The equivalent for the antinatalist would be something like "Moral acts are to minimise suffering". — Isaac

Sure let's go for that one. As if that takes away from any of the arbitrariness. The natural next question then becomes "Why pick that premise instead of 'moral acts are fo the benefit of the community'?" which would bring it all back again.

I can raise evolutionary, cultural, linguistic, psychological and sociological reasons why moral acts might be those which benefit the community. — Isaac

This sounds to me like a natrualistic fallacy at best and a type error at worst. If by this statement you mean that we should follow this or that moral intuition because they are culturally and biologically evolved that would be a natrualistic fallacy. And last I checked we have an intuition both not to harm people AND to help the community thrive. Are you asking me to provide evolutionary, cultural, linguistic, psychological and sociological reasons why we try not to harm others in general?

If by it you mean that an explanation of the factors causing us to have this or that moral premise suffices as a moral premise then that's a type error. Why we came to have this or that moral premise, and the moral premise itself, are very different things.

So I'm not exactly sure what evolutionary, cultural, lingustic, psychological and sociological reasons qualify as "evidence" for exactly? What are you trying to prove by citing these?

Yeah, I think that's right. So what kind of evidence would one bring to bear if one were to make an argument about the parameters? Say if we were talking about 'dog', you might argue some new creature was a type of dog by pointing to similarities with other dogs (physiology, genetics etc). You might argue that my toaster isn't a 'dog' by the opposite method. — Isaac

Whatever the evidence is, it is not hard and fast. The line gets blurry at foxes and wolves. But you seem to me to be asking for hard and fast.

What makes "Moral acts are for the benefit of the community" so incredibly different than the moral rule we outlined that the former works as a definition and the latter becomes "arbitrary rules followed for no reason"? They seem to be at similar levels of arbitrariness for me.

But in a world where most people are not color-blind, the color-blind person has to adapt to the color-normal use (say, learning how to navigate traffic lights by noting the light intensity at a bulb position). With regard to this very specific distinction (and the color-normal standard), they would not be seeing things as they are. — Andrew M

Just seems to define "the way things are" as "the way things seem to most of us" @Andrew M

The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is? — Echarmion

I would say that's even less interesting. Who cares?

'Moral' is a word in our shared language. — Isaac

Well considering how many debates we have about it, maybe its meaning isn't as "shared" as, say, "dog". It has some flexibility.

It can't be a term which you apply to describe absolutely anything — Isaac

Agreed, which is why I don't apply it to absolutely anything.

More generally, the meaning and function of truth is a long-standing question in philosophy, one of the less tractable ones, but I am not sure whether your query has anything to do with that. — SophistiCat

The question is more about: What is the function of Truth? We don't speak in truths, we speak in what-we-think-are-Truths. So unless you argue that they are the same thing, or that there is some way to go from what-we-think-are-Truths to Truths, then why the need to defend the notion if it never enters the conversation? Don't know if that helped.

It's not that the 'deeper' rules are arbitrary, it's that they're definitional. Obligations which count as 'moral' ones (as opposed to just any obligation) have to be defined, in order to be in that class. — Isaac

Obligations are obligations. Who cares which class they're in? What are "non-moral obligations"?

that one could reasonably define it as 'an arbitrary set of rules one sticks to for no reason at all' — Isaac

As I've said, it doesn't need to be arbitrary. But you have to start from some arbitrary point. For example:

For me, I'd say 'moral' obligations we those obligations which related to creating a more harmonious community (we live together with less conflict and suffering if we follow them). — Isaac

"Creating a more harmonious community is moral". Is just as arbitrary as the rules we set out. Only one level deeper. I don't see any need for that "extra level". For me it's: "Acting as follows

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome — Isaac

is moral". Arbitrary? Yes, but not any more than alternatives.

Finally. This time it only took you sixteen pages to admit the same point we get to every time...

"I have some weird axioms, look what weird consequences arise from following them"

Summarises all these threads in on sentence. — Isaac

Problem is all you can say about these axioms is that they’re weird. That’s not really important, it’s like saying you don’t like vanilla ice cream. But this thread is an attempt to say they’re wrong. I’ll reply to the rest later I don’t have time right now but just a few thoughts:

I'd say 'moral' obligations we those obligations which related to creating a more harmonious community (we live together with less conflict and suffering if we follow them). That seems to encompass what most people are trying to get at - even Kant. — Isaac

Does allowing serial killers to kill innocents by refusing to lie to them create a more harmonious community?

On another occasion, I remember hearing that Kant was asked: If there were 2 people male and female, left alive on earth but one of them was a criminal, should she be executed or should the couple try to rebuild the human race and he answered: Executed for her crimes. I don’t know if this actually happened, I only heard it from a friend. But that was Kant’s philosophy. It doesn’t matter what the impact is on the community, it only matters whether or not the act is right

If I’m reading you right the quest for the Big T is unnecessary or irrelevant. — Brett

Yes

For the them the Big T is staring them in the face every day. — Brett

How, then, are mistakes possible?

Covid is up next. Think we can make it there ...? — Marchesk

If we keep talking about things as they are, definitely. Very quickly too.

It was the refusing to apply it bit I was confused about — Isaac

In my comment I told you how I apply it to get the conclusion “You shouldn’t have kids”. What do you think of that application? I think yours was hand wavy. Didn’t specify exactly what A B or C were for one.

None of that sounds anything like an arbitrary set of rules which are simply followed for their own sake. — Isaac

I didn’t say that. I said Kant didn’t care about consequences. If you had the option to lie to save some innocent’s life from a killer, he would say don’t lie. Period.

Same for me. I don’t care about the consequences. I set my rules and I follow them. If your question is where do these rules come from? Why do you care? That shouldn’t affect what we’re talking about.

I could “embed” them in some sort of “respect of human freedom” or something like that. As in the reason you don’t do things to people without consent (under the conditions we highlighted) is because it “violates the principle of human freedom” or “treats people as ends in themselves”. There are a gajillion things I can embed these rules in. I don’t feel the need to do that though. These rules just seem right to me, that’s why I follow them. I don’t see how “embedding” them in deeper, yet still arbitrary rules helps. Though everybody seems to like that for some reason.

You'll have to point me back to where you think I did this. — Isaac

Here:

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome — Isaac

A would be the good things in life, B would be the bad things in life, and C would be the child. You are not under any responsibility to provide A. So don't.

Not quite sure how to take this. Are you implying that moral behaviour has no objective. It's just series of arbitrary rules we follow just because...? — Isaac

The objective of moral behavior is moral behavior. I don't know how many ways I have to restate this. And this isn't some fringe belief either, Kant thought that way. To him, the consequences don't matter, only the behavior does. Same here. The rules are set out because we deem them as good.

Another antinatalism thread and another case of the same arguments being re-hashed or going nowhere :roll: — Albero

Really hoping someone will say something interesting one of these days.

How does that which is absolutely true become something the sureness of which comes into such question that we must affirm it absolutely? — tim wood

Assume there is the Absolutely True Statement A, but we do not know what that statement is. How do we go about finding A? At what point do we know (for sure) that we have found A?

I say we are never sure if we've found A, so who cares about A. We don't seem to need it for anything.

Idk if that answers your question because I'm not sure what your question is.

But it seems we need some absolute standard so that we can conclude that the (small t) true statement is at least closer to it as the false one. — Echarmion

Don't know why the standard has to be "Absolute". We just need A standard. Of some sort. An aboslute standard would be required to say that "The earth is flat" is False with a capital F. Which is just another Truth with a capital T.

In the case of flat earth, that standard is common sense, trust in our sources, and trusting our eyes. No need to elevate our visual reports or the photos to the status of "undoubtalbe" see? For the purposes of any discussion ever we only deal with agreements. Big T doesn't enter the conversation, so I don't care if it exists or not.

In my own life, and from discussion in this thread, I would say that we cannot find an absolute truth but the need to find frameworks and personal, authentic truths is an important aspect of life and essential to philosophy. — Jack Cummins

:up:

Why bother with “people that try to go for it”? — Mww

Just curious why there are so many of them. Their number makes me think they might be on to something. Anything.

but to justify something we can be absolutely sure of, and that is the unconditioned, a deductive inference that can’t be reduced further without self-contradiction, from within the same system. — Mww

Idk what this means though

Maybe it wouldn't sound as ridiculous if you bother to read it. Good night.

We were not talking about V8 Engines in German though. I agree the thread is in English outside of that one line. I don't see a reason or justification to elevate this to undoubatle knowledge though. That's my problem.

Anwyays we beat Brexit you're welcome.

It's true — Banno

It isn't.

êtes-vous sûr de cela? — khaled

you believe it is evident in your continuing replies to my English sentences. — Banno

First off, me replying in English doesn't show anything about the thread language. Besides that, I believe it is in English apart from that one line alright. I'm saying there is room for error. Or more precisely that claiming there is no room for error is only disadvantageous, and doesn't bring about any benefits. Who cares about whether or not the thread is actually English or not, all we ever deal in is beliefs.

When we call something “true” or “real” all we’re saying is that we agree on it.
— khaled
should be...
When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno

Like the bishop always staying on the same colour — Banno

Until someone breaks the rules.

seawater being salty — Banno

Unless you have rona and can't taste.

elephants being mammals. — Banno

True by definition. Or until we change what "mammal" means.

Lots and lots of things are true; some of those are even certain. — Banno

I would say lots and lots of things are highly agreed upon. Don't see the need to make the jump to "undoubtable". Why do you want to? What is the benefit of claiming there are things we cannot be wrong about? Sounds like a completely useless thing to try to defend.

Yep. Except for that bit, and a few other bits. — Banno

So the thread is not in English. It was in English until it wasn't. So your original statement is wrong. My point is that there is always room for error. Outside of things like "There can be no married bachelor" which are true by definition but also completely pointless to say. If it's not true by definition, you can be wrong about it. Heck even then you still have things like calculations mistakes which you can't be sure you're not making.

Well, you are right that this thread is in English.

So that's not right. — Banno

êtes-vous sûr de cela?

You jumped form "We might be mistaken..." to "We don't..."; from we might not to we never do.

We get it right sometimes, too. — Banno

No that's exactly what I mean. We never get it right. We only get it not-wrong until we get it wrong (or die first). "Getting it right" means there is no room for error. We don't reach no room for error I don't think.

You seemed to suggest that we don't see things as they are — Banno

What I want to say is that we can always be mistaken about what we see. That to me sounds exactly like "You don't see things as they are". If you mean something different by "You don't see things as they are" then what is it exactly?

Looks suitably relevant. — Banno

Not really a difficult achievement at this point :lol:

not trees and rocks and stuff. — Banno

I'd say Qualia is part of what happens when we look at rocks and stuff. But is not a description of what the brain is doing. It's a phenomena, not something to be seen.

We're conscious of seeing trees. That is qualia. — frank

unjustified, perhaps? — Banno

Yea.

But there's lots we know for sure — Banno

We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.. — Banno

I've still not seen a way to get that last bit "when it's true". I thought we just agreed you don't. It's easy to tell when a belief is false, but for it to be true would imply that it is impossible that we are mistaken. Can't see how you would prove that.

Whatever we're doing here should be another thread, not that I'm entirely sure where it's going.

Really? Not to me. — Banno

Well I don't know what "know stuff without our mind" even means (sounds like "see things without eyes") but the closest thing I can approximate it to is: You won't get to a point where you know anything for sure, without any unexplained beliefs. Sounds pretty reasonable.

The idea is that we only know stuff using our mind, so we cannot know stuff for real. — Banno

Sounds exactly like:

When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno

The point is we don't have any sort of "hotline to truth".

Well, if it is raining, while you go dancing in the puddles, do you choose to believe that it is raining? — Banno

Oh that's what you mean. Ok.

should be...
When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno

That's all I was saying. But that sort of makes stove's gem not such a bad argument does it? I can't tell if you think it's bad or if you just keep mentioning it here and there.

You get to decide what to believe. — Banno

So

When we call something “true” or “real” all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — khaled

Mostly — Banno

Wdym mostly?

no but that in itself is a belief. How did you confirm that one?

That question is the same as "what should you believe?" — Banno

How so? Unless you define "true" as "you should believe this".

great. It's pretty easy to see when they're false, but how do you confirm when they're true?

Also at this point I think it should be renamed to: "General thread"

sure but we never speak in truths. We speak in what we think are truths. Those are popularity contests.

Is "We" just you and I? Or a simple majority? Or can we use Hare-Clark? — Banno

Depends on the context.

Behaving morally is done for its own sake. I don't see what's weird about that. Idk what brought the whole desire thing into it.

I don't think we have any common ground on which to base an argument. — Isaac

You laid out the common ground. You summed it up very well. Then refused to actually apply it. If if "misapplying" the framework we set out, where exactly am I doing so?

Really? So if we all agree on something, that makes it true? Or real? — Banno

No, the other way around. When we call something “true” or “real” all we’re saying is that we agree on it. Nothing more. We’re not accessing some “hotline to truth”. As we could always be mistaken.

But we are still capable of seeing things as they are, no? — Andrew M

Best you can hope for is seeing things as people agree they are. I think it makes sense to call this “the way things are” when virtually everyone agrees on them (2+2=4) but even then it doesn’t exceed the point of being an agreement. I don’t think this is controversial.

What's the point of behaving morally, for you? — Isaac

Behaving morally.

So why would you want to reduce suffering...above all else...seemingly to the complete exclusion of all other considerations? — Isaac

Not all other considerations. But all considerations outside of the considerations we outlined. The ones you summed up really well:

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome — Isaac

Having kids is like buying the suit with your money when I don't have a responsibility to keep you suited. Just with way higher stakes. There is no factor here that I’ve outlined as important that I’m not considering as far as I see. The fact that you tried to sneak in the “extinction bad” thing again without outright saying it (because you know I don’t see it as a worthy goal, but something that has to come out of the morality naturally) suggests that you know this too.

No. It had no notification attached to it, quite deliberately. — Isaac

Weird, I got one. I've been getting notified by quotes sometimes.

We can also add to this that in some moral frameworks, it's not unreasonable to assign a duty to members of a community, and as such we would assume this duty of our imaginary child when predicting their opinion. — Isaac

Idk what their duty would have to do with their opinion of life. Don't see what you're trying to say with 3a

A world with no-one in it is not a good world — Isaac

I'm not after "good worlds" whatever those are.

and (4) would indicate that avoiding those harms via extinction would be self-defeating — Isaac

Again, I don't care about "good worlds". So what exactly is self-defeating here? The conclusion that we will end up with an empty world doesn't matter to me, I'm only going to consider action by action.

It is a fact of the matter that having children produces more suffering than not. For easy comparison:

Sum of all harm in a world in which adam and eve didn't have kids: Suffering(Adam) + Suffering(Eve)
Sum of all harm in a world in which adam and eve had kids: Inarguably a lot more than that.

Your 5-6 points just sound like handwaving to me. First off you bring in benefits, when this whole time I've exclusively talked about harms (deliberately) and second you try to sneak in the "extinction bad" argument without saying it outright.

It really is quite simple if you apply the framework we agreed on.

Situation 1: Do not have kids: I experience X suffering. You would probably want to add "and the community also misses out" but again, you'll need to prove that your child will not be harmful in the first place to make that argument.

Situation 2: Have kids: I alleviate X suffering from myself and add much more to the kids (in addition to each of them having to deal with their own X now, unless they also have kids, ad infinium)

There will almost never be a situation where X (harm in situation 1) is MORE than the harm in situation 2 (which can be approximated as: numberOfKids * X + each kid's individual suffering. Can't see that ever being less than just X), but that is what would be required by the framework. The only exceptions may include:

1- I know my next child will do something amazing like cure cancer (Again, I don't think even this one works because I have explicitly always made it about harm to you vs harm to the affected party, never "harm to the community". I don't think that should be a factor but I'm going with it for now)

2- I have some condition where X is so large that it is actually comparable to the suffering of an entire lifetime AND this condition is not genetic (or else I'm just pushing it onto someone else)

Those are the only 2 exceptions I can think of.

The analogy wasn't necessarily aimed at you. — Isaac

I mean.... it was written in response to me. Kind of confusing.

For fuck's sake, it was an analogy and hopefully you knew perfectly well it was an analogy when you wrote it, otherwise it was mindnumbingly stupid thing to write. To make the analogy correct, we'd have to add that there are situations where it is your responsibility to buy me a suit. — Isaac

It is, but I'm just saying that nothing in it implied that I have the responsibility of keeping you suited. But yes there are cases where that could be true.

There is some benefit A which carries a risk B to person C. If I'm under no duty to provide benefit A then it is not appropriate to take risk B if I cannot get the consent of person C to do so. IF, however, I'm under some responsibility to provide benefit A and still can't get the consent of person C, I might well take risk B because failing to provide A would be no less of a risk - be an equally morally relevant outcome. — Isaac

:ok:

The risk that a person might end up displeased with their life is worth taking because not taking it also causes harms. — Isaac

Didn't say that. But in general, we do have to look at both outcomes yes, and this case is no exception.

Why are you suddenly only taking into account the harm you alleviate from yourself as the only positive in the balance? — Isaac

What else is there? And don't tell me "harm you alleviate from others" because I could also easily argue that your child will cause a fair share of harm. And I'm not sure if "others" should come into the calculation at all, so far it's just been you vs the affected party. I'll have to think about that one.

I've also stated that other people may decide differently. — Benkei

So it's not so much that there is anything wrong with antinatalism then is there?

You claim that the "chance of bad outcome" needs to be near 100% for having children to start to be considered wrong.
— khaled

Yup. That's my personal moral intuition — Benkei

And you claim at the same time that putting the bar at >0% is wrong. On what basis?

I never said that. I said the question doesn't pertain to reality and as such the question is moot — Benkei

Why is it moot in the second case but not the first? We're just talking about where to put the bar.

Why is it everyone couches disagreement as the other side not 'understanding'? — Isaac

What you said wasn't disagreement, you were refuting a misunderstanding of the argument. I am not arguing that there is a person who is benefited by antinatalism, or that there is someone who is harmed by birth (although suffering does result from it). And yet everyone here just keeps refuting the same 2 arguments, even though I'm not (and no one is really) making them.

So definitions aside, I don't see what difference there is. It might well be your responsibility to ensure I'm suited — Isaac

In what world? If I was your parent and you had some important interview or something maybe :rofl: But other than that, I don't see why I would have a responsibility to keep a stranger suited. Didn't cross my mind.

Is absolutely evidently insufficient. Driving is a risky undertaking. You risk harming others in doing so, that much is unarguable. — Isaac

Correct. And NOT driving is also very bad because then I can't work. So my job is to get good enough at driving that the harm done to me due to not being able to work starts to be comparable (hopefully less) than the "expected value" of harm I can cause. Again, I am part of this calculation, and me being unable to work is a problem.

If I am a bad driver to the point that I run people over 3 times a week getting to my job, I shouldn't be driving. Because then the harm I alleviate is not comparable to the harm I cause.

And as Benkei has pointed out, the odds of causing net harm to a future person are pretty low. — Isaac

The difference is, in the case of a future person, the amount of "harm" I alleviate from myself by having a child is insignificant to the amount I cause by having one. Whereas in driving they become comparable when I'm a good driver.