You are violating the very dignity of someone as you are trying to fix it. — schopenhauer1

Fix it? No that wasn’t the proposed motivation. The motivation was: My child will likely be a positive influence, thus not having him is the riskier option. Similar to how not waking up the swimmer is the riskier option, and so you can choose to wake up the swimmer.

a) how you don't see the difference here of someone who is in an inescapable game from a situation where no one is put in an inescapable game. — schopenhauer1

I see the difference. It’s clear as day. I don’t see how it’s significant.

Again:

to me it sounds akin to saying “Killing mr A is wrong, but killing mr B is ok because mr B has green eyes” — khaled

b) how putting someone in the inescapable game is itself violating the dignity/justice/unnecessary harm principles — schopenhauer1

Yup.

once in the game, mitigating circumstances for others playing the game is not violating it. — schopenhauer1

This bit is false though. Here is an example:

waking up a sleeping swimmer when you see someone drowning and you can’t swim? — khaled

Is it violating the dignity of the swimmer? Well you’re imposing on him so yes.

Justice? Idk about that one it’s too vague a word.

Unnecessary harm? Well depends on what you mean by “unnecessary”. If harming someone to reduce harm elsewhere makes the harm “necessary” then this is not violated by birth or by this case (both are “necessary harm”). Otherwise idk what you mean by “unnecessary” harm.

But you would still wake him up in spite of this.

The basic principle of intellectual inquiry is that the burden of proof is on the one whose claim conflicts with appearances — Bartricks

And when things appear differently to different people?

I would think if everything appeared the same way to everyone people wouldn’t even argue.

This seems to just put the burden of proof on whoever is disagreeing with you (as they clearly conflict with what appears to you to be the case). Cheeky.

Nowhere there was there an actual explanation of the differences in treatment. Just restatements that there should be one.

However, if you were to say to me.. "You should create harmful situations for another person, so that they can mitigate harmful situations for someone else" I would say this is absolutely wrong. — schopenhauer1

Jails? Taxes? How about the simple example of waking up a sleeping swimmer when you see someone drowning and you can’t swim?

Creating from NOTHING harmful situations is different than people who already exist and are in the game. — schopenhauer1

Sure it’s different. Why is that difference significant? That is the question. Because to me it sounds akin to saying “Killing mr A is wrong, but killing mr B is ok because mr B has green eyes”

Creating harmful situations is creating harmful situations. Who cares if it’s from nothing or not?

What if you were recruited into a game, and the only thing you can do is get better at the game, join another team, or kill yourself? Would that be fair? — schopenhauer1

Depends on the situation of the people who brought me in.

Restating the same thing isn’t addressing the point. I’m asking why you think that it’s fine to use people that exist and not fine to use people by making them exist.

When you pay taxes, the only thing you can do is pay to solve other people's problems (mostly) or got to jail. Is that fair?

Arguably yes depending on the effectiveness of the taxes. If my tax money is being used for something that doesn’t benefit society then no. So what’s so different in the 2 scenarios?

I’m always skeptical about assigning moral value to how someone reacts. People can hardly choose to hate or not hate. It’s like assigning moral value to eating, or taking a piss. You can’t very well help it.

When people say “hate is bad” I don’t think it is intended as moral condemnation but rather practical life advice.

We've been through this and we know where we stand on the argument.. — schopenhauer1

Sure but you haven’t explained your POV.

Starting a whole new life to ameliorate those already here is still unnecessarily causing harm to someone that does not need to take place.

Using people that already exist to ameliorate harm is appropriate, however, like the examples you give. — schopenhauer1

Special pleading. Why does the harm done to someone suddenly matter way more when they don’t exist yet?

Why is using someone who exists better than using someone by making them exist?

Or is that just a starting premise for you? If so I don’t think many would share it. And it should be pointed out that you have this premise. Or else your argument is incomplete.

We enforce negative conditions on others all the time without their consent. Taxes, schools, etc. So your premise that it’s always wrong to do so isn’t justified. Unless you think taxes and schooling are wrong.

Really, ANYTHING you do risks harming someone. Not sure how you get anything done with that premise.

I'm saying I've never seen such an explanation, so it's not an empty assertion. — Janus

It is empty. "I've never seen one therefore they're not possible" doesn't follow. It could very well be that we cannot, and will never be able to, neurologically account for things like logical entailment. But you have no evidence to conclude that. You keep reasserting it for no reason.

That's just a baseless assertion rejecting the distinction between the semantic and the physical. — Janus

It has just as much basis as the assertion that that distinction is there. Your "evidence" for the distinction is "I haven't seen logical entailment explained physically yet". That's not evidence.

And the quote was intended as the hypothesis in question. I'm trying to find issues with identity theory. You have provided none. All you've said is effectively "Well, I think there is a distinction here". That wasn't what was being asked.

You don't respond to the topic, and are incapable of supporting your own position. And then accuse me of being unable to argue... Funny.

Logical entailment is simply what seems self-evident to us. — Janus

Right. And there is a neural difference between when something makes sense and when it doesn’t. That’s your logical entailment explained in physical terms.

you cannot explain how it is that you are moved by the poem by simply examining the physical marks on the paper, the processes of visual perception involved in looking at them and the ensuing neural processes going on in the brain — Janus

You keep asserting this. It doesn’t get any more convincing when you keep insisting on it.

Do you believe it would be possible to examine two different neural processes associated with two different thought processes, one logically valid and the other not, and tell just from that physical examination which thought process was logically valid and which was not? — Janus

Yes. Except that the neural process IS the thought. Not “is associated with” the thought.

Neural processes are just neural processes; they are physical, not logical processes — Janus

And again with the “I’m not making any ontological claims here, but thoughts ain’t physical and so they can’t be grasped by neurology”....

and how do we recognise 'that' particular pattern...? — Isaac

We find what's common in the degenerate neuronal systems that produce the same cognitive function?

Sounds like as good a starting point as any. I used to operate by the opposite principle. “If you don’t want to believe it it is probably true so might as well rip the band aid off and believe it”. Can’t say it’s done me any good.

I don’t think discussions of this level really make sense. Your disposition towards what to believe and what to reject precedes any beliefs, so no one can really change your mind about it. If I tell you “Hey that’s a terrible way of thinking” then that counts as a disempowering belief and so you will reject it.

Similarly, if you were to attack my disposition then I would think “I want to believe he’s right, so I won’t”.

These “dispositions” are largely impervious to attack or discussion. And there isn’t really any set starting point when it comes to them, since they precede all argumentation and belief. They seem to be more like personality traits than beliefs.

Way I see it, this thread might as well be a discussion of which flavor of ice cream is best. No one is going to change their mind, because there is no objective answer.

digestion isn't a presupposition for our very knowing — schopenhauer1

Can’t think on an empty stomach!

There is something about brain states that allows the very knowing of all the other states and this is really what makes it unique. — schopenhauer1

Sure but

So it is not just equivocating brain states with mental states — schopenhauer1

But I don’t see how this follows. What is the problem with equivocating brain states with mental states?

but what we are really asking in a philosophical sense is why is there an "inner feeling" at all with mental states? — schopenhauer1

I’m not sure if you’re alluding to the hard problem here. But if you are then I would say, if the problem makes sense, it’s not interesting anyways. It’s like asking “why is there gravity at all with matter”? Who cares? There just is.

Think about logical entailment, for example: how do you explain that in physical terms? — Janus

we cannot explain the conceptual in physical terms — Janus

You have this idea where logical entailment is a “thing out there”. Some law inherent in the universe or something. Whereas I think logical entailment is just another instinct. Something “makes sense” when it is logically entailed. And this “making sense” is a neural process. Logical entailment is a “local phenomena” so to speak.

We can explain logical entailment in the same way we can explain hunger.

You keep saying that you are saying nothing ontological but you keep splitting up the conceptual and physical ontologically as far as I can tell. That or you're just asserting that the conceptual cannot be explained in physical terms because...... idk.

You haven't presented any worthy objections so far, just empty assertions. Can't you find anything to present other than that? I doubt you can, but I'm prepared to listen if you do. — Janus

Funny I was just about to say that.

Thought is a conceptual as well as a physical process. Digestion is just a physical process. — Janus

The hypothesis is that conceptual thought is a physical process. So I don’t see the difference.

My reasoning is that I've never seen a narrative explained in terms of neural processes — Janus

That you’ve never seen one means it’s fundamentally impossible to achieve?

What we think of as me is the story I tell myself about my life. — Janus

And this “telling” is not a neurological process? What is it then?

but a thought process is distinct from a neural process insofar as one is physical, whereas the other is conceptual. If you can't see that obvious distinction then I don't know what else to say. — Janus

Well no because it’s a fabricated distinction. It’s dualistic. And dualism doesn’t have to be the case. I know you claim not to be a dualist but I see no way to interpret “One is physical whereas the other is conceptual” in non dualistic terms.

You’ve defined thought processes to be different from anything physical. That is a choice. That is not some metaphysical truth. And I consider it a bad choice.

Now imagine two systems, one from each world, that are physically identical to each other but are different in that one is conscious while the other is not. — Yun Jae Jung

You first off have to assume that this is possible. Which is already dualistic (splitting minds and bodies as different types of things).

This establishes the existence of our Free Will because our decisions are affected by non-deterministic factors through our transcendental consciousness." — Yun Jae Jung

No it doesn’t. You haven’t proven that consciousness affects our decisions. You might want to look into epiphenomenalism because it is what this dualistic thinking usually leads to.

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"?
— khaled

Digestion, respiration, tendonitis, etc.,etc.,: the list is endless, — Janus

Ok... What is the "conceptual element lacking in digestion". I still don't understand what the sentence means at all.

Right, in order to understand the self; eliminate it just as I said. — Janus

Well you didn't even say that. And I definitely didn't say that.

and narratives are not understandable in terms of neural processes — Janus

You keep asserting this with no evidence. What's your reasoning?

it must be since we use it effectively all the time — Janus

Non sequitor. Often people use the same word to mean a bunch of different things. I suspect "You" as you use it is one such word.

It would need to be established that there are no subconscious narratives going on in people; how are you going to do that? — Janus

Wtf is a "subconscious narrative". And what does it mean for a narrative to "go on" inside someone. To have some sort of neurological impact? Because we CAN study that...

Considering the motivation behind an idea is never an argument against the idea I struggle to see how it will.

then you could present an example from someone who does "know their neurology" to support your case. — Janus

There is no shortage of studies of self in neurology. Here is one:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292534980_The_Lost_Self_Pathologies_of_the_Brain_and_Identity

And as predicted what it does is: Look for cases where "you" isn't present and try to find what the significant variables are. Just like any other science.

It's because there is a conceptual element there that is lacking in non-mental bodily states. So, it could be said that they are also bodily states, but are not just bodily states. — Janus

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"?

Otherwise it just looks like an empty presumption. — Janus

But I explained why it isn't. If "You" is in any way a coherent concept then we should be able to find brain states where "You" is present and others when it isn't. Find the the difference between the two. That is "You".

And if it is empty presumption then its alternative (that we can never account for "You" neurologically) is also empty presumption.

We are what we think we are; our selves are the stories we tell about our lives and who we are. — Janus

Sure but I don’t see how that makes mental states more than body states.

give an account of your first person experience in terms of brain processes, and then try to discover where you are in that description. — Janus

Doesn’t seem too challenging to someone who knows their neurology. Assuming this “you” is in any way a coherent concept we can mess with the brain enough to find out when it’s present and when it isn’t. The physical difference would be precisely this “you”

but I also think they are more than that; narrative comes into it as well. — Janus

How so?

and that first person experience cannot be objectified without losing its sense — Janus

How so?

if one is downtrodden, then is being downtrodden interchangeable with demonstrating a specific neurochemistry? — Aryamoy Mitra

Idk why you'd pick "Downtrodden" out of everything. Do you mean it as an emotion or a financial state? If it is the former then, yes, according to identity theory it is interchangeable with a neurological state.

Is the relation semantic, or metaphorical? — Aryamoy Mitra

semantic.

Without one, this seems an absurd equivalence. — Aryamoy Mitra

Why? What problems arise when we replace all talk of minds and their emotions with talk of neurological states? If anything it seems to be more accurate and allows for more common sense usages.

"His anger made him punch the wall". According to you this statement is false. Since you're an epiphenomenalist, to you, the anger did nothing. Had no effect. Since you separate the mental from the physical dualistically, which coupled with the fact that physical systems seem self sufficient (no need for minds) leads you to the conclusion that minds exist, as a separate kind of things from physical stuff, but do nothing. Anger is "mental" and so causes no physical change.

But if "Anger" refers to a neurological state then the sentence actually makes sense. If that initial split is not made in the first place, if a mind is just a brain state and an emotion is just a brain state and so on... things becomes much simpler. And you can actually say "His anger made him punch the wall"

Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain. — Janus

How about "A mental state is a bodily state"

this would be to say that the mind can be exhaustively understood in terms of brain processes, which it obviously cannot. — Janus

Doesn't seem that obvious.

whereas 'mind' as a noun is misleading — Janus

Agreed. The dualists don't seem to think so though.

Certain mental states are engendered by neuronal states — Aryamoy Mitra

Nope, certain mental states ARE neuronal states. It’s not that there exists “mental states” as separate from neuronal states, and the formal is caused by the latter no, they are literally the same thing. It’s not dualistic.

First and foremost, there'll always remain an indeterminacy at the heart of the mind-body problem — Aryamoy Mitra

There is no mind body problem in identity theory. How does your emotion of “anger” interact with your body? Confused question. Your emotion of “anger” IS a body state. It’s not something external that “interacts with” your body.

as opposed to creating a satisfactory and infallible scheme, for deriving answers to unforeseen questions — Aryamoy Mitra

Why not?

Personally, I adhere to Epiphenomenalism in this regard — Aryamoy Mitra

I think epiphenomenalism is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science.

The difference between identity theory and anomalous monism is the rejection of a one-to-one correspondence between brain states and states of mind in favour of a many-to-many relation (very roughly) — Banno

Then what’s the difference between identity theory and reductionism? I don’t see a difference. Maybe there isn’t and I’m just getting hung up on words...

Also, for identity theory it’s not a “correspondence”. A mental state IS a brain state, it’s not that a mental state “corresponds” to a brain state (that seems to open the door for a dualism of some sort)

I don't see that a certain states of mind is exactly equal to a certain state of mind. — Banno

I'm assuming you mean "of brain". And who said that it has to be one to one? The claim is that certain states of mind ARE certain states of brain. Anger IS a brain state, it is not "something caused by a brain state". What would be the issue with that claim.

Khaled believing that the Pope is Catholic may "correspond" to various different brain states from one time to another. — Banno

Sure. I never said it is one to one. The claim is that Khaled's belief that the pope is catholic IS a brain state. Not some separate entity as the dualists would have it. And not “corresponds to” but IS.

Then again, I struggle to see how this isn't simply identity theory. Here is what Mind/Brain identity theory is according to SEP:

"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/

(I was using "the mind is the brain" as a shorthand I didn't literally mean it)

And here is what reductionism is according to the IEP (couldn't find an SEP article about it):

"The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena."

https://iep.utm.edu/red-ism/#:~:text=The%20type%20of%20reductionism%20that,are%20identical%20to%20physical%20phenomena.

Anomalous monism — Banno

The more I looked into it the more it just seemed to really be reductionism or epiphenomenalism in disguise, though it claims to be neither.

Most renditions of "mind" has it doing something though. And by these uses "mind" is not a thing doing something but just a side effect of brains. Digestion is not an entity that does something to the guts, it's just a name for what the guts are doing.

Furthermore, we don't ever need to talk about minds if that's what they are. Just like talk of guts and stomach is sufficient anywhere you want to talk about digestion. "I am digesting a burrito" can be restated in terms of guts doing things, and so the concept of digestion itself is no more than a shorthand, and not really needed.


And besides, this doesn't tell me what the problems are with identity theory rather just asserts reductionism.

On the other hand, if the answer is yes, then the task is to explain how "the mind reduces to the brain." — TheMadFool

How are they different specifically? Different like in ontological dualism? Different how?

2. If I have been caused to come into existence by external events that I had nothing to do with, then I am not morally responsible for my initial character. — ToothyMaw

I doubt babies have an “initial character”. You develop a personality/character as you grow up.

5. If I am not morally responsible for my initial character and not morally responsible for my environment. and the laws of nature that prevail in it, then I am not morally responsible for anything. — ToothyMaw

Would be the premise to attack really yes. What exactly counts as “environment” or “external”? Because some folks around here like to count their own bodies and brains and “environmental” and “external” to them, so anything those bodies and brains do, they are somehow not responsible for. I don’t know why people do that.

And then they’re surprised at how it turns out they’re not responsible for anything. That’s because “They” themselves cause nothing in their own setup. Their bodies are “external” to “them” so what the heck does “them” do? When you externalize the source of your agency you’ll end up with the conclusion that you’re just a helpless watcher who has no control over anything that happens. But why would you externalize the source of your agency. “Your honor, I didn’t punch the man, it was my fist the punched him see? I had no choice in the matter!”

which effectively partitions the will from the laws of cause and effect. Thus, I will deny a premise. — ToothyMaw

Yup. That would be the normal reaction. Not what Bartricks is doing, saying “Yup, this goes against countless laws of conservation that we have derived, but so much worse for science! My armchair is a better source of knowledge”

and yet the atheist supposedly believes in none of them. Because of this, I reckon the atheist would need to account more generally — Georgios Bakalis

Non sequitor. Just because I don’t believe in any of them doesn’t mean I need to have the same attitude towards their existence. I can not believe in them yet want some to exist and others not.

Read my reply above. — 180 Proof

Again, you're confusing the fact of being alive with the occurence of suffering; the latter correlates to, but is not caused by, the former. — 180 Proof

Ah well you see, stepping on a mine is only correlated to blowing up to bits, but doesn’t necessarily cause it. There is always a chance the mine randomly doesn’t go off! It’s only a perquisite see!?

Yea I don’t think this one flies.... Being born causes suffering in the same way that a mine causes suffering. The chances it doesn’t are abysmally low (the chances someone has a “suffering free life”). And the chances someone has a life they consider not worthwhile are pretty low, but still existent. It would be like placing an old dysfunctional mine instead. Still an arbitrary risk, for which you need something to counteract the risk. Which you do provide:

Also, 'not procreating' causes the vast majority of the Already Born to suffer — 180 Proof

I like this one. That’s the one I use. Because it works off the same principle of minimizing suffering, no need for extra premises like “Mankind must go on”.

Depends on the God.

However, one can presently increase the probabilty conditions of a harmful occurence that will last into the future. — 180 Proof

I’ll take that. And this is wrong correct? Yet having children is an example of presently increasing the probability conditions of a harmful occurrence that will last into the future (this is literally the exact premise I gave but reworded) no? So what makes having children fine but placing the mine not?

Oh and the original premise was:

Do not do something that will harm someone if there is a safer alternative available — khaled

Which is PRECISELY what you’re saying.

Intentional or negligent endangerment, even without a victim, is vicious because it deliberately makes probable a harm where there once was no risk of such harm. — 180 Proof

Don’t think any AN could have said it better!

Well that’s just an unproductive definition of the word “know”.

How does that challenge my premise? If they don't have sensible qualities, then they're not sensible objects, duh. — Bartricks

Right, so to keep your hypothesis intact you will make it so that "sensible" is different from physical/material. So electrons are no longer sensible, even though they are a subject of study in physics.

Well, you need to be above a certain level of intelligence (quite low, embarrassingly) to realize that everything I said was true and consistent. — Bartricks

It's consistent but misleading. I didn't say it's inconsistent. I said you are likely lying. Why else would you say "there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview" when you yourself don't see that problem. Either you're lying about not seeing the problem, lying about it being thought that there is such a problem or.... what? Why else would you say that sentence? Are you making some sort of argument from popularity? "Some people think there is a problem here, which is evidence that I am correct. Note I personally don't think there is a problem here, but I will cite it as evidence anyways". That's idiotic if that's what you're doing. Consistent, but idiotic.

An electron is extended — Bartricks

No it isn't and I've provided a link.

You: But you're wrong because Ts are Rs. — Bartricks

You misunderstand as usual. No, the claim isn't that Ts are Rs. By your analogy the claim would be "But actually, not all Rs are Qs, there are Rs that are not Qs, such as electrons". Not all sensible objects (Rs) are infinitely divisible or have infinite parts (Qs).

But to you, it is definitional that if an object is sensible it has infinite parts. In which case you would have to argue that electrons aren't sensible objects, although they're physical. Most people use "sensible" to mean "physical" or "material". But in your system there is: Material stuff, Sensible (a subset of the former) stuff, and Immaterial stuff. It’s just too much. And you end up with “light is not sensible”

And more problematically, all your arguments conclude that minds are not sensible. But again, you have to distinguish between sensible and physical/material. So you can have it be that minds are not sensible but are still material (like an electron). So you don’t get “immaterial” anyways necessarily, even if your arguments make sense.

And I noticed you dropped the objection to the 4th premise of the 4rd argument (that if you are a sensible object everything you do traces to external causes). You would rather avoid responding to an argument than admit you have no response. Dishonest and pathetic.

Anyways, you seem incapable of responding to or even recognizing critiques of your position so I won't waste any more time trying to help you. Furthermore, you’re dishonest, so there is really no use. (Ohhhh boy here comes the dunning kruger :roll: )

But in this case you know no one will step on it. No one that exists right now anyways. And that's all that matters right?

And parents saving money for their children's college education before the children are born are also committing "bad metaphysics" I guess....

I just don't understand why people pretend that we cannot consider harm done to a person who doesn't exist yet. We do make considerations like those all the damn time. Another example: The common saying of "Let's not leave a terrible world for our grandchildren" when talking about climate change. It's almost as if doing something that will harm someone in the future is bad even if the person to be harmed doesn't exist right now.

It's just not true that the reason placing the mine there is wrong is that someone "might" step on it. Because in the example you know as a matter of fact no one will, except Jeff of course. But Jeff is a fiction so we don't care about him....

And as decoration the mine only morally problematic if you intentionally or negligently left it armed to explode when stepped on — 180 Proof

But this is not an issue for anyone. You know this. No one will be harmed by the mine (since Jeff is a fiction). So what's the problem in that case? What is it about armed mines that will never harm anyone (again, since Jeff is a fiction) that is problematic?

It's just harmless decoration....

So do you only care about intent? And not about consequences? What if I placed the mine there as decoration with no intent to kill anybody?

And besides, if I KNEW Jeff would be harmed, wouldn't placing the mine anyways count as "intent to kill" regardless of my reasoning for placing it? Is it possible for my intent to be "to decorate the park" while I know that Jeff will die because of it 200 years from now?

The first two have shapes — Bartricks

Not really. https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/02/07/what-is-the-shape-of-an-electron/

Btw, which premise in which of my arguments are you trying to challenge? — Bartricks

This:

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?). — Bartricks

Quantum wave functions, electrons, and many other things in the physics of small things have no sensible properties (color, smell, taste, shape). Yet we call them physical. Unless you want to distinguish between physical and sensible now, and claim something like "electrons are not sensible objects"

But typical of you to miss the point and require me to remind you...

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one.
— khaled

Me too. So? — Bartricks

Then you are lying or were lying:

But by all means just contradict me, just note that unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview. — Bartricks

You claim that there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview, I reply that most people don't think there is such a problem, then you reply that you don't think there is just a problem? If you didn't think there was such a problem why would you point out that there are people who do. What kind of argument is that?

I did not claim that a sensible object has all the sensible properties. — Bartricks

Nor did I. Nor is that required for what I said. You just missed the point.

to a self-evident truth of reason — Bartricks

It is not something one arrives at by reason. Whether or not one experiences pain at the moment of death is an empirical question. No contradictions arise if the answer is "yes" or if the answer is "no" that are not just definitional.

This seems to be something ignorant narcissists have a problem with: they can't distinguish between things they say and self-evident truths of reason, for at some level they think they're god and all they need to do is say 'no' and it will be so. — Bartricks

The irony is too funny....

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states. — Bartricks

False dichotomy. They can not be extended and also not be subjective states. See: Quantum wave function. Or even electron.

It's you who doesn't understand.

I don't know what an electron is. — Bartricks

Not surprised...

But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing. — Bartricks

It goes against premise 2 of argument 8. There are sensible objects that are not divisible. So it is not true that if a sensible object exists that it is infinitely divisible. Is it clear enough for you now?

I'm seriously getting tired of having to remind you where the argument is. All the while you accuse me of not understanding the dialectic.....

Thinking while not being subject to any sensible experiences. — Bartricks

And you think this is possible without a brain?

For example: Say I knew that if I planted a mine at coordinates X,Y,Z, that Jeff will step on it 200 years from now and there is 0 chance it harms anyone other than Jeff. — khaled

Is placing the mine morally wrong? If so why?

The "someone" doesn't exist, is merely hypothetical. They can no more be harmed, or saved from harm, than Santa Claus can. — 180 Proof

Sure. Now why is placing the mine wrong? Or do you think it isn't?