One could call Schopenhauer an altogether crude mind. I.e., he does have refinement, but at a certain level this suddenly comes to an end; he is as crude as the crudest. Where real depth starts, his finishes. — Wittgenstein
I agree with you on your summation of Wittgenstein, great mind though he was, he appeared more concerned with language use then actual philosophy perhaps giving birth to philosophy of language in the meantime slightly inflated his reputation as a philosopher at the time and although significant in his own way he holds nothing to say Locke, Hobbes, Hume or Kant imo. — simplyG
On a quick search, I wasn't able to find the source of this. Is it apocryphal? Does anyone have the original location? — Banno
No one can enter Wittgenstein's mind of course, there is however a bit of history to it. In his youth Wittgenstein was enamored with Schopenhauer's epistemology (largely inherited from Berkeley and Kant), but when he became interested in logic and mathematics he found it wanting on account of their nature and role. In particular, he was impressed by Frege's critique of "psychologism" about logic and converted into his conceptual realism. Youthful disappointments cast a long shadow. — Conifold
Late Wittgenstein wrote that because he was very critical of Schopenhauer's philosophy. You may think his criticism was maybe too strong, but it is natural among philosophers to employ that kind of strong criticism. Wittgenstein has also been heavily criticized by the philosopher Mario Bunge, who said "Wittgenstein is popular because he is trivial" (Bunge 2020). So no philosopher, not even Schopenhauer or Wittgenstein, are free of that kind of "rude criticism". — James Walker
That's not addressing my question. — Banno
I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly. — Banno
Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. The Logical Positivists, who believed that only the phenomenal existed, took this as the paradigm for their philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, moved away from it and proposed a new and different analysis in his book Philosophical Investigations, and this became the most influential text in linguistic philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies, each of which influenced a whole generation that remained largely oblivious of its Schopenhauerian origins. — Bryan Magee
I wondered why Wittgenstein admired him, if somewhat begrudgingly. — Banno
I saw a similar start of an approach in the quotes schopenhauer1 posted, which I began to flesh out here. — Antony Nickles
Students and scholars of all kinds and of every age aim, as a rule, only at information, not insight. They make it a point of honour to have information about everything, every stone, plant, battle, or experiment and about all books, collectively and individually. It never occurs to them that information is merely a means to insight, but in itself is of little or no value. — Arthur Schopenhauer
This mirrors Wittgenstein’s insights about the limits of knowledge, and our desire to have knowledge be everything, that knowledge might equal virtue, will be an answer in place of us, of our responsibility to see for ourselves, to expand our vision; that the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. This is why I’ve been saying we have a desire to have knowledge (purity) replace our other relations to the world (and others) beyond it, apart from it. — Antony Nickles
My guess is that Schopenhauer gets mixed up somewhere along the way, as others do (Plato, Kant, Descartes, Hume, etc), not because their inquiry is totally misguided, or otherwise useless, but because of the prerequisite they have for an answer (before the “first step” that “escapes notice” Witt says #305]. This might strike Witt as an inability to notice subtlety (only focused on purity), and thus the critique: “crude”. — Antony Nickles
…the value of philosophy is an insight beyond what can be told. - Antony Nickles
Indeed and this goes right to the heart of what I am trying to convey about why philosophies like Schop's allude the criticism of "certainty". That is because the very essence of his philosophy was about an intangible unknowable(s). — schopenhauer1
…philosophy is about one's (hopefully well-thought out) way of conveying one's insights…. Wittgenstein himself was sharing his insights. — schopenhauer1
That's just quibbling over the definition
— Luke
Similar and same mean different things. "The Eiffel Tower is similar to the Blackpool Tower" is true. "The Eiffel Tower is the same as the Blackpool Tower" is false. — RussellA
What matters is that when the builder calls "slab", the assistant brings a suitable piece of stone. — Banno
What is the correct use of Form of Life ? — RussellA
What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as “given” are precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein’s terms, “It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required” (PI 242), and this is “agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life” (PI 241)...Forms of life can be understood as constantly changing and contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc.; or as a background common to humankind, “shared human behavior” which is “the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language” (PI 206); or as a notion which can be read differently in different cases – sometimes as relativistic, in other cases as expressing a more universalistic approach.
I can define the word "peffel" as "part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower", and I can define "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", but I cannot put into words what the words "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" mean to me, as my concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" have grown and developed over a lifetime of unique multiple experiences. — RussellA
Even in Wittgenstein's terms, as my personal concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others, it is part of my private language. — RussellA
For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. — Antony Nickles
If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. — PI 246
Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. — schopenhauer1
That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. — schopenhauer1
Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". — schopenhauer1
Embodied embedded cognition...................The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world. — schopenhauer1
So personal and private (as Wittgenstein terms it) are two different things, and you are using the word "private" in the place of both, — Antony Nickles
The point being, if two objects are "red" (based on the context), the color is the same, and not because our personal experiences match up (or that we "agree"). — Antony Nickles
If we take the case of someone actually being blind, philosophy would say they have never "experienced" color. But we can still explain the experience of color. — Antony Nickles
Simply pointing to an object and uttering simple words sound like a limited elementary ability of language use by young children just starting to learn languages rather than key ability for the general language users. — Corvus
Pointing at objects seems not a key ability to use language. Pointing at objects is primarily for learning words for children.........................Our key ability to use language is, from my point of view, not just uttering simple words, and simple sentences pointing at the object, but also being able to explain the situations, problems as well as trying to solve the problems by giving out some kind of verbal instructions or more information on the object...............I was unsure of your claims that pointing at objects is our key element to use language. — Corvus
Just generally, the Wittgenstein you talk about bears little resemblance to the one with which I am familiar. — Banno
What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel", which means "part [your] pen and part the Eiffel Tower". Is this not what "peffel" means? — Luke
In what way is the concept of "peffel" inaccessible to others? You have already defined it for us. Also, in what way is "peffel" a part of any language? Do you ever use the word "peffel" and, if so, how do you use it? — Luke
There are different uses of the world "meaning". The absence of pain means a lot to me and "pain" means "a sharp unpleasant sensation usually felt in some specific part of the body". — RussellA
My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. — RussellA
Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person? — RussellA
We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully. — RussellA
My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person? — RussellA
Sounds like something that happens routinely in engineering labs.
Points to waveform on oscilloscope and says, "The op amp doesn't have the balls to do the job." — wonderer1
In the PI he finds that there is rationality despite not being purely logical; he finds our ordinary criteria which embody our interests in the different kinds of things we do, in different situations, filling in the areas set aside by him (and by Kant), and learning why we are compelled to see the world as either pure or unknowable. — Antony Nickles
So he’s not telling you “his insights”; he’s “showing you” examples of what we say (in a context), in a sense to ask: “can you see this for yourself?” in order to grasp why we desire a single standard (or give up); so you must change yourself, your “need” (#108), not what you think. He shares his style of autobiographical confessions with Montaigne, and I thought perhaps Schopenhauer, though maybe not. — Antony Nickles
But Witt’s method is not to impart knowledge; it’s to get you to see the world (yourself) differently. — Antony Nickles
So when I say there is more to our relation to the world than knowing it, I am not saying it is unknowable. For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works. P. 225. This insight is a shift in our attitude (as a position in relation to others), a realization of our responsibilities. — Antony Nickles
We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully. — RussellA
Many things follow from this, but two are central here. The first is that we do not need a theory of the meaning of "slab" in order to do the task at hand - to build the structure. — Banno
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