Explain it then, instead of beating around the bush.

It's what and I were discussing before you interjected.

You noted it was "dealt with" and "not a problem".

Premise: The interests of a future child do not exist.

Implication: Actions that willfully undermine said child's non-existent interests are acceptable.

Your main problem is that you cannot compare the suffering of someone to the "suffering of nothing". Maybe that's true. But that would imply some nasty things I'll start with one. — khaled

I've noticed that these implications have been pointed out on several occasions by you, and I, and none of us have received much response.

It's not avoided at all. I specifically mention unavoidable poverty. — Benkei

So then, do you accept the implication of your premise?

I'm not sure I see this as a problem. — Echarmion

The problem is simple. If one accepts the premise that children do not have a well-being to take into account before they are born, this implies that it is perfectly acceptable to have children even when one is fully aware that they are causing them a life-time of suffering.

To me this contradicts any conceivable notion of parenting and morality.

It wasn't dealt with. It was cleverly avoided.

You're presented your premise. I've presented you with an implication of that premise. If you accept one, you accept the other.

Then we arrive at the problem already presented:

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. — Echarmion

So are they important or not?

You seem to be beating around the bush here.

No, because the obligation of the parents is one sided. It applies regardless of the interests of the child, so there is no need to try to divine their interests before they can have any, much less ascribe some kind of will to nonexistence. — Echarmion

If not the interests of the child, from where do these obligations stem?

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to?

But even if I grant that for the sake of discussion, it'd still be the case that I need to decide, for myself, whether or not an interaction is voluntary on the other side. Even if I am being told directly, that only ever constitutes a certain amount of evidence for or against an underlying will. — Echarmion

Sure.

Seems like all the more reason to be extremely careful when interacting forcefully with others, even more so when it concerns (literally) life-changing matters.

My line of reasoning would only say that the interests of the child are not the issue. — Echarmion

If the interests of the child aren't important, then whose interests are? The desires of the parents?

And doesn't your mention of obligations imply that the interests of the future child should be taken into account preceding the act of putting it into existence?

Whose discretion do you suppose I apply? I only have access to my own. — Echarmion

I'd take it a step back and argue that one should avoid forcing one's will upon others against their will altogether. Voluntary and consensual interaction seems to me the basis of moral conduct.

But this implies that the child that doesn't yet exist already has a will we are protecting. — Echarmion

What individual is being forced? You're only an individual after you have already experienced life. — Echarmion

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth.

You should use your power if doing so follows a maxim that you can will to be universalised. Usually, asking if you yourself would want to experience it is a good first approximation. But the details depend on the experience and the relationship we're in. — Echarmion

If it is acceptable to use one's power at one's own subjective discretion to force one's will onto others, we enter a slippery slope that inevitably leads to "might makes right."

I don't see how there could be a "violation" if there is nothing protected. — Echarmion

Protection implies more parties are involved (AKA, parent protects their would-be child from a third party). I am arguing from the viewpoint of the parent in relation to their would-be child. 'Protecting' one's future child from one's own desire of having children can be more easily understood as making the choice not to potentially violate one's would-be child's will.

But this is getting overly fuzzy, while the objection of anti-natalists is very straight forward. What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not?

It's not a complicated matter at all.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent?

I don't think that needs to be argued. The argument is simply that one should not purposefully put an individual in a situation that they did not (or cannot) consent to.

There's no protection of another's will. It's the prevention of violating another's will.

The question that needs answering first here is why consent is important. — Echarmion

Because without it one risks causing harm or distress against an individual's will, regardless of one's intention.

I haven't made up my mind about anti-natalism yet, but I think the most difficult question it raises is what exactly justifies the act of forcing someone to experience life.

If we can agree that forcing individuals to do things without their consent is inherently problematic, then this raises a lot of questions regarding the act of having children.

I think when we whine about American imperialism, we've just totally forgotten how devastating a real empire can be. — frank

If that is the case I blame short memories.

We want to satisfy our hunger, we want to have sex, we want to acquire things and do things that help with survival and pass on our genes. To overcome this "slavery" would involve being able to ignore the imperatives evolution sets up. It would involve not desiring food when hungry, not desiring sex when horny, it would involve not reacting to fear when scared, not reacting with angree words when offended. Monks through meditation have been able to do this to different extents so in a seance monks are overcoming there "slave to the evolutionary process" — Restitutor

If evolution isn't driving our behaviors then what is? — Restitutor

This is the key question, I believe.

I would take it one step back. The driving force behind our behavior is a desire to be happy. The evolutionary process has provided us with goals that promise happiness, which function as a carrot on a stick.

Some individuals may come to the conclusion that this situation does not provide them with the happiness they seek.

What then is the function of all the imperatives that evolution has produced for them?

It seems to me whether evolution has a purpose for the individual is therefore a subjective matter, and not particularly suited as a basis for truth or morality.

Do you not see any role for evolution at all in any human behavior? — Restitutor

It depends on the individual. I imagine it can be useful for explaining human behavior in general, but I'm not sure what the purpose of such generalizations are in the context of philosophy.

It is not a master-save relationship. — god must be atheist

A slave without a master is a slave nonetheless.

I would brush up on learning the evolutionary process if I were you and wished to understand natural processes of evolution. — god must be atheist

Cute. Not a polite way to start a conversation.

Keep your condescending diatribe to yourself.

We are a a very similar proposition, we are just the packaging for our DNA, the host that allows for there replication. It makes sence that genes wouldn't just control what our bodies look like bout would control behavior, or at least create a the framework within which we can indoctrinate each other with useful ideas. — Restitutor

Is there any reason that the individual should be content with being a slave to the evolutionary process?

And what rational analysis pertaining to this process can be expected from individuals which, as you say, are indoctrinated in a framework to enforce it?

Self-discovery assumes there's a self and that there's something to be discovered about the self and, most importantly, that it's something one would want to discover. I have no idea about the first two assumptions but, in my own case, the third assumption turns out to be false. Let's face it, we're all just one bad day away from becoming something we, ourselves, wouldn't want to meet in a dark alley. — TheMadFool

Assuming one finds a monster to be dwelling in their sub-/unconscious, wouldn't one want to understand how it works and what it is doing there?

I'd say an obsession with the acquisition of material things can be an inhibitor of enlightenment, but it is indicative of a deeper condition, namely the obsession with material existence; the latter being the real issue.

It ties in nicely with 's comment. How are the "monster" that TheMadFool describes and material existence connected?

Gloating over someone's lynching. That's absolutely disgusting.

Deal with it? I think we've already established you're the one who is having a hard time accepting the fact that other views exist. And that is your problem, not mine.

Projection seems to be becoming a theme in our conversation, no?

That's it then? The way you rationalize your hatred for views you do not agree with is some vague notion that I didn't care enough?

Remorse? Remorse for what? The millions of deaths and untold suffering that I am somehow responsible for in your head?

Please.

You're just trying to convince yourself that I must be a horrible person so you don't have to think about what I have to say.

You need a long look in the mirror my friend. — Tzeentch

And if you have any trouble figuring out where you should start looking, start here:

When you are confronted with a view you do not agree with, you wish for that person to get hit by a car.

When I am confronted with a view I do not agree with, I wish for them to reflect.

Now reflect upon that, and tell me which one of us hasn't progressed beyond the mental age of 15.

And please, please do not look before you cross the street next time. :up:

+This goes for anyone else who hasn't progressed beyond a mental age of 15 and thinks it's cool to do stupid shit because "mUh fReeDoM!". Keep doing it. You'll get your Darwin award eventually. — Baden

I guess instead you'd like everyone to make mature comments such as this one.

You need a long look in the mirror my friend.

If you have such a hard time dealing with other people's views maybe you're the one who should leave.

That's your problem. Not mine.

@Baden Oh, is that so? Do you offer similar tirades to people who do not look before they cross the street?

The only one you are fooling is yourself.

@Baden Does it bother you that people aren't as afraid of this as you are?

Interesting topic.

For two reasons I think being taught critical thought should always precede being taught philosophy.

The first is that critical thought is often required to understand why philosophers think a certain way. Without it, many ideas of philosophers will seem absurd to children who grow up in a world that lives according to very different principles.

The second is that critical thought is one's only weapon against a faulty or opinionated teacher.

Philosophy is a type of teaching that shouldn't be taught to someone who is incapable of challenging the ideas. I think that goes against the nature of philosophy. That's why teaching children should be done with caution.

But the fatality rate wasn't the reason for measures. It was the impact on the healthcare system that required and continues to require measures. — Benkei

The strain on our medical facilities wasn't caused by covid itself, but by the disproportionate measures that were taken and never reversed. Hospitals are overworked because a large portion of their personnel is "treating" patients who have flu symptoms.

The fatality rate wasn't known and everybody who knew what he was talking about didn't talk about the fatality rate but case fatality rate. — Benkei

Turns out they made wrong assumptions, then. I don't fault people for making wrong decisions when there was no information available. Information is available now, and governments should start acting upon it instead of trying save their hides by pretending they haven't made some grave mistakes.

The problem in the end is no pre-existing immunity anywhere with a high reproduction rate. — Benkei

Yet we accept this "problem" every year with the flu and other coronaviruses.

And if you want to talk about confirmation bias I would suggest a long look in the mirror first.

Single studies don't prove. They make plausible. And what this makes plausible is that the infection fatality rate of covid-19 is only a fraction of the estimates which were used to plunge the world into a full-blown panic.

A certain amount of people owe a certain amount of other people an apology.

https://www.who.int/bulletin/online_first/BLT.20.265892.pdf

What I think requires consideration is the common sense notion that suffering is an objective thing, external to the individual. I think when examined, suffering is internal. It is highly subjective, and caused by the desires (however understandable those desires may be) of the individual.

If this type of action is permissible, then so are actions like allowing someone to drown, be tortured, etc. — Pinprick

Except this would be more akin to a situation in which two persons are drowning and only one can be saved.

I'd say the moral thing to do is to save one rather than to let both drown. I'd certainly not consider it immoral to save at least one.

I don't know what "this" is. — khaled

If someone believes they are helping someone, but in fact they are not (the person who is helped does not consent) then the helper was ignorant to the desires of the person who is helped.

The probem with "helping others" is you don't know if you're being an actual help or if you're harming them in some way — khaled

This is why I posit that the valid point you are raising is covered by my point about ignorance in relation to outcomes.

I'm trying to understand what you're saying, let me see if I got it right:

A is capable of helping both B and C, and because he chooses to help B, your argument is that this harms C, because since B is helped, C is deprived of that help.

I have two issues with this.

First, I don't think this constitutes harming someone. Whatever C needs help with, this harm has already been done in the past. Therefore C needing help is the starting point and not a result of A's actions.

Second, as I argued, the neutral situation here is that both B and C need help, and if A only has the capability of helping one or the other, he is still capable of producing a net positive effect where either B or C is helped, instead of both not being helped.

Isn't this covered by ignorance, though?

And if someone successfully manages to help someone else, isn't consent implied here?

I think I understand what you're saying, but I'm not on board with this. I think it should be argued from a neutral situation, being "No one is helped", so whoever I manage to successfully help it's a net positive.

I think a well intentioned person "believes they are being moral, and desires to be moral", but their actions may result in immoral outcomes. — Philosophim

The way I view morality is, that only actions performed by moral agents can be said to be either moral or immoral. So an outcome (not being an action) cannot be said to be moral or immoral, as far as my views go.

The question I see being problematic with this is what if helping one person inadvertently, or perhaps even knowingly, harms someone else? — Pinprick

Again, basically the same point with this. What if intentionally harming someone helps someone else? — Pinprick

So in these cases one's intentions do not match the actual results. In other words, despite one's best intentions one was ignorant of what was required to achieve the desired results. This would belong in a category that may be called 'naive morality' or 'naive immorality'. One's actions are moral (or immoral), but one is not able to act in a way that brings these intentions about.

For example:

A friend needs help with a psychological problem, but despite one's best efforts, instead of helping this friend one only makes his problem worse.

That would be an example of 'naive moral' behavior.

What if it is intentional, like when a boxer intentionally inflicts as much damage as possible within the rules in order to win the match? Perhaps the contractual nature of boxing, and sports in general, eliminates morality? If I say it’s ok for you to intentionally harm me, is it actually ok? — Pinprick

That depends.

If the intention of the boxer is to win, and hurting his opponent is an unintended side-effect, then I do not think he is being immoral, but possibly ignorant (if he deals more damage than he intends).

If the intention of the boxer is expressly to hurt his opponent, I would say we are certainly in immoral territory.

There is an added dimension of consent in the fact that both boxers agree to being physically hurt by each other in the practice of their sport. I think in this case there's an agreement between the two parties and ideally both parties are aware of what is 'acceptable' hurt to inflict upon each other.

There is of course a difference between having to intention to bloody someone's nose, or trying to deliver brain damage. The other party would likely consent to the former, but not the latter. So in the former case I'd say the behavior isn't immoral, but in the second case it might be.

Just thinking out loud here, but maybe you could argue that a perfectly moral act actually requires some level of ignorance. I find it difficult to think of an act that is essentially vacuous, that only affects one person at one particular time and place. Because of this, it is likely that what helps one person may unknowingly harm someone else. So, if one were omnipotent, and was aware of these unforeseen consequences, would s/he even be capable of only intending to do good? Basically, I think most, perhaps all, moral acts are the type of situation where doing A helps B, but harms C. If we have full understanding, then doing A is intentionally causing both harm and help at the same time, which isn’t perfectly moral. — Pinprick

Lets take our friend with a psychological problem again. Lets say I want to help him, and I succeed in doing so. Who or what would be the party that is harmed in this example?