If you talk about two levels of description, be advised that you cannot establish a causal relationship between the two, — Wolfgang

There is a hidden dualism embedded in physical descriptions sure. Neurons X firing is equated with mental event without explanation (easy vs hard problems).

There is no causality between physiology and psychology. I won't discuss this any further here. — Wolfgang

So you’re posting and not going to discuss? Seems then why post?

@Leontiskos et al,

When we use "essence" do we mean the defining feature of the referent, or the defining feature of meaning of the word referring to the referent? I think there is a difference. One is metaphysical, the other is logic/linguistic. That is to say, for example, in Harman, the "essence" of an object is always "withdrawn" or "hidden" such that it cannot be interacted with. Therefore, it cannot be defined, but its influence is felt through its causative interactions with other objects, so we know there is an echo of "something" within the object that "Makes it that object". But you see, this kind of inquiry becomes about the object in question "itself" (the referent), and not about how we necessarily refer to this object. One requires a metaphysical inquiry, the other an epistemological one based on linguistic use.

As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab — RussellA

All good stuff there, but I'm just going to pick this out. So my question is, do you think that Witt cares so much about behavior or context within a community? This idea you have might be conflating the two. Pain loses meaning not necessarily when due to an undefined behavior, so much as an undefined context perhaps, according to Witt.

So if we split it up we have:

1) Pain as felt (the sensation of pain)

2) Pain as behavior (the behaviors associated with pain)

3) Pain in context (the associated uses of pain in the context of a community)

It is 3 that Witt seems to attribute the source of meaning. So I see where you are coming from, but perhaps change 2 to 3. That is to say, meaning can never be attributed to some direct correlation to pain itself, but to how it is used in a community or in a context of a certain language game within a community. You can only understand this by understanding the community's use of the word. But even then, if you wrote a definition down, you'd have to realize it's "fuzzy" and could change with its usage.

It's quite isolating though. You are left with your private sensation of pain, and the word pain just becomes this epiphenomenal construction. Also a problem I see here, is that it's hard to see if there is any criteria for anything here. I would normally say the closest epistemology for criteria of meaning would be pragmaticism. In other words, did the usage "get something done in a particular way", but I don't think Witt is saying that either because that has sort of a telos to it (did this usage get this thing accomplished). I don't think he is saying that either necessarily.

Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?

All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow". — RussellA

:lol: :up: Exactly. I will now dub this "Radagasting" (see my post above for why).

Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?

There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories. — RussellA

:100: :fire: . Yes, you hit the nail here. Demonstration without any exposition is impotent. And if you say, "my demonstration is all that I have", then you deem yourself a prophet and others have to "augur" the implications for broader use. I am generally repulsed by such an approach because it deigns of as "above the fray of having to explain". And to then go back and say, "well, my philosophy can never truly be explained because it's all about how things can't truly be explained.. see how clever that is!" is about as eye rolling as a hipster in a coffee shop trying to convince you of some hidden meaning in some inane obscure band.

That reminds of a joke:

"How many hipsters does it take to screw in a lightbulb?"

I'll respond to this too, but see my above post too as I think you might find it interesting:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839480

Delete

@Banno@Antony Nickles

I see Witt's style in PI as a sort of "confounding" affect/effect. I can't say if it is intentional, but it is the way the text is laid out. He generally starts out as the "interlocutor" in quotations, sort of like his "demon" presenting various absolute cases of language use (very Socrates-like) and then Witt goes on to prove that absolute case is not as absolute upon further reflection. This goes on and on, until the reader is to feel a sort of wary defeat at the end, that perhaps the author is correct, that word meaning and concepts can only ever be "family resemblances" and never "pinned down" to this or that theory/definition of meaning. Thus language is an ever-evolving language game. Many times meaning is at odds with its own definition, with the audience's definition, and perhaps the speaker himself is mistaken of his own definition. Witt shows various examples of this.

The problem is not so much Witt himself. I think he does a good job demonstrating the inanity of pinning down exactly "what" a theory of meaning can even be. However, it's not his demonstration that I have a problem with. It's what he, or more importantly, his admirers do with this definition. That is to say, does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves.

This then leads me to think Witt can represent a sort of "Radagast" philosophy. What do I mean by that? Well, Radagast the Brown was the wizard in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings who became enamored with the flora and fauna of Middle Earth and in being so focused on these, became disinterested in the broader doings and goings on of Middle Earth. He got caught in the "web of ecology" of the animals and such, but never paid mind to any broader mission. Well, if Witt represents being "caught in the web of ecology" of word use and not about understanding things like the "human condition, ethical implications, suffering, what is, what should, what ought, what can, by what criteria, etc." then one isn't really practicing philosophy so much anymore, but hovering around the edges of meta-philosophy about how word usage makes it impossible. Thus, I see it as a great tool against a particular set of beliefs (logical positivism / logical atomism / certain kinds of logicians in general), but if applied to philosophy as a whole, I think it becomes an excuse to not engage in understanding these broader questions or an excuse to deflate any philosophical inquiry or solution to inquiry as futile attempts.

The meaning of a proper name is incomplete without some account of the way that proper names are used to reference real objects. — Leontiskos

Just an idea out of leftfield, Graham Harman had the notion of "withdrawal" and a "hidden" aspect of objects. Objects "withdraw" from other objects and retain their hidden essence that can never be perceived or have interactions with other objects. The parts that have interactions (direct or indirect) he calls "vicarious causation". Vicarious causation is basically the ability to influence other objects, via their surface qualities.

From ChatGPT:

Graham Harman is a contemporary philosopher associated with the philosophical movement known as speculative realism and object-oriented ontology (OOO). His ideas regarding objects are central to his philosophical framework. Harman's conception of objects departs from traditional philosophies that often emphasize human experience as the primary focus. Instead, he shifts the focus towards the objects themselves and their relationships.

Object-Centric Philosophy:
Harman proposes an object-centric philosophy, where objects are considered as the fundamental building blocks of reality. He argues that objects are autonomous entities that exist independently of our perception or knowledge of them. These objects have their own unique qualities, essences, and interactions with other objects.

Withdrawal and Vicarious Causation:
Harman introduces the idea of "withdrawal," suggesting that objects have an inherent depth that eludes complete human understanding. According to Harman, an object's true essence is never fully accessible to other objects. This withdrawal indicates that objects possess an inner reality that is not directly perceivable, and interactions between objects occur on a surface level.

He also proposes the concept of "vicarious causation," where objects influence each other indirectly through their appearances or interactions. Objects do not directly access the inner reality of other objects; instead, they interact through the surface qualities or manifestations of those objects.

Object Relations and Networks:
Harman emphasizes the relationships and interactions between objects. Objects, as autonomous entities, interact with one another, forming networks of relations. However, these relations are not exhaustive or fully determinative of an object's essence. An object retains its autonomy and uniqueness even within relationships.

Fourfold Structure:
Harman proposes a fourfold structure to describe the relationships between objects. This structure includes real objects (existing in the world), sensual objects (perceived by other objects), real qualities (inherent properties of objects), and sensual qualities (perceived qualities of objects). These elements contribute to the complex interplay and understanding of objects and their relationships.

Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO):
OOO, a philosophical movement that Harman is associated with, emphasizes that everything is an object, including not just physical entities but also abstract concepts and events. OOO advocates for treating all entities equally, acknowledging their autonomous existence and inherent uniqueness.

Yep.

But you will. — Banno

The impreciseness of language does not negate the attempt at understanding the world. It does not mean to close up shop. It certainly helps illustrate logical atomism's failing in its attempt for preciseness and its trapping itself in "what exists" and "what doesn't exist" and such.

apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. He claims Wittgenstein doesn't address ontological concerns, while the first hundred remarks of PI do exactly that. — Banno

This is misleading. He talks about usage of language (apples, and brake-levers oh my). He is giving examples of various uses of language, not ontological claims about the world. And so...

apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. — Banno

Well yeah and I said as much why I don't like it in my previous posts. No need for me to repeat them.

But wait, there’s more..cause there is a subgroup that tried to assign preciseness to language in such a way- early analytics like Russell and Frege. Well, that’s a small subset of philosophers that this would then be aimed at. It becomes less relevant for those who never held that view in the first place.

But don’t worry what I do get is Witt thought we shouldn’t try to philosophize about these things as there is no certainty. I just think that doesn’t follow. We may be open to various systems. No system is going to give me slam dunk certainty. But I, like many others don’t need Witts language game idea and examples to understand that.

He is not isolating us to language removed from the world. It is through the method of looking at language that he is investigating why we misconceive the world, as they are the normally the same (until we have a situation in time when that falls apart—we don’t know our way about).

Our ordinary criteria are not based on agreement, nor statistical majority (this is not a defense of common sense or “ordinary people”), but the way our lives have aligned over our history, that we would judge things using the same criteria, usually come to same conclusions, respond the same way, have the same expectations, understand the same implications. These are not rules, nor usually explicit. It is the same basis that allows each of us the ability to evaluate his claims of what we say when, to see for yourself. — Antony Nickles

See this is all meaningless to me. In 1-3 sentences, explain to me what Wittgenstein's views of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics are. If you cannot tell me, then we are treading water. I can make balloon animals for you as a response to a question, but it's not getting anywhere. I can then tell you, "You don't get it" and we would not be getting anywhere.

Yep. But then it goes back to this:

It's as if I asked you to show me the house you built, but instead, you not only not show me the house, you not only not show me the blueprints even, you talk to me about how the language is used to program the software that makes the blueprints. — schopenhauer1

If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. You have given me the meta-rules of the game perhaps, but you have not given me any commitments on the game itself.

Yes, this accords more or less with what I said here

I guess what I’m saying is the object itself falls out perhaps. Whatever the object is, it’s a way to help define meaning. And that’s its importance in language meaning. The object’s only relevance here is its use in defining meaning. — schopenhauer1

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object? — schopenhauer1

I guess what I’m saying is the object itself falls out perhaps. Whatever the object is, it’s a way to help define meaning. And that’s its importance in language meaning. The object’s only relevance here is its use in defining meaning.

But I agree, Witt seems to have a problem making ontological claims, especially as to the status of objects. This is why it seems pedantic to provide examples of how language meaning comes from language games but then not do much else with it.

Yes, it is very difficult to make sense of the PI when we don't even know whether the objects he refers to, such as slabs, are those of the Nominalist or the Platonic Realist. — RussellA

And I don’t even think he cares about the question. The flock of disciples will then in unison say “because you can’t” or some such.

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object?

If you are trying to get ontological commitments from PI, you won't find any as far as I see. Besides that meaning of words comes from language games, you won't find much ontologically-speaking. If you think that is a lame cop out, then I agree. It's basically up to his disciples to figure out a "use" for the language game idea for actual philosophical commitments and jumping off points I guess.

See my response here. I think this helps illustrate it:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839179

That's how I understand Wittgenstein in the PI, whereby meaning is use in language, in opposition to Augustine's Referentialism.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. — RussellA

Presumably, someone might say the "pointing to its bearer" is a function to help the person get a sense of its "use" (i.e. the word refers to that object). In a different language game, perhaps that same word would not need an ostensive pointing. For example, a whatchamacallit might be some yellow button. Someone points and says "whatchamacallit". You start referring to it as a watchamacallit. Then, someone yells "whatchmacallit!". You are in some job that requires you push that yellow button when they shout the name like that. So now "whatchamacallit" means "press the yellow button referred to as watchmacallit". So ostensive pointing to an object is simply one mechanism of teaching use, it doesn't replace use.

Now, let's say the "whatchamacallit" yellow button was a mystery as to what it did. The crew had no idea what it's function was other than they needed to push it as part of their job. The work crew starts replacing the word "mystery" with watchmacallit". So now crewmembers say things like, "Life is a big watchamacallit" (mystery). Now its use has changed. In the language game of the crew, this makes sense. The small crew of 10 people think it means "yellow button" and "mystery". The wider company only knows it as the "yellow button". People outside of the company don't attach any meaning to that word.

Interestingly, this follows a path of causality leading to a modal theory of reference (pace Kripke).

The word "slab" can be used to refer to either an existing or to a non-existing slab. The only difference is whether the slab exists. — Luke

So how does one use Wittgenstein's "revelation" (the common sense notion that we already knew that a words meaning changes with context) pertain to such things as to "what exists" (ontology)? I just think this is treading the same ground over and over. Unless this thesis is used to actually "mine" some philosophical concepts, what is the use of pouring over this?

If your answer is, "We can't because language games", I'm going to (metaphorically) scream. See my post here for more elaboration:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839003

@RussellA

This weeks comic ha. Very appropriate.

https://existentialcomics.com/comic/516

Plato, Kant, Hume, Descartes, etc. are all reacting to skepticism, doubt in our knowledge. That’s not vague, it’s pervasive. — Antony Nickles

But this itself is a language game of how "certainty" is used. I'm going to push back that this as even appropriate to use for all of them, as they all had such differing approaches and asked slightly different questions. Descartes psychological approach (the cogito), Hume's outright "skeptical" empiricism, Kant's trying to solve some of Hume's skepticism, and Plato's Forms, are kind of their own thing and use their own approaches, and draw on different influences. Again, I think "certainty" is a misplaced word for what they were getting at. They use various methods for constructing metaphysics (Plato's Forms, Descartes' God, and Kant's Thing-in-Itself mainly), and epistemology (Descartes' cogito, Hume's impressions and habits of thought, and Kant's transcendental idealism, respectively). Certainty is something regarding confidence in one's judgements of knowledge. Certainty in Descartes would be a much different kind of thing then certainty in Plato, or even Kant. That is to say, certainty should just be replaced with for "constructions of epistemology and metaphysics". Indeed certain philosophers had more emphasis on "confidence of one's knowledge", but it's not always cut and dry that all of them emphasized these types of judgements of cases. And even then, only some of the time, were these philosophers concerned with specifically, "certainty".

“Language game” is not a helpful term to latch onto; it confuses people. In an attempt at shorthand (which is never gonna work), abstraction removes any criteria and circumstances of an individual case of confusion and takes me out of the equation, along with my responsibility (in the fear of “subjectivity”). Our ordinary criteria are sufficient; it’s just hard for people to swallow that some of the time things just don’t work out the easy way, or at all. — Antony Nickles

Not sure what you're quite saying here.

Yes, that would be an ordinary sense of certainty. I am using it in the sense of a math-like necessity; Witt calls it “logic” or “crystalline purity”; Descartes will call it perfection; Plato just calls it knowledge. Basically it is the desire to know beforehand, generally, reliably, based on fact, without involving the human, etc. It is a standard invented by philosophy in an attempt to counteract skepticism. — Antony Nickles

Fine with me. Is all of philosophy logic? It is one approach to formalizing language. Aristotle used it for looking at classes and if things fit into classes and such. They were rhetorical devices that became more formalized over time. Frege, Russell, and many analytics began making it as if it can solve all problems related to propositions. So to me, it is still speaking to this main subset, more or less.

Just because you don’t get it yet doesn’t mean that it is “vague”. The writing is very specific, rigorous, and necessary for its purpose. Anybody that thinks they can tell you what it “means” is wrong (including me), thus the problem with summaries. I’m just trying to help you guys in reading it; to avoid its pitfalls. — Antony Nickles

Ugh, this is the kind of presumption that I can't stand... As if "getting" Wittgenstein confers some apotheosis. But I still think it stands that if you want to be known, then say it. Show it after you say it. Or show it and then say it. There is a balance. All show and no tell, and now you are a prophet and others are doing your telling.

The claim is not “interpretative”. It comes from a familiarity with the history of western analytical philosophy. The desire to solve skepticism is an ever-present theme. — Antony Nickles

Eh, that's so vague though. Talk about language games! Plato's search for "Truth" and Kant's search for "reason" or "knowledge", or whatnot are in the same tradition, but are positing slightly different questions about ontology and epistemology. They come at it from different approaches. That is to say, "skepticism" is too broad a stroke there. Either way, my claim was if that was interpretive for what Witty was saying being that he doesn't outright say much of what he is doing but just ya know, "shows it".

Again, it’s not about language or language use. Skepticism starts with a case of not knowing what to do (#123). Kant and Plato find no satisfactory certainty to resolve it and so abstract from our ordinary cases to the forms or requiring imperatives having denied the thing-in-itself (“constructing systems” you say). It is this flight from ordinary criteria for how things work in a desire for certainty that concerns Wittgenstein. — Antony Nickles

Supposing he was directing his line of thought to philosophers like Plato (and not more contemporaries perhaps or his former beliefs), if the "language game" is thus defined appropriately, why would the abstractions not be helpful in conveying these new "concepts" about "reality"? An architect sees blueprints and he understands them because he has learned the art and science of reading blueprints. He has learned that synthetic language game. A musician learned notes in the diatonic scale and reading sheet music. Again, synthetic language. This is yet another set of synthetic terms and uses of those terms. But in this case, it is applied to ontological questions of being, knowing, and the like. They are ways of viewing the world (a worldview).

why we have this delusional need for a standard of purity (certainty) that we create systems in advance of looking at the world. — Antony Nickles

I don't even think that is the whole philosophical project, as I've stated. I think certainty has more to do with confidence in one's knowledge. I'd say something like Forms or the "Thing-in-Itself" or theories of understanding, are more about being, ontology, and the mechanisms of knowing.

Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share the goal of creating a new philosophy out of the old, and so are speaking to a new philosopher, one that you must become in order to see in a new way. These are not textbooks that say everything explicitly, only there to tell you information. — Antony Nickles

Yeah, same reason I think I don't like either of them. It's vagueness is just enough to have a fanbase use it endless debates and they can then always say, "No, it REALLY means this...".

It just reminds of this:

https://youtube.com/shorts/xlKOLXArvrc?si=xiR2g2GIxLrgpxCs

Indeed it is to a degree. Or rather application of misguided use of language towards example philosophers that isn’t just adherents auguring.

The investigation is to find out why we want what he wanted in the Tractatus, what Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, etc. wanted. — Antony Nickles

Is it? How do you know? There are smidgens of philosophers he sort of mentions but this seems very interpretive. More auguring.

Well I would say criteria rather than rules (another day), but what you are meant to see is not (only) his descriptions, but to ask why the philosopher wants to overlook our ordinary criteria to substitute the sole standard of certainty or something certain (as metaphysics was). This I would say first takes letting go of the fixation that he is trying to (somehow alternatively) answer the problem the skeptic (or uncertainty) poses. — Antony Nickles

But I don't see that as the case. And it's hard to "prove" he was really "saying that" being he didn't provide many historical examples.. I mean you can really cherry pick some Augustine and Frege every once in a while.. but not with what you said really as the topic (more just refuting referentialism in general).

But let's say that is what he was trying to say (because after all it's a method without much explication...), how does this really apply to the philosophers throughout history? He doesn't really explain again.. but I can say Plato was trying to figure out change and permanence, universals and particulars, things like this. Kant was trying to figure out empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge and how they fit together to understand the world, etc. I don't see that as major breakdowns in ordinary use of language. Rather it is constructing systems out of our ordinary language. As long as they try to define it so that the reader tries to understand their project, it doesn't seem a misuse of things.

R. Scott Bakker has a good short story he published in some philosophy journal about accomplishing this in the near future through neural implants. The idea is that you can just tweak your pleasure, mirth, contentment, aggression, etc. upwards, on demand using a neurally controlled app.

The rub is in how one's ability to control how they feel, almost regardless of circumstances interacts with how they promote, or destroy other's freedom. There is the distinction between "learning to desire that which is good," and the second order volition aspect of "being able to desire what you want to desire." But these two only become mutually reinforcing in a social context of we "desire to want the good," and can make those desires effective. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, clearly the utopia doesn't exists in this world; manufacture whatever scenario you want to make it a utopia- what you are reiterating is simply that this world isn't coming close to a utopia anytime soon, or perhaps can never reach thus, even in possibility (though perhaps in theory). That is to say, whatever the case in the future (which looks bleak regarding utopia), utopia was not created as we speak. All the suffering leading to utopia then must be justified in the light of the people being "used" as pawns to reach the supposedly good terminus.

IDK, that's like, if roads are good, saying that the road pavers not-build roads all the places there aren't roads and that this is a bad act. Or if numbers are good, and God only emanates the natural numbers, then God is somehow acting by not emanating the reals. — Count Timothy von Icarus

, it doesn't follow that any creation is act of creation is thus a contradiction of goodness. I personally have never found that sort of religious philosophy particularly interesting, so I forget the details, but I recall it being convincing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't understand your argument, so I won't answer. You'd have to clarify. You said:

Saint Augustine saw evil simply as a lack of good, an absence rather than its own substance. A thing is better, more perfect, when it more fully embodies its essence. But even for him, there are different gradations of perfection between essences. Thus, a perfect flower is still less perfect than God. I think it is this second type of perfection we need to think about here. Creation itself implies "not God," which implies "less perfect." But in this view, it is still true that God is not the source of any evil, but rather "not-God," lack of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, so the "not-god" part (the relevant part for us because it's the part that's um, "not perfect" and thus I guess is "not good") is still something an omnipotent g/G brought about, so I don't think your answer fits though I see you are trying there.

He is trying — Antony Nickles

The prophet for Wittgenstein... Then why doesn't he just say it thus? There is a point where "showing it and not saying it" becomes pedantically pedantic. Some explication is okay. Instead we have to have prophets who speak for Witty on this. As I said:

If I want to be real charitable to Witty, I would say that as long as you clarify what the language game is you are playing, then you can proceed to answer in your philosophical language game way. However, if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling. — schopenhauer1

The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. Just philosophize or don't philosophize. If you have a problem with something X philosopher is saying, then critique that philosopher and explain how that philosopher is using the language game incorrectly, or whatnot. Otherwise, it is is a long elaboration on something without application. Rather, it is adherents (people perhaps as yourself and others on here) who apply it for him and thus it is always Wittgenstein-lite or Wittgenstein-inspired, but not really much commitments from Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1

Also, as I said, this is not about language. He is looking at the things we say in a situation as a method and means for learning why philosophy ignores our ordinary criteria of judgment about the world to focus on a general explanation to ensure certainty. “Language use” is neither the issue nor a “solution”; it is a means of seeing the variety of what is meaningful rather than a single standard and explanation. — Antony Nickles

Huh? An author presumably is trying to convey "something". Perhaps they aren't explaining it clearly, but we try to interpret it correctly so that we can make judgements about agreement. Even "knowing" that there are various rules in various contexts, doesn't thus confer anything more than the usual of me just trying to interpret the person's philosophical statements. Perhaps they are using neologisms or not explaining their terms correctly, but that is a different issue. Or should I say, that is a meta-problem with the way the philosopher is communicating the ideas.. Perhaps they aren't playing the "language game" correctly in the philosophical context. But that simply takes clarification and some back-and-forth and attempts at understanding what is being conveyed.

So doubt creates the framework of ontology, appearances, or something else (in Wittgenstein: the misinterpretation of “use” or forms of life or language games) to try to ensure our words are meaningful, to close the gap we created. Philosophy takes the limitations of knowledge and turns it into an underlying ever-present intellectual problem it feels it needs to “solve”, rather than a truth about our human condition that only raises it head when we “don’t know our way about”, and we become dissatisfied with our ordinary criteria. — Antony Nickles

It just seems like not making any commitments and saying "language games" is akin to putting on a pair of sunglasses and posting an "office closed" sign with feet up on the desk and calling it a day. It's as if I asked you to show me the house you built, but instead, you not only not show me the house, you not only not show me the blueprints even, you talk to me about how the language is used to program the software that makes the blueprints. It's majorly trolling.

If I want to be real charitable to Witty, I would say that as long as you clarify what the language game is you are playing, then you can proceed to answer in your philosophical language game way. However, if it is just stalling and spinning in circles about language use, I just see it as a kind of long con trolling.

The rest of what you said, I'm not sure. Just philosophize or don't philosophize. If you have a problem with something X philosopher is saying, then critique that philosopher and explain how that philosopher is using the language game incorrectly, or whatnot. Otherwise, it is is a long elaboration on something without application. Rather, it is adherents (people perhaps as yourself and others on here) who apply it for him and thus it is always Wittgenstein-lite or Wittgenstein-inspired, but not really much commitments from Wittgenstein.

Jacob Boheme's insight was that such a unity cannot achieve certain things that divided being can. Self-knowledge is impossible for a unity because there is no differentiation between it and anything else. Just one thing existing becomes the same as nothing existing, it's like the information held in an infinite series of just 1s or just 0s. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe Schopenhauer drew inspiration from Boheme. @Wayfarer can perhaps confirm that with the book he is reading on Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer was adamant that his metaphysical Will was unitary but individuated (Will and Representation), as the flipside is "objectified Will" and "individuated". However, he was careful to emphasize his system was atheistic. That is to say, there was no creator or logos or purpose for it. It just "is". However, he did not give it a positive spin, but rather thought of it as tragic as the Will-individuated is full of suffering and dissatisfaction. That seems to offer a solution around the problems I brought up above for someone planning suffering and dissatisfaction to be in the system.

Saint Augustine saw evil simply as a lack of good, an absence rather than its own substance. A thing is better, more perfect, when it more fully embodies its essence. But even for him, there are different gradations of perfection between essences. Thus, a perfect flower is still less perfect than God. I think it is this second type of perfection we need to think about here. Creation itself implies "not God," which implies "less perfect." But in this view, it is still true that God is not the source of any evil, but rather "not-God," lack of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The creation is still the output of a creator. See my problems above again.

If everything is good, without the possibility of bad, then good becomes contentless. It is a label applied equally to all things. Thus, the creation of good implies the bad. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which is why Schopenhauer seems relevant here again. "Good" in this metaphysical sense of "unity" (no individuation, binaries, etc.) would be some sort of Nirvana-like state, not "good" in the hedonic sense. However, to posit an alternative, I could say that there could have been a possible world where everyone was hedonically happy, and never suffered and knew it by way of some self-aware feeling that they felt good. Or alternatively again, there could have been a possible world where people could change the degree of hardship and change it back so that they had the opportunity for less optimal conditions to "overcome" something, but if this was too much, they could switch back, etc. If this is preposterous, it is because yeah, it doesn't exist. It's a "utopia". But, this is not our reality. Rather, our reality has suffering, dissatisfaction, and evil as either hedonically true (contingent for each person's experience) or metaphysically true (it's built in, in some Schopenhauerian sense of "suffering"). Either way, it doesn't lead to the "best possible world". And thus I bring you back to the problems I brought up.

I raised this point in another thread. If g/G is omnipotent, either 1) g/G is a sociopath or 2) g/G is beyond good and evil.

1) This would be that g/G has some sort of agenda where he needs evil to happen to see an outcome. But if he was omnipotent, surely he could have picked a range of choices that had no evils in it.

2) This would be that g/G is on a level of ethics whereby "good" and "evil" does not apply to him. He's working at a "higher level". But this doesn't get around the fact that many/all of his creatures did/do/will suffer and he is aware of it. How does ethics at a "higher level" justify suffering at the "lower level", when it is perceived as suffering at this lower level? Surely an omnicient g/G would know this.

Either way, these two scenarios are quite problematic. 2 is especially problematic in that it may be the case that humans are default being used for a "greater plan", but nullifying the "don't use people as a means to an ends". If there is no "greater plan", then there is still the mystery of why "suffering" and "evil" exist in and of itself.

Also, with 2, it is oddly anthropomorphic to assume that g/G has started a game (the universe/multiverse) so that he could watch something play out. If he is truly "beyond all ethical values of comprehension", even this pedestrian interest in watching a game play out, is ridiculously anthropomorphic. — schopenhauer1

I raised this point in another thread. If g/G is omnipotent, either 1) g/G is a sociopath or 2) g/G is beyond good and evil.

1) This would be that g/G has some sort of agenda where he needs evil to happen to see an outcome. But if he was omnipotent, surely he could have picked a range of choices that had no evils in it.

2) This would be that g/G is on a level of ethics whereby "good" and "evil" does not apply to him. He's working at a "higher level". But this doesn't get around the fact that many/all of his creatures did/do/will suffer and he is aware of it. How does ethics at a "higher level" justify suffering at the "lower level", when it is perceived as suffering at this lower level? Surely an omnicient g/G would know this.

Either way, these two scenarios are quite problematic. 2 is especially problematic in that it may be the case that humans are default being used for a "greater plan", but nullifying the "don't use people as a means to an ends". If there is no "greater plan", then there is still the mystery of why "suffering" and "evil" exist in and of itself.

Also, with 2, it is oddly anthropomorphic to assume that g/G has started a game (the universe/multiverse) so that he could watch something play out. If he is truly "beyond all ethical values of comprehension", even this pedestrian interest in watching a game play out, is ridiculously anthropomorphic.

For that reason, I call this particular thing in front of me an "apple", even though "apple" is a universal concept and the thing in front of me is only one particular example of it. — RussellA

But that doesn't answer the metaphysical question of "what" is this concept apple. It is obviously a mental thing. What is that? Witt doesn't have an answer. "Family resemblances" just seems like formalized idea written down about something we intuitively know- that concepts are are not exacting but have resemblances. I don't think it added much except a neologism to a concept we already understand about how we use language. But what does it say about the problems of ontology, epistemology, and such? Very little.. which is my problem with it. It's like he's only talking to the formalists of language that were his contemporaries and his former ideas, but then doesn't really posit much with it. Yeah, that sort of logical positivistic "referentialism" is wrong, but that was a problem they created themselves. It's like.. okay, let's just go to the whole, philosophizing now that we cleared that up...

I think it's important to understand that "analytic philosophy" is dominated by examining propositions (or in Wittgenstein's later idea "language games"). But that this is not the only way to "do" philosophy. One can approach it more holistically, from the stance of epistemological / metaphysical theory. Unfortunately, 20th century philosophy bifurcated philosophy into linguistic/logic/mathematical approaches which took discrete propositions and tried to answer them on one side and phenomenological approaches on the other (existentialism for example). Both sides have a problem with "everything is text" (in much different ways), with post-modernism and the "linguistic turn" (both very different methods but are similar in that they are caught up in language usage).

Logical Positivism stated in the 1920's. Their central thesis was the verification principle, whereby only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful in terms of conveying truth value, information or factual content (Wikipedia Logical Positivism).

It is probably not surprising that the movement came to an end in the 1960's, though they had a good run. — RussellA

Yes, that is what seems to have happened more-or-less, but I was being rhetorical as to present what is problematic with these approaches in general. That whole "behaviorism" nonsense and the like. Or not accepting mental states of "ontologically" existing or some such. Weirdly non-commonsensical for a common sense-touting strand of thought.

This is why the Logical Positivists liked Referentialism, in that it aimed at creating a "perfectly descriptive language purified from ambiguities and confusions" (Wikipedia, Direct Reference Theory). — RussellA

Right, but then where did the internal states "go"? "What" were they for them? Why didn't they care?

Risible — Banno

I actually did a "Find" on the word "objects" in PI, just in case I missed something, and it showed up 38 times. None of the instances discussed objects in any philosophical way beyond the language game thing. There were no commitments to "what" "how" etc. So, yeah I refer you to this:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/838538

The objects and names discussed in the PI are not the simple objects and names of the Tractatus. — Fooloso4

Indeed they aren't. That is barely discussed in PI. Indeed, it's all language games, all the way down. But this doesn't say much about metaphysics or epistemology. It's a long treatise on language so, not much to mine from it other than meaning is "language games". Indeed, in very different ways, both the Tractatus and the PI don't make many references to epistemological or ontological claims at all.

For the Tractatus, he can always hide behind the "Whereof one cannot speak.." quote. For the PI, he can hide behind "language games", and thus no commitment shalt be made. Thus the defenders pick up the slack and such and do "something" with it.

In a way, good for Witty. He let the blowhards stuff his ideas into various academic BS. He was able to avoid it himself.

What is an object? The SEP article Object discusses the nature of objects. Is it really the case that the child is pointing at a table as an object, or is the child pointing at a set of atoms that have a momentary location in time and space, and have taken the form of one particular example of the general concept "table". To say that the child is looking at an object is to say that what exists in the mind of the child as a concept also happens to ontologically exist in the world.
Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) speak for the nihilist thus: “the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality” (p. 143). They suggest three theories on which there are no objects. The first that there are just stuffs everywhere, but no objects. The second that there is just one big mass of stuff.[14] The third is that there just isn’t anything at all. This last option is what Hawthorne and Cortens defend. They do so using what they (following Strawson) call a “feature-placing language”. They model a potential nihilist program on sentences like “it is raining”, “it is snowing now”, and “it is cold here”. Such sentences do not quantify over anything and have no logical subject (‘it’ functions as a dummy pronoun), and so do not ontologically commit one to anything. The nihilist may then paraphrase sentences that apparently require objects (such as “there is a computer here”) with those that do not (such as “it is computering here”). In short, the nihilist turns every putative noun into an adverb, making judicious use of spatial, temporal, and numerical adverbs too. — RussellA

Ironically, even though I disagree perhaps with this ontologically nihilistic claim, the fact that he (Cortens) spends any time explaining objects (as well as the SEP article in general it came from), is infinitely more informative, and interesting than Witty's Tractatus where he just starts with the assumption about objects, as if the ontological work of positing this view doesn't even need to be explained.

I can't even get away with that shit on a philosophy forum! He gets defenders. As long as I have a claim like, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." I get a pass and don't have to defend anything. :roll: :rofl:

I won't speak for anyone else, but as I see it, what is at issue is not agreement or disagreement but the strength of an interpretation. A problematic interpretation is problematic whether the interpreter agrees or disagrees with an author. — Fooloso4

Sure, and perhaps that is the case in this instance. That remains to be seen (because after all, these are two-sided interlocutors on an internet forum so we can't just assume strong incredulity means thus wrongly interpreted).

There are two things going on here. There is really a misinterpretation and this is clearly demonstrated, or the interpretation is correct and the disagreement is over the substantive issue. But it would be a bad faith argument if all disagreements were seen to be but mere misinterpretations (indicating that true interpretation sees the clear and present truth of the substantive issue and being in accord with the prophet/philosopher).

Even where I strongly agree with Schopenhauer, I will allow for others who read him to be wrong about their estimation of his thoughts (even if I think they interpreted right). I do not think "knowing" Schopenhauer's philosophy confers one's epistemic understanding to accord with the "truth" by way of simply understanding what he is saying.