Nor I. Must've imagined it.

The idea is that we only know stuff using our mind, so we cannot know stuff for real. — Banno

Sounds exactly like:

When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno

The point is we don't have any sort of "hotline to truth".

Sounds exactly like: — khaled

Really? Not to me.

The point is we don't have any sort of "hotline to truth". — khaled

Depends on the truth you are looking at. Yeah, despite the pretence, philosophy will not give you any shortcuts. Indeed, it shows how hard the issue actually is.

An even better gem: let’s obsess and argue over qualia for dozens of pages and several threads to show how totally useless that concept is...

Really? Not to me. — Banno

Well I don't know what "know stuff without our mind" even means (sounds like "see things without eyes") but the closest thing I can approximate it to is: You won't get to a point where you know anything for sure, without any unexplained beliefs. Sounds pretty reasonable.

You won't get to a point where you know anything for sure, without any unexplained beliefs. — khaled

Well... not too sure about the "unexplained belief" - unjustified, perhaps? But there's lots we know for sure. It's just that philosophy tends to blind us to them.

unjustified, perhaps? — Banno

Yea.

But there's lots we know for sure — Banno

We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.. — Banno

I've still not seen a way to get that last bit "when it's true". I thought we just agreed you don't. It's easy to tell when a belief is false, but for it to be true would imply that it is impossible that we are mistaken. Can't see how you would prove that.

Whatever we're doing here should be another thread, not that I'm entirely sure where it's going.

You seemed to suggest that we don't see things as they are, in a chat with @Andrew M. That's a long stretch, and pretty close to the conclusion of the Gem. It relates to the OP because there are folk who think that we see qualia, not trees and rocks and stuff. Andrew has been at pains to show that this is misguided.

Looks suitably relevant.

because there are folk who think that we see qualia, not trees and rocks and stuff — Banno

Yeah, no. We're conscious of seeing trees. That is qualia.

You seemed to suggest that we don't see things as they are — Banno

What I want to say is that we can always be mistaken about what we see. That to me sounds exactly like "You don't see things as they are". If you mean something different by "You don't see things as they are" then what is it exactly?

Looks suitably relevant. — Banno

Not really a difficult achievement at this point :lol:

not trees and rocks and stuff. — Banno

I'd say Qualia is part of what happens when we look at rocks and stuff. But is not a description of what the brain is doing. It's a phenomena, not something to be seen.

We're conscious of seeing trees. That is qualia. — frank

Well, that's what a sensible qualist might say.

Well, that's what a sensible qualist might say. — Banno

Oh. Thanks!

What I want to say is that we can always be mistaken about what we see. That to me sounds exactly like "You don't see things as they are". — khaled

You jumped form "We might be mistaken..." to "We don't..."; from we might not to we never do.

We get it right sometimes, too.

You jumped form "We might be mistaken..." to "We don't..."; from we might not to we never do.

We get it right sometimes, too. — Banno

No that's exactly what I mean. We never get it right. We only get it not-wrong until we get it wrong (or die first). "Getting it right" means there is no room for error. We don't reach no room for error I don't think.

We never get it right. — khaled

Well, you are right that this thread is in English.

So that's not right.

Well, you are right that this thread is in English.

So that's not right. — Banno

êtes-vous sûr de cela?

Yep. Except for that bit, and a few other bits.

And so are you, since you clearly replied to my English sentences.

But as I said, It's just that philosophy tends to blind us sometimes.

Yep. Except for that bit, and a few other bits. — Banno

So the thread is not in English. It was in English until it wasn't. So your original statement is wrong. My point is that there is always room for error. Outside of things like "There can be no married bachelor" which are true by definition but also completely pointless to say. If it's not true by definition, you can be wrong about it. Heck even then you still have things like calculations mistakes which you can't be sure you're not making.

My point is that there is always room for error. — khaled

But that's not right. You know the thread is in English. It's true, justified and that you believe it is evident in your continuing replies to my English sentences.

There are other things, too. Like the bishop always staying on the same colour, or seawater being salty, or elephants being mammals. Lots and lots of things are true; some of those are even certain.

It's true — Banno

It isn't.

êtes-vous sûr de cela? — khaled

you believe it is evident in your continuing replies to my English sentences. — Banno

First off, me replying in English doesn't show anything about the thread language. Besides that, I believe it is in English apart from that one line alright. I'm saying there is room for error. Or more precisely that claiming there is no room for error is only disadvantageous, and doesn't bring about any benefits. Who cares about whether or not the thread is actually English or not, all we ever deal in is beliefs.

When we call something “true” or “real” all we’re saying is that we agree on it.
— khaled
should be...
When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno

Like the bishop always staying on the same colour — Banno

Until someone breaks the rules.

seawater being salty — Banno

Unless you have rona and can't taste.

elephants being mammals. — Banno

True by definition. Or until we change what "mammal" means.

Lots and lots of things are true; some of those are even certain. — Banno

I would say lots and lots of things are highly agreed upon. Don't see the need to make the jump to "undoubtable". Why do you want to? What is the benefit of claiming there are things we cannot be wrong about? Sounds like a completely useless thing to try to defend.

OK, then. Back to talking about V8 Engines in German, then.

We were not talking about V8 Engines in German though. I agree the thread is in English outside of that one line. I don't see a reason or justification to elevate this to undoubatle knowledge though. That's my problem.

Anwyays we beat Brexit you're welcome.

Also please just read the thing. — khaled

Nuh. At a certain point the conversation gets too ridiculous. And it's bed time. I'm sure of it.

Maybe it wouldn't sound as ridiculous if you bother to read it. Good night.

? But there's lots we know for sure — Banno

We probably need to do some real Quining on this issue.

And the rest of §306, and on through §308. The error comes from thinking that because we treat mental processes as we do other processes: "We talk of processes and states and leave there nature undecided". This is what has been done with qualia. — Banno

Don't overlook the end of §308:

And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.

Again: it would be absurd to deny that we experience tastes and sights and feelings. — Banno

Yes, it would. But I don't think it's very clear from the paper (and, perhaps more so, from his defenders here) what Dennett intends to deny: whether it's conscious experiences themselves, the four properties of conscious experiences that he cites, qualia as an explanation of consciousness, qualia as a cause of consciousness, our knowledge of the causes of qualia, or something else.

But they are not private - we can talk about them. — Banno

We do not and cannot talk about the private aspect of conscious experiences. That, again, is the upshot of the private language argument. However, this doesn't imply that there is no private aspect of conscious experiences (at least, Wittgenstein keeps repeating that he does not want to deny any "inner" or mental processes).

What is absurd is positing another level of experience, qualia... — Banno

Who said anything about "another level of experience"? Dennett, at least, speaks of qualia as properties of conscious experience.

...which are private and hence ineffable... — Banno

Yes...

and then talking about them by using them to explain consciousness — Banno

What explanation of consciousness?

The illusion is the notion that because folk talk about qualia, there must be something there... — Banno

Both Wittgenstein and Dennett acknowledge that there is a private aspect of conscious experience.

No, I was aware of being touched on the shoulder. That was my experience. — Andrew M

You weren't aware of the experience?

It's not that a person touched me on the shoulder (an external occurrence) and then I felt it (a subsequent internal occurrence). It's that I felt a person touch me on the shoulder. That was my experience - a relation between myself and the world. If I hadn't felt it, then my experience would have been different - an alternative experience that didn't include an awareness of being touched on the shoulder (although I nonetheless was). — Andrew M

I never claimed anything of the sort.

This is an example of how we're using the word "experience" differently. Dichotomizing it into internal and external occurrences creates ghosts, or shadows on the cave wall. — Andrew M

It's implied by your own example. You get touched on your shoulder (externally), and you might feel it or not (internally). You cannot dissolve the distinction between internal and external without dissolving the distinction between self and world.

Suppose I stub my toe. I feel pain in my toe. And my toe is in the world. — Andrew M

You, as a person and as a body, are in the world. But we need to distinguish you as a person (and/or you as a body) from the world. Your toe is in the world, but your toe is a part of you and you are the one feeling pain. It's not the world's toe or feeling of pain, it's yours.

Or, in another case, I might feel a generalized pain. But I am also in the world. — Andrew M

Do you feel the pain or does the world?

The distinction between a person and the world is one of perception and conceptualization, not one of ontological separation. That is, a person is embedded in the world that they are perceiving. A person is materially constituted by their body, but we conceptualize a person differently from their body (i.e., as having a higher level of structure and organization). — Andrew M

I disagree. I don't think there's a distinction to be had, with only one proviso: that the person/body is living.

Is a colourblind person capable of seeing things as they are? — Daemon


That depends on what one's standard is for seeing things as they are.

In game theory, a focal point (or Schelling point) is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication.... — Andrew M

Hi Andrew M,

I'm seeking to apply the Principle of Charity [In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity or charitable interpretation requires interpreting a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation.]

But your response here seems like irremediable bollocks. Were you serious? Are you really saying that how things are is determined by majority vote?

There are other things, too. Like the bishop always staying on the same colour, — Banno

So let's Quine this. The only way to avoid the Quine bombs is to conclude that Banno's sentences perform a function his interaction with us. We want to dispense with folk psychology that says "bishop" refers to a specific object, or that the whole sentence couldn't be replaced with some other with no change seen in our collective behavior.

Anybody need the actual bombs or can we just nod to Dennett's article for the basic idea?

Where's the acceptable theory of meaning at?

Where's the explicit account of how meaning first emerges onto the world stage in it's most basic identifiable form such that it continues to grow and/or evolve over a sufficient enough time period so as to provide enough groundwork, a semantically rich enough basis, for us to be able to begin naming and describing all of the different aspects of own personal experiences as well as getting the simple language less ones right?

It's certainly not found in semiotics, qualia, belief as propositional attitudes, or meaning as use, although all of them are helpful regarding certain complexity levels throughout the ongoing process, from conception through times like these.