I’ve always had a good feeling forZen Buddhism and always found it very elusive. But my feeling is that they do believe there is an objective reality — Brett
Is there evidence that they didn't mean it literally? — leo
See it that way: if as long as you haven't reached Nirvana you keep getting reincarnated when you die, but once you reach Nirvana you stay there and stop getting reincarnated, then Nirvana does not reduce to a mental state, it's a place beyond the material world. — leo
But in order to be relativists I believe they necessarily assume that there is something beyond the shadows (otherwise again they would be solipsists, believing that other humans don't experience anything).
So if they believe there is something beyond the shadows, don't they have to believe in some objective reality (as in things existing beyond their own mind)? — leo
But then Buddhism cannot be characterized as relativist, otherwise it wouldn't claim that there exists a state (Nirvana) that people can reach, no? — leo
"this a state I've reached, here is how I have reached it, but I make no guarantee that this state exists for you or that you can reach it" — leo
Reaching that state can be seen as reaching some absolute place that exists beyond death, so it's more than a temporary subjective state of mind provoked by some medicine. — leo
Whereas in relativism there is nothing beyond the shadows. — leo
regardless of appearances. — leo
Since gravity and other fundamental forces in the universe do not undergo change — Weynon5x
Yes and then Nirvana would be that objective reality — leo
I'm using "objective" in the sense what really exists beyond appearances, are you guys simply referring to "what people agree on"? — leo
A person has not chosen his birth therefore it would be very unfair to make demands just because he has been born — Congau
The only difference is that procreation is not in itself good or bad since the potential sufferer or happy person is not yet existing — Congau
The points you make about there not being an 'objective reality' in these cultures is kind of true, but none of their exponents would necessarily speak about it in those terms. — Wayfarer
This is really odd indeed. Are you saying that among the countless millions of our forefathers not one single person had the sense to say what you're saying, that suffering is more important than pain or is the more plausible alternative, that pain is the first of our problems, true? — TheMadFool
That said I must agree that medicine has only managed to pluck the low hanging fruit, pain, but then to compare that with the failure to tackle suffering is like disgracing a runner for not winning before the race finishes. — TheMadFool
From the outset, we can’t demand that anyone does anything, but we can demand that they abstain from doing. — Congau
Physical wellbeing takes precedence over mental wellbeing. I believe the history of medicine stands testimony to this - psychiatry is younger than surgery for example. — TheMadFool
were chosen for their tangible, indubitable impact on our wellbeing — TheMadFool
Well, you could just phone me and say "There is a sale going on over a house you would definitely like and time is running out, i will send you the details and you could tell me whetever you wanr to but it or not." — HereToDisscuss
So, that is not a really good example. — HereToDisscuss
There is always a risk, but it can be drastically reduced. — HereToDisscuss
So much for the possibility of coming out of the gutter to do great things, and in doing so helping the gutter people rid themselves of some of the gutter-ness all at the same time. — creativesoul
spurious presupposition that we know what the direct consequences of our decision will be. — creativesoul
1. If you look at how medicine and technology has changed our lives you must agree that suffering is decreasing compared with the past where disease and the simple act of living were much more difficult
2. From the above we see a downward trend to suffering in general which bolsters our hopes that in the not so far future, suffering, harm as you put it, will become zero — TheMadFool
life would be preferable to nonexistence. — TheMadFool
The above statement encapsulates the problem with antinatalism that the "solution" to life's problems is nonexistence. — TheMadFool
it becomes evidently clear that no one, choice/not, would object to a life/existence in heaven. It's like an offer you can't refuse. — TheMadFool
However when we're certain of what the choice will be, life in heaven in this case. we don't have to ask for consent do we? — TheMadFool
Yes, as of the moment it is unavoidable but given how much progress we've made over the ages in the happiness department you can surely see that suffering is not a necessary but a contingent truth about the world — TheMadFool
the vast majority — Brett
The idea of caring for others, the value of life, was not created by Christianity, it had to exist first. Just like the idea, I believe, that caring for others is in human nature and not some sort of contrived idea for keeping the peace, something contrived to contribute towards your survival over others.
Our capacities for caring, our morals, where do they come from? We didn’t invent them. — Brett
Well, since i agree that negative ethics entails procreation being immoral unless Earth is devoid of any suffering whatsoever, i will ask a question: How do you justify negative ethics? — HereToDisscuss
Can you kindly present your version of antinatalism? — TheMadFool
2. A life of joy is desirable. — TheMadFool
Now imagine a person being given choices as follows:
1. Hell
2. Earth
3. Heaven
4. Nonexistence — TheMadFool
The foundation under antinatalism is suffering. There is no suffering in heaven. So, no, antinatalism can never provide a good reason to opt for nonexistence over heaven. — TheMadFool
Doesn't this mean that life/existence is NOT the problem here and that existence is sufficiently distinct from suffering? — TheMadFool
In short I think it's possible to make earth a heaven. No suffering, no antinatalism. — TheMadFool
The antinatalist can't see the distinction between life and suffering. — TheMadFool
You say even "some" suffering is good enough to decide. — TheMadFool
Doesn't that mean no suffering or perhaps ecstatic joy would make the antinatalist decide otherwise. — TheMadFool
If 1 were true then antinatalists have no argument. Right? — TheMadFool
The antinatalist/pessimist thinks 3 is the truth. — TheMadFool
I'm saying the situation is actually 2 — TheMadFool
and then the following basic arithmetic is possible. — TheMadFool
The antinatalist/pessimist position is as follows:
1. Life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness — TheMadFool
2. If life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness then nonexistence is better than life
So, — TheMadFool
"The conditions of harm" are not the harm itself. And there is no "aggression" against an embryo that gestates through foetal and prenatal stages to live birth. Harm and aggression only apply to a sentient human being which a human foetus only becomes once her thalamocortical system is fully connected — 180 Proof
Not even a quack, let alone a qualified doctor, would prescribe beheading as a cure for a headache. The aim is to treat the malady - suffering - AND make life enjoyable or at least livable. I guess I'm saying, in a very important way, antinatalists are unable to distinguish the patient (life) from the disease (suffering) and this leads them to the mistaken conclusion that life (patient) = disease (suffering). — TheMadFool
I think it comes into play most when it comes to procreation. There are several first principles that must be agreed upon- — schopenhauer1
Besides, while what makes people happy varies from person to person and from day to day for each of us, what makes people miserable, or suffer, is the same for everyone (i.e. not "subjective" in the least) — 180 Proof
deprivation, physical dysfunction (i.e. illness), harm of any kind, helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, fear-terror), betrayal, bereavement, etc - in effect, involuntary decrease or loss of agency — 180 Proof
therefore, we (can) reasonably judge whether or not, by action or inaction, conduct decreases (i e. avoids mitigates or relieves) someone's - some creature's - suffering. Hardly a (merely) "subjective" consideration. — 180 Proof
Why would the prevention of suffering take a back seat to the promotion of "well-being"? — schopenhauer1
Give one yourself. — S
All you have to do is think of a situation where the parents make a decision based on what they consider to be best for the child where that doesn't necessarily match up with the least risky option. — S
A fish is just like a dog! — S
He clarified that by "prove", he means show to be the case. — S
False — S
Basically a repetition of the same false assertion. — S
Another false analogy. You're really bad at analogies. — S
how in the world do you expect me to go about proving a claim such as "In every situation when consent is not available the least risky option is chosen". Do you seriously expect me to go over every conceivable situation where consent is not available and you have to make a situation for someone else?
It would be so much easier for you to come up with a counterexample to disprove it wouldn't it? — khaled
The alternative I am offering is, essentially, that future people have no moral weight at all. I don't like the implications of that, but I'd like to know if anyone can offer a convinving argument that they do. — Echarmion
That means that while we are still deciding, we have to treat the future child as non-existant in the present and future. — Echarmion
The special case is creating new moral subjects in the first place. — Echarmion
Even if I concede that point for the purposes of this argument, this still leaves the question of how future people can exist — Echarmion
That if an action results in harming someone in the future, it doesn't matter whether or not that person existed at the time the action took place. — khaled
There are lots of things that children can't consent to, and which carry risks, some of which are severe, like with almost any medication or surgery — S
