this word has no clear meaning to me. — Olivier5

It’s what physicists study.

What I believe is that the mind is perfectly natural, and that it exists for a reason. It does things. That's why we have one. Same as for your nostrils, your hair and your feet: you have them for a reason, they serve a purpose. — Olivier5

I don’t really buy the argument from evolution.

You can remove a persons nostrils or feet. And they will have a lower chance to survive. But you can’t remove a mind.

It seems to me that minds come “free of charge” with a sufficiently advanced organism. They’re not like feet that require energy and cell replacement. They don’t have a cost. So it would make sense for them to exist and serve no purpose.

I believe the purpose of the mind is to integrate information from all sources to support decision making. — Olivier5

I would flip it. When you integrate enough information minds pop out. Or something like that.

So to me, the idea of a thing (the mind) having no effect on other things is simply impossible. The mind as you describe it (a dead-end of causality) appears to me a logical impossibility. — Olivier5

Logical? Again, cause and effect is not a logical principle.

But I can understand if you said “seems absurd”.

They don't. Not without breaking fundamental laws of physics. You're positing a system which defies the laws of physics - despite being well within the purview of physics ("causing neurological changes" - a physical event). If something defying the laws of physics isn't reason to look elsewhere, then what is? Are you seriously suggesting that "It seems that way to me" is a stronger argument the "It is consistent with all the laws of physics"? — Isaac

Given that we agree there, what’s your stance? Epiphenomenalism? Something else? Are you a dualist in the first place? I’m curious.

Then I misspoke. It is not coincidence. You can go back and check why as I explained in the last comment.

I said “coincides with” but I didn’t mean it was a coincidence. I meant “accompanies”.

But do you actually intend to address what I’m saying? I’m dedicating an awful lot of time and typing into this so if you’re only going to give cursory responses to half of what I type like these I don’t think there is much point in continuing.

You called my ideas ridiculous and faulty, — Olivier5

Sure and you’re welcome to call my ideas ridiculous and faulty. But that’s different from saying “you’re incapable of understanding”. Which is what you did.

And I assure you, I’m not crying.

But if I seemed antagonistic I apologize. I seriously didn’t mean to.

without any other argument that "minds are not physical", which is itself a pretty ridiculous argument because it assumes you know what the mind is made of... — Olivier5

I didn’t think that was in dispute. Me and wayfarer have been talking about non physical minds this whole time when you came in. And when I asked “are you arguing for materialism” you didn’t answer so I assumed the answer is “no”. Aka that minds are not material.

So... are you arguing that minds are physical? In that case then there would be no issue with minds interacting with brains and vice versa. But I don’t see how materialism makes sense.

That my memory of the route does not cause me to take it. — Wayfarer

What proof do you have that it did? That remembering the route precedes taking it? That’s not proof of causality.

That I only turn right ‘as a coincidence’. — Wayfarer

Who said coincidence?

Think of it this way. Let’s call physical events P and mental events M.

P1 causes M1. M1 being remembering the route. And P1 being seeing the KFC.

You think that then, M1 goes on to cause P2, the turning. That’s an interactionist picture.

I think that, no, nothing follows from M1. Instead P2 is also caused by P1.

To say that it is a coincidence is to say that even if M1 occurred, P2 wouldn’t occur sometimes. That is not the case in either of our pictures.

Even in my view, if M1 occurs, it necessarily follows that P2 will occur. Even though M1 doesn’t cause P2 directly or indirectly

Just because M1 doesn’t cause P2 doesn’t mean P2 is a coincidence.

That nobody can ever do anything intentionally. — Wayfarer

How is the turning not intentional in my view? You had the intention to turn. You then turned. What is missing?

As for your view, it suggests that we have limited telekinetic powers. That’s what I find absurd there. If you think it doesn’t suggest that then please explain how it doesn’t. I’ve told you why I think it does.

Apparently this is telekinesis — Wayfarer

Yes it is quite apparent.

You want to say that the thought caused some chemical reaction in your brain. And that in turn eventually caused the turning. That first step is telekinesis.

So we humans have telekinetic powers within our own brain only. The second you step outside of it our minds suddenly lose their magical ability to make things move and to cause neurons to fire.

That's what I don't get about interactionism.

In my view, that thought that you've been there before, remembering the KFC store, and turning right, all of it happened, and is real, and is immaterial (except the turning right bit). But is not causal. It just coincides with the turning. Whatever your brain is doing as you are having the thought, that's what causes the turning, not the thought. What is wrong with that picture? Because you're making fun of it but I don't see why. What's absurd?

they are the consequence of symbolic language and abstract thought, are they not? — Wayfarer

No they are not. Symbolic language and thought coincide with our inventing and use of such devices. They do not cause it. That is my hypothesis. Yours is that they do have an effect. But you do not think something like telekinesis is possible. So how, exactly do they have an effect? How does a thought result in movement? Because to me, that's nothing short of telekinesis.

I agree that actions follow thoughts. I do not see proof that the thoughts are causal however.

To all intents and purposes, you seem to be arguing for materialism, but then you say that you're not arguing for materialism. So it's hard to counter an argument that seems self-contradictory. — Wayfarer

I'm arguing for epiphenomenalism if anything.

That's why I don't understand how you can say that such things as reasoned argument are physical, or can be seen as 'neural events'. — Wayfarer

When have I said so? That's rubbish.

Do you recognise the need for two levels? — Wayfarer

Sure there are mental things and physical things. What I don't recognize is that there is top down causation. Because no proof of such a thing has been provided. And I outlined how it can be provided.

So, what happened? — Wayfarer

The quote didn't contradict anything I thought and it was very concise and straightforward. So I liked it.

My explanation was correct, but your mind causes nothing to happen at all, not even understanding, so it has many limitations. — Olivier5

When you can’t defend your position your resort to ad Homs as if that accomplishes anything.

Respond to the question or don’t bother

Sure. And what physical impact does that have, precisely? How do you go from the decision to the movement? Where on the causal chain of the movement is the decision? — khaled

And, no. For the reasons I outlined above, action reaction doesn’t apply here.

You can’t apply physical laws when talking about minds. It’s as ridiculous as claiming your mind has a mass or color. — khaled

Because that makes no sense

Making decisions. — Olivier5

Sure. And what physical impact does that have, precisely? How do you go from the decision to the movement? Where on the causal chain of the movement is the decision?

It would also break the law of action-reaction, as I explained already. — Olivier5

Your explanation was faulty. You can’t apply physical laws when talking about minds. It’s as ridiculous as claiming your mind has a mass or color.

You said: biology will one day prove that the human mind "does not interfere"; and yet biology itself is a product of the human mind. — Olivier5

Correct.

Any time biologists find something, their mind "interferes". Any time they write down a paper, their mind acts on the world. — Olivier5

Non sequitor. It could be the case that the workings of their minds are a side effect. It remains to be seen that they are causal.

Again, M1 can imply P2 but doesn’t necessarily cause it. A desire to understand biology can imply a bunch of different things from writing papers to conducting studies. But that alone doesn’t prove it is causal.

In the decision to do so, apparently. — Olivier5

That’s not answering the question.

What role does the mind fulfill? Chemical energy gets converted to electrical energy in batteries, do you need a mind there too? Is the battery “deciding” to work?

When you said:

All of them can be understood in terms of a sufficiently advanced neurology and biology. ... The burden of proof is on you to show that the mind has any room to interfere here. — Olivier5

I don't understand how that leads to saying that the human mind can somehow not understand the world and itself. So I don't see the dispute.

And what proof do you have of the "net" part? How do you know it doesn't consume say chemical energy? — Olivier5

If a movement is consuming chemical energy then it's a physical thing that is causing it no? Where does the mind come in when chemical energy is converted to some mechanical energy?

My mind has a certain velocity — Olivier5

What’s the direction and how many meters per second are we at?

Does light have a mass? — Olivier5

Sort of.

Once it become more advanced, it will provide further proof of the ability of the human mind to understand the world, and itself... — Olivier5

Sure. When was that in dispute?

I don't. — Olivier5

Why not?

Is it not the case that a mind causing something would mean there is a movement for which there is no physical cause?

And is that not an example of a net increase in momentum?

Which part of the argument do you have issue with?

It would imply that for a human being, knowing the truth about some case is irrelevant to whatever he or she can do about the case — Olivier5

Sort of. Explained below.

i.e. that knowledge is powerless. — Olivier5

Doesn’t follow.

Think of it this way. Let’s call physical events P and mental events M.

P1 causes M1. M1 being knowledge of how to bake a cake. And P1 being reading a book about it for example.

You think that then, M1 goes on to cause P2, the baking of the cake. That’s an interactionist picture.

I think that, no, nothing follows from M1. Instead P2 is also caused by P1.

To say that knowledge is pointless or powerless is to say that even if M1 occurred, P2 wouldn’t occur. That is not the case in either of our pictures.

Even in my view, if M1 occurs, it necessarily follows that P2 will occur. Even though M1 doesn’t cause P2 directly or indirectly

So, in a sense, M1 is powerless on its own yes. But its mere occurrence also implies that P2 will occur. So in that sense knowledge is power. As any time it occurs, some action based on it follows or becomes available.

You can say M1 implies P2. But not M1 causes P2. As that would be telekinesis.

intersubjective construction of private worlds. — unenlightened

Subjectivity is a social construct — unenlightened

Have no clue what this means. Subjectivity is not socially constructed.

What is the mind, is part of that whole question. You can't assume the answer before solving the riddle. You cannot assume it is some metaphysical or supernatural thing. It looks very natural to me. — Olivier5

Natural? Sure.

Physical? Definitely not.

Does your mind have momentum? Mass? Velocity?

If it has any of these things that means I can physically pick it up. I struggle to see how the word “mind” can ever be applied to something you can pick up. I’m sure you’d agree with me there.

Otherwise are you pushing for a materialist view?

I don't think so. Biology is not that advanced. — Olivier5

Sure. But once it becomes that advanced....

We are talking of the mind-body problem in a scientific, i.e. 'physical' conceptual frame — Olivier5

If by this you mean a “materialist frame” then no, that’s not what I’m talking about.

That is precisely why you raise physical laws such as the conservation of energy in this discussion. Otherwise, drop that argument. — Olivier5

I don’t know exactly what “that” means. But I raise them because they contradict the view that the mind does things “top to bottom”. Which is your and wayfarers view.

First, do you agree that they contradict? And if they do, what evidence do you have that top to bottom interference occurs that is so powerful, that it makes it worth throwing these laws in the trash (because that’s what you would be doing by admitting top down action)?

The very concept of 'proof' requires or assumes that human thoughts and language can say something meaningful and true about the world. It therefore assumes the existence and effectiveness of — Olivier5

The assumption that thoughts and language say something meaningful and true, is not the same as the thought that they effectively cause physical changes. You can have the former without the latter.

It's a principle of physics though. — Olivier5

Sure but we’re not talking about physics are we?

In fact we’re talking about something non physical. A mind. Asking whether or not it causes physical changes.

None of these simple, familiar event can be understood without recourse to some capacity of symbolic language (and thus abstract human thoughts) to produce physical outcomes. — Olivier5

False. All of them can be understood in terms of a sufficiently advanced neurology and biology. Since that’s all they are. Neurological events leading to certain physical outcomes. The burden of proof is on you to show that the mind has any room to interfere here.

I’m not denying that we have a symbolic language and abstract thoughts. I’m denying they interfere in the causal chain. Because if they do then they contradict conservation laws.

If you want to say the mind does something physical, and that the mind is non physical, we should expect to find movements in the brain with no detectable cause (since they were caused by a non physical mind). That would contradict conservation laws. So that’s evidence to suggest minds don’t cause physical change.

On the other hand, the only evidence to suggest that minds cause some physical change, is that physical changes are always preceded by certain thoughts. For example: when I feel like raising my hand, that is followed by my hand rising. However, this does not imply causation.

I don't know, but it squares well with the principle of action-reaction. — Olivier5

Well that’s a problem innit?

And the principles of action-reaction only has any meaning when referring to physical things bumping into each other. It makes no sense to apply it to mind production. “Action” does not include the production of minds. It only includes physical things affecting physical things. And hence, brains affecting minds does not lead to minds affecting brains. Because brains affecting minds isn’t a physical action to begin with, so is not subject to action-reaction. And neither is the other way.

But regardless, this is confused. The principle of action reaction implies the conservation laws and vice versa. So you can’t satisfy one and not the other. And the position that minds cause physical changes satisfies neither. As it would imply an “action” without any reaction. A force, that has no detectable source (since it was caused by the mind) and consequently no opposing equal force.

Never will. — Wayfarer

Sure it will. If you can find a neuron firing without any physical cause. We can then attribute that to a mind doing something top down. The condition is specific. But you haven't given an experiment that satisfies it.

And as far as I can tell the only "experiment" you gave was never done and you assumed its conclusion. And even if it was done, and the conclusion was what you wanted, it would still not contradict my position.

Have a look at the Schopenhauer quote on my profile. — Wayfarer

The quote argues against materialism. Which is not what I am arguing for. For the third time... I really liked the quote when I read it the first time actually.

I'm arguing against "top down" causation from minds to brains. Because it is simply telekinesis.

I might decide your reply is not worth responding to. Then I won’t respond. The ‘mechanism’ is not really a mechanism, to call it that is itself reductionist. — Wayfarer

Sure and that decision, and the thought that the decision had causal power, were both results of certain neural changes. Not the other way around. No top down action occurred. None that you have been able to show. Even though I outlined the conditions for showing it, the examples you gave did not satisfy.

In determining meaning, which determines course of action. — Wayfarer

What exactly do you mean here? How does determining the meaning change the course of action?

If, say you want to raise your arm. Does your mind telekinetically fire certain neurons?

What is the mechanism by which determining meaning leads to a course of action?

That's not a logical principle.

The weather can affect me but I can't affect the weather.

And what would the mind affecting the body look like, exactly? How do you square it with conservation of momentum and energy?

If the body can affect the mind, then it logically follows that the mind can affect the body. — Olivier5

No it doesn't? What's the logical principle there?

The weather can affect me but I can't affect the weather.

But being able to hold it or see it or weigh it tells you nothing about what it does. — Wayfarer

Well it should tell me that energy is conserved there. That momentum is conserved there. Unless the brain is somehow magical and telekinesis is just a common occurrence within for some reason (despite not being detected anywhere else in the outside world).

But if not, then there really is no role for the mind to interfere. The brain, embodied, is a physical system. Physical laws should hold there. Where can the mind come in? If it ever does, and causes some movement, we'd have movement with no detectable cause. That would mean energy or momentum is not being conserved.

The reference to ‘embodied’ is with respect to ‘embodied cognition’. And the point of that perspective is that ‘the brain’ in itself, is an inert collection of stuff. Only when it is situated in a body, in a nervous system, and in an environment, is its power realised. — Wayfarer

Sure no one is disputing that.

And no one is disputing that the mind is a result of this embodied brain.

What is being disputed is that the mind affects the brain or body "top down".

I dispute that. The brain is an embodied organ. — Wayfarer

What does that mean? What does the "Embodied" serve to add there? Does it mean "Physics breaks there"?

Far as I can tell the brain strictly falls within the list of things that are material. You can hold it, see it, everything. It's not even like a "Quantum probability wave" or electron where things start to get iffy (because you can't see or touch them).

The non-reductionist claim is that mind is not reducible to physical principles. — Wayfarer

Sure and I agree with that. What I'm disagreeing with is that the mind causes any physical changes "top down". Which is what I understand you claimed.

If the book you cited simply wants to claim that mind is not reducible to brain then I don't think there is much value in me reading it, since I already agree.

It doesn’t ‘break’ those laws but says that their scope is limited — Wayfarer

Their scope is limited only to explaining how material things interact with each other.

However the brain is a material thing.

A "top down" interference would imply breaking physics. It would imply the mind changing the brain. A non-physical thing messing with a physical system. That's nothing short of telekinesis.

I'll check it out but I'm not sure if I trust a book published in 1975 is the best source for this. That's half a century ago now. Any other recommendations? Bonus points if their audiobooks are available.

and the subject was always able to differentiate self-initiated action from that which was brought about by the surgeon — Wayfarer

Do you know this or are you assuming it is what will happen?

Because I gave an example where the exact opposite happens above. I think the patients would only be able to tell if the arm muscles were the ones being stimulated directly. But if you go up in the causal chain all the way to the brain, they wouldn’t be able to tell eventually.

But more importantly, ok let’s say the subject can, in fact differentiate (though I’m still interested if they actually will or if you are assuming they will), what does that prove?

In my model I could just say that the brain can “know” when these areas are tempered with. As in, when these areas are stimulated despite the preceding chemical chain not occurring, and when you hold in memory that you are being operated on, you logically process this and say that the surgeon did it.

In short: There is a physical difference between the surgeon tampering with a neuron and the same neuron firing naturally. And that difference can account for how the subject can tell. So it doesn’t contradict my position.

But, again, the mind has not been shown to be causing anything here. If this was proof of anything it would be the mind being immaterial. I don’t disagree there.

But he could not discover an area associated with a subjects’ own voluntary movement — Wayfarer

What does this mean?

Mechanical means explication in terms of cellular actions; as distinct from voluntary. — Wayfarer

Is the claim here that voluntary action somehow changes the course of cellular action? That the mind breaks physics and chemistry?

But regardless, even if they were able to tell. What would that prove? I don’t see how it contradicts my model at all. How does it prove that minds cause anything? What has the mind been found to cause in this case?

I edited the comment.

And no I don’t see what the hypothetical is supposed to provide because I don’t understand it.

Do you mean to say that the subjects will definitely be able to tell that the surgeon is manipulating them? If so you might wanna read the edits. I don’t think it’s obvious at all that the subject would be able to tell.

You would think that if this process was mechanical then the subject wouldn’t be able to tell if these were a consequence of the surgeon’s activities. — Wayfarer

What is “this process” that is mechanical? I don’t understand.

I’ll suppose you mean the movements and sensations the surgeon is triggering.

If so we actually have evidence that, yes, they wouldn’t be able to tell. Provided they can’t literally see themselves being operated on and even then it’s dubious. Split brain patients for example, express different answers to questions when asked to write the answer vs say the answer, because a different half is responsible for each.

When asked to explain this inconsistency they never say “because my brain is split, so one part answered the first question and another answered the second”. No, they always come up with some random explanation. Like “Oh, I changed my mind”. And they are not lying they genuinely think this.

But if the subject could tell that these movements were being triggered by the surgeon, what would that say? — Wayfarer

That the brain causes the movements. I’m not sure what you’re getting at here. It seems to be an argument for my position.

Heck, if the mind can alter the brain top down, you’d expect this surgeon to be met with some resistance if he tries to make you do something you don’t want to do. So for example, if he tried to stimulate your arm to rise, and you don’t want it to, he should physically experience some pushback caused by your mind during the operation. I highly doubt that will happen. Do you think it will? And don’t you think it should?

Neurons don’t do anything. Attributing voluntary actions to cells or brains or other metabolic systems is called ‘the mereological fallacy.’ — Wayfarer

I said “the neuron that results in raising”. As in the one that, when fired, results in raising the arm. The one the surgeons tempers with. I know it’s not one neuron I’m simplifying.

I didn’t say anything about neurons voluntarily doing anything.

Yea.

Why? Why get moving? You won't remember any of it when you die and you can't take it with you (assuming an afterlife). There really is no reason to get moving or do anything. — Darkneos

Because standing still is worse.

Purpose is something imbued by a creator — Darkneos

Or the creation.

We seem to agree that movement happens because of neurons.

And that intents happen because of neurons. Or, at least that intents don’t cause movements (or else you get telekinesis), just precede them.

So what’s odd?

So what would you expect to see? How would you test for it? — Wayfarer

We would look at the an act. Say, raising your arm. And check whatever neuron results in the raising. Then you’d ask a participant to freely choose to raise their arm at any point in time.

If the mind is causing the excitation of those neurons, you’d expect them to fire without any physical causes. They didn’t fire because of some chemical chain reaction or anything, no, they just went off suddenly. They got energy out of nowhere, seemingly.

Then we can attribute that to the mind of the participant doing something.

Otherwise, the mind isn’t really part of the causal chain is it? This is what top down action would imply. It would imply some movement in the brain that we cannot detect a cause for (since it was caused by the mind)

By 'closed' do you mean to exclude immaterial objects? — Bartricks

No. This is elementary school physics. Closed means no energy exchange from outside the system to inside it or vice versa. If it is too complicated for you just consider the whole universe as a system. Momentum and energy are conserved in the universe.

If the system includes them — Bartricks

A physical system cannot include non physical things.

I am talking physics. Not non-physics. Which means it applies to, guess what, physical things! And you’re just talking nonsense.

And don’t repeat the “It’s begging the question to assume energy only applies to physical things”. No it isn’t. And I’ve explained why in multiple ways and I’m not going to repeat myself.

Is it begging the question to assume momentum only applies to physical things too? You want non physical things that have momentum? IE mass and velocity?

But anyway, you now allow, clearly, that one thing can cause another without transferring any energy to it, yes? — Bartricks

Don’t overgeneralize. I have no clue where you got this or what it means.

What I allow is that physical events cause non physical events.

Seriously, what does “one thing can cause another without transferring energy to it” mean? What is “it” here? An event? You don’t transfer energy to an event. A thing? You don’t cause a thing! Nonsense! Complete word salad!

I find it incredibly difficult to believe you’re not trolling again.

How is it inconsistent?

The physical laws talk about how material things interact. I’m saying that interaction also causes minds and such.

Let’s look at conservation of momentum for example. When objects collide the total momentum of the system remains constant, assuming the system is closed. I am saying that when objects collide in a specific manner, minds pop out. What’s inconsistent in the latter statement with the former?

And besides, it’s weird that you ask me this when even you think that material events cause immaterial ones. Why am I the one that has to explain this supposed inconsistency away?

And I like how you completely ignore the entirety of my comment and address nothing. And instead ask me to deal with a non-existent inconsistency that is in both of our positions.

Address what I said. Or don’t waste my time. Do. It.

Or on my asking "why did you move your arm?", you reply "Because my c-fibres fired...!" — Banno

Well we both agree there.

1b. My arms move because certain neurons fired
— khaled
Yep. — Banno

I can't avoid the image of you sitting there saying "Ah, my c-fibres are firing - I think I might move my arm!" — Banno

There is no buildup there (or any reason) for me to say that. My c-fibers would fire. And then I would feel like moving my arm. And also my arm would move shortly after (not sure if the c-fibers also did that part or not).

I would later say "I felt like raising my arm so I raised my arm". And by that I would mean "I raised my arm because my c-fibers fired, which, incidentally, is also what caused me to feel like raising my arm".

The former implies the latter. I felt like raising my arm, so the c-fibers must have fired. That also leads me to raise my arm. The "I felt like raising my arm so" is not meant to imply that the feeling is causal.

Nuh. You don't think that. SO what's going on? — Banno

Not sure what I said to make you think so. I've been saying that the brain causes both the act and the intent since the very start.

No; your decision was not based on your knowledge of the firing of certain neurones. — Banno

Not knowledge of. Just that neurons firing caused my decision. And also the movement. In a pair.

I would even be willing to bet that they were the same neurons! But I don't know enough neurology to say so for sure. Though I think Isaac might have said something similar a while ago.

You just arbitrarily believe that though material events can cause immaterial events, the reverse is not true. — Bartricks

Not arbitrarily. Though, again, it must seem so to you since your highest form of evidence is "It seems to me that way".

But a) nothing in the idea of material/immaterial causation violates those laws — Bartricks

False. You just don't understand them. Seeing as you are attributing physical laws to non physical things. I'll say it again, hopefully it sticks: Energy is literally only defined for physical things. It makes no sense to talk of energy that is not that of a physical thing. Same with momentum, mass, velocity, torque, etc.

And the funny part is, you whole argument for why the mind is immaterial was that you can't ask about its mass or color. Yet here you are repeatedly doing exactly that.

b) if it did, then your view involves a violation of them as well. For how, exactly, does a material event cause an immaterial event without that involving a transfer of energy? — Bartricks

Attributing energy to minds makes as little sense as attributing color to minds.

You know what, forget conservation of energy. You seem incapable of using the term correctly. So let's look at another conservation law that is more difficult to misuse. Conservation of momentum.

Are you going to propose that minds gain momentum and gives it back later in order to cause a change of momentum in the brain (which is just movement)? For a mind to gain momentum that would necessarily mean it has mass and velocity. That would make it a physical thing. But it isn't. So minds don't gain momentum. Therefore if a change of momentum occurs in the brain that is caused by the mind, then momentum is not conserved (as the mind couldn't have gained or lost any momentum, so any change it causes must be a net increase or decrease of momentum, which violates the law)

I decided - mental event - to raise my arm, and my arm raised - sensible event.

If all the evidence is that my mind is an immaterial thing, then what we have there is evidence that immaterial events can and do cause sensible events. — Bartricks

"Event B followed event A therefore A must have caused B"

Can't say I expected much better from you at this point but wow.

2b. I decide to move my arm, causing specific muscle fibres to contract.

No issue so far...? — Banno

Yes issue so far. If you deciding to move your arm causes any physical change, that would be telekinesis. It would be as weird as an astronaut deciding to stop moving suddenly in space using his mind.

Unless by 2b, you're being colloquial and you just mean 1b.

I would say:

1b. My arms move because certain neurons fired
2b. I decide to move my arm because certain neurons fired

3. I decide to move my arm =/= certain neurons fired.

Two descriptions:
1. My arms move because I decide to move my arm,
2. Certain neurone fire, causing specific muscle fibres to contract.

One event. — Banno

Sure that I’ll buy. Though I would say statement 1 is liable to misinterpretation. Makes it sound almost as if the thought is a causal agent.

Bartricks on the other hand for example was claiming telekinesis.