Very good OP.
I think the natural language use and philosophical (as in 'hard problem') use (if there is such a distinction) intersect in, for example, the following reasonably natural exchange between two people at the beach:
Jack: I wonder what it would be like to be a seagull?
Jill: Fantastic, I would imagine. The feeling of swooping through the air, the effortless traversing of long distances. Pecking people, nicking chips. I'd love it.
Jack: I dunno, it might not feel like how you imagine at all. We're very different from seagulls. It's like trying to imagine what it's like to be a snail, we're just too different.
Jill: Maybe, but even though I can't imagine what it is like to be a snail, I reckon there is still something it is like to be a snail, even though I'm not sure what. I think they have nerves don't they?
Jack: Sure. Not like rocks though, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. No nerves or even cells, so they couldn't possibly have experiences.
Jill: Agreed, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. Although some philosophers think there is according to my friend bert1.
They are discussing, I think completely intelligibly, about whether there is
something it is like to be x.
Equivalently, to my mind, we can talk about the kinds of things that have
experiences, and the kinds of things that don't.
Equivalently, to be
aware of something is to be experiencing something, is to be
conscious of something.
'Feeling' can be used equivalently,
to feel x is to be conscious of x. Even to 'know' something could be used in this way, although that's less common.
'Sentient' can be used this way.
To be sentient is just to be conscious, to be capable of experience.
There are other ways these words can be used, but I think all of this language can be used to talk about
consciousness in the phenomenal sense. (I personally think it is important to make a distinction between consciousness and consciousness-of-something, as it is, for me, in principle possible to be conscious without being conscious of something, even if that never actually obtains).
Dictionaries typically identify this usage among other usages. Although interestingly, not all do! I think the Cambridge online dictionary misses it out. For example (I have bolded the phenomenal sense intended by the OP):
Dictionary.com
noun
1) the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc.
2) the thoughts and feelings, collectively, of an individual or of an aggregate of people:
the moral consciousness of a nation.
3) full activity of the mind and senses, as in waking life:
to regain consciousness after fainting.
4) awareness of something for what it is; internal knowledge:
consciousness of wrongdoing.
5) concern, interest, or acute awareness:
class consciousness.
6) the mental activity of which a person is aware as contrasted with unconscious mental processes.
Banno only identifies one of these definitions (roughly no 3) and says it is 'the best' which is absurd. Dictionaries describe usage, it's a factual business not a normative one. Likewise this thread is concerned with facts of usage and meaning. People mean what they mean. Is Banno saying that people shouldn't use words in ways he doesn't like? That philosophers should stop talking about sense 1 completely? Or is he saying that sense 1 is really best thought of as sense 3? Or what?