@khaled What do you think of the tiresome and predictable move that the natalists make that parents make decisions on behalf of children all the time, so what makes this different? I can guarantee one of the arguments will move there, so mine as well just discuss that usual perennial one...

But this again only tells me that affecting others is a violation, not why this is so. It's not obvious why any influence I have on anyone should be considered a violation. — Echarmion

I should really qualify "affecting" as imposing and causing conditions of harm on another person.

Sure, all you'd need to argue now is that being affected by this decision is equivalent to a violation. — Echarmion

How is it not? A decision was made. This affected the individual being born. The individual being born could not possibly be a part of the decision affecting him/her. Similarly regarding harm..True no one at the time of the decision to procreate was harmed. However in the future, a person will be harmed from that very decision. This could be prevented. At this point I am just re-explaining what I have explained in more precise language using "state's of affairs" so refer back to that if you need to.

Edit: The violation occurs because a decision was made affecting someone else, even if the affect for the person is displaced from the time the decision was made and there was no person there previously. It doesn't matter if the decision and the affect happen at the same time or displaced by several months, the violation took place nonetheless.

Shifting the problem so we now have a decision that is both made (becasue a person exists, which can only happen as a result of said decision) and not made (because we act as if we can still prevent that person from ever existing, which we can only do before the decision) doesn't help.

The core problem remains that all humans necessarily exist. There are no humans that do not exist, and thus there are no humans who do not have existence (and all it entails) "imposed" on them. This logical necessity cannot be changed by semantic games, displaced decisions etc. — Echarmion

But you are the one making semantic games here. I stated earlier:

If there is a state of affairs that a person is born, there is a person affected by someone else's decision. However, if there is a state of affairs with no person born, then there is a state of affairs where no person was affected by the decision, thus no violation, and no new individual who suffers will take place. All of this is encompassed with colloquial terms like "potential child" etc. — schopenhauer1

I keep reaffirming logic, yes. It's gaslighting only if your view is so muddled that it feels the need to undercut the principles of logic, like the principle of non-contradiction. Future persons cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, and yet you claim they do again and again. — Echarmion

Displacement of when decision is made to when person is affected doesn't negate that a decision was made that affects a person.

You know a discussion is in a good place when the factions that have emerged stop engaging with the critical comments and instead reaffirm to each other how right they are in a big, happy circlejerk. — Echarmion

There's too many similar conversations. Best to summarize at this point if I don't have time to hit each and every point, and again, they are similar in nature. Best in one bigger post. And it's addressed to them because I see what you and others are doing in your arguments that's flawed and just wanted them to know that they are not crazy, I see it too. Didn't want them to be gasllighted :D.

One can prevent all risk for a future person, period.
— schopenhauer1

No, one cannot, period. — Echarmion

And you keep doing it.

1) The essential nonsense that we cannot consider the future person being born because there is no person currently existing. I've seen uses of "potential parent" in the mix. Yet, "potential child" is also a consideration of course. Someone will exist, and it is that person who will exist that we are preventing either the suffering or non-consent, or the "not being used for means to an end" result.

Essentially what this comes down to is the themes I have seen here regarding community vs. the individual. The community may be ordinarily needed for the individual to survive, but it is not the community that lives out life.

2) Rather "community" is an abstract concept of interactions between individuals composed of institutions, historical knowledge, location, etc. However, it would be using an individual for an abstract cause that isn't any actual person to then determine that people need to be born to feed the community's needs.

3) The locus of ethics is the individual, not the community. The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering.

4) There seems to be an underlying Paternalism in the natalist's thought. Other people must be affected greatly because I deem it good. This is the height of hubris to think other people should affected greatly in a negative way by what you deem is good for them. In doing so of course, many other negative things have been imposed/violated. Suffering, consent, using people as a means for your/community's ends. There are a number of reasons this paternalism argument is simply license to use do these negative things on behalf of other people.

I still like khaled's analogy of being kidnapped for a game regarding this paternalism. If I was to kidnap you into a game where this structurally meant to be many challenges to overcome, and there is also sufficient room for contingent harms to also affect the player, and the only way to escape is death, so you are de facto forced into playing the game or commit suicide, being harmed along the way, is the a good thing to do?

The only defense people are going to give for this is going back to the nonsensical argument that in the birth scenario there is no "one" to be kidnapped. Yet antinatalist arguments keep repeating that there will be someone born, and this "kidnapped" in the future. By being born this becomes the case, even if at the moment one decides, there is no actual person yet. — schopenhauer1

Denying that future person would exist when the decision to procreate is made and that this future person, is what is being prevented, and denying that we can generalize instances of suffering seem to be going on here. However, at the same time, it is recognized as something to keep in mind when discussing the outcomes of poverty and disability.

Also, Benkei I know you have a preference for semantic preciseness here. I can respect that, but I also think this actually gets in the way as to obfuscate the argument at hand. For example, it really doesn't matter if I say: "There will be a state of affairs where a person will be born in the future and by not procreating this state of affairs will not occur", or if you say "preventing a potential child" because those two things are pragmatically the same thing. — schopenhauer1

As far as I'm concerned the failings of natalist arguments were encapsulated in this post. I haven't seen much progress from them since either.
Addressing the conversations I am seeing now:

@Tzeentch @Albero@Andrew4HandelYou are getting a complete runaround. The interlocutors are trying to say that they can make decisions based on how it will affect the child in the future and then keep contradicting themselves by saying that you cannot make decisions based on how it will affect the child. All instances of suffering that the future child might experience are being prevented by not bringing about a state of affairs where said child will be born. Don't fall for the very obvious contradiction they are claiming they are not making. Your case is good. You see it too, as I can see from your posts, I just wanted to mention I see it too.

Also, as stated above, they are trying to find a loophole in the consent thing, but it's not working. One cannot get consent from something that does not exist and therefore the consent thing cannot matter because there is no referent that it is talking about. That's their claim. However, they fail to recognize the decision that they are making at time X affects someone who will exist. So there is a displacement of time. Just because there is a displacement of time between the decision and the person it affects, does not make it invalid that a decision is being made on someone else's behalf. If there is a state of affairs that a person is born, there is a person affected by someone else's decision. However, if there is a state of affairs with no person born, then there is a state of affairs where no person was affected by the decision, thus no violation, and no new individual who suffers will take place. All of this is encompassed with colloquial terms like "potential child" etc.

@khaled The interlocutors are going to claim that we make risky decisions all the time when we do X, what makes procreation different? But procreation is an example of a decision where one can indeed prevent all suffering from incurring if one simply does not procreate. This is why I make a distinction between inter-wordly and intra-wordly affairs. It's not special pleading when the circumstances are actually different by de facto circumstances. Once born, indeed almost any action that one needs to take to live (presumably the normal course of a society for humans), would incur risk. Not so in inter-wordly affairs where one is deciding on new life. One can prevent all risk for a future person, period.

It's not well-stated at all because consent cannot play a role here because this is once again personifying non-existence as if it has thought processes and a will. And consent isn't even necessarily important for moral questions. Actions can be moral or immoral without another person being involved. Unnecessarily cutting down trees because I like destroying stuff isn't right either. Gluttony isn't right either. Lusting after your girlfriend even when nobody in the world is aware of it, isn't right either. — Benkei

@khaled

So I don't believe @Tzeentch was doing that.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent?
— Tzeentch — Benkei

He said as a hypothetical analogy. You are still not getting what I stated about a future person who will be affected. And that was what he is getting at. All you have to do is agree that you can make a decision that affects someone later that that person later could not possibly (by way of not existing), be a part of.

And impersonal stuff like the environment should not be miscategorized as if it is affecting only one individual. One is an abstract public good. The other is affecting an individual.

@khaled@Benkei

I think he goes on to generalize form this that we mean to HELP Billy or Sarah. We don't. That makes no sense. We are using the same model, we just set the "Acceptable chance of bad outcome" to 0%. — khaled

Yes, I also think he might be thinking that there is an airtight case around consent. He thinks that because at the time the decision was made, there was no child that could be denied consent, that this is an airtight case against the consent argument. However, at the time the child is born, that is when the violation occurred. Just because there is a displacement from the decision that affects the child (procreation decision) and the actual consequence of the decision (birth) doesn't mean that at the time of birth consent was had (or not needed). I just don't see it as a big deal as he does and find it to be semantic nonsense really.

So I think on both the negative outcomes and consent case he is wrong.

No one is doing this. Antinatalists are not trying to improve life for anyone. There is no one to be better off. It's a very common misconception. — khaled

Yes exactly. I am not sure if this is a rhetorical move that @Benkei is making. Antinatalists are using the same "as if the child existed" model as well. As I stated over and over, it all about someone who could exist in the future. That person X (you called him Billy or Sarah as a placeholder), would prevented from suffering.

Denying that future person would exist when the decision to procreate is made and that this future person, is what is being prevented, and denying that we can generalize instances of suffering seem to be going on here. However, at the same time, it is recognized as something to keep in mind when discussing the outcomes of poverty and disability.

Also, Benkei I know you have a preference for semantic preciseness here. I can respect that, but I also think this actually gets in the way as to obfuscate the argument at hand. For example, it really doesn't matter if I say: "There will be a state of affairs where a person will be born in the future and by not procreating this state of affairs will not occur", or if you say "preventing a potential child" because those two things are pragmatically the same thing.

But malicious genetic engineering is wrong because it causes harm. Also being born itself doesn’t. Idk how they pull off the mental gymnastics there. — khaled

Yes, exactly. It gets pushed to either, "Well they don't exist when making the decision, so that's fine" or "It's for the community" or something like that. Or again, it's that paternalism, "I know what's best for others to endure".

@khaled@Tzeentch@Echarmion@Benkei
Ok, it's been a couple pages since I answered so I'm just going address the trends I see in "What's wrong with natalism".

1) The essential nonsense that we cannot consider the future person being born because there is no person currently existing. I've seen uses of "potential parent" in the mix. Yet, "potential child" is also a consideration of course. Someone will exist, and it is that person who will exist that we are preventing either the suffering or non-consent, or the "not being used for means to an end" result.

Essentially what this comes down to is the themes I have seen here regarding community vs. the individual. The community may be ordinarily needed for the individual to survive, but it is not the community that lives out life.

2) Rather "community" is an abstract concept of interactions between individuals composed of institutions, historical knowledge, location, etc. However, it would be using an individual for an abstract cause that isn't any actual person to then determine that people need to be born to feed the community's needs.

3) The locus of ethics is the individual, not the community. The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering.

4) There seems to be an underlying Paternalism in the natalist's thought. Other people must be affected greatly because I deem it good. This is the height of hubris to think other people should affected greatly in a negative way by what you deem is good for them. In doing so of course, many other negative things have been imposed/violated. Suffering, consent, using people as a means for your/community's ends. There are a number of reasons this paternalism argument is simply license to use do these negative things on behalf of other people.

I still like @khaled's analogy of being kidnapped for a game regarding this paternalism. If I was to kidnap you into a game where this structurally meant to be many challenges to overcome, and there is also sufficient room for contingent harms to also affect the player, and the only way to escape is death, so you are de facto forced into playing the game or commit suicide, being harmed along the way, is the a good thing to do?

The only defense people are going to give for this is going back to the nonsensical argument that in the birth scenario there is no "one" to be kidnapped. Yet antinatalist arguments keep repeating that there will be someone born, and this "kidnapped" in the future. By being born this becomes the case, even if at the moment one decides, there is no actual person yet.

Then it follows that necessarily there is also no person who could be harmed by being born. — Echarmion

No that does not follow.

You're ignoring the context of my comment. As I said over and over, you can either focus on consent, but then run into the problems discussed at length, or you focus on eliminating on suffeirng, but then you run into the question of why bother with consent if it's ultimately suffering we care about.

Both legs of the argument fail on their own terms. Stitching them together to form an inorganic whole doesn't help. — Echarmion

I think you can combine them as the locus of ethics is at the individual level, and one of the most important implications here is what people decide to do with their own lives, especially something like ending their own state of existence. However, even suffering taken in its own accord, there is an asymmetry between starting and continuing an existence. Starting existence, there is no person to be harmed. If born, they will be harmed. As for discontinuing someone born, most people would say death is a great harm to them. And yes, you can have it such that suffering is sufficiently bad enough to never have been, but life sufficiently good enough that once born, would not want one's interests obliterated.

Sure they can be prevented. By nuking everyone, like I said. But you don't want to do that, because you care about consent. But when I bring up that consent cannot possibly apply, you go back and say that this doesn't matter because it's about preventing suffering, and so round and round we go.

You have chosen to use two fundamentally incompatible principles, and switch between them as the defense of your position requires. — Echarmion

It can work on both fronts, and both fronts combined. My position has always had the element that ethics is at the locus of the individual and not for some cause. Killing someone to stop suffering would bypass the individual would not be respecting the individual as a person with dignity. Perhaps the very basis why issues of harm/suffering/causing unnecessary impositions on another should be the basis of ethics.

It doesn't logically follow from anything said and alluding to it like this as if it does makes a piss poor argument. — Benkei

Let's go back. I am essentially saying that you do not account for a future child who will exist and you do not seem to like the idea of generalizing the idea that suffering exists and a child will be born that will almost certainly suffer. You don't like taking instances of suffering and summing it up and then applying it for the future child. These are perfectly in the realm of human reasoning. We can take specific instances and group them as instances of the same category. We can project these instances in the future.

If you think these indeed are legitimate moves, then your argument about proximate causes and metaphysical limitations are moot.

This is a straw man by the way. Nobody argues this. — Benkei

Yet, perhaps inadvertently you seem to be arguing this.

Torture already exists. It's the individual child that does not. — Echarmion

So, I'm not going to bother with the previous comments, because this answers your supposed problems with the metaphysics of no existing person prior to their birth.

This isn't the same argument though. This goes back to what I said earlier. You can avoid the problem of causality and attributing a will to nonexistence by committing to just eradicating suffering as a phenomenon. The problem is that you then have to answer why we're not nuking the planet into oblivion. — Echarmion

So how many times does consent and the individual matters do I have to say? How is nuking someone who already exists respecting the individual? Now that they exist, indeed they do have thoughts, desires, fears, preferences, etc. Ironically, this is back to making a decision for someone else again.

I am absolutely NOT an aggregate utilitarian. That is to say, it should be based on individual's decisions as to their own state's of being (which obviously, cannot even in theory be had prior to birth).

Also, another thing to consider is there is a difference between starting existence and continuing it. As I said many times earlier, prior to birth, there is no person who could be harmed by not being born. There is no person also who has any interests that would like to be preserved. Once born, people often fear death, have their own interests thy want to pursue. This doesn't negate being better off not existing, it only means that there are interests and values held once born that would be taken away. So it is not a symmetry, it is not the same preventing birth and discontinuing already existing life. So both from a consent issue, respecting the individual, and from the perspective of a person with interests vs. a person who never existed to have interests, this would be incomparable.

But then it's me who gets to judge, isn't it? — Echarmion

Yes. You can follow principles I disagree with. It's like veganism. Maybe veganism is right, but it shouldn't be forced.

I do believe in future outcomes. The problem is that you want us to act as if the outcome has simultaneously happened and not happened. — Echarmion

I don't see why you say that. We know suffering exists, with almost 100% certainty. We know of the varieties and kinds that could happen. We also know there is unknown sufferings we didn't even think of. All these things can be prevented. Doesn't seem hard to me.

I believe Schopenhauer's idea is not egoistic at all. Compassion is so lauded by Schop precisely because it is something which gets one out of the individuation cycle. Most interactions are egoistic but compassion sees everyone as the same metaphysical entity and we empathize by seeing someone else's suffering as the suffering that everyone shares and thus not individuated in the person at all but gets one out of one's own individuation. Compassion and aesthetic contemplation are two ways to get out of the individuation, while full asceticism would be the most complete way by completely denying the will.

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. Apart from that, you just apply whatever moral principles you would otherwise. If you think desires have moral weight, then yes the desires of the parents would be relevant. — Echarmion

This is the ridiculous move Benkei also makes.. You don't believe in future outcomes. There is no actual person now, but there will be in the future. It is the person who will be in the future that has the suffering you are preventing. Stop with the sophistry.

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

Yep, similar example to what I had.

The same person we're otherwise imposing life on. — Echarmion

So you are now saying we are taking freedom away from the thing that does not exist yet? "Who" is being deprived of this freedom? Here's the move you miss: once born, the freedom was by default taken away... now it is de facto live (via usual means, hack in wilderness, or die slowly), or kill yourself. Prior to this there was no person with impositions, there was no freedoms to be taken away. At instant X when that person is born, there was a decision made that affected it, that it could not possibly make. Yep.

The word "unnecessary" seems to do all the work here. I already argued above that suffering that's necessary to exist in the first place cannot reasonably be called unnecessary. — Echarmion

I don't know what that means.. suffering that's necessary in the first place. Again, no one "needs" to exist just so they can realize suffering exists. If a baby is 99% sure to get tortured if born, we don't need it to be born to have torture, so that torture exists so that we can then say it is wrong. Clearly all cases of suffering can be prevented, but were not if procreation occurs. Same odd thinking as Benkei to not be able to generalize all instances of suffering and then realize that this can be prevented, and not initiated on someone else's behalf.

Principles cannot judge, on account of not having minds. — Echarmion

Clearly I meant if you believe that you should follow it. Yes, very good.

Edit : Or to put it more clearly, life is not a sufficient condition for any of these situations. Without tiredness, there would be no sleep. Without hunger, no eating. It's always something else and that something else is always the proximate cause of suffering. Nobody using "cause" in any sensible way, will blame this on life. I stubbed my toe today and it hurt like hell. It was carelessness that caused it. — Benkei

I just don't buy this move you are claiming. You deny two things that humans can do very easily:
1) Project future outcomes. We know what life's sufferings can be and can predict that others can also experience this. Thus all the sufferings known to man are at our finger tips.

2) We can generalize. We can look at all instances of suffering in a life and generalize them to suffering that will most likely happen to someone born. We don't need to know every case to know suffering will occur.

Does living cause you to eat? Or is it your decision to move that fork into your mouth? How about falling asleep last night? Life, habit or because you were tired? And waking up? Life or your circadian rhythm? Everybody eats, sleeps and wakes too but nobody is so confused in their use of language or understanding of causality that they blame life for it. — Benkei

Actually, those are exactly the de facto impositions I am talking about. So, when you project things about life, are these not things that factor in?

But this is getting overly fuzzy, while the objection of anti-natalists is very straight forward. What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not?

It's not a complicated matter at all.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

Exactly. Well-stated and concise. It isn't that hard. I called it the Argument Against Paternalism. At base, the answers here is that the parent thinks that it is best for the child, even if it is causing suffering, which is why I say, it is still wrong to cause unnecessary suffering unto another even if one has good intentions to do so.

As to sickness, that's mostly caused by bacteria or viruses. Not life. — Benkei

Yet it's something which almost all people born experience.

It's not about getting consent from some individual after they have been born. That'd be ridiculous. The point is realizing that consent is based on respect for an individuals freedom. It'd be entirely backwards to protect freedom by taking it away. — Echarmion

From whom?

So your approach to this discussion is to just use whatever argument is convenient? What's the point is you're putting the conclusion first and select arguments according to happenstance?

Can you name the first principles you base your view on? — Echarmion

It's always been do not cause unnecessary suffering on behalf of someone else. I will admit I went down a consent rabbit hole with you, but I still think after debate this can also be an principle because I see this is about forcing other people into impositions unnecessarily without consent as well.

You cannot simply combine utilitarian and deontological approaches to the problem. The assumptions underlying them are fundamentally incompatible. If you're talking about suffering, you are talking about some kind of state of affairs. Something that exists "out there". If you're talking about consent, you're talking about a relationship between subjects, an idea.

If it is "something about suffering itself" then how does it then matter about how it's imposed? Suffering is either bad in and of itself or it isn't. — Echarmion

I don't abide to a utilitarian that is aggregate. There is a mix because it is causing suffering unto an individual, not how much aggregated suffering in the abstract. I see the locus of ethics at the individual level. Most utilitarian principles try to look at some aggregate abstract notion.

We put people in jail against their will, do we not? The justification is that putting them in jail is necessary to preserve the freedom of everyone. — Echarmion

Absolute vs. instrumental. Already born, vs. no need to impose at all, period.

And who judges what is and isn't necessary? Whose goals define instrumentality? — Echarmion

If people should not be exposed to suffering or imposed upon unnecessarily, that principle is the judge. If you don't believe in it, see my idea about how meta-ethics works.

Yes but when non compliance results in severe harm that's not really a choice. That scenario is what people call "an imposition". For instance: You theoretically could kill someone in public, you'll just be executed for it. In this scenario, while techincally there is a choice, practically there isn't. That is what impositions do, practically remove choices. — khaled

Yes, people fail to recognize de facto forced choices. For example, we can follow the impositions that are demanded of life or die. That is a de facto forced choice.

Not really. We don't pull the plug. Period. You don't "guess" you only look at the amount of harm done in both cases and pick the one with least harm. You take the conservative approach. I challenge you to come up with a situation where you pick the option that does more harm when consent is not available. — khaled

:100: :up:

But if consent is something that matters, then the imposition is necessary, because its the conditio sine qua non for consent. If the core of morality is people deciding their own destiny, then it seems to follow that it's a moral good to create that ability. — Echarmion

Creating situations for suffering so you can get to consent.. This is honestly why I rarely form the argument around consent and just keep it at unnecessary suffering because at the end of the day, you are creating the suffering so you can ask consent. That is why I brought up the idea of let's say you know that a baby will get tortured if it is born. But it doesn't exist yet, so does this consideration matter? I mean according to your view nope, there is no thing to give consent, so who cares right? Fine, at that point the original AN argument stands.. causing unnecessary suffering onto another is wrong. You can make an argument combining both too. Unless you get consent, you shouldn't put someone into a negative state without knowing what the person wants. Why would the assumption be that this is okay?
Surely this goes back to something about suffering itself which makes its imposition on someone else wrong. That is not something intuitive or relevant to your judgements? If not, I'd like to know why you think you can just do that on behalf of someone else other than rhetoric for the sake of argument. Cause I doubt you really do, other than this case of procreation. I can't find out if this guy wants to be put in a state of negative situations.. so I'll go ahead and proceed. Wrong.

I mean obviously I do think it's permissible to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. Else we'd not be allowed to operate on unconscious patients etc. — Echarmion

And here's why in my first formulation in the post I said unnecessarily and absolute not instrumental.

What do you think about the harm principle? As in "prevent unnecessary harm and suffering?"

People are likely to follow that more than anything else and our laws are pretty much based on that principle. — 8livesleft

Certainly a good basis for antinatalism.. No reason to unnecessarily cause conditions of harm for the future person.

Then how can you support denying people any decision whatsoever by denying them existence itself? — Echarmion

So if you cannot get consent, you should be able to impose suffering and impositions on someone unnecessarily? In other words, there is no reason to do it other than you want to.. you are not saving them from a greater harm, but simply to initiate it. That is what I meant by absolute imposition vs. instrumental and why this is different than other things.

However, if I was to indulge this as if it was a symmetry rather than an asymmetry, then I don't want to be around you at all because your default position is you are allowed to cause impositions if you cannot get consent.

But this really just sounds like the suffering isn't actually what matters. The argument really only refers to suffering as something that exists. But what changes some behaviour from permissible to impermissible or vice versa isn't some quantification of suffering, but really only whether or not there is consent.

So, where does the consent get it's moral weight from? What is it that makes consent "good"? — Echarmion

Negative states/suffering/causing impositions on others to overcome.. these are things which deal with the dignity of the individual person. That is the locus of ethics because the individual is who bears the burdens of life. Not recognizing suffering in another is not recognizing them as moral agents. We can say it is we are discounting their dignity as people who will be the ones who will bear the brunt of these decisions made on their behalf.

The very fact that you think deliberating upon a moral framework right now, implies that people should be able to make decisions on what affects them. I'll answer your obvious next move which is to explain "affects" for non-existing person, yadayada.. See below where you ask about non-existing persons.

But you also realize the problem with that is that this almost legitimizes special pleading? — Echarmion

It's unique, but not special pleading. This is a unique situation and I explained the difference. I explained how the situation is sufficiently different and is not comparable other cases. Perhaps one of the interesting aspects of antinatalism in general vs. almost all other moral quandaries. It is at the core of existence itself. It is the start of it all and perhaps the most important moral question because it gets to the core of the existential "Why?". Other questions are almost pragmatics of living in an intra-worldly reality.

But to me, the logical thing to do in a situation where the very concept of consent is unintelligible (because whatever could it possiblý mean for a nothing to consent?), is to drop consent from my test or system. It seems a bit like asking whether green is heavier than red, or whether nights are colder than forests. — Echarmion

If you can't get consent for being imposed upon and harmed, are you saying it is okay to to do for someone else? That's what you are implying here. Someone doesn't exist NOW so it is okay to allow impositions for them in the future. Doesn't make sense and while you are trying to claim my claim is nonsensical, that definitely flies in the face of how most people view impositions.

An aside about meta-ethics.. At the end of the day neither you nor me can open up the universe and show an objective principle. At some point, it is about how the individual views the the principle. Is it emotionally or intuitively appealing? That's pretty much it at the end. But ironically, in a sort of Kantian way, the very fact that we are deliberating and trying to choose which system makes sense to us intuitively, emotionally, etc. means that we are using the very ability to deliberate which cannot be had by the person who will have suffering and impositions initiated for them. So there is a contradiction in the very act of deliberating here admitting that this is the very thing, not quite "denied" the person that will be affected, but simply incapable of even doing so from the very nature of the non-existence.

So, can I impose things that aren't suffering on others? — Echarmion

Let me clarify cause I am using impose in two ways that should be more clearly explained:

1) Imposing suffering.. used in conjunction
2) Imposition in general.. as in for example, if I said you have this game where you make many choices, but you cannot escape except through death. That can be an imposition. It is de facto imposition as there is no escape without death or making the choices the game's conditions imposes. These more generally, are the challenges of life.

Certainly one should not unnecessarily impose suffering on others no matter what. But it also stands to reason, which I will just call Argument Against Paternalism, is to try to benefit someone else by imposing on them challenges to overcome which they could not consent.

Since there is only a single "E v N scenario" no comparisons are possible at all, and hence the entire argument begins and ends with a claim. — Echarmion

Yeah, well it is a special scenario. What do you want me to say. That is the point. It is a special scenario that is hard to analogize without making a false analogy.

ou're not even following this request yourself, since "self-imposed suffering" clearly is only possible once you already exist, so it ought to be entirely irrelevant. — Echarmion

I'll answer in two ways:
1) Fine, ditch it. Self-imposed suffering is also not analogous. Doesn't hurt my argument, just shows how using analogies like these aren't great anyways in this very unique scenario, and hence my highlighting how unique it is.

2) It can be kept because, self-imposed suffering, or suffering on others who consent are examples of being able to consent. The only example where one would unnecessarily cause suffering (because it's not in order to prevent a greater harm as they don't exist obviously), and where there is no consent that can be obtained is the case of E v. N.

This doesn't really relate to the question. I was wondering whether it's the suffering that matters or the lack of choice. — Echarmion

So can I take from this that bad choices are worse than not having a choice at all? — Echarmion

It's both. If you want to self-impose your own suffering, go ahead. Once you impose it for someone else, it's not good. Please don't make the move comparing E v. N vs. E only scenarios as I addressed that. Otherwise, we will keep talking in circles.

Much of these debates are around the sophistic move that we cannot sufficiently generalize all of life's sufferings and then make a judgement: For all sufferings, we would like them not to be imposed on another. For those who think that you can't generalize sufferings, why? That doesn't make any sense. That is something humans can do.. inferencing particulars to a general category.

It doesn't change the assessment that living is not a sufficient condition for such suffering. But maybe your should get specific. Name a suffering. — Benkei

Are we referring to inherent or contingent? If inherent then, being born is the direct reason why someone is alive which, if inherent suffering exists, is a directly entailed with being alive. What brought about this inherent suffering? Birth. I see inherit suffering as similar to the Eastern version I discussed several posts ago.

Contingent suffering is contextual. It technically is not entailed in being alive, but mine as well be based on the material circumstances. For example, almost everyone will get sick, and that's just a basic example. Then there are just daily challenges great or small to overcome. Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the paternalistic types that think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them.

With either example, a future person can be prevented from going through this. Why, someone might ask, would we not just end humanity? And my response, for the thousandth time, is that consent is a huge factor. I give the example usually of veganism. Maybe veganism is correct. Maybe it is best not to eat or use animal products. However, to force this on people would violate that consent idea.

Like which ones? — Echarmion

A state of E (existing itself) vs. N (not existing), rather than default already existing E (where x, y, z intra-worldly affairs happen within it). All other moral decisions are of the latter, only pertaining to what is within E where this one is about E vs. N. So, before you jump to the obvious move to then say why isn't death different? Look at what I said about unnecessary impositions on another person's behalf.

So, to leave the boundaries of accustomed debate a bit: Why does it matter whether it's self-imposed? If it's about avoiding suffering, it's not necessarily obvious why we care about concepts of choice or consent. Why aren't we paternalistic and just make sure no one suffers, regardless of choice? — Echarmion

Oh can we make no one suffer? Please tell me how? But since we obviously can't, simply not procreating is sufficient to prevent all harm to a future person, and it is sufficient to not impose unnecessarily challenges to be overcome on someone else's behalf.

So is having choices good or bad now? — Echarmion

No rather, the fact that the happy natalists/optimists cruel next move is to just say something like "Oh well you always have the choice to kill yourself or find a piece of wilderness to slowly die" or something like that. But what a shitty choice.. Either be imposed by the things that you need to live or kill yourself. But where did this choice come from? Being born in the first place.

No it wouldn't though. My personal assessment of whether life is worth living should be applied for myself, not for others. Just because I find life worth living doesn't mean my child will, and so my assessments are unimportant. — khaled

:100: :up:

I wasn't aware we were traveling between worlds in a literal sense. — Echarmion

Yes, then you would be correct. Different states.

See, here is the negative framing again. That the only reason anyone would accept having obligations imposed on them, or having to endure suffering, is if they were forced to in order to survive. This seems to me a very reductive view of human sociality. As I have alluded above, if that were true, noone would be having children in the first place, since having children comes with both obligations and suffering attached, and it certainly is not necessary for survival nowadays.

But it really applies beyond that, to all forms of human community. Engaging with others always comes with impositions and the possibility of suffering. Beyond anti-natalism, your view seems to imply that the best way to live is as an individual detached from all obligations, and therefore all relationships. — Echarmion

But these are also different cases. These are self-imposed. I have nothing against that. It is creating unnecessary harm and impositions, in an absolute sense for someone else. This is the height of paternalism (and again, not in a literal sense.. which it is too, but meaning that someone knows better for someone.. and worse knows better to the point that suffering and impositions have to be overcome by the person born due to someone else's decision.. even if intentions are good that it is for the child's "benefit"). There are some choices, but certainly not the choice to not have these choices in the first place. That can never be when born.

The OP says quite clearly there's two types of suffering. Intrinsic and contingent. — Benkei

I agree with this.

Intrinsic isn't caused by living — Benkei

But how come birth isn't the cause?

for contingent life is never a sufficient condition on its own and never a proximate cause and almost always even intervened upon by other circumstances. In my view there's no causality any way you cut it 99% of the cases. — Benkei

This I believe I gave a sufficient response. You make it seem like we don't know the contingent harms that usually befall people. We know very well the impositions and sufferings that will occur and can prevent all of those. I also mentioned that even more reason to prevent harm, is that there are also unknown impositions and sufferings that may befall, and can be prevented those too.. We are a self-aware and deliberative being. We can gather what types of harms can befall someone in the future. We can prevent those harms. Also, unnecessarily imposing challenges to overcome for other people, even if "for their benefit", is wrong. Unlike being born already, where impositions are a necessity to live in a society (unless you want to die or hack it alone in some wilderness), the case of birth is one where one would be imposing unnecessarily these harms in an absolute sense. To deny that harms will ensue seems a disingenuous claim knowing what we know about harms. Knowing, and preventing harms as well as imposing a set of known challenges on someone unnecessary is what counts.

As I think I stated this most clearly in that post, I will leave it again for you to answer if you decide to engage with the actual rebuttal:

We can generalize what they are without knowing each particular case. We know these would be impositions. The Big Bang and other non-deliberative things cannot evaluate this and prevent these impositions but we can. I think this is a case of ignoring what doesn't fit your case. We know the impositions that occur, both structurally, and even contingently what is in range of what people often have to deal with. There is even the case that because we don't know all the contingent harms, this is even more evidence that it is best to prevent those unknown harms from occurring. But, even if you think unknown harms are not enough reason, even if you don't believe in necessary harms, even the known contingent harms should be enough evidence to prevent it. — schopenhauer1

Instead of rehashing the same arguments made on this forum a dozen times before, I'd like to look more at the underpinnings of your view. Why is it a principle "not to cause an imposition"? Aren't impositions a right and proper part about being human? — Echarmion

Because this is different than other impositions.

One is about inter-wordly affairs (should we impose existence, and the harms and challenges to overcome that come with a usual life)

One is about intra-wordly affairs (we already exist.. do you want to die? Do you want to go it alone? No? Okay, here are societal impositions to survive, gain comfort, and find entertainment).

In the inter-wordly scenario, it is an absolute case. That is to say, it is completely unnecessary to start/initiate the conditions for unnecessary suffering/impositions on someone else.

In the intra-worldly scenario, it is an instrumental case. Survival, comfort, entertainment is necessary, and when the child becomes an adult has no other choice (unless they are okay with death or somehow finding a remote wilderness to hack it alone) to follow the impositions of a given society.