Really? Not to me. — Banno
unjustified, perhaps? — Banno
But there's lots we know for sure — Banno
We know some statement when at the least we believe it, it fits in with our other beliefs, and when it is true.. — Banno
You seemed to suggest that we don't see things as they are — Banno
Looks suitably relevant. — Banno
not trees and rocks and stuff. — Banno
We're conscious of seeing trees. That is qualia. — frank
You jumped form "We might be mistaken..." to "We don't..."; from we might not to we never do.
We get it right sometimes, too. — Banno
Yep. Except for that bit, and a few other bits. — Banno
My point is that there is always room for error. — khaled
It's true — Banno
êtes-vous sûr de cela? — khaled
you believe it is evident in your continuing replies to my English sentences. — Banno
When we call something “true” or “real” all we’re saying is that we agree on it.
— khaled
should be...
When we believe something all we’re saying is that we agree on it. — Banno
Like the bishop always staying on the same colour — Banno
seawater being salty — Banno
elephants being mammals. — Banno
Lots and lots of things are true; some of those are even certain. — Banno
And the rest of §306, and on through §308. The error comes from thinking that because we treat mental processes as we do other processes: "We talk of processes and states and leave there nature undecided". This is what has been done with qualia. — Banno
And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.
Again: it would be absurd to deny that we experience tastes and sights and feelings. — Banno
But they are not private - we can talk about them. — Banno
What is absurd is positing another level of experience, qualia... — Banno
...which are private and hence ineffable... — Banno
and then talking about them by using them to explain consciousness — Banno
The illusion is the notion that because folk talk about qualia, there must be something there... — Banno
No, I was aware of being touched on the shoulder. That was my experience. — Andrew M
It's not that a person touched me on the shoulder (an external occurrence) and then I felt it (a subsequent internal occurrence). It's that I felt a person touch me on the shoulder. That was my experience - a relation between myself and the world. If I hadn't felt it, then my experience would have been different - an alternative experience that didn't include an awareness of being touched on the shoulder (although I nonetheless was). — Andrew M
This is an example of how we're using the word "experience" differently. Dichotomizing it into internal and external occurrences creates ghosts, or shadows on the cave wall. — Andrew M
Suppose I stub my toe. I feel pain in my toe. And my toe is in the world. — Andrew M
Or, in another case, I might feel a generalized pain. But I am also in the world. — Andrew M
The distinction between a person and the world is one of perception and conceptualization, not one of ontological separation. That is, a person is embedded in the world that they are perceiving. A person is materially constituted by their body, but we conceptualize a person differently from their body (i.e., as having a higher level of structure and organization). — Andrew M
Is a colourblind person capable of seeing things as they are? — Daemon
That depends on what one's standard is for seeing things as they are.
In game theory, a focal point (or Schelling point) is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication.... — Andrew M
There are other things, too. Like the bishop always staying on the same colour, — Banno
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