Maybe I'm missing context, but I don't see the difference in perspective the two accounts provide in thread. If what matters for the purposes of the thread is:

( 1 ) In order for a person P to believe X, P must act in accordance with X.
and ( 2 ) P acts in accordance with X at some times (contexts etc) but not others. — fdrake

I'm saying there's two ways to look at (2), we could see that they do, in fact seem to show two beliefs, or we could say that the belief is something we've yet to establish (something which explains both behaviours) but the story to rationalise that belief is confused) The difference, as I see it, is an important one. I hold that beliefs themselves are quite deeply ingrained and difficult to shift, they're almost directly causal of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. That we model X as x1 is a result of the properties of X as much (if not more) than it is about our priors about x2. The narratives we use to make sense of what we've just done (and which do influence our priors in future) are, however, much more malleable and depend largely on what narratives are available to us in our community. We'd rather pick one off the shelf than construct one ourselves from scratch, so it matters greatly what's on the shelf currently.

It seems to me that if ( 2 ) being true automatically removes P's belief that X, that opens up a can of worms. If you require that someone follows X at all times or contexts in order to believe X, then contexts in which X is irrelevant and even momentary lapses in judgement suffice to remove P's belief that X. A less absolute position, that in the aggregate P acts in accordance with X is required for belief seems necessary — fdrake

It depends what you mean by 'aggregate', or rather how you intend to 'aggregate'. We could say that I believe I ought to go for a run every other day; or we could say, on a Monday, I don't believe I ought to go for a run, then on a Tuesday that I do believe I ought to go for a run, then on a Wednesday I don't believe I ought to go for a run... The former seems more parsimonious.

If, on the other hand, you're going to include every lapse in judgement or attention, we get a failure of pragmatism the other way - which is why I always refer to beliefs as 'a tendency to act as if...'. We've got to include the scholasticism of mental activity at the very least.

But the priest... Well, it seems unlike a momentary lapse of attention, or a few randomly firing neurons messing up the system. It seems we simply haven't described what he actually believes properly, relying too heavily on his poor explanatory narrative and not enough on his pattern of behaviour - what is he acting as if were the case.

Even if they believed in bible study that God approved of stoning, I don't think they'd have to worship the entity as if they approved of stoning. Albeit this comes with the price of making God's definitive properties, opinions and dispositions towards them depend upon what the believer is doing at the time. — fdrake

Yeah, I don't think either account prevents us from doing this, but the problem with this, and...

the contexts in which P's believing X could be assessed would therefore be dependent upon P's state at the time of assessing their believing X. In other words, which contexts count as relevant for trialling P's accord with X vary with how P is and what they're doing at the time. — fdrake

...is that we're left with shifting the important question further down the road. Why? Why then and not then? It's like the 'interpretation' argument. If we accept that there are these different beliefs at different times, then we're left with the actual belief no longer being the important question (after all, it might not be the belief in a minute). The important question becomes the connection between context and belief. I'd personally still couch that in terms of belief "the subject believes that in context A they ought do X, but in context B they ought do Y", but we could couch it in terms of two incongruous beliefs that one ought do X and Y respectively, beliefs which vary by context. I think we'd still need the meta construction in either case.

But they refuse to do so. Now what? — baker

I walk away I suppose. I'm not going to progress to fisticuffs.

What use is fairness, when people can live just fine without it? — baker

Again, you're misconstruing my intent. I never claimed fairness was indispensable.

Maybe it is better to learn from a book with some prickly parts and some rough edges. — Srap Tasmaner

You might have to draw this out a bit for me. It seems like, if true, it would make a good counter to what I'm saying (that the book is an undesirable offering as one of the available narratives), but it's not quite clear what advantage you see the 'prickly parts' having.

If, however, you wish to speak to people that find meaning in the book, you have to speak to them about the book in ways that they will relate to. — Ennui Elucidator

I agree.

Foisting your opinion of what the words mean (e.g. “It is a literal telling of mythic history and the dinosaurs prove that the story is untrue and the Bible is a lie!”) does not mean anything to someone who cares about the story because your meaning is so far from theirs. — Ennui Elucidator

Why not? If I'm talking about the Lord of the Rings with someone, is it a mark of a reasonable adult conversation that I simply refuse to listen to anyone whose interpretation differs from my own?

The argument is not about what it says, but what it means; what the value is in including that story both on its own and within the greater context/s of the book. If you aren’t willing to engage with the material on that level... — Ennui Elucidator

Who says I'm not? Again, the same special pleading. I'm not entitled to an opinion about what the meaning is to me, what it's value is to me. Only positive interpretations are welcome. What other text gets that treatment?

One can find merit in both positions (and even agree with one or the other) without willfully misrepresenting one position or the other. — Ennui Elucidator

Again, why am I refused an opinion on their position? I've spent an entire lifetime studying people, specifically people's beliefs and how they're formed and defended. Am I still not allowed an opinion on why people form their beliefs? Do you really believe people have such faithful and privileged access to their psychologies that my even venturing an opinion contrary to their own is nothing short of an insult?

Both methods lead to an interpretation of your writings, but one cannot objectively say which is right and which is wrong, just that they are different. — Ennui Elucidator

Right, but one of those ways here is being rebuked. Or is it that you just thought I was unaware of the other and might benefit from having it pointed out to me?

If you want to engage with their meaning (be it to describe or critique), you need to identify their meaning in the first place rather than supplanting it with your own. — Ennui Elucidator

No, I've no interest in going that (at least not here). I'm talking about the danger inherent in the ways in which it could be interpreted.

The Bible “opens” with Genesis. — Ennui Elucidator

'Opens' is not a technical term, it's a conversational one. I'm not objectively wrong for referring to some of the early books as being in the 'opening' part. Just about anything in the first half could arguably be called the 'opening'. Again, more special pleading. I gave direct quotes relevant to the claims I was making and you're trying to wriggle out of them by quibbling over whether they're really in the 'opening' or not. Honestly, I doubt you'd find a single secular commentator who doesn't know that the Bible starts with Genesis, so even the slightest charity in reading would gather what I meant.

The justification condition is quite clearly understood as being about the reason(s) the individual believes what he does. Your quote doesn’t say otherwise (in fact it explicitly mentions justified false beliefs). The debate between internalists and externalists is over what constitutes good reasons. Regardless of which side is correct, it is nonetheless about the reasons the individual believes what he does. — Michael

Yes, I agree. One such reason might be "my epistemic peers have thrown every conceivable test at it and they all believe it's the case" a justification.

Also, as we've just agreed, a legitimate definition of 'truth'

Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. It's just a particular type of justification.

I quoted directly from the book. It's in English, right? — Isaac


No you didn’t and it’s not in English, but translation will suffice. — Ennui Elucidator

I'm no bible scholar. If my quotes are inaccurate I'm happy to be corrected.

Read the first story and show me the babies put to the sword. — Ennui Elucidator

“Samaria shall become desolate; for she hath rebelled against her God: they shall fall by the sword: their infants shall be dashed in pieces, and their women with child shall be ripped up.” (Hosea 13:16)

Or the second or the third or the fourth or the…. You get my point. — Ennui Elucidator

Not really, no. These things are in the bible - or at east the version I'm looking at

“A priest’s daughter who loses her honor by committing fornication and thereby dishonors her father also, shall be burned to death.” (Leviticus 21:9).

“But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for the damsel: Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father’s house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die.” (Deuteronomy 22:20-21)

“If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her; Then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die.” (Deuteronomy 22:25)

Yeah, I really don't want to be read as implying that no good can come out of religion. I've heard other stories like your pastor, but then people (as you have done) will say " of course the secular folk have done much good to", so I find it hard to see Christianity as playing any role here other than a narrative, a way of being kind, a story to explain the struggle, the need to help others, the falling back into bad habits, the group identity, the value of a spiritual leader... But one narrative among many, yes?

So we can look at those narratives and question how good they are at what they do. When people want to feel part of a group, want to find some meaning to the whole charity, forgiveness, compassion thing...do we want them reaching for Christianity as their story (the one with all the misogyny, homophobia and abuse in it too), or would we rather they reach for something a little less fraught? Less at risk of leading people astray.

See the trouble with narratives (post hoc though they are) is that we don't like to have too many of them. So there's a tendency to view other things through the same story. If people use a Christian narrative to make sense of their feeling of belonging, compassion, charity... they're more likely to reach for it to make sense of their feelings of othering and disgust at something like homosexuality, more likely to reach or it to make meaning of their sense of fear when people live less retrained lives (sex outside marriage, experimenting with drugs etc). It's not such a good story to have around to help people make sense of those aspects of their lives because it's answers there are not so friendly.

Maybe I'm being unrealistic in assuming we've any control at all over the prevalence of such a powerful narrative as Christianity, but narratives have been changed before

Just one more symptom (an important one) of a much wider problem of irrationality. — Xtrix

Let's look at that claim then.

Corporations have presided over the largest accumulation of wealth the world has ever seen. The pharmaceuticals have, in the space of just over a year, managed to take public funds and turn them into private patents that they've sold to over 80% of the population of the western world. An absolutely unprecedented success for any product ever. New legislation is being passed which will make it harder for people to report on corporate malfeasance, and the left-wing has voluntarily gagged themselves from complaining about any wrongdoing for fear of undermining confidence in their products.

Meanwhile, some nutjobs think the vaccine will turn them into a 5G transmitter because some Facebook page told them so.

Perhaps you could start by explaining why you think the latter is super important whilst the former is just old hat that there's not much point talking about.

In context of the JTB definition of knowledge, the J refers to the individual having good reasons to believe what they do. — Michael

Where have you got this interpretation from?

Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.[7] We shall return to the question of how reliabilist approaches bear on the analysis of knowledge in §6.1. — SEP on justifications in JTB

I quoted myself. But believe what you wish. — Xtrix

It's not about what I believe, this is a debating platform, you're expected to support your positions against interlocutors. That's the point. Otherwise just write the stuff you think in your own private journal, or start a blog if you really want the world to hear. This is a debating platform, if you're not prepared to debate, you're in the wrong place.

I’ve said repeatedly that they’re encouraging people to take the vaccine. But to you this means I’m saying they’re discouraging it. — Xtrix

No, it means your point is flawed. Corporate media may well be responsible for 'irrational thinking' but vaccine hesitancy is a terrible example of it because all it shows is that people do not follow corporate media. As I said, just a thinly veiled attempt to get another "aren't non-vaxxers stupid" comment in by putting it in a new dress.

No, it’s thousands of scientists. — Xtrix

So you claim. I've yet to see you're evidence.

I quoted one. — Xtrix

Yes. In a direct response to my request that you support your claim of an 'overwhelming majority'. So it matters that there's only one. I didn't ask "do any scientists agree with you?" I asked where you got your evidence of an 'overwhelming majority' from. I've asked four times now and you've dodged the request each time. It's quite simple. You made the claim that an 'overwhelming majority' of scientists supported your position. I just want to know where you got the numbers from, that's all

Some people are refusing the vaccine for irrational reasons. Many, in fact. This is what I’m talking about — Xtrix

But some people are taking the vaccine for irrational reasons too. You agreed. So you've come onto a thread about Coronavirus, just to point out the general fact that lots of people are irrational.

Yes.

Good discussion?

If we’re wrong then we don’t have knowledge. That’s why knowledge is said to be JTB, not just JB. — Michael

Assuming 'true' is a separate property to 'justified'. I'm questioning that assumption. On my account, we're wrong (and so don't have knowledge) if what we currently believe is not what a community of epistemic peers would come to believe once they've exhaustively tested the hypothesis. Both result from justifications. One is just better than the other.

Here:

My claim, in the above sense, is simply that 'truth' (the word) has the same meaning in speech acts as 'justified' (the word)* — Isaac — Michael

See above. Both 'current evidence' and 'all possible evidence' are justifications.

So truth is a counterfactual? Something that is inaccessible? — Michael

Not necessarily inaccessible. We might well feel we have, in fact, fully exhausted all tests, but yes, mostly truth is inaccessible, if it weren't we would be unable to believe we could be wrong (what would it mean to be wrong about something which is true?).

I don't think being inaccessible is a distinction between correspondence accounts and deflationary or pragmatic accounts. Both have to have 'truth' as inaccessible otherwise there become situations where we cannot possibly be wrong (those in which we have direct access to the truth). As has been discussed here, such situations may occur within abstract schemes such as mathematics, but again, these are the same between accounts.

What's different is the matter of whether truth is a specifically justified belief, or some other property.

At the very least you finally understand that truth is distinct from the actual justifications we have. — Michael

I've never said anything to the contrary. If I have, I'd rather you quote me than attribute positions to me I've never held.

I have a computer print a random word (using radioactive decay measurements) on a piece of paper but have the paper and computer burned before it can be read. There is a fact as to what was printed on the paper even though we have no way of knowing what it was. — Michael

It's what my epistemic peers would see if they invented a time machine, or deep space telescope, faster-than-light travel...all hypothetical tests I can think of.

I'm saying that without some notion of what effect it would, even hypothetically, have, we've no way of making sense of what it means for it to be the case.

hypothetically — Isaac

What sense could we possibly make of something being the case that we can't even hypothetically detect? What would it mean for it to 'be the case'?

We cannot, even hypothetically, detect whether borogroves are mimsey or not. What could it possibly mean to say that it's true that they are?

the fact that we understand this shows that there is a conceptual difference between truth and justification. — Michael

No it doesn't. All it shows is that there's a difference, it's insufficient to show that the difference is conceptual. If I have a pound and you have a million pounds we can all see that there's a difference between our two states with massive and far reaching consequences, but it doesn't prove that a million pounds is an entirely different kind of thing to a pound.

Your situation shows only the we see a difference between the two states. That difference could just as easily be explained by the difference between beliefs we actually have and beliefs we might hypothetically come to have after we thoroughly tested our hypotheses.

"Whether we believe he committed the murder" (our current beliefs).

"Whether he actually committed the murder" (what any rational epistemic peer would come to believe after their hypothesis had been exhaustively tested)

Initially, let's disabuse ourselves of the notion that ancient religion typically stoned people, at least not for the past 2000 years. If you want to use the biblical accounts as evidence that the stoning actually occurred, you would be taking a literalist approach to the OT and would be accepting is historicity. To prove the actual existence of stoning, you need a real historical source, not the OT. — Hanover

Happy to do that, I don't think I really had such a notion in the first place... but consider it disabused.

my initial question back to you would be why do you seek meaning in my behavior unless you're assuming meaning matters. — Hanover

To better predict your future behaviour (though not you personally, of course, I doubt we'll ever meet - a general picture suffices).

I look to the bible for meaning because there is a rich tradition over the millennia of scholars using it as a means to derive meaning and purpose. — Hanover

How would you know? That there's a rich tradition of trying, is indisputable, but how would you measure their success? After all, if there was a rich tradition of trying and failing, you'd want to steer clear of that particular book for your task, no?

I'm not sure what you mean when you say that the book opens with God putting babies to the sword. That's not how it opens. — Hanover

It was a rhetorical device, I just mean it's quite early on in the book, Hosea I believe.

In any event, you are not limited to using the Bible to search for meaning. — Hanover

Indeed. So why the Bible (given it's got such horrific aspects to it)? It seems your answer is about tradition, am I reading that right? It's a book with a long tradition of being used that way and that helps you personally to use it that way, yes?

This is one of those things that you can’t understand without having done it or being around those who encourage you to do so. — Ennui Elucidator

I don't see any evidence for these kinds of assumptions, but I'll take it on advisement.

It is sort of like your description of the book; within one sentence you get the contents of the book entirely wrong — Ennui Elucidator

I quoted directly from the book. It's in English, right?

Maybe if the people summing up the book said things to you like, “It is a text with which our fathers and our fathers’ fathers and our fathers’ fathers’ fathers have engaged with for generations in order to make sense of their existence and their meaning/role in the world. Within its pages, countless people, learned, wise, and daft alike, have found wisdom. Sit awhile and read. Consider what others have written and said about it. See the ways in which our people are both great and detestable, the ways in which individuals and communities act to create a place in the world even as they are fallible. What matters in these stories is not whether they happened, but that those who came before you thought them worthy of attention and passing on to the next generation.” you would be more sympathetic to those who engage with it. — Ennui Elucidator

Yeah, I probably would. But that assumes that any of that is actually true. You're no less ascribing motives and models of people's approaches. No less constructing a narrative about religion and it's place in society. I'm not disputing that other narratives are available. I'm asking why someone chose one over the other.

We can take any book and use it as our material for meaning making. Perhaps you prefer book Z over book X. Will they both have you think about the same things in the same ways? Probably not. Is there some categorical way to say that X is better than Z for purpose W? Probably not. — Ennui Elucidator

You don't think that not having instructions to stone girls to death is an advantage? I'd say any book which didn't have such instructions had an advantage over one which did. This is the question I'm asking. If "We can take any book and use it as our material for meaning making" then why on earth choose one which contains such horrific misogyny, homophobia and abuse?

It is dissimilar from other books of the same length precisely because it is not a single narrative or a single authorial voice. — Ennui Elucidator

Seriously? Have you never read an anthology?

Furthermore, the book explicitly engages with the sorts of questions that we generally consider have existential import - how to live the good life, how to make community, why we are born and why we die. — Ennui Elucidator

But this is the point. It doesn't. It says we should stone girls who've had sex outside of marriage. That's not, under any decent person's morality, "how to make community". So barely a quarter of the way in, you have to already know how to make a community so that you know that instruction isn't to be taken literally. But if you already know, then what are you reading the book for?

if you want to talk about it or the people that use it in their meaning making, I suggest that you try a bit more charity and little less cynicism. — Ennui Elucidator

Why? Or more accurately, why specifically? Do you think your responses are being charitable to those here who believe Christianity is a misogynist, homophobic crock of shit? I don't think so (nor do I particularly expect them to). It's more of the special pleading we saw earlier - Christianity ought to be properly understood before engaging with it. I'm a psychologist (academic, not clinical). I have theories about things like beliefs, perception and the role of social narratives (my general fields). Should I demand the same from anyone engaging in those areas on these threads? That they should all thoroughly read my papers and books before engaging (and when doing so read all my critics and supporters analysis to make sure they've understood it right)? That, further, they should all attend a few of my lectures, really engage in my belief system, perhaps work for a while in my research team, get a feel for what it's like to believe what I believe about the role of social narratives in belief formation. Then, and only then, can they comment on what I say I believe about it?

I think that's daft. I think if I say something here about social narratives, in perfectly cogent English, people are free to tell me it's bollocks (or not) on the basis of what the English words mean in the context I said them.

I wasn't advocating "policies," I was pointing out that irrationality abounds. — Xtrix

No you weren't. You were declaring anyone who disagrees with you to be 'irrational' under the thin guise of of some pseudo-intellectual sociological commentry. "Oh, isn't it tragic how so many people don't see the obvious truth that I'm so blessed with the vision of...". Yeah, we're all devastated that we lack your divine insight into the truth, do lead us into the light won't you.

During a pandemic, when experts are encouraging taking the safe and effective vaccines, and people are refusing for irrational reasons (for the same reasons they believe in election fraud), I'd say that's a problem. That was my entire point. — Xtrix

No it wasn't. Your point went on to blame corporate media, in a bizarre twist. Apparently the one group who stand to gain billions from everyone taking the vaccine are actively discouraging people from taking the vaccine in an devilishly cunning double-bluff.

Not interested in expanding on truisms. — Xtrix

I was pointing out something that anyone who isn't caught up in the "controversy" of vaccines would readily recognize. — Xtrix

Then what the fuck are you doing here? If any and all disagreement is immediately consigned to that which is not worth responding to, because what you've said is just an obvious truism, then why did you say it? Anyone you're prepared to discuss it with already agrees, anyone who disagrees is rendered unworthy of response. What exactly did you have in mind. Did you want a prize?

It's not one scientist, it's thousands of scientists and doctors. — Xtrix

No, it was definitely one scientist. They gave his name and a photo and everything. I may not be smart enough to see all the truisms a true Oracle such as yourself can see, but I can count. That was one.

So your evidence of this 'overwhelming majority'? That another truism you're not willing to discuss?

I stand by every word of that. — Xtrix

So you stand by every word of an article bemoaning the fact that some (eligible) people haven't taken the vaccine, but it's not your position that everybody (eligible) should take the vaccine...?

Oh and anyway...

I'm sorry you continually want to make this about your bizarre vaccine obsession. — Xtrix

...it's apparently not even about vaccines at all.

So the article (about vaccine mandates), worries about a lack of vaccine uptake, you quote it on a thread about Coronavirus (largely the vaccine-based response), but apparently talking about vaccine uptake is a bizarre diversion. I can only say how sorry I am that I misconstrued the obvious topic... turnip cultivation was it?

...and to think that here's me worried about something trivial like corporate greed among the largest transfer of wealth from the poor the world has ever seen, when there's some nutjobs who think the vaccine's going to turn them into a 5g transmitter. Yes, that's definitely our main concern; forget the corporate takeover of the world's economy, forget insider trading, lobbying power, control of the media, revolving doors, ministers having shares in the very companies they're supposed to regulate, consultancies offered as prizes for towing the line, billions spent in putting up puppet politicians to work solely for corporate aims, laws being passed left, right and centre to curtail freedom and enhance corporate powers (whistle-blower penalties, civil disobedience bans, spying without warrant...)

No. Forget all that. Some people think a silly thing about a medicine - that's where all our focus should be.

This theory explains why religious belief is inured to rational discourse.

Your mooted paedophilic priest (as if that would ever happen) keeps his religious beliefs and his beliefs about little boys in different boxes in his mind. — Banno

Interesting piece (but see by response to fdrake above for my concerns about the pragmatism of seeing beliefs as 'boxable' at all). I think this ties in with what I was arguing about religious belief being more like a token than an treatment of states of affairs, but I think it's more complex that that. Religion seems to be a mixture of several different type of belief propositions.

Some undoubtedly (in my mind) is mere token. Propositions with little to no belief content (no tendency to act as if...), we can see that in some manifestations of eternal damnation, but I think it's be a mistake to lump all religious belief into this type. Some is clearly analogous to non-religious irrational beliefs (such as sentimental values, ritual behaviour, good luck charms etc). Much is associated with externalising narratives for conflicting desires (one is internal 'base', the other must come from God). Some are re-reinforcement labelling (adding a more powerful narrative to 'authorise' otherwise challenged activities - slavery, misogyny clerical power etc) Here we're not really dealing with particularly foundational beliefs, but rather just strategy beliefs (if I do x, it will get me y).

It's a real mess. But then so are the secular so...

What role do you think cognitive dissonance plays in all this? I think maybe you've missed a fourth option that the expressed beliefs are put by the wayside contextually, no matter how hard one's current conduct contradicts the suppressed belief. I don't think there's anything about belief that requires such a contradiction to be felt without also feeling the connection between one's horrible actions and one's noble beliefs - suppressing the connection between the two seems precisely a form of dissonance. — fdrake

Yes, I'd forgotten that. I'm suspicious of certain forms of cognitive dissonance though. It's not going to be easy to explain why without going into great detail about my theories of beliefs systems, but I'll try to be brief. Say if someone had a belief that one should exit the house by the back door, and also a belief that one should exit the house by the front door, and contextually they continued to switch between the two with a suppressive dissonance each day. If we model beliefs as propositions then we have a model including dissonance - but as merely propositions, where's the tension? At t1 the proposition is x, at t2 the proposition is y. Tension arises when we expect a person to act according to these propositions (and they can't act according to both). So we could look at what it is that they act as if were the case. They act as if it were the case that sometimes the back door and other times the front door were the most appropriate doors to exit the house by. Now we have a statement of their belief which is consistent with their behaviour. What we now need is an understanding of they post hoc rationalise that belief. In the case I described (and the priest, in your case), it's their post hoc rationalisation that's flawed. Instead of rationalising a perfectly consonant story involving context, they've rationalised it as two stories which cannot both co-exist in a unified narrative.

It's an approach which is a necessary model for my further work, so for me it's quite an embedded commitment, but (as an aside entirely) it has proven to have some useful therapeutic applications, so not entirely academic.

Why is the former more likely? — Seppo

I thought I'd explained that (or at least why I think that), but I did tuck it away in some parentheses, so 'll just highlight it.

parsimony again, if I can explain their behaviour with beliefs we could share, rather than incommensurable ones, I'll do so — Isaac

I basically don't see any reason to jump to a weird incommensurable belief when their behaviour can be explained using perfectly commensurable beliefs. It's just a pragmatic thing.

It strikes me as equally plausible that either they accept the doctrine that one is justified by faith (and so belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ is sufficient for salvation regardless of what evils one has engaged in, including child abuse) and so they don't believe they are risking eternal punishment by engaging in child abuse/rape — Seppo

Plausible, yes, but that kind of comes under the category of my (1), just with better post hoc justification. The point in my (1) was that they don't believe they will be condemned for eternity for committing the act in question. What they do in fact believe instead wasn't really relevant at the time. Interesting take on that though. I would make Lewis' argument more compelling becasue the last thing we want is dangling a story in front of people whereby they can get away with child abuse.

...or that their decision to engage in child abuse simply isn't a rational one involving any calculation of the relevant risks (either of legal repercussions, or eternal punishment) at all. — Seppo

Here I disagree. I don't think 'rational' enters into it. I believe that my cup is in the kitchen. I don't engage in any rational thought process to work that out, it's 'already there' as a conclusion in no doubt. It's still a belief. I get that some belief (such as punishment) might just not become relevant if one doesn't link up the consequences, but I think a priest, in a cassock, in a church, with a choirboy is going to have a hard time forgetting about his religion. That's some poor memory.

there certainly appear to be plenty of Christians who do behave as if they genuinely believe that unbelief can/will result in eternal punishment, going to great lengths to try to convert friends and loved ones and displaying apparently genuine concern over the fate of non-believer's eternal souls. — Seppo

Again, I'm only looking to see if the behaviour can be explained by more commensurable beliefs. I've seen the same enthusiasm for getting people to drink (in drinking cultures, such as student halls, or male sports fans) "Come on! Have a drink, it's Friday...etc", or even getting people to watch the latest Netflix series. When people have made a commitment to something which involves either strong abstinence, or strong abandon of such, there's an equally strong incentive to pull others in, as both abstinence and indulgence are harder to cope with in communities who do not join in (problems of temptation and moral approbation respectively).

Christian doctrine has no particular urgency for me, but how real Christians live does — they’re people, after all, and fellow citizens, and quite likely my political enemies. I think that might explain why I’ve approached this discussion as I have. — Srap Tasmaner

That makes sense. I suppose the matter is more pressing in some places than others. Not a lot of radical Evangelicals here in Cornwall.

No patents, reminding of Salk's polio vaccine. I guess we'll see what comes of it. — jorndoe

Mmm, a noble aim, but I think this goes too far the other way. We need substantial resources to properly test new drugs, especially ones with such a widespread expected cohort of recipients. Nationalisation is the only route forward I can see. At the very least a forced release of the patents the pharmaceuticals already hold.

Just those? — jorndoe

Not exclusively no, but mostly. I make no claims to impartiality. I listen to those experts who are saying things that align best what I already believe.

The keyword there being 'experts', not 'anyone'.

It's a distinction I don't see many here grasping. There's a world of difference between listening to experts who align with your existing beliefs and listening to anyone who aligns with your existing beliefs.

Edit for the slow ones at the back, the 'world of difference' is that the former checks your beliefs are at least reasonable, the latter checks nothing.

Vaccines are safe and effective— there is a consensus on this. — Xtrix

As I said Amoxicillin is also safe and effective. Should I take that too? Being safe and effective is not sufficient justification to cover all the policies you advocate.

This is exactly what I’m saying. — Xtrix

I asked you for a non-media source for your claim that there's an 'overwhelming consensus' of scientists in favour of the policies you advocate. You've given me a media source showing that one scientist agrees with you.

Do these experts claim the vaccines aren’t safe and effective? Probably not. — Xtrix

No. Neither do I. Again, 'safe and effective' does not automatically lead to 'everyone ought to take them'. One is a technical assessment, the other policy. We do not advocate the consumption (certainly not the enforced consumption) of every medicine which is safe and effective.

Being 'safe and effective' is merely the minimum threshold requirement to advocate the consumption of a medicine. It's not sufficient reason alone.

So, once more. Your favoured policy that everyone eligible ought to take the vaccine. Where is your (non-corporate, non-government, non-media) evidence that an 'overwhelming majority' of experts agree with you on this?

Um, yeah, if you worship chocolate, I guess. — Baden

Willy Wonka? Complete power within his domain, cruel and excessive punishments for fairly minor transgressions, being both the creator of temptation and the punisher for giving in to it... I think your avatar makes a good candidate God.

Well, yeah. How much more obvious can you make it that you need help? — Srap Tasmaner

Indeed.

My favorite but of wisdom about parenting:

Kids need your love most when they deserve it least. — Erma Bombeck — Srap Tasmaner

Very nice.

one does not think of permanent tooth loss as a cruel and disproportionate divine punishment for not brushing one's teeth. — unenlightened

But it is cruel and disproportionate for one who has it in their power to make it not the case. If my kids refused to brush their teeth, but I could slip some magic powder in their juice which prevented tooth decay anyway, it would definitely be cruel and disproportionate of me not to do so, and let their teeth rot, just so I could say "I told you so".

that's obviously not even close. — Srap Tasmaner

...yet...

The problem of hell is how to reconcile our ideas of it with the perfect goodness of God. Way out of my league here, but maybe one could imagine the jealous God of the Old Testament as a different sort of thing altogether, a god that can kick the ass of every other god, our guy, not necessarily the principle of goodness. (That local badass-god was long gone by the time the book was written, transmuted into something universal.) — Srap Tasmaner

...sounds exactly like what I described. Someone, only now, 2000 years later, still coming up with possible ways in which God isn't a dick. It's pretty much exactly what I'm saying. "Come back to us when you've finished working your religion out and we'll see if it's a useful moral guide then". what's of no use is claiming it's a moral guide, then when God's unarguably tyrannical behaviour is raised say "I'm sure that's all got a perfectly coherent explanation, give me a minute..."

I haven't been trying to give Christians any more deference than I would anyone else whose beliefs are quite foreign to me: — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't for a minute think you'd do so deliberately, but I think it's the result nonetheless. I see an admirable amount of trying to see things from other people's point of view, throughout much of the forum, but the special pleading, I'm targeting here is the assumption that they've probably got it worked out, that we'd be ham-fisted in our interference, that we (like a psychologist on a philosophy forum) would be out of our depth. That is not an assumption I see with other sets of beliefs. No-one is approaching (to use an apposite example) say, active inference views of perception with the assumption that any contribution they make would be nothing more than a clumsy, outsider, speaking out of turn about something they know nothing about. No. There's a most endearing enthusiasm to get stuck right in.

someone can claim to believe whatever they like, but that claim is only accurate when it summarises their actions. — fdrake

Yes. Maybe my old behaviourist commitments seeping through, but of the two choices (people believe just whatever they say they do -vs- people believe what they act as if they do) I'd choose the latter as the more pragmatic way for a community to proceed. The main reason being that we'd end up with a need to define and make use of that second parameter anyway. If we imposed the first as the definition of 'belief' it's role in any conversation would be relegated to a negation so that we could talk about 'the thing that's like a belief but not', which is of far more importance to us.

if the analysis was reframed to someone who really did believe that sinners ought to burn in hell forever, what would their conduct look like for that belief? Does it need to look like anything more than repeating the doctrines? — fdrake

Hence our problem (well mine anyway). I can't see a way in which a priest, considering a little 'extra-curricular choir practice' with the boys would actually think "I'll be tortured in hell for eternity if I do this, but at least I'll get my rocks off for a five minuets - whatever, I'll do it". No-one's thinking that way. Which means either a) they don't really truly believe the punishment they claim they do, or b) they really do think it's all about doing the rites properly and not about sin at all (even worse), or c) they're super psyched for choirboys and are prepared to face an eternity of torment for the pleasure. Of the three, I think the former is the more likely. The idea of an eternity of torment for any transgression is just as implausible to them as it is to us (parsimony again, if I can explain their behaviour with beliefs we could share, rather than incommensurable ones, I'll do so).

But that leaves Lewis's argument in trouble. Because the best explanation is they don't even believe what they say they believe. They're not really worshipping a torturer. It's all just an act to get to wear a socially (or psychologically) useful badge. So does the moral argument still have any force?

I think it does, but perhaps in a way that diverges from Lewis. I think the moral argument is to ask "how far are we prepared to let such token badges go before we step in?" If people play at believing in eternal damnation whist actually being perfectly moral citizens, then maybe we can let that slide. But if people's play at believing in eternal damnation leads them to mistreat those who would fit into that category (to make the play all the more real), then we might want to put a stop to the game before it gets out of hand.

Just to clarify, since there's been a lot of generalisation in place of specifics here, I'm not saying that all religious belief is make believe, I'm specifically saying that for those beliefs which seem incongruous with a person's normal moral sentiment, the most parsimonious explanation is that they're not really beliefs at all, just tokens.

As I said before, I think most rationalisations are post hoc checks. We believe first, find out why later. I don't see any reason to make exceptions for the religious. I'm sure that "a benevolent God created the world" for some is quite a good post hoc explanation for why they feel so happy looking at a sunset. But "a vengeful God will punish minor transgressions with eternal torture" just isn't an explanation for any belief about they way the world is, so I doubt it plays such a role.

I'm looking for existential meaning when I read the book. Stop pointing out the trees. I'm learning about the forest. — Hanover

Can I ask why? Why would you search for existential meaning? Why there? The book opens with a vengeful God putting babies to the sword, advocating the stoning to death of just about anyone who has sex without his say so, demanding sacrifices etc. What is it, after reading all that, that makes you think "I bet there'll be some great existential nuggets in here, if only I can get past all the blatant misogyny and homophobia and see the bigger picture"?

There's a great 'big picture' message in the Lord of the Rings too, but very few babies being put to the sword by the main protagonist - and it's got fight scenes.

it corresponds to the consensus of experts — Xtrix

I'm listening to science. — Xtrix

listening to the consensus — Xtrix

The science and medical consensus — Xtrix

There is overwhelming consensus — Xtrix

I asked

Where's your impartial, non-media, evidence of the 'overwhelming consensus' you keep referring to? — Isaac

You don't need to "go over all this again", just point me to the impartial scientific journal from which you obtained your knowledge that there's an 'overwhelming consensus' on the issues you advocate. You keep using 'safe and effective', but you're advocating far more than that. Amoxicillin is 'safe and effective' too - doesn't mean I ought to take it. You're advocating a particular health policy regarding vaccines (and masks, and distancing, etc), that it's 'safe and effective' is woefully insufficient as justification. So again, what are your sources for this claim that your position is supported by an 'overwhelming consensus'?

I suppose. I have no idea what political factor you're referring to, in this case. — Xtrix

Seriously? You don't see any political similarity in people who are strongly pro-vaccine? You think they're from a wide range of political beliefs? It's crap. To a man, they're all the generally liberal-left leaning, post-enlightenment, secular, urbanites. You find me a single transphobic vaccine supporter I'll give you ten quid. What's a position on transgender issue got to do with a position on treatment for a pandemic? Nothing at all. but you'll not find an overlap because it's a political tribal decision. pro-transgender, pro-vaccines, pro-immigration, pro- gay marriage, pro-climate action, etc. I could probably take a more than 50/50 guess at what music they like.

We should listen to experts — Xtrix

Indeed. Recently I've been listening to Vinay Prasad, Stefan Baral, Martin Kulldorff, Jay Bhattacharya, Norman Fenton, Pete Doshi, Paul Hunter... Or are they the 'wrong' experts?

“Hidden” from whom? — Srap Tasmaner

Popular discourse. I mean, when our political leaders attend a mass, or the church presides over some national event, no-one mentions the issue. I don't doubt theologians discuss it, but that's kind of the point. There's an unresolved issue which could undermine the morality of the whole project (I assume it at least could otherwise the theologians wouldn't be tying themselves in knots over it). It just strikes me as odd that we treat, with such casual reverence, adherence to this religion which hasn't even quite sorted out yet how their main man isn't actually evil. As a mythology, it's very much 'come back when you've finished it'.

I know it’s their Holy Book and all, but if you tried this approach on someone of the caliber of, I don’t know, Niebuhr or Tillich or even C. S. Lewis, to say nothing of Kierkegaard or Aquinas, do you really think this would carry the day so easily? — Srap Tasmaner

Again, to be ultra clear, my argument is not that the words of the bible are damning and no counterargument could be constructed, it's that the words of the bible should not (given the esteem in which it's held) need to be carefully interpreted. You read the quotes right? It says that women who've had extra-marital sex should be stoned to death and children of non-believers put to the sword. I'm not interpreting it some convoluted way, that's quite literally what it says. Niebuhr, Tillich, C. S. Lewis, Kierkegaard and Aquinas can re-interpret post hoc all they like to justify their beliefs - and I'd be very supportive of that - at least it shows that they think there's something that needs re-interpreting when their book appears to say that girls should be stoned to death. But why the rest of us? Why the protected status, why the concern for Christians being morally judged? Their book's shit, I mean there can't really be any argument about that. It says that girls ought to be stoned to death for Christ's sake! That's a shit book.

In essence I'm not even judging Christians at this point, I'm judging us, as a secular society for holding such a religion in any esteem at all. If you're already steeped in it, then I can see you might prefer to , post hoc, re-interpret everything so that it's all fine. I don't have any problem with that. But the rest of us, with no good cause to undertake any of that 'interpretation'. A book which says girls ought to be stoned to death, and those for whom it's a moral guide, deserve little more than a disdainful harrumph. Surely you can see that - from a distance.

Religion aside, if I come to you with a book, say "hey Srap, this book's a great moral guide, the first instruction is to stone girls to death, but you have to 'interpret' that one, the rest is great..." I think you'd tell me where I could stick my book.

All of which might just be me saying that you can’t have the latter without bothering with the former. — Srap Tasmaner

You might well be right there, yes. I suppose a purely historical approach would leave some questions unanswered, but I think I'm trying to get at the fact that Christianity is where it is in our culture for historical reasons. People believe it's edicts for cultural reasons, it's not metaphysically compelling.

if the pastor says, we don’t spend a lot of time talking about hell here, we focus on helping our parishioners and our community, then we pronounce them not real Christians. It’s lazy (which is my complaint), but it’s probably some other unsavory things too. — Srap Tasmaner

Could be, but you'll have to join the dots a bit more for me. Why am I not allowed an opinion on whether they're Christian? I'm allowed an opinion on whether they're poor, or West Ham fans, or Journalists... If they say "we're all journalists, we write about the news quite a bit", and I say "I don't think you;re a proper journalist unless you're actually employed by a paper", that seems like a perfectly normal conversation. what are you seeing that's different with 'Christian'?

I think the point made in the article in the OP (and argued by Banno) is closer to judging Christians though. Namely because once their beliefs are interrogated, it is arguably a sensible decision to take their ethical intuitions and reasoning abilities with, at best, a large pinch of salt. Something is definitely found wanting in the believer due to their belief, here. — fdrake

It's tricky because the matter of what's moral is something we all have a legitimate stake in - and so becomes something I think it's fair to interrogate. But the consequence of concluding 'no it isn't' is judgemental in that first sense. I honestly don't see an easy way out, but if something seems immoral, my gut feeling is that our legitimate interest in that question, as a community, trumps any concerns about the consequences of the discussion. We have to have some way of being part of that discussion.

I don't understand this. What is the unfair treatment and the less well labelled moral failing? — fdrake

I'm only saying that trauma has myriad consequences, not all of which are so easily labelled as Christianity. If we say of Christians "we ought tread carefully, their belief may be something of a crutch" then we're treating them a care we're not extending to say, UFO enthusiasts, or Qanon cultists whose beliefs may also be crutches to cope with some past trauma.

Just idly reading through some threads I notice our own version of God has already ruled on this matter.

You need to learn to think for yourself and not outsource your moral choices to people you think are "great". — Baden

Well, the manager's manager is an even less plucky, even more overpaid cog, and I sympathise, but I don't see your story as much of defense. You left. What does that say about the moral fibre of the ones that didn't, the current incumbents?

Or is it perhaps a continuous cycle of disenchanting the idealists? I can imagine that. Perhaps it's not so broken after all. "How do we deal with these idealistic doctors?", "Stick them in management for a year, crush them with soul-destroying bureaucracy, then put them back on the ward". Like breaking horses!

Oh but I forget. There's a crisis on, so we all must pretend that hospitals are all run by Dr. Kildare. He wouldn't massage any figures would he?

Indeed. Not to mention the fact that, contrary to our bizarre mythology, hospital reports are not provided by the plucky, overworked nurse. They're provided by the entirely un-plucky overpaid hospital manager.

Perhaps it's the word "stupid" you object to -- fine. Irrational is better. Many (though admittedly not all, but i would argue MOST) of that 20/30% are making these decisions irrationally, partly based on the consumption of the media I mentioned before — Xtrix

...and the 80/70%? You think they've made their decision rationally because...? It happens to be the same as yours?

If you consider science and medicine somehow part of corporate and social media (which I what I was talking about) or governments, fine. I don't. If we discount all science that is funded by corporations or government, we're ruling out a lot indeed. — Xtrix

Who said anything about discounting. Gods! I'm genuinely baffled by the almost religious submission you people have on this issue. Do you really not see any position to take between 'discounting all science' and actively campaigning for one of it's products to be forceably injected in the entire population of the world? There are positions in between, you know.

I think it's important to be skeptical — Xtrix

See above. What level of scepticism are you displaying here. Where is any reasonable caution in what you advocate? Scepticism is using their products to the minimum necessary at the utmost need. Scepticism is understanding that not everyone is going to be as trusting as you and nor should they. Scepticism is accepting that, with uncertainty, people ought to be allowed to make their own choices. Scepticism is campaigning for oversight, checking data, listening to dissenting voices.

You're exhibiting none of this. Corporate science says everyone must take the vaccine and you unquestioningly fall in line. They say 'jump' you say 'how high?'

it's in the interest of corporations and governments to get facts, to really know what's going on — Xtrix

So? That doesn't therefore mean it's in their interests to provide those facts to us, unfiltered. What they themselves benefit from knowing and what they benefit from us thinking are two completely different things.

Here we're back to where I think we discussed consensus -- and I argue in favor of following the consensus, particularly if it's overwhelming. — Xtrix

Yes. Notwithstanding my disagreement about being morally obligated to follow a 'consensus', it's this conclusion that I'm questioning. What Lancet article told you there's a 'consensus'? What medical expert did you speak to who'd conducted a poll of his peers? You talk of 'consensus' as if that were an established fact, but there's been no such check. As far as I can tell, there's healthy debate among experts about the extent and force with which the vaccine should be used. There's disagreement as to it's use in the under 25s and further use in the under 40s, disagreement about the value of cloth masks (particularly for the very young), there's disagreement about the value of boosters, there's disagreement about the use of passports, there's disagreement about the value of natural immunity, there's disagreement about the role of vaccines in ending this (as opposed to just reducing illness severity).

Where's your impartial, non-media, evidence of the 'overwhelming consensus' you keep referring to?

You were earlier imploring that we not 'do our own research'. Now you're saying we should listen directly to the experts. Which is it? — Isaac


When did I say that? — Xtrix

I must have confused you with someone else then, I'm not trawling back through your comments. If you say you didn't say it I'll take your word for it. I assume then, you're in favour of people doing their own research?

that frustration, even borderline contempt, really is rooted in wanting to see human beings thrive rather than suffer and die. — Xtrix

Such a common theme here Do you not see the flaw?

1. I believe the people who tell me that x is going to avoid suffering and death.
2. I believe them because I want to avoid suffering and death.

So if I told you that you should put a bowl of trifle on your head right now or a billion people will die you'd do it - because you want to avoid suffering and death? No, obviously not. You don't choose who to believe on the grounds of the severity of the message. Those who oppose the global enforcement of vaccinations do so because they too want to avoid suffering and death. When someone like Vinay Prasad speaks out against promoting vaccines for children, he's obviously concerned about the suffering of the children. What makes you think you've the monopoly on concern?

I wouldn't mistake this flaw as having much to say about my analysis, beliefs, principles, and conclusions. — Xtrix

As I said. Both sides can claim to be concerned about suffering and death. You still picked a side nonetheless, so your 'concern' here has nothing to do with the side you've chosen.

But this assumes I'm in the two-party trap which I've already myself condemned. — Xtrix

No insisting that any mention of the word 'politics' must refer to your party ties is what assumes that.

Because that's how any reasonable English speaker would interpret it. — Michael

I see. We're back to the assumption that the way things seem to you must simply be the way things are. There's nothing to say to that. If you can't understand that things might not actually be as the seem then I really don't know what you're doing here, you already know the answers to every question. It seems to you that that's the way any reasonable English speaker would interpret it. Obviously it doesn't seem that way to me.

You won't accept it when I or InPitzotl explain to you that when we say "it is raining" we are referring to a belief-independent fact. You won't accept it when we explain to you that we don't mean "I believe that it is raining". If you won't do us the courtesy of accepting what we say about what we mean then why should I accept what you say about what you mean? — Michael

You shouldn't (or needn't).@InPitzotl seems to be missing the same point. My argument is that you can't mean what you say you mean (that it's incoherent). Your argument is (currently) only that I don't mean what I say I mean. Those are two very different arguments. One is about logical possibilities, the other just a slur on my character. If you want to say that I can't mean what I say I mean, then make that case, there should be no need in doing so to quote anything except my most recent post.

I think you're just grasping at straws, twisting yourself in knots, contradicting yourself, trying to defend a theory that doesn't work. — Michael

OK. So let's say you're right. I'm borderline schizophrenic and can't keep a consistent belief in my head for more than five minutes. How does that make my most recent post wrong? If I contradict myself, then one of the two contradictory things I've said can still be right. You've still failed to show that it's the one you prefer and not the other. I don't see how demonstrating my tragic mental health conditions helps your argument any. You still want to defeat one of the things I've said, proving that I've previously said something other than it doesn't help in that one bit.

As I said to @InPitzotl, I've no interest in continuing this is your only objective is to try any show some inconsistency in my writing. I'm commenting on a trivial social media forum, not writing a paper. If you want to find some inconsistency, be my guest, but I'll save you the time, you'll definitely find some. I don't get my editors to proof read my posting history and clarify/correct each bit of terminology in context. I just write stuff that's on my mind, usually on the phone on a train.

If you want clarification, you can ask, if you just want to play gotcha with some error I might have made I'm not interested.

What I think the confusion is here is that the typical Christian knows about and agrees with the objectionable stuff in advance. Putting aside whether the objectionable thing is necessary for Christianity, do all Christians know it and agree? At least as to eternal damnation, Lewis thinks not and calls the conversation around it the "neglected argument." — Ennui Elucidator

Not wanting to repeat myself, but coming to respond to you here I note it's the same problem as I've just written about above. I think what is 'neglected' is the stepping-back from our historical acceptance of Christianity simply by familiarity. I think what Lewis wants us to do is put aside the historical familiarity and look at it with some more objectivity. Would we want our leaders associated with such a book? Would we be comfortable with their reassurances that they'd interpreted, the torture, misogyny, homophobia and abuse in such a way as to make it all admirable?

One thing which makes me believe that religious people ought not to be judged so harshly, or given some leeway, for what they believe (especially if it doesn't translate much into practice)... — fdrake

I think something important to distinguish here is 'judging' as in being judgemental (acting harshly, ostracism...), and being free to interrogate a belief (including even the morality of it). I realise it might sound like the cliché of an self-distancing academic, but I think there's a difference.

Perhaps it does not reduce culpability for acting on horrible beliefs, or even for believing in them, but pragmatically it makes it somewhat understandable. Ergo, forms less of a mark on their character because they have a good excuse. — fdrake

I agree entirely with the sentiment, but the danger is the unfair treatment of those no less traumatised, but whose trauma lead them to a different, less well-labelled moral failing. I don't think 'Christian' is a very useful label for this, we should be aware all the time that people which are unduly touchy about having their beliefs interrogated may well be using them as crutches for surviving trauma. This is, in the main, my reason for the distinction above.

I think when you hear the voice of God, or are guided somehow by the Holy Spirit, that you need not model this 'input' at all. It's God and you know it is. Anyhow, I want to say that, but the Deceiver is also known to whisper in people's ears... — Srap Tasmaner

Indeed. Thus modelling is required. I've come across the odd 'God told me...' in my line of work (well, my daughter's in this case actually) very few, if any, show the level of certainty about the origin of the message you'd like to claim here. At the time there's enough conviction to act (we're talking about murder and attempted murder here - criminal insanity pleas), but on interview and occasionally in pre-act interactions, the doubt is written all over their face, their body language... Being spoken to directly by God is not nice. Maybe the occasional Guru, by the overwhelming majority are just tormented by the voice, by the doubt about it, as it clashes with what remains of their grasp of reality.

I just want a more neutral framework for having this discussion. I'm not comfortable beginning from a commitment to religion being bullshit. That's what I personally think, but I don't go around, ahem, pontificating about how believers ought to modify their bullshit religions. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's fair, but to achieve it we need an historical understanding of religion, not a metaphysical one.

For me, one of the most interesting parts of the Lewis article is not the argument itself, but the reminder of how 'hidden' it is. Arguments about whether God exists are two a penny, the misdoings of the Christian Church are well known, but what's less often accepted is the simple fact that we accept (even venerate in our political leaders), adherence to a religion which is fundamentally flawed. God does some abominable things in the bible - no doubt about that.

“A priest’s daughter who loses her honor by committing fornication and thereby dishonors her father also, shall be burned to death.” (Leviticus 21:9).

“But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for the damsel: Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father’s house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die.” (Deuteronomy 22:20-21)

“Samaria shall become desolate; for she hath rebelled against her God: they shall fall by the sword: their infants shall be dashed in pieces, and their women with child shall be ripped up.” (Hosea 13:16)

“If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her; Then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die.” (Deuteronomy 22:25)

Yes they can be interpreted in some way as to make them less abominable, but that's not the point. The point is that in any other circumstance can you imagine uncovering this kind of writing in a book one of our political leaders had in their briefcase - there'd be outcry, scandal, the politician concerned would be sacked and disgraced, interpretation go hang. It simply would not be tolerated in any other guise than religion, but religion is actually admired as a characteristic in our leaders. Why? History. Christianity has been with us for decades, so we've learned to live with it, learned to wear it as a badge on our sleeve, not to actually follow its edicts, but just as a token that we're the morally serious.

But it's a dangerous thing to use as such a token, for that very reason. It makes it difficult to dismiss homophobes, misogynists and child abusers - they use arguments from the same book we're using as a badge of moral authority.

do I have to repeat again?

the scandals, failures, conspiracies, malaria, poverty, General Motors, ...
the task at hand (like what Strang and colleagues around the world does) — jorndoe

It seems all we do is repeat.

The right course of action in the 'task at hand' is determined by who you trust to deliver it. The two are inseparable.

If the 'task at hand' were to build a wall, the fact that your builder had criminal convictions for negligence is extremely relevant, no?

Here you admit to there being an "actual weather", but claim that we don't have direct access to it. Here you aren't talking about your beliefs or the language community's beliefs or a battery of tests or anything like that. You're just talking about the common sense realist notion of there being belief-independent facts that may or may not be as we believe them to be. — Michael

What makes you think that's what I'm talking about (especially given my quite explicit definition)? It seems quite a stretch for you to take a fairly ambiguous piece of writing and use it to prove I don't really mean what I've just said that I mean. I can't think what could be gained from such an exercise.

here you connect the notions of truth and being wrong to whether or not the actual weather (which is belief-independent, and according to you cannot be directly accessed) is as we believe it to be. — Michael

I'm not sure what you think the word 'infallible' is doing there if I had (as you claim) s correspondence view of truth.

And then later you admit that we do (sometimes) have direct access to the facts. — Michael

Again, I don't know what you think the word 'if' means here if you take it as a statement about what is actually the case.

---

I must admit to being slightly baffled by the line of argument you're taking here. Where's it going? Let's say you're completely right, all those previous quotes did, in fact, show that I had a more correspondence view of truth. Let's say I've changed my mind and now believe whatever view was presented in my latest post. Does that change anything about the veracity of that latest post. How would the fact that I used to believe otherwise have any impact on it?

Are you sure the story you want to tell of this is that I'm treating you unfairly and building straw men? That's a bit of a hard sell, given that bolded part is you literally telling me what I mean! — InPitzotl

Yes. You're describing a state of affairs (unless your claim is that you and only you are able to refer to the actual weather). I'm arguing that the state of affairs is not as you claim they are in the basis of coherence with other states of affairs I thought we might agree on.

If you think I can't mean what I say I mean (on the basis, as above, of incoherence with some state of affairs we already agree on), then we'd have an equivalence. As it stands you've presented no reasons other than that you don't agree.

You did not respond to that. — InPitzotl

Yes. As I said, response seems pointless if my responses are simply going to be assumed to be the misguided product of a bias. I'm not playing the role of fish-in-barrel for your pleasure.

You had mentioned the number of people vaccinated. These articles have nothing to say about that. They’re talking about vaccinated and unvaccinated death rates. — Xtrix

No. I mentioned (bolded for your reading pleasure).

The idea that 20-30% of people's failing to take the vaccine is problematic is something you've repeated because it's been told to you by government agencies and media. — Isaac

If not death (and death which higher vaccination levels could mitigate), then what problem are you raising with the poor vaccination rates. Your argument that it's a problem (the low vaccination rates), relies on studies and data produced by exactly the corporations and governments (and presented in the exact media) you've condemned for 'leading us astray'.

So I'll ask again - from where are you getting your data on death rates if not a government? From where are you getting your judgement on vaccine efficacy if not a corporation? From where are you getting your view of "the majority of medical professionals..." if not the media?

Did you gather your own data? No. Did you conduct your own trials, or understand the intricacies of the actual published papers? No. Did you poll the experts yourself? No.

You trusted governments, media and corporations to do those things for you and decided to believe the results you were thereby handed.

Polling hospitals myself? Is this a serious question? — Xtrix

Yes. you said you trusted the hospital data. I assume you're polling them yourself. Otherwise it's not the hospital data you're trusting is it, it's the data of whomever tells you they've polled the hospitals.

Journals are not corporate media — Xtrix

Who owns the journals then? A kibbutz?

I simply encourage people to listen to the science and to medical experts. — Xtrix

You were earlier imploring that we not 'do our own research'. Now you're saying we should listen directly to the experts. Which is it?

I take the Lancet seriously — Xtrix

I seriously doubt you have even close to the expertise to judge the accuracy of an article in the Lancet. I've also presented several papers from journals, each one you've dismissed in favour of your preferred narrative. This idea that you're just impartially constructing an opinion by listening, unfiltered, to the experts is transparently bullshit. You choose the experts you're going to listen to on the basis of whether they're supporting the message your politics inclines you to believe.

But if it's not 'special' in the sense indicated, then it's not true. — Srap Tasmaner

As I believe the kids say 'well, duh!'. Yes. I think you're right, but I don't see such exclusion as z problem, rather the opposite, that if we don't exclude it thus, all interrogation of belief becomes meaningless.

What I have to justify is saying such an approach is fine for some purposes ("God told me to" doesn't excuse you from murder) but useless if our intention is to understand and judge how Christians believe and what they believe. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I believe so. Difficult.

Your argument is that the voice of God has the same role in belief formation as the hidden unknowns we model, as the outside cause of whatever we do to end up with something identifiable as a belief -- is that it? — Srap Tasmaner

Spot on. Yes.

God doesn't even bother with your brain; He speaks directly to your soul. Or so I've heard. — Srap Tasmaner

Ahh yes, but the signals from your soul are hidden states are they not? We are not instructed by our souls directly, else what role for priests and Bibles?

Absolutely. There is no privileged class of belief. — Ennui Elucidator

But I think one might be being created nonetheless, by invoking a 'special language' in which religious texts are written. If I read in Mein Kampf that "the Jews should be exterminated" (Not a direct quote, I've never read it, it's just an example), and then say "I worship Hitler, we should act according to Mein Kampf", then I don't think it would normally be held to be unreasonable for someone to argue that "the Jews should be exterminated" is an awful thing to say and so worshipping Hitler is an awful thing to do. There's no special class of 'Nazi', that requires one, in advance, to assume the words don't literally mean that the Jews should be exterminated, to assume that most Nazis don't believe it literally and have some much more generic allegorical meaning. So treating Christians differently would be special pleading.

And if, after this first round of take-things-at-face-value, the Nazi explains that they don't take "the Jews should be exterminated" (but do take other similar instruction) seriously, then I don't think it's unreasonable to ask why, and expect some justification. So treating Christians differently would be special pleading.

I grant that Lewis's method might be a bit ham-fisted but at the end of the day, the words (of the bible) are still there to be explained one way or another. It's either 'why do you worship one who acts that way?' or 'why to you treat that as merely allegorical and not this?'

Maybe that second question is somewhat out of the scope here. But to me, the answer is exactly what Lewis is driving at, because I'd hazard the answer would be "well that's obviously allegorical because if it wasn't, it'd be awful"

Once you personally (or some other group) are in charge of what's to be taken literally and what isn't, you no longer have a religion (from ligāre - to bind). — Isaac


Then there are probably no religions at all. This argument is clearly overbroad. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I see @Ennui Elucidator has interpret it this way too, so I guess that's my bad. I'm not attempting a redefinition of the word 'religion' (given my fanaticism for meaning from use I hardly think such a position would be tenable for me). I'm saying that the distinction one might want to make for religious beliefs doesn't seem to apply if those beliefs are ultimately derived in the same way as any other belief.

It does indeed, but if you just rule out revelation, you're ruling out Christianity tout court. Which is fine, but then there's just no point in nitpicking about theology. It's a two-pronged attack: "What you believe is bullshit, and you ought not believe it, but this particular bullshit is bad bullshit, and you also ought not believe it because it's also bad." What are you asking of Christians? "I'd prefer you believed some different bullshit. Make up something else"? How are they supposed to respond? — Srap Tasmaner

Again, my argument is simply that religious belief is no special category - supporting the 'special pleading' complaint made earlier. If I'm asking anything of Christians it's that they take part in the usual social game of post hoc rationalisation that everyone else plays.