Why does the question matter first off?

I don't quite get the relevance of memory in the equation. Suppose this hapless person does remember every detail of faer horrific crimes and still transforms into a classic good guy, the problem of how we should judge this person still remains; after all, this person has changed faer ways and that's exactly the sticking point in the original scenario in which fae suffers amnesia. — TheMadFool

:up:

My answer would be: We shouldn't prosecute him but people will anyways.

The person that would otherwise be harmed. The premise is clear "Do not do something that will harm someone if there is a safer alternative available". It's not a crazy premise at all. And it doesn't need that the person who is harmed be existing right now.

For example: Say I knew that if I planted a mine at coordinates X,Y,Z, that Jeff will step on it 200 years from now and there is 0 chance it harms anyone other than Jeff. But surely we can agree that it is ridiculous to say "No one exists to be harmed so placing the mine is fine". The premise only requires that there will exist someone that will be harmed.

So in this case safer for whom? Safer for Jeff of course. Though Jeff doesn't exist right now. But then people dismiss it as "bad metaphysics" to say that something is safer for Jeff. Well how else do you want me to say it? For what other reason is placing the mine wrong? You know what I mean when I say "safer for Jeff" even though no Jeff exists.

ha ha venting and kidding around. Good luck guys! — Joe0082

The irony....

I really wanna know what you hoped to accomplish by this thread...

The Unborn (or Never-To-Be-Born) cannot be "saved" because they don't exist to be "saved" — 180 Proof

Don’t want this to turn into another AN thread but the point of AN isn’t “saving the unborn”, it’s “Not doing something that results in harming someone when a (supposedly) safer alternative is available (not having children)”. It's a commonplace premise.

If one can occupy himself with the battles in his skull he need not pay attention to the ones that require actual effort. — NOS4A2

I sometimes wonder if that’s what everyone here is doing.... Philosophy as an escape from reality. A socially acceptable form of daydreaming perhaps.

Well, no, because consciousness is not an object at all, but a state. It's typical of your sloppiness that you treat consciousness and minds as equivalent, which is as silly as confusing thoughts with thinkers. — Bartricks

I meant mind. Stop nitpicking.

it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?) — Bartricks

What sensible property do electrons have? Or photons of light? Or quantum wave functions?

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem
— khaled

Okaay. You might want to get in touch with the world's philosophy departments and point this out then. — Bartricks

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one.

Psst, whether lumps of ham are minds is what is in dispute. — Bartricks

False. Whether minds are lumps of something sensible is what is in dispute. We can both agree lumps of ham don't have minds.

My point still stands:

2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks
— Bartricks

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow. — khaled

It makes sense to wonder how heavy a piece of paper is, but not how heavy light is. Even though both are sensible objects. In the same way, minds can be sensible, and also be such that it makes sense to wonder what they think, but not what rocks think.

No it doesn't. The claim that if something comes into being it has a prior cause is not equivalent to causal determinism. — Bartricks

But that wasn't the claim being made. The claim being made was:

4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes — Bartricks

And I responded: Not necessarily. A quantum wave function can do something that does NOT trace to external causes, because it was random. Sensible objects can cause things without tracing to external causes.

And besides, even if your claim was that if something comes into being it has prior cause, what's your proof for that? My reply would again be: Not necessarily. Example: Big bang.

But a reasonably intelligent person, upon asking "Is Megan at the party? And are there any dogs at the party?" and receiving the answer "Megan is certainly here, but I am not sure if there are any dogs here" would conclude that Megan was not a dog. — Bartricks

And that reasonably intelligent person would be wrong. He does not have sufficient evidence. As you said yourself:

Surely. It is, of course, possible that Megan is a dog, for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. — Bartricks

Which has to be the case. If you follow the analogy, here you want to know "Is the mind a material thing?". You ask the host (reason) "Hey, is the mind present". The host replies "Yes". You ask him "Are material objects present". He replies "Maybe".

Given that you were asking the question in the first place we have to assume that your reason doesn't present the answer (or else you wouldn't be asking the question). So your reason (the host) doesn't know whether or not the mind is a material thing, despite knowing that it is present and that material things may be present. So you don't have enough evidence to conclude from that that the mind is not material.

I would suggest you stop wasting half a paragraph attacking me when you don't understand what I'm saying. It just makes you look like an idiot.

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).
— khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you. — Bartricks

Yes I could. And with as much evidence and credibility as you use for your argument: None.

: every extended object has a top and a bottom — Bartricks

We were talking about sensible objects. Not extended objects. So there ends your line of reasoning. To say "extended object" is to already assume it's divisible.

Your confusing 'currently unable to divide it' with it being metaphysically impossible to divide it. — Bartricks

No, I'm saying there could be things that are metaphysically impossible to divide. An electron is a good candidate.

So, I can conceive of myself existing, and my brain not. — Bartricks

Describe to me what you're imagining then. No wonder you specifically can imagine being without a brain!

I started reading the drivel you wrote and determined it is not worth responding to. I think anyone reading can see which of us is making more sense. Happy trolling!

Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties — Bartricks

Thus it is possible that consciousness is a sensible object without smell or taste or texture or color.

unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview — Bartricks

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like — Bartricks

Correct. Because the lump of cheese happens to be one of the sensible things that it makes no sense to ask what they’re feeling. While minds are one of the sensible things for which the question makes sense. In the same way that it makes sense to ask what a mushroom tastes like but not what light particles taste like, even though both are sensible. You just couldn’t understand the argument.

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
— Bartricks

Not necessarily.
— khaled

Explain. — Bartricks

This assumes determinism. Which is not necessarily the case. And QM makes it unfavorable

Do you have grounds to conclude that Megan is not a dog? — Bartricks

No.

for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. — Bartricks

This is the case. Or else you're just question begging. When asking whether or not the mind is physical or immaterial, that means you don’t know (that the host doesn’t know whether or not Megan is a dog).

Er, you think there can be extended things that are not divisible — Bartricks

An electron for one. Yes.

Now, are you claiming that it is 'never' harmful to have one's sensible body destroyed? — Bartricks

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).

Due to it being divisible — Bartricks

But not every sensible object is divisible. Nor is there reason to think they are from armchair musings.

Stop up your ears, close your eyes, make sure not to be eating or smelling anything, and now render your body numb. Are you still aware of your self? Of course you are — Bartricks

Because my brain is still churning away. Try to stop that. Then come back and report what happened to “you”.

The point, though, is that the argument has a high degree of plausibility and if it goes through it establishes that our minds are immaterial. — Bartricks

You can’t assume idealism, then argue that minds are immaterial. That would not be convincing to anyone who’s not an idealist.

For even if each argument is only 50% likely to be sound — Bartricks

I would give them a 1-3% chance.

I've pointed out a bad premise in each. That's known as addressing generally.

But yea.... replying to you was a mistake as usual if you can't even see that.

Just say the dunning kruger line then move on. Write something interesting next time. :yawn:

the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? — Bartricks

Mental things causing physical changes is telekinesis. Seems dubious.

2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has — Bartricks

No. What does light taste like? What is its texture?

2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks — Bartricks

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think like, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow.

If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects — Bartricks

Where did this come from?

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes — Bartricks

Not necessarily.

If an object is sensible, it is divisible — Bartricks

Not necessarily.

2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs — Bartricks

Not necessarily. Depends on the way you die.

2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts — Bartricks

wtf?

My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing — Bartricks

Really? What would a mind that has no body feel like? Doesn't seem possible to me.

Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations — Bartricks

Ontologically no. We only know of them through bundles of sensations. To assume sensible objects ARE nothing more than bundles of sensations is just idealism.

the proposition that our minds are our brains. — Bartricks

I don't think it's so much a proposition as a "call to redefine" each mental state with its associated brain state. Which makes many of your arguments that rely on language use bad (that we can't ask how much our mind weighs for example)

I also don’t need to sacrifice mine or my children’s rights to protect Tim from a virus any grown adult can avoid on his own accord. — NOS4A2

“I don’t mind infecting someone with COVID by not wearing a mask because they could have avoided it (somehow)”

Is that really what you’re saying? And how could Tim avoid it? If you’re infected and you go on a subway without a mask do you expect everyone to up and leave to be safe?

Until someone comes along and deems masks to be risky, then you’re left wondering why you gave up your right in the first place — NOS4A2

Your “right” is societally granted too. You claim you have a right to wear whatever you want based merely on the fact that you can clothe yourself. But as I pointed out, you don’t have a right to steal or kill, even though you have the ability to do so. So the ability to do something doesn’t imply you have a right to do it. Rights come from society. Or at the very least, they don’t come from the ability to do something.

So you need to back up your claim that you have a right to wear whatever you want. You say it’s because you can clothe yourself. But ability is insufficient. So then, on what basis do you say you have a right to wear whatever you want? And if you say something like "Because that is a socially mediated right" or anything to the effect of putting rights in the hands of society (which is where I think they belong) then you would be obligated to wear a mask by the same token. And it would not be within your rights not to wear one.

How in the world is wearing a mask risky? If someone suggests so they’ll at best be ignored.

This answer assumes that neither optimism or pessimism is the proper starting point — Hanover

Well that was the matter in question. “Which is the best proper starting point”? When you ask that, you can’t assume your answer already. Pantagruel’s answer was, basically “due to lack of evidence to indicate that either is more proper than the other, I’ll pick the one I like more because it is less limiting”

So with that being said, one can be a "happy-go-lucky" Schopenhaurian philosophical pessimist. — schopenhauer1

I don’t think so. Would be very interested in meeting one but the “thematic discrepancy” would be too much I think. I find that generally, one’s attitude towards life in general is a huge factor in their philosophy. You can’t be optimistic for long while thinking that life is inherently suffering.

Buddhism is pretty much the same thing. The world is inherently suffering — schopenhauer1

Is not Buddhist doctrine but this isn’t the thread for it.

Yup, so we outlaw the ones that have risks we deem high enough. Like stealing. Or killing. Or not wearing a mask during a pandemic.

Because not wearing the mask has a chance to affect other people’s bodies negatively in this case. Same reason you don’t have a right to steal or kill.

I do for the simple reason that I am able to dress myself. — NOS4A2

You’re also able to still and kill. Do you have a right to do those?

Instead, we should appeal to everyone's direct appetites, free from any interpretation into desires or intentions yet — Pfhorrest

Only part I don’t get. What’s an “appetite” that’s not a desire or intention? What are these “hedonic experiences”?

But can Tom make his own arguments? Now this changes the path this takes. — schopenhauer1

Sure. I’m just adding mine.

I now have to choose to argue your particular line of thought. — schopenhauer1

If you want to. But that got us nowhere last time.

- That most general and fundamental subfield of the ethical sciences, playing the foundational role to them that physics plays to the physical sciences, is what I think deserves to be called "ethics" simpliciter. That field's task would be to catalogue the needs or ends, and the abilities or means, of different moral agents and patients, like how physics catalogues the functions of different particles.

- Building atop that field, the ethical analogue of chemistry would be to catalogue the aggregate effects of many such agents interacting, as much of the field of economics already does, in the same way that chemical processes are the aggregate interactions between many physical particles.

- Atop that, the ethical analogue of biology would be to catalogue the types of organizations of such agents that arise, and the development and interaction of such organizations individually and en masse, like biology catalogues organisms.

- Lastly, atop that, the ethical analogue of psychology would be to catalogue the educational and governmental apparatuses of such organizations, which are like the self-awareness and self-control, the mind and will so to speak, of such organizations. — Pfhorrest

I don’t see how any of this tells someone what they should do? It just seems to be cataloguing what people need and want, and the results of that. It reads like the first level is simply psychology, second is economics, third is political science and the last is.... also political science.

I don’t see where ethics comes into the picture. Knowing that people want food, and the consequences of the they all the way to a political level, doesn’t seem to have anything to do with ethics.

Why is this a good thing to do to someone else? — schopenhauer1

Because not doing it is also harmful. To the people already here.

And before you ask me why I’m commenting this: It’s to offer a different perspective since you, once again, seem to be repeating the same old argument. “Life can be harmful so it shouldn’t be enforced”. And since I don’t see anyone making this point on the thread I say it. “Not enforcing it is also harmful, sometimes”

No I’m not trying to stick it to you or “put you in your place” or whatever else you insist I’m doing. Just preventing the thread from becoming and echo chamber.

534,000 deaths in your country.

Less than a thousand in mine. Lockdowns work. Where yours went wrong was to lock down too late, and hence for too long. — Banno

Idk why it takes so long for someone to say the most obvious points. Finally!

The claim would then have to be that lockdowns killed more than 40700-40800 Australians (adjusted for population, you can check the math yourself). I find that highly unlikely. Especially not due to the causes you mentioned such as domestic abuse or suicide. Domestic abuse death cases in Australia numbered 48 in 2020.

https://womensagenda.com.au/latest/48-women-have-now-been-killed-violently-in-australia-this-year/#:~:text=And%20it%20didn%27t%20make,recorded%20in%20a%20single%20day.

And suicide rates don't seem to have increased much either. There was no statistically significant increase at all in Queensland lockdown:

https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(20)30435-1/fulltext

So you're still short over 40,000 deaths that were supposedly caused by this lockdown. Your claim that these deaths will come from "locked down kids killing themselves" is total bunk. And to say the Australian lockdowns caused 40,000 deaths in the 3rd world is a pretty big claim. And even if it were true, it could easily be argued that the Australian government is justified in favoring saving its own citizens lives over the lives of people in 3rd world countries that rely on its trade. What kind of government would not put its citizens first?

But when you have hundreds and thousands of subjects it’s difficult to believe they’re all lying to troll you. And besides, no one has a reason to call a red apple green.

Also, does this imply that near-identical bodies produce (only) near-identical experiences? Perhaps this is what Isaac is getting at with his talk about 'sameness'. — Luke

I think so.

All of this of course assumes that, identical bodies produce identical experiences.
— khaled

So it's no more than an assumption, right? — Luke

You don't share this assumption? You think that you can have the exact same physical state at two different times and have different experiences? I find that the way less likely hypothesis. Cheddar cheese tastes similar every time I eat it. And if cheddar cheese suddenly tastes like chocolate ice cream the first thing I suspect is that there is something physically different from the last time I ate cheddar cheese. It seems that when the physical conditions are the same or similar that the experience is the same or similar.

Otherwise what can account for a difference in experience? Do you often find yourself in the exact same physical situations but with different sensations?

But yes. It is no more than an assumption. But then so are all the alternatives. Point is it is the assumption that seems to match our experience the most. When the same things happen (stepping on a lego), we feel the same way (ouch).

Why can it not be anything stronger than an assumption? — Luke

I'm interested in an example of something "stronger than an assumption" for you.

You can access their "neural regions involved, behaviours produced, words used to describe it...etc", but whether these are associated with the same sensations seems like little more than an assumption. How can you prove it? — Luke

By changing variables around to see if the affect the sensations and the reports. There will be some physical differences which result in different sensations. For example: When I step on a lego I am in pain, whereas if the lego isn't there I'm not. The physical difference in this case is the lego. You can deduce that that is the case by having my walk on a lego then not walk on a lego. In once case I'll be in pain, and in the other I won't be.

If we change a physical aspect and the experience doesn't change, then we can conclude that that physical aspect is not responsible for changing the experience. For instance: We can know that toe size does not affect your perception of color. Or else we'd expect that when your toes are swollen that you would report that your perceptions of color changed (similar to putting on color inverting glasses for example). That doesn't happen, so we can conclude that toe size doesn't affect your perception of color.

Incidentally, this is what neurologists do. They mess with your brain and see how your reports of your experience change (due to your experience changing). Based on this we can narrow down the important physical factors for any sensation. Such that we can tell, decisively, that if we cloned Luke and gave his clone slightly bigger toes, the Luke clone will still be having the exact same experience of color as the original Luke.

Similarly, by narrowing down the variables sufficiently we can get to a point where we can tell exactly what Luke is feeling at time X by measuring all the relevant variables.

All of this of course assumes that, identical bodies produce identical experiences.

It's the fact that we cannot access other people's sensations in order to compare them. — Luke

Sure but we can access their reports. And assuming that they aren't lying that should be good enough no? If they're not lying a change in reports should indicate a change in sensations.

Your individual situation doesn't map to large social gatherings — Bitter Crank

Finally someone said it!

and still today, more than a hundred years after the double slit experiment. — Olivier5

I am familiar with the experiment and many of its variations. It does not pose a threat to determinism. It ends our hopes of actually determining the future, but it doesn’t end the idea that it is determined. Many interpretations of QM are deterministic.

There is no qualitative difference here. — Olivier5

Yes there is. Weakly emerged concepts can be completely reduced to their component parts. Something like “temperature”. We can always talk about “average kinetic energy of the molecules” instead of temperature, and we would make exactly as much sense. Because temperature is precisely a measure of the average kinetic energy of molecules.

With strong emergence, you can’t do that. Which is why I think it’s magical bullshit. “Put 3 candles in these spots and draw this in blood on the ground and you get Lucifer”. No amount of talking about candles or blood will say anything about the resulting devil.

Actually they do — Olivier5

Actually they don't, but believers still believe!

I'm undecided on the issue btw. I don't think determinism/indeterminism matters much.

Emergentist, if that's a word — Olivier5

Strong or weak?

It takes courage to doubt everything at the risk of going completely insane. — TaySan

Did he really though? He got all his beliefs back. With God as a bonus.

Maybe doubting everything should drive you insane.

Your "egg of consciousness" is different from most people's because you don't say "the mind is non physical" or anything like that.
— khaled

That is correct. — Olivier5

Reductionist? Just curious.

As for old assumptions that do clash with modern scientific observations, well, they should be discarded I suppose. — Olivier5

Like these:

The model where the mind is non-physical, yet has top to bottom causation, and also mental events are private — khaled

determinism — Olivier5

Modern scientific observations don't discard determinism. Probabilistic theories do not discard determinism any more than saying "This coin toss has a 50/50 chance of producing heads or tails" means that we cannot predict the outcome given starting conditions.

epiphenomenalism is for the epiphenomenal among us, those of us who have no impact on anything whatsoever and are quite happy about their own irrelevance. The theory may logically be true for them, as a self-fulfilling prophecy is: they don't matter because they don't want to. But otherwise, it is logically self-contradictory. — Olivier5

Way I see it is it is the only way out for a dualist who wants to respect the science. That, or parallelism. Because it is very difficult to convince oneself of interactionism if they want to respect the physics.

I wouldn't break the egg of my own consciousness for any omelette — Olivier5

Your "egg of consciousness" is different from most people's because you don't say "the mind is non physical" or anything like that. I think Isaac is arguing specifically against a dualist model. Then again, idk what your position is.

Some social constructs may be based on insufficient empirical evidence but it does not make them total nonsense. — Olivier5

The model where the mind is non-physical, yet has top to bottom causation, and also mental events are private, clashes with empirical evidence. It's not that we don't have enough evidence to establish it.

There is no evidence we should care for babies though, that much is true. We do it for other reasons than strictly material. And therefore, not all social construct can be evidence-based. Some are a priori stated. — Olivier5

And when an a priori assumption clashes with modern findings which should we favor?

We should doubt everything — TheMadFool

I doubt it!

There's a social value in having a case that is immune (or seemingly so) to counter-argument using established methods of debate. That social value is not the same as the utility/aesthetic value of the belief to you. — Isaac

When should you favor the utility/aesthetic value over the social value? Some people, like flat earthers do it too much. Others too little, and are probably anxiety ridden because of that.

Well now you’ve replaced one question (whatever it was you were doubting) with 7. More room for doubt. But I think “How certain do I have to be in this situation” is the most important there.

I voted yes obviously because it’s not like I have to press the button. Having the ability to be happy whenever I want to seems to be a pure positive.

You wouldn’t really be left with anything. If you want to keep doubting, beyond any reasonable stopping point, you could. The question is where is a reasonable stopping point.

link isn’t working

Once we do that, I think we come up with only a few basic things that remain. — Dharmi

I doubt it!

That seems enough to me already. Doing it deliberately on top of all that seems a bit masochistic. — Isaac

I would know.