first place.

He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not. — Fooloso4

Yes, I can agree with things like this when applied to say, Kant's Categorical Imperative. One can spend all day figuring out how reality can be set up to make any "certain" conclusions that fit the criteria of Kant's CI. But then, Kant had some better ideas that conveyed the "sense" of his idea better- that is to say, he had the second formulation "don't treat people as a mere means to an ends". Now, here is a less strict formulation. It is still fuzzy because there can be all kinds of scenarios where we can think of some hard-to-tell ideas.. and is this mental, or is this according to your view, the other person's view, etc.. See, we can all ask these questions of "certainty" for sure. But because it is "fuzzier boundaries" for the second formulation, it can be internalized as a general approach to how we treat people (internalized value or rule rather than a formulation that has to be solved).

That has always been the philosophical approach of dialectic in general. Everything can be questioned, including the question, and it can go endlessly. Nothing can be grounded completely in theory. However, I think this misses the goal of philosophy. It is trying to find some coherence within the Forms of Life. That is to say, it is putting the cart before the horse when saying because we have forms of life that differ from ideas about reality or ethical principles or whatnot, that doesn't mean we can't attempt to create various theories or ideas. Ideas are weighed and judged and applied, and critiqued, and so on. They create their own "forms of life" that lead to other ideas and expansions and applications and the like. One need not stay in the "web of ecology" of word use and then decide to pack your bags and stop philosophizing (what I call now Radagasting).

I don't think any of this really answers my critiques about Radagasting and that this is aimed more a particular kind of philosophies that try to make things like "definite descriptions", for example whereby words correspond to reality in some way. I don't think other philosophies need those kind of critiques (of certainty). That is to say, concepts that are not tied to a correspondence theory of words to metaphysics, are simply describing their theory. And it is implicit in their descriptions of reality that they are mere descriptions- a way of relating their ideas about reality. However, unless they are committed to a strict correspondence of words to metaphysics, they have always implicitly been "loose" understandings of metaphysics and epistemology. They are using "forms of life" if you will, to convey their message, and there is no error had with any above and beyond demand for "certainty".

Is Schopenhauer's Will answering questions of "certainty"? Perhaps reality, but that is certainly not certainty.

At first glance, one may think Kant is answering questions of "certainty" when responding to Hume's ideas. But really, it is a theory of how we understand the world by empirical and a apriori means.

Plato is not necessarily talking about "certainty" when he is discussing Forms. He is providing a theory for how there are universals, or things that remain constant amidst change.

I just think that this implies to me there is a "certain" set of philosophies that this idea of "certainty" applies to (analytics- Moore, Russell, Frege, etc.).

Not sure if you are familiar with the book "Words and Things" by Ernest Gellner, but he provides similar arguments you are suggesting in your post. For Gellner, there is a great desire/importance to theorizing, and so he takes great offense that he needs Wittgenstein's therapy. Take for example,

"If these principles(linguistic philosophy) come to be generally respected, the result would be inhibition of all interesting thought.” — Richard B

I have not, but it looks like we independently have the same conclusion.

“It(linguistic philiosophy) is an attempt to undermine and paralyze one of the most important kinds of thinking, and one of the main agents of progress, namely intellectual advance through consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies.” — Richard B

:fire: :100: Yes! This is what I have been saying. He explains the issue well.

Additionally, Jerrold Katz, in "Metaphysics of Meaning", presents a theory of meaning that tries to resist the many criticism of Wittgenstein. He believe that Wittgenstein criticism mainly addresses those theories proposed by Frege, Russel, and those presented in Tractatus,

"For Wittgenstein to be successful in his radical critical purpose, he has to show how to eliminate all theories of meaning on which metaphysical questions are meaningful.” — Richard B

Yes that's what I have been saying. It seems he trying to show the flaws in his former belief (Tractatus) and people like Russell and Frege (logicl positivists and logical atomicists specifically). And I think he did make his point, but that's because they straightjacketed themselves in the first place. He is showing the "fly out of the bottle" because they created a self-imposed bottle that doesn't necessarily apply to other philosophers/philosophies. That is to say, yeah if you look for things like a "definite description" as a way to solve metaphysical problems, that is going to cause problems as you try to tie language in some corresponding way to metaphysics. There is a difference between a "description" of a metaphysical thing and a "definite description"- a specific device/idea used by some analytics and logical atomists like Russell..