someone who relies on their religious faith does. — Janus

Then they misunderstand.

Buddha says that Buddhism itself is like a raft, used for 'crossing over' the river of suffering, but to be let go of once it's served its purpose. 'Dhammas should be abandoned, to say nothing of adhammas'. That is specifically about not becoming attached to Buddhism. — Wayfarer

I acknowledge that if I felt such certainty, I may not be skeptical about it; indeed I could not hold such certainty unless I was not skeptical.

The point is that no matter how much I might feel that I could not be wrong; there could still never be any real guarantee that I was not mistaken; neither my own conviction nor any institutional judgement based on tradition could ever suffice to give rational grounds for absolute certainty about anything. — Janus

"In Zen you don't find answers, you lose questions" -Saying

Zen isn't about finding "The One Mindset/Worldview to Rule Them All" as much as it is advertised that way. It's about getting rid of the need for such a thing and being able to live with the uncertainty you outlined.

Detachment is more about the abandonment of egotism than being callous or indifferent. — Wayfarer

There is a difference between being indifferent about something or someone, and not caring if you lose it or them. I don’t buy the idea that desire is a “two way street”, where if you want something then you’re necessarily distraught at not having it. I think it could be two separate streets. Sometimes you really want things but are not too distraught at not having them (certain Christmas presents), other times you are really distraught at not having something you don’t really want (smoking, addictions)

"Finding refuge"; if you find refuge in something you rely on it and/or care about it, no? — Janus

I was asking for a source on where it was said that you should “find refuge” in the eight fold path. I’m interested in the exact wording. I thought I had read the exact opposite of that and wayfarer pointed it out:

Buddha says that Buddhism itself is like a raft, used for 'crossing over' the river of suffering, but to be let go of once it's served its purpose. 'Dhammas should be abandoned, to say nothing of adhammas'. That is specifically about not becoming attached to Buddhism. — Wayfarer

To rely on something or to care about it is to be attached as I see it. — Janus

I think it’s a bit more nuanced than that. I rely on my keyboard but I wouldn’t be distraught if I lost it. I care about my grades but doing badly on a test doesn’t affect me nearly as much as it used to.

attempt to shock people with an extreme example towards their own (possible) revulsion with the idea of this sweet spot and the pragmatic error of attachment to outcomes being wrong but desire is ok, etc. — Coben

You mean: Revulsion with the idea that the sweet spot should be sought after in every circumstance. That it exists was all I was trying to establish, not that it should be sought out. Though I think it should.

there is something anti-human (or you could say anti-limbic system in Buddhism). There is a judgment by some parts of the brain that the limbic system is a problem, period. That there are problems with being a social mammal, internally. In the context of what is often presented as a non-judgmental, pragmatic system, — Coben

I’m skeptical when people say “anti human”. Is it not a part of the brain that is judging this other apart as a problem? Whether or not you judge it as a problem or not then still seems pretty “human” to me. In other words, it's only anti-human because you decided it was, it could be easily argued to be natural to want to eliminate suffering.

Others may be mystified by what is actually fairly complicated and not realize that what they might think of as resistance to Buddhism (and 'resistance' in a pejorative sense for them) is actually the fact that they do not share the same values as the Buddhist teachers and masters, who are willing to cut out a portion of themselves to reduce and even eliminate their pain. — Coben

Fair. Again, I wasn’t saying that this sweet spot should be sought out, only that it exists. Though I think it should be sought out, but I can see the arguments against that (not that I agree with them)

According to Buddhist thinking it is fine to be attached ("find refuge") in the Sangha (the community of the faithful), the Four Noble Truths and the Dharma ("Way") because they are believed to lead away from attachment to transient, earthly things and lead towards the changeless. — Janus

Really? When was this said. I don’t read much about Buddhism in particular but more about Zen and other offshoots. I doubt the words used were “attached” though.

OK, your kid's getting treatment for childhood leukemia. You want your kid to live.
Where's the sweet spot? — Coben

At not caring if your kid dies. Similar to some stoics. Then again, Buddhism is not about finding the sweet spot in everything, it is the observation that such a sweet spot exists. You are not instructed to go get it in the same way you are instructed to becomes a good Christian. Buddhists do not spread their religion actively for example. If you want to be attached go right ahead, just know what it will hurt and will have no practical advantages (at least none that I can think of)

If you are talking about addictions I would agree, but do you think that is what is meant with attachments here? Maybe, I'd need to think about it some more. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't have any major addictions but sometimes I notice that I feel the need to get something I don't even really want. If you've been on a losing streak in a videogame you'd know what I mean. You just keep playing in a rage, you're not even having fun, and you're hardly trying to win, but for some reason you feel you need to.

I'd say this is more a question of a lack of confidence. — ChatteringMonkey

It's also a common trait of mediocre athletes to be OVERconfident, not lacking confidence.

It's sort of a psychological downward spiral that compounds the mistakes that other non-top players get stuck in. How do you see the relation to attachments here? — ChatteringMonkey

Attachments are "How big of an issue is it if I don't get X?" I find this has surprisingly little to do with how much you want to get X. And sometimes not having X is a huge issue even though you don't even really want X.

There is supposedly a sort of mental "Sweet spot" where you want things but at the same time are not distraught at failing to get them. — khaled

at different degrees of what is essential one psychological process. It seems a matter of degree rather than discrete things — ChatteringMonkey

That is exactly what I'm saying does not seem like the case for me. They seem qualitatively different.

Maybe they can shrug it off more easily, I could buy that. — ChatteringMonkey

If desiring to win and failing to do so is disappointing, then those who desire to win the most should be devastated the most. We can agree that top athletes probably do desire to win the most. However they are not devastated the most (ideally, they are not affected by a bad performance at all). Suggesting that maybe there is something extra that is the actual cause of disappointment, something other than desire to win.

If I don't get what I want, I'm disappointed. If I don't get what I'm attached to, I'm very disappointed… — ChatteringMonkey

I can think of many instances when I didn't get what I wanted but wasn't disappointed. You could probably do so too.

Also I find there is a world of difference between getting the thing I'm attached to vs the thing I want. When I get something I want I'm happy, when I get something I am attached to I don't feel anything. And sometimes I'm attached to things I don't even want (bad habits).

Purpose meaning here to desire or want certain things to happen, which is another way of saying that living things have (emotion) attachments to certain things or outcomes — ChatteringMonkey

I don't think those two things are the same at all. Attachment is different from desire.

You focus on playing every game as good as you can, and try to care only insofar you played well or not. — ChatteringMonkey

This would mean that you would be put down by a bad performance. But athletes are pushed to to not care even about that. Take volleyball for example, it often happens that a player single handedly loses a game or a set for his team because of the nature of the game making it very clear who messed up (fast paced, highly structured and a single mistake by a player puts down the whole team). But top players shrug off mistakes without losing performance, worse players are put down by bad performances leading to even worse performances. Does that mean that top players have a weaker desire to win? I think they want it just as badly, but they're not attached.

I think that attachment is linked to desire — Jack Cummins

It is. But the key distinction is that they are qualitatively different. Not quantitatively. You can want something really really badly and still not be attatched to it. How attatched you are to something is answered by asking yourself "How big of a problem would it be if I didn't have this/this didn't happen?" The answer to that is usually different from what we desire. There is supposedly a sort of mental "Sweet spot" where you want things but at the same time are not distraught at failing to get them. However usually, attachment follows desire. You start by wanting something, then that want turns into a need. That thing becomes a necessity.

However, I would argue that it is supremely difficult, for better or worse, to live without attachments and desires. — Jack Cummins

Probably.

If we simply stayed in bed most of the time rather than pursue grander desires, it would still involve an attachment to the comfort of being in bed. — Jack Cummins

I don't think so. Not necessarily at least.

Well what is the purpose of attachment? You agree that it is harmful, but you haven't given any use for it.

Also while in traditional Buddhism attachment is seen as something to overcome, in its offshoots (Zen, etc) it is not. You have no "obligation" to overcome attachment in those systems in the same way that you have to be good in christianity. The point of them is to see the uselessness of attachments. Whether or not you sever them later is up to you (though I don't see why you wouldn't)

You guys seem to be equating attachment with desire. They are very different things. As you say, if the Buddha hadn't desired anything, he wouldn't have got out of bed to eat. But he did. So that suggests that they're not the same thing.

Human morality concerns biological and cultural adaptations to allow humans to live together in social groups and allow social groups to co-exist. — Kenosha Kid

But then 90% of moral theories cease to be moral theories, because they have never been tested to prove that they would allow us to co-exist better or at all. I don’t think it’s a fair definition.

I think you’re using morality in the normative sense while I’m using it in the descriptive sense (check the SEP article on the definition of morality)

Individualism is an antisocial moral philosophy — Kenosha Kid

Weird. How do you consider it a moral philosophy? It would not allow social groups to co-exist very well. Unless you’re suggesting it would.

I cannot see what individualism is doing that antinatalism is not.

Merry Christmas!!!! — Kenosha Kid

Merry Christmas to you too! And everyone here.

We can call it an ethic insofar as you can personally subscribe to it, but it has zilch to do with human morality — Kenosha Kid

What’s “human morality” if not codes of conduct you personally subscribe to? All you’ve said here is that it is Impossible to have an antinatalist culture. Ok so what?

Characteristics are always definitional though: that's why they're called characteristics. — Kenosha Kid

The question is why do you make it a characteristic of a moral theory to ensure the survival of the society in which it is used? Why does it need to be possible for a moral theory to be accepted on a societal level for it to be called a moral theory? Because that would disqualify many moral theories.

So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac

If you were to also propose some moral duty to undo 10mm nuts, then yes that would be a moral claim. Otherwise it is instructions.

Secondly, you still have not resolved the issue of what makes claims 'moral'. As the SEP quote clarifies not all values basing a moral theory are properly countable as 'moral'. It's insufficient to simple say that other moral frameworks have slightly different values and therefore any value equally counts as moral. A multiplicity is not the same as arbitrary. — Isaac

In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups. — SEP - The Definition of Morality

Ah so that's where the misunderstanding is. I've been using "moral" in the descriptive sense.

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior — SEP - The Definition of Morality

Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac

My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac

Sure....

If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you.
— khaled

No. I'm saying the exact opposite. We simply do not have arbitrary desires. — Isaac

We keep getting confused here that's my bad. I should have used "No justification". There are clearly reasons (natrualistic explanations) for why we favor this or that moral premise but there are no justifications to favor any. To say those are the same things would be a naturalistic fallacy.

a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac

If they are about how you should act.

My claim is that it is community co-operation. Efforts to support it are what unite certain normative claims we call 'moral', and the normative force is the maintenance of such co-operation - 'if you want {community co-operation}, then you should [moral rule]'. — Isaac

So I guess "ethical egoism" is not about morals then? And neither was whatever Kant was doing. I think your claim is ridiculous because many (if not most) things we call "moral theories" do not have the community co-operation as an end goal, and often have cases where they favor other values (freedom, sanctity of life, whatever) over the community.

If you want to define "moral" such that Kant was never talking about ethics feel free to do so but don't expect anyone to use that definition.

Your claim seems to be that there is no 'if you want...' component at all — Isaac

No, my claim is that the "if you want..." component is arbitrary. "If you want community cooperation" works. So does "If you want to respect the freedom of the individual". etc.

So you need to fill in the blank 'if we want to...we ought to avoid risking harm to others without consent'. What is in the blank? — Isaac

Silly quesiton. Here let me ask you another silly question: "If we want to..... we ought to ensure community cooperation". What is in the blank?

See how this is silly? You have to start somewhere. I could just keep taking whatever answer you give there (X) and ask "If you want to.... we ought to X" what is in the blank? Ad infinium. This is why I keep saying the starting point is arbitrary.

Or...you're arguing that avoiding the risk of harm to others without consent is the contingent part - 'if you want to {avoid risking harm to others without consent}, then you ought to [not have children]' — Isaac

This.

But here you're faced with the naturalistic argument. We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent? — Isaac

How is this a natrualistic argument? I didn't say "We should not want to harm others without their consent because it is natural".

If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you. But then there would be no error with antinatalism, just premises you disagree with.

Likewise deeming something to be a moral consideration or not on the basis of its ubiquity is not about popularity: that ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic. — Kenosha Kid

So unpopular moral theories are no longer moral theories? I'm confused here. What "evolved characterisitc" is antinatalism missing that other moral theories have?

Sure the ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic, but it is your choice to make that characteristic definitional or circumstantial.

What does then make a thing 'moral'? Our agreement that it fits in some loose category. What causes us to agree on such a loose category? Our shared experiences. Why do we assign normative force to the behaviours in that category? Because we have some drive to do so. — Isaac

Agreed. Though I'd add that the "shared" experiences are not shared by everybody (maybe not even shared by any majority)

This leaves you in the bizarre position of claiming the moral rules have no purpose at all, that we're inclined to add such normative force to them for no reason. — Isaac

It leaves me in the position where moral rules are followed for their own sake. As I have said to you on a bunch of different occasions. Frankly, I find your whole "Let's follow this moral rule purely because it makes better societies" repulsive.

the fact that we evolved moral sentiments to enable a more harmonious community that moral sentiments would be aimed at the maintenance of such a community. That's just how evolution works. — Isaac

I would say that we do not evolve moral sentiments to enable a harmonious community. As in, no one goes out of their way to decide how people should act purely to make for a better community. People propose and use all sorts of crazy moral sentiments. The ones that survive are necessarily the ones that encourage said survival.

However you give these rules undue importance. Simply because they survived does not mean they ought to be adopted. A lot of very questionable ethics have survived for a long time, what makes you think procreation would be different?

"x lacks features a, b and c (which moral impulses share)" — Isaac

What are these features?

And more importantly, why do you make these features definitional instead of circumstantial? That's really the crux of the matter.

If we did not have a drive to co-operate, for example, there'd be no material cause for us to "decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong". — Isaac

Correct. We also have a drive to take what we want. So it is not the mere fact THAT we have a drive to do X that makes X moral. Sure, we would need some sort of drive to do something to ever consider it moral or immoral, but simply having such a drive doesn't make the thing moral.

It must be something to do with living co-operatively because if that weren't an issue we'd have no morality at all. As such, any purported 'moral' objective which cannot claim to be working toward such an end is not moral, by definition. — Isaac

All he says is that were we a solitary species, the question of whether or not to steal would not arise. In that I am agreed. However, this does not indicate at all how a communal species (like us) should act.

Given that you seem to agree, what purpose to you suppose a drive to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent might serve? — Isaac

Ensuring a more harmonious community with less conflict. What now? Because it does NOT follow from that that the goal of morality is to establish such a community. Just as seeing an apple fall to the ground does not give apples any sort of teleological purpose of falling to the ground. To think that since moral impulse X arose naturally due to [insert explanation here] therefore we must all believe in moral impulse X is textbook naturalistic fallcy.

I could just as easily ask "What purpose do you suppose a drive to take what we want from others serves?" The answer could be something along the lines of "To ensure the survival of the individual" or "To establish dominance" or whatever. Does that make theft moral? It clearly does not.

At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses.
— khaled

Then how do you suppose it was done? Randomly? And the massive levels of correlation between disparate cultures are what...just coincidence? — Isaac

Definitely not randomly. But that is different from having a justfication. All moral premises are by definition unjustified. Some work better than others at preserving the society. The societies that adopted the ones that work better have survived longer.

However, you cannot conclude from that that: "Therefore the goal of morality is to ensure the survival of the community". It simply doesn't follow.

If you just stick to avoiding harm, you end up with contradictions (such as surgery) — Isaac

Not necessarily. I've presented my system and you summed it up well. Whatever Benkei is attacking is not the system I'm using. If you want to go back to trying to show contradicitons please do so directly, as I see none.

such a maxim cannot really count as 'moral' because it is not focussed on living together better, the need for which is the only reason we have morals in the first place. — Isaac

Morality is not concerned with living together better, but with what is right to do. We often happen to decide that the right thing to do is also the thing that leads to us living together better. This is not necessary nor is it always the case.

I don't think we can describe any drive, including the drive to procreate, as either moral or immoral. How we act, yes. Perhaps even how we think. But one cannot be responsible for one's biology or one's upbringing. — Kenosha Kid

I was oversimplifying. I meant to say that we decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong. But that that statement cannot be concluded from the mere fact that we have a drive to take what we want or from the fact that we have a drive to cooperate. Listing which drives we have doesn't help here.

On the contrary, I think it is the crux of morality. Were we a solitary species, the question would not arise. Likewise were we of a hive mind. It is the competition between impulses that gives us ambiguity, without which there's nothing to talk about at all. — Kenosha Kid

But, again, the mere fact that there ARE different impulses is useless. Which should be favored when? That's an interesting question. But restating that we have different impluses over and over again (like Isaac is doing) is not adding anything to the conversation.

if there's no naturalistic reason to accept that premise then, in the absence of any other moral authority, the resultant moral rule is arbitrary. — Kenosha Kid

First off, there is no such thing as "no natrualistic reason". Unless you consider accepting the antinatalist premises a supernatural act somehow. There is clearly a reason that we accept this or that premise. Stating this fact (over and over) adds nothing to the conversation about which premise we should be accepting.

Secondly, you are implying that the moral rule ought to be accepted based on the existence of a naturalistic reason to accept its premises. Which is textbook naturalistic fallacy. And, as I said, there are naturalistic reasons to accept antinatalist premises (unless, again, you think that the Devil is playing with my mind or something).

There are biological drives and responses that act as the angels of our better nature, as well as selfish ones. — Kenosha Kid

At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses. That is what I am saying. But for some reason you and Isaac keep restating the point that we have different impluses. As if that helps in any way to determine which we should think are good and which bad (again, I'm simplifying)

If we cannot accept the premise on grounds of common experience, nor on grounds of biology, nor by extending existing in-group morality to out-groups — Kenosha Kid

The first would be an argument from popularity. The second would be a naturalistic fallacy. And the final would actually be something akin to what I'm trying to do.

Of course! And situations where it's fine to let someone die, and ones where it is morally compulsory to give to charity. But none of them are generalisable. — Kenosha Kid

Ah come on now. You can do better than that. None of them are generalisable? At all? We just decide arbitrarily on a case-by-case basis depending on how we're feeling? I doubt you really believe that.

For one, I think we can agree that it's fine to let someone die if saving them puts you in similar danger for example. There is some generalization there. I bet you could come up with SOME outline of the scenarios where procreation is unethical, and we can go from there if you want.

But I'd like to point out something important here. Nowhere in my talk with Benkei or Isaac have I pushed antinatalism, because I think that would be a waste of time (and not fun). What they were trying to do is find an inconsistency within the system itself. Failing to do that, they resorted to saying "Well we still have no reason to accept it" which I am perfectly fine with. I was only trying to show that the system is consistent, even if you don't agree with its starting premises. I am only now trying to actually make a compelling argument rather than just a self-consistent one at your request.

If all you and Isaac want to say is "There is no reason to accept the premises of antinatalism" then that's fine by me. However Isaac was trying to say "There is something wrong with antinatalism internally" which is just false. And I would again point out, that unless you're a moral objectivist, "there is no reason to accept the premises of X moral theory" applies to any X. This isn't an AN specific problem which is why I'm confused why it's highlighted so much.

Sort of disappointed with Banno’s reply. He didn’t address what it means for a child or a cat to “believe” that the mouse ran behind the tree. To insist that they do, despite not knowing any language, is to be proposing something like Steven Pinker’s mentalese, which is a bit cheating.

It's neither moral nor amoral — Outlander

You would probably agree that malicious genetic engineering (like making someone blind through genetic engineering) is wrong. If that’s the case what is your basis?

I find the idea that there are absolutely no moral considerations when it comes to having children laughable. Most people I’ve talked to on here (and I’m pretty sure you too) would agree that having kids when one cannot provide for them is wrong.

It's a means not an end to a means, one that can result in either outcome. — Outlander

Me pointing a loaded gun at someone and pulling the trigger doesn’t necessarily harm them. My gun could jam after all. But I’m pretty sure we can agree it’s wrong. Imagine if I said “Shooting people is a means not an end to a means, one that can result in many outcomes”

Who knows, maybe if I shoot just right I’ll accidentally remove a tumor or something. So I guess shooting people is fine?

This is obviously ridiculous. Humans are capable of predicting the future and making decisions based on that. We do not need certainties to say that something is wrong (shooting for example, doesn’t harm for certain and yet is wrong). So let’s apply the same standards to procreation. Let's not require perfect knowledge in this one case, and actually look at the harms done by procreating vs not procreating.

We don't have a natural drive not to steal. We have a natural drive not to do to others that which we would not have done to us (empathy and altruism) — Kenosha Kid

We also have a natural drive to take what we want. Yet we pronounced one drive good and one drive bad. All I’m trying to get at is that the mere fact that we have different, often contradictory drives is not in any way useful when talking about morals.

The fact that it rests on a unjustifiable claim does. One can dismiss it with as little justification. — Kenosha Kid

Agreed. One can dismiss the conclusion if one doesn’t accept the premises. That’s why I don’t peddle antinatalism, because usually people have different starting premises from mine.

But that’s not what Isaac and Benkei are trying to do. They are trying to find a contradiction even after accepting the premises, and failing.

I’d like to note though that this isn’t an AN specific thing. Any moral theory can be dismissed on the basis of unjustified claims. Unless you’re a moral objectivist, you’re going to have to admit that your starting point is unjustified.

The best you've got is a self-consistent argument. — Kenosha Kid

You can’t get better than that in ethics. “Compelling” is subjective.

For that, you need a compelling argument, not just a self-consistent one. — Kenosha Kid

I could try, though it is not usually my goal to peddle the belief. I’ll try some “intuition pumps”. Here goes:

First off, do you think there are situations where having children is wrong? If not, do you think malicious genetic engineering is wrong (genetically engineering an otherwise able child to be blind for example).

What is your justification for why that is wrong? (the situations or the genetic engineering. If you think the genetic engineering is fine there isn’t much I can do)

And who will help to ensure and/or correct it's current state toward this? — Outlander

If we all decide not to have kids tomorrow, no one will have to. You’re not addressing the actual question of whether or not procreation is moral

See above. People will continue to be born, either with the mission or at least inclination that they should or perhaps could better their fellow man and thus future selves in the process, or not. Regardless, births will continue. — Outlander

"People will be born therefore procreation is ethical" is a bad argument. The former says nothing about the latter. It's like saying "theft will occur therefore it is ethical".

but you can always tack on a 'Why?' — Kenosha Kid

That's not the kind of why I'm tacking on. I'm not asking for exactly why we ended up with a desire not to harm others or whatever, that is irrelevant to the argument. To think it was relevant is a naturalistic fallcy.

I'm asking "Okay, so due to [insert neurological, biological, evolutionary process here (no omniscience required)] we ended up with a desire to steal, is it moral to steal?" The fact that we have an inclination to steal does not make it moral as I'm sure you'd agree. Similarly, the fact that we have an inclination to reproduce, and the fact that most of us think that it is morally fine, does not show that it is.

To show that we have to agree on starting premises and reason from them. Now if, like Isaac, one of your starting premises is "Anything that leads to extinction is bad because preserving the human race is a worthy goal in and of itself" then of course having kids is fine and that's that. We go our merry ways. I don't share that premise so that's as far as the talk will get (unless you can derive it from a premise I DO share). However this method fails to show what was intended to be shown, that there is some actual error within AN.

That we do not tolerate certain behaviours under certain circumstances (e.g. allowing a person to die who can easily be saved) but are fine with others under other circumstances (not giving to charity at noon tomorrow) is sufficient to demonstrate that the the moral claim that all suffering is equivalent and any action or inaction that might yield or fail to quell it is as bad as terminal negligence is simply not a reflection of human morality — Kenosha Kid

In ethics you argue as to what should or should not be done. The fact that our current moral paradigm (supposedly) does not lead to antinatalism doesn't make antinatalism bunk. That would be like saying that the fact slavery existed for the longest time makes it right. This is no more than an argument from popularity.


The title of the post implies that there are things wrong with antinatalism. As in, even starting from the same premises that lead to AN you will not reach AN. Every time I talk to Isaac (or anyone really) about AN it goes like this:

1- They try to show an inconsistency
2- They fail at showing the inconsistency
3- They either add another premise to overwrite the conclusion (see above) OR just conclude "Your premises are unusual" which is very different from "Your reasonsing is wrong" (what they originally try to show)
4- Wait 5 posts
5- Repeat from 1 again for some reason.

I'm hoping if this is going to go on that that doesn't happen because it's just tiring for all parties envolved.

Why don't we two, if you're up to it, analyze the notion of Satori (sudden enlightenment) against the backdrop of koans (paradoxes) and epiphanies (Eureka moments)? — TheMadFool

I don't know why but I really like speculating about this specifically so I'm going to chime in.

To start, our experience is always, and immediately filtered automatically by our brains. You can easily test this by trying to read what I am writing as individual letters without actually reading the words, or harder yet by trying to listen to what someone is saying without automatically understanding it.

All of these "models" we employ arise out of thin air spontaneously. They are sort of like Jordan Peterson's "Order" or the pragmatists' notions of how we think. We automatically filter experience so as to allow us to act. These filters or models are by nature fallible and are always intended for a particular purpose. If you are walking in a forest and you see a lion your brain will instantly make the distinction "Threat" and "Not threat" and will put the lion in the former. You can't just not see the Lion as a seperate thing from the background and you can't not see it as a threat (nor should you!)

We usually get attatched to these models. It is difficult for us to actively seek out alternative views or to seriously consider them because no one wants to be in the "pre-model" chaotic state. As far as I understand it Enlightenment or Satori is being able to see these models as they are, and not to grow attatched to them. It is to develop the ability to sit in this "pre-model" state (which is what I believe "Dao" is) and to understand that whatever model you employ to be able to act is not some objective infallible thing, and so not to grow attatched to it. Koans are trying to accomplish this by breaking the models. You come up with a hundered different "models" to explain the Koan which in turn shows you how inconsequential these models are, so you don't get attatched to them.

For perspecitve, the other way to deal with the chaotic "pre-model" state is to come up with the "perfect model". Some sort of "infallible knowledge" similar to what Descartes was trying to go for. These two ways are not contradictory. It's just that the more you fear uncertainty, the more angst you have, the more motivated you are to want the "pefect model" whereas if you are fine with uncertainty you will likely opt for a less rigorous model, as you won't need much more than that.

I've said this on another thread before, but it seems there is a big cultural rift between the East and West in this regard. In the East the primary way to deal with suffering is to learn to live with pain and uncertainty, in the West, the primary way is to try to get rid of them (heaven).

Don't know about you but I have a hard time conceiving of 4569083745096837450968346098734506938450986735096830976324560987245069274648734650837464893715039487569837456928374659283745602378465928374569823746598317456289374659837456928374659283745692837456983745620938476. I could learn to recite this from long term memory, but not think of it as a whole the same way I think of two.

I think you need to more sharply define what you mean by "every number can be thought of"

It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term. — Isaac

I think the standards are arbitrary. Moral objectivists think they're not. Also there is no job called "ethicist" for this reason.

What I'm saying is the judgement of which is better must also have a naturalistic explanation, or be non-physical in origin. If the former, then there is no 'better' in objective terms, nothing to debate. — Isaac

There is never "better" in objective terms. Objective terms are just what is. Since when does that mean there is nothing to debate? I really don't understand what you're trying to get at here. Why are you on this site? After all, all of what we are doing here has a natrualistic explanation, including every thought and typed word. If this means that there is nothing to debate then what are you doing here?

It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about". That there is a natrualistic explanation does not mean there is nothing to talk about. There is nothing about the former statement that implies the latter. And it is clear there ARE things to talk about or you would have stopped talking.

The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim. — Isaac

Agreed. Now, we check the premises and check the reasoning. If we agree with the premises and reasoning then the conclusion must be true. You don't just say "Well actually there is a natrualistic explanation for what we are doing here therefore there is nothing to talk about". That makes no sense.

Sounds like a question for a psychology forum.

a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge — Isaac

Arbitrary standards, again.

b) if there's not a naturalistic explanation (predictive model) to be had regarding which we will choose, then what does the choosing? If, on the other hand, the choosing is done by some natural mechanism, then there exists a naturalistic account of the choice. — Isaac

I never denied that there is a naturalistic explanation behind our choices. I denied that that gives any choice legitimacy. Say you have a 5 year old that says "two times two is six". There is a natrualistic explanation behind that utterance, that we can get by going into the neurology. However that does not say anything about 2x2 or 6 and certainly doesn't make them equal.

In the same way, figuring out why you favor this or that moral premise while I favor a different one does not say anything about the premises themselves, or which is better (if there is such a thing), or which is consistent. That is the job of ethics. That is what we are debating.

When I say "we use arbitrary standards to judge" I am not denying that there is not a natrualistic explanation for why I picked this premise and you picked that. There is nothing in the former statement that implies the latter, they're speaking at different levels. But you seem to me to have a habit of thinking things imply things they don't imply (usually a neurological theory), fom talking to you on multiple occasions now.

Just that words are not defined by individuals alone, nor by some rational process. They are defined in the use they are put to in a community. — Isaac

Agreed. And clearly we have had hundreds of uses of the word "moral" in context of antinatalism. So I'm not sure where your objection that the conclusion is "not moral" but is "just a plan" comes from. It could only come from arbitrarily deciding that one use of the word is "illegitimate" even though we have had threads going into hundreds of posts using it in the context of antinatalism.

We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning. — Isaac

And as we said, the word has some room for error. And I think "having children is immoral" falls squarely within legitimate bounds of its use. You also think this, or you wouldn't have understood what was being said. It would have sounded like "having children is 134". But it doesn't.

We have those imperetives. That's what we just established. The's not some 'other' you that gets to decide what the 'natural' you wants. — Isaac

Agreed. I wasn't talking about whether or not we have this or that inclination. I was arguing which should count as "moral".

Some of which are 'moral' according to the definition of the word. — Isaac

But which becomes the problem. We have an incentive not to harm others. We also have an incentive not to want our species extinct. What do we do when those clash? The answer to THAT is not natrualistic. You can explain the instincts and evolution behind both incentives but that doesn't tell you which one we should favor in which circumstance. That's the job of ethics.

the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping. — Isaac

What do you mean here? Just sounds like word salad to me.

Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. — Isaac

Arbitrary in the sense that there is no reason you should favor it over another one.

If that explanation is natural, then there exists a naturalistic basis for that shared understanding. — Isaac

Agreed. There is a naturalistic explanation for why we have the starting premises we do. However that does not invalidate using alternative premises.

OK. The way I would put it is that we are capable of being mistaken about what we perceive. — Andrew M

I would say we are capable of being mistaken about anything.

Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means? — Isaac

By sharing the same arbitrary starting point.

On what grounds do we decide? — Isaac

Arbitrary ones. I think.

To be clear, my position is that morality is not imposed from some divine (or otherwise non-physical) external source — Isaac

Agreed.

the idea of 'moral' behaviour is just that behaviour we find ourselves generally inclined toward with a certain category of effect (either internal or external). The inclination (ceteris paribus) is already there. — Isaac

But not everything we are inclined toward doing is moral. That's the naturalistic fallacy. We are inclined to steal. We are also inclined to help the poor. One is moral one is not. Deciding which is ethics.

There's a huge difference between seeing someone right in front of you who will die if you don't help them, and deciding whether or not to give to charity. I find it remarkable that you apparently can't see that difference. — Janus

Enlighten me. In both cases: someone will probably die if I don't help (depending on the charity). The only difference I see is that in one that death is near, and in the other I can't see it.

The key point to note here is that there is a natural standard in play. That is, we are comparing one human-observed scenario to another. — Andrew M

a creature-specific standard. — Andrew M

Which is to say that "the way things are" is "the way they seem to us" (creature specific standard). I am not saying that a stick that looks bent in water is actually bent, but that whether or not the stick is "actually bent" is found out by employing a creature specific standard. That there is no "direct access" if that makes sense, we see things through fallible senses and fallible reasoning. I find people forget this often.

So, given we both agree that they have not arrived in our heads by divine force, then their origin is natural, hence it is not a naturalistic fallacy. — Isaac

A naturalistic fallacy is when you say "We should do this because it's natrual". For example: "People naturally want to steal therefore they should". That seems to me what you're doing.

There is no 'should'. — Isaac

Bit late for that.

The relevant task is only to try to describe and predict that process. — Isaac

That's psychology and sociology. Not ethics. Ethics is precisely concerned with what you should and should not do.

Tell me what you have in mind. Cite these sociological, biological, cultural "evidences" and tell me exactly what you mean to prove by them. Then maybe we'll get on the same wavelength.