Things in themselves are neither apriori nor aposteriori. — Astrophel

Agreed. Those are conditions related to experience or the absence of it. Things-in-themselves, as such, in and of themselves, have nothing to do with the conditions of our experience.

They are not empirical, not in time and space….. — Astrophel

Space and time are the conditions for the objects of our experience. Things-in-themselves are not objects of experience, therefore space and time are irrelevant with respect to them.

…..just postulates. — Astrophel

For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility.

Pure reason is only shown in our visible affairs. — Astrophel

Pure reason is never shown, if that be taken to mean demonstrated; it is pure transcendental thought and judgement, having no real objects belonging to them. It is, “….the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything absolutely à priori….”.

They themselves cannot be witnessed. — Astrophel

Agreed, having space and time already eliminated from them as conditions for being appearances. But it remains that they were conceived for some purpose, and it turns out there were two.

Things-in-themselves, for Kant, did not lie in the perceptual world at all. — Astrophel

Of course they do. In what other world would they lie?

They do not lie in the perceived world.

A thing-in-itself is still just a thing.

Ok. Thanks.

That it exists. — RussellA

But what if its non-existence is impossible?

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience.

Here’s a language game for ya: when “carrying on” a conversation, the worst one can do is repeat himself.

the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named. — RussellA

Nope. We named a possible cause, which could be a possible experience. A thing-in-itself will never be one, by definition.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me?

but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself. — RussellA

Yep. The catch being, it never will be determined, because……once again, repeating myself…..it is undeterminable, by definition.

This is like telling Henry Ford he didn’t invent the Model T. Or, the Model T he did invent, wasn’t really a Model T. You can’t just take something meant in one way, and make it something else. If Model T’s aren’t your thing, go drive something more adaptable to your way of getting around.

it seems to me that "representation" is really more about how we describe relations within the parts from which the cognitive system emerges…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I’d have agreed, if it had said, representation is really more about how we describe relations within the parts of the cognitive system as a whole. I don’t think we should say the system emerges from the description of relations, but the relations described emerge from a kind of system capable of it.

…..not the relations that obtain between the whole cognitive system and the objects of experience. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That would be fine, as long as the cognitive system as a whole wasn’t comprised of relations. There are established metaphysical theories predicated on just that being the case.

I feel confident in saying we "see trees”….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh certainly. It is the convention to speak in those terms. I suspect only the philosopher or the philosophy student would use the more precise terminology. I understand no one knows how it is we think, but the average joe barely even knows he thinks. He says, I think this, I think that, but hasn’t a farging clue what that means.

….“in-itselfness" seems to be a fraught abstraction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, agreed. There’s only one use for the term, nothing else need ever be said about it.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The homunculus, and the informal fallacy of the argument, disappears from a cognitive system as such. For the subject that is the thinker by means of that system, anything that represents that subject, also as a thinker, to the very self that thinks, is superfluous.

It is quite absurd to consider that there is a theater in the brain, so why would a theory describing a method for what goes on in the brain, make room for one?

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox. — RussellA

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world . — RussellA

Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox.
—————

But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.
— Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist. — RussellA

It can’t apply to the direct realist, for he knows the name of the object from the perception of it, which makes explicit there is knowledge in the mere perception. Because of this condition, the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. In effect, it is a red postbox for no other reason than it is seen, re: I see a red postbox.

the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red. — RussellA

Not quite. The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right?

Depends on what you mean by the word "see". — RussellA

It shouldn’t. To see is that mode of perception in which a sensation is given from that sensory apparatus susceptible to being affected by light. No human can see with his eyes closed.
————-

We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A. — RussellA

Ok. You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B. It follows that anybody that doesn’t know the cause, can call it anything they like. Pretty slipshod method for acquiring knowledge, I must say.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is. — RussellA

Sure. We name stuff all the time without knowing what it is. But in the case at hand, the cause is something, and as soon as it is possibly a certain something, it is determinable. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself.
—————

The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism. — RussellA

I can handle that. It might stand as an initial condition, or a major premise in a syllogistic argument, sure.

….both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding. — RussellA

Perhaps. It then becomes simply a question of which is the more parsimonious, and the less in conflict with what Nature demands.

I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, — RussellA

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. And to perceive alone, is not to represent.

If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? And if you don’t know the true cause, how can you say that which you see is in fact a red postbox?

I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows.

If what you say here is the case, how do you explain those times where you don’t know what causes your perception? You feel a tickle on the back of your neck, what tells you it is a hair or a bug? The sound from around the corner…..backfire? Firecracker? Dump truck tailgate? Something dropped from a roof? According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. If you always know a red postbox is what you’re seeing, shouldn’t you always know the name of what you’re hearing? It is obvious this doesn’t always work, which casts doubts on a system operating in accordance with those conditions.

Kant was aware that the thing perceived is always at that time undetermined, but not that it was undeterminable, otherwise every single thing ever perceived would immediately be identified as a certain thing, which contradicts natural occurrence. The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision. And this is what makes you an indirect realist.

Realism: the attribution of properties such that an object is determinable;
Realist: one who attributes properties as that by which objects are determinable;
Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object.

I submit you don’t see a red postbox. You see a thing, to the representation of which you attribute the properties in the form of a series of conceptions, by which the thing becomes the experience of, becomes known to you as, a red postbox.
————

As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds. — RussellA

Right. “Cup” names. I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name, which is what happens when there is a “cup-in-itself”, in that the thing now has the name “cup”. How can a named thing exist independently of that which named it? And if it can’t, where did “cup” come from when attached to “-in-itself”?
—————

The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself — RussellA

I don’t think so. The (immediately) unknown but (mediately) determinable cause of our perception, is the thing; the unknown and always undeterminable cause of the thing of our perception, is the thing-in-itself. And don’t make it an issue that a cause is unknown. A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable.

this just demonstrates that there is no such transcendentally (valid) argument for there actually being real objects beyond our intuitions. — Bob Ross

Transcendental arguments are not intended for empirical conditions, so, no, there wouldn’t be one. No need to argue for that which gives you a bloody nose, or a headache, or hurts your eyes if you look at it too long.

“…. The science of all the principles of sensibility à priori, I call transcendental aesthetic. There must, then, be such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcendental logic….”

What is the argument for intuitions necessarily being sensuous (in the sense of real objects exciting a sensibility)? I don't see how one could transcendentally prove that. — Bob Ross

There isn’t a proof. Remember….we’re not even conscious of this part of the system as a whole. The transcendental argument sets the technical groundwork, nonetheless, as the first part of the work.
—————

Like how is it called a "ding an sich"? — Bob Ross

No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself.

But the “real objects” which excite your sensibility could be fabrication by a higher power, could they not? — Bob Ross

Sure. But why would we care? We work with what we’re given. In the case for natural real objects, say, what do we gain by asking if something we know absolutely nothing about created that of which we know very little? And for real objects humans make for themselves, it doesn’t even make sense to ask if a supersensible whatever created rakes and dump trucks.

just because there is a set of intuitions which contains a separation (in space and time)….does not mean that the “object” which impacted you exists as something which excited your sensibility — Bob Ross

That’s precisely what it means, insofar as intuitions are proven only and always sensuous. If denied, such that intuitions do not depend on the existence of real things that affect the senses, then you have falsified T.I., at least the original view of it, without sufficient reason.
————-

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?

who Austin believed he was arguing against. — J

Not who. What.

“…. What we have above all to do is, negatively, to rid ourselves of such illusions as 'the argument from illusion….”, and assorted other linguistic vagaries.

And a caution, if I may: mention Kant at your own dialectical peril.

“…. The general doctrine….goes like this: (…) we never directly perceive or sense, material objects…. but only sense-data…”

I am on whomever’s side that denies this. We always directly perceive material objects. I do so not from a “…. deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies….”, but because it should never be an issue that I don’t, insofar as every perception is direct, re: unmediated. I perceive a shadow as equally direct as B flat minor.

Nahhhh…..the tidy-looking dichotomies lay elsewhere, direct perception/sense data need add no more to them.

Efficient law-like agent of change. Has a nice ring to it, for sure.

I swear, Feynman had a cool phrase like that, talking about how fields should be treated as real things. It was in the Caltech lectures, but I could never find it again. Wish-I’d-thought-of-that moment, lost to time and weakened memory.

I think of empirical science theories as grounded in models of causation, and causation as not being observed, but inferred. — Janus

Sure, the causes may be inferred, but wouldn’t models of causation be predicated on observable effects following from them? Working backwards kinda thing, donchaknow.

I was just commenting on the main point for writing CPR.

But now that you mention it, why do you suppose he devoted everything after A293/B350 to PURE reason, practically two thirds of the whole work, in Kemp Smith pg, 293 to pg.669, if reason and pure reason where so interchangeable.

I think the key is in pure, rather than reason.

Are not all consistent and coherent theories logically grounded? — Janus

I had in mind that empirical science theories are grounded in observation. For some of those there is precedent where syllogistic logical coherence has been set aside, or at least fought over, as in the uproar ca 1920-25, even if mathematical logical coherence holds.

Kant didn’t force anything, is what I think. There is a truth buried in there but doesn’t have anything to do with force. Or Nietsche.

….if someting is affirmed to be true, then we have to be able to make sense of it not being true. — Astrophel

If a thing is affirmed to be true, the sense of its falsity must already be given. If we know it is this, we must already know why it is not that.

How is this not covered end to end in Aristotle?
———-

Kant didn't understand that what is transcendental is what is right before one's perceptions IN the empirical phenomenon. — Astrophel

There’s a ton of references to just that. He did understand it, in his own way. Just because someone understands it differently only indicates they approach from a different direction, and doesn’t negate the antecedent.

….we fill the world with purpose that is not in the phenomena…. — Gregory

Yep. Purpose relates to how the subject feels about a thing, regulated by aesthetic judgement. Phenomena relate to what a subject knows about a thing, regulated by discursive judgement.

He divorced the shadows from the forms such that we cannot know what a form even is. Agree? — Gregory

Ehhhh….he doesn’t give us much to work with here. Forms “….exist a priori in the mind…”. Supposedly, any instance of a form, form of this, form of that, is meant to be that which exists a priori in the mind as the possibility for whatever this or that is.

Kant says we can know nothing at all about noumena, but….why? Therein lay the solution to the nonsense.

From my books on Kant, they all seem to agree in saying that Kant's main point for writing CPR was to draw a boundary on the power of human reason….. — Corvus

Not quite right, in that reason alone does not account for PURE reason, right there is the title of the book.
“…This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics (…) constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Reason….”

The boundary on the power of pure reason merely follows necessarily from the revolution in its procedure.

…..i.e. reason can only operate within the limits of our senses. — Corvus

Close, but still not accounting for Pure reason.
“…. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him**, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose***….”

**operating within the limits;
***operating no matter the limits.

The revolution in metaphysical procedure extended reason into that which has nothing to do with the senses, but establishes the possibility and validity of pure a priori conditions, which had always either been unacknowledged, or when acknowledged then outright denied. You know….“consign it to the flames” kinda nonsense.

The main point in CPR ended up being, pure reason can only operate, with justice, within the limits of, not experience, which just is practical reason, but possible experience, and that is its proper boundary, transcendental philosophy, then, being that which sets the boundaries as to that of which the justice consists. That is, that which is otherwise is illusion. Junk knowledge.

Except for the quotes, a personal interpretation of the original view, whatever it’s worth. Still, if reason were limited to the senses, it’d be pretty hard to not only justify, but to even come up with, some modern scientific theories.

Kant didn't understand metaphysics at all. — Astrophel

Pitiful, ain’t it? Just as ol’ Henry didn’t understand production efficiency. Landry didn’t understand football. Gandhi didn’t understand civil rights. Wright didn’t understand buildings. Just what we of the vulgar understanding didn’t realize we always needed, huh? Another fool coming along, disrupting the status quo, knocking us from our collective intellectual comfort zone.
————

That introduces the further complication of the 'ding an sich' (thing in itself) and the vexed question of whether that is the same as, or different to, the noumenal. — Wayfarer

You know what it’s like? It’s like….dog food and house paint both come from a can, therefore dog food is the same as house paint. As my ol buddy Forrest would say….that’s all I’m gonna say about that.

Logically grounded theories in the metaphysical discipline necessarily justify, or validate if you’d rather, whatever is the case given by the course of the argument.

It never was that “metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered”, but sets the background by which the subject orders himself, such that the science by which the world is ordered, by and for him, becomes possible.

Ok. Thanks.

We look at the world and see an object that has been given a name by the Community within which we live. — RussellA

Superficially true, but insufficient to explain empirical discovery by a solitary subject.

Hume's principle of constant conjunction….. — RussellA

….has more to do with the relation of cause and effect than to perception and cognition. It is the case that the relation of perception to cognition is under certain conditions entirely a priori, the validity of which Hume vehemently….and quite mistakenly…..denied.

…..one can have the thought of an object independently of any name it may or may not have been given. — RussellA

Yes, but because of constant conjunction alone? I rather think not, insofar as Hume’s carries the implication of necessary antecedent impression, whereas pure thought of things is exclusive of it. Constant conjunction refers this object to this impression as a matter of habit, but the mere impression of an object is not enough to name it.

for example what I understand by the word "tree" is unique to me, as no one else has had the same life experiences. — RussellA

But you just said the name is given by a relevant community, and if “tree” is that name for an object looked upon in the world by yours…..how can it be unique to you? If it is unique to you, it contradicts the proposition it is named by a community.

Life experiences are not identical but they can still be congruent, or similar enough to eliminate self-contradiction.
———-

HA!!! Like me and my foot, did the fork experience take your ego down a peg or two? One could say it was just a life experience, but the truth is, it perfectly exemplifies how to be a dumbass. Well….for me anyway.

How can a thought be named ? — RussellA

It isn’t, which was the point: thought of a cup is to name the thought, whereas the thought “cup” references that which is thought about.

The thought is just the system doing its job, in T.I., the synthesis of representations, and is an image. The name, then, in the form of a word, belongs to the image as its representation, and is its conception, and the different particular instances of that general conception are its schemata.

I would not be so presumptuous as to call W wrong. I have no problem whatsoever, on the other hand, in dismissing OLP, insofar as it is the case no word is ever presented that isn’t first thought. It is never the case we think with language, or by means of it. The only reason for language in the first place, is to objectively express, to communicate, the cognitive system’s functionality, but is not a necessary condition for it. Want proof? Read a book, to yourself of course, then reflect on what it was you were actually doing.
—————

Is it the case that we have the thought of a cup and then name it….. — RussellA

Close. We think, and name that which is thought about, the object of thought, cup. Or we could just be recalling a priori what was already resident in us as that represented named thing. Some call that residence consciousness, others call it memory, some call it intuition. Doesn’t matter; it’s just meant to represent that which has already been done, which just is, or given from, experience. The initial experience is not a priori, but the recalling of it by mere thought, is. How else to know a thing in a different time than its immediate perception?
————-

The limits of my language is the limit of my world……that I can tell you about. When I was bulletproof, many MANY years ago, by sheer accident I put a chainsaw into my left foot. Now there’s a part of my world I will never be able to tell you about. No matter what I say, your experience will never relate to it unless you’ve done the same thing, and then, our experiences will only match in content and not the least in effect, and proof positive there is that in my world beyond, and therefore not accountable by, my language.

Why OLP? So we relieve ourselves of the hard part of inquiring where words come from. It’s so much easier to examine the games we play with language, then to examine how the games we play are even possible. Funny, innit? That every single word ever, and by association every single combination of them into a whole other than the words themselves, being at the time of its instantiation a mere invention, is for that very reason entirely private? Gell-Mann’s language wasn’t private, but Joyce’s, from whence it came, certainly was.

People are funny. They think that because they are taught the name of a thing, the thing always came with the name they were taught to know it by, they’re comfortable believing the name belongs to the thing as its identity. And maybe that’s true for them, but it wasn’t always. And simply from that fact, speculative cognitive metaphysics is justified.

you must have had the thought of a cup. — RussellA

Might be closer to the case to say, there had to have been the thought “cup”, simply from the fact “you must have had” is already given by the thought itself.

And even that isn’t as close to the case as, there must have been a judgement that the conception represents “cup”.

It may do well to note, in addition, as long as we’re “making a case for transcendental idealism”, that since it is merely the thought “cup”, there is already the experience of that particular object by the same subject to which the thought belongs, for otherwise the subject would’ve not had the authority to represent it by name.

By fabrication, I just mean it in the sense of something being simulated and not real. — Bob Ross

That’s fine. Intuitions are made up, fabricated. Kant calls it something else, but works out to be close enough.

….why would you say that (….) there exists real things that impact our sensibility (and are not just made up)? — Bob Ross

Sensibility is a big place involving the entirety of the non-cognitive human intellect; best break it up into proper parts.

Because without real things that impact us there is no accounting for sensations. Sensation is just a message that there is an object present and affecting the senses, but can offer nothing as to what the object is. As for making it up….there is nothing in the physiology of perception that permits making stuff up. That is to say, under the assumption making it up implies contingency, all the human sensory devices function according to mode-specific natural laws, which do not lend themselves to being contingent. In other words, for that range of wavelengths there will be that impact on the eyes; for that chemical composition there will be either that impact on the nose or that impact on the tongue, or both, and so on.

T.I. exhausts precious little effort on the impacts on sensibility; it just is that which is given on the one hand, and that of which we are not conscious on the other. What is done with the given at the point of becoming conscious of it….that’s where the fun is.
————

…..in order for the mind to be represented for experience….. — Bob Ross

I can’t unpack this. The mind is represented conceptually, but no mere conception is an experience. To represent the mind for experience requires the intuition of it as phenomenon, which requires the mind to be a real object conditioned by space and time, which contradicts the conception. You’ve got me over the proverbial barrel here, I must say.

I understand you’ve qualified this entire thread with your interpretation of the original view of transcendental idealism, which is fine, you’re perfectly entitled. Perhaps for my benefit you could re-phrase the “in order for….” to elaborate on how it relates to that original view.

….proves that there must be real things outside of me in space (…) but this doesn't prove that the sensations or intuitions themselves must be non-fabricated. — Bob Ross

All of which was the point. If you already know there is a proof of a claim (things do exist outside the mind), I don’t understand why you would then ask how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds.

And what's any of that got to do with fabrication? How are you assigning this condition, what do you mean by it?

I have long wondered what it actually means to be a Kantian….. — Tom Storm

“…. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition….”
(Think carefully about what you don’t know)

“…. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject….”
(Speak even more carefully about what you don’t know)

Kant specifically denies knowledge of the things-in-themselves: so how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds? — Bob Ross

Kant does in fact claim things do exist outside minds, and that necessarily so. In fact, there are two arguments in affirmation of it, concluding from either subjective a priori** or objective a posteriori*** major premises.

So, what……you think the warrant for those claims was unjustified, or, you think he had no warrant at all?

**the gigantic footnote to Bxxxix
***Bxx: “…. and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence….”

So who is the real idealist? — Gregory

Everyone. At least, of a certain kind.

I don’t see how that would entail a close mirroring of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Here’s the overlooked part of the whole ding an sich dichotomy: the thing of perception, or appearance, is the thing of the thing-in-itself, the only difference being time, or, occassion. Or, using your word, happenstance. Some ol’ thing is out there, just minding it’s own damn business, been doing its thing for a million years, suddenly gets itself perceived by a human operating under the auspices of Transcendental Idealism. POOF!!! The thing that used to be all by itself out there suddenly gets itself transformed into a mere representation by a being sufficiently equipped for doing it, and it’s off to the rodeo.

So, yes, all we have to work with is the representation, but we’re trying to mirror with it, the thing out there that was formerly just another extant, albeit undetermined, object in a universe full of ‘em.
————-

I have a different interpretation of this passage. — J

Been paying attention, haven’t you. For you, a pro; for me a con, in that I took some liberties with the author’s intent. Bob advocated negative knowledge, which require judgement, and from the preface to what we’re talking about here….

“…. Negative judgements—those which are so not merely as regards their logical form, but in respect of their content—are not commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect them….”

….I offered Bob a way out such he wouldn’t be exposed to the obligation for apologizing, to himself only of course, for something his reason should have guarded him against, which he actually did, of a sort, by admitting to the point.

I trust you, so here we go:

Regarding the content of a knowledge judgement….knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible;
Regarding the “task of negative judgement”: reject false knowledge, re: reject as false that knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible;
Regarding “where yet no error is possible”: given from pure speculative reason, it is necessarily the case knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible, insofar as all knowledge is of mere representation;
Regarding substitution of such negative judgements that are…..

“true…..” (knowledge of things-in-themselves is not impossible iff negative knowledge of things-in-themselves is possible);
“but empty…” (negative knowledge is nothing more than negation of knowledge itself);

Regarding “…..and just for this reason….”: knowledge of things-in-themselves already having been shown as necessarily impossible reduces negative knowledge of things-in-themselves to the negation of that which never was;
And we finally arrive at: that which “…is inane, senseless and quite absurd”.

TA!! DAAAAA!!!
(Mic drop, kill the TED lights, Chaplin-esque waddle exit stage right)

so would 'immanent' be simply possible [human] knowledge of things? — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I dunno. Immanent/transcendent relates mostly to understanding. Understanding is the faculty of thought, so immanent/transcendent relate to the manner of thinking of things. Thought with immanent quality will be about things of possible experience, transcendent thought will be about things not possible to experience.

It doesn't follow that the p-zombie is "inconceivable" merely that it is implausible, and even incoherent in the sense that we can find not any cogent explanation for how it could be possible. — Janus

Whew!! Thanks for the addendum, the add-on. I was having trouble with the post, but…..hey, no worries…..I’m all better now.

Instead, I know that what I am given is not a thing-in-itself, but the thing-in-itself could turn out to be a mirror (by happenstance) of what I am given — Bob Ross

It is the function of understanding/judgement, to as closely mirror the thing as it is in itself with the thing as it is represented in us. So….not by happenstance, but by logic, Nature herself being the arbiter.

What do you mean by "immanent", and how it is contrasted to "transcendental"? — Bob Ross

Immanent isn’t contrasted to transcendental.

What I mean by immanent is that which concerns understanding in its considerations of possible experience. Transcendent, on the other hand, concerns understanding in its considerations of that which is beyond all possible experience. And transcendental does not concern understanding at all, but has pure reason for its origin.

Transcendental, in its broadest sense, merely stands for the possibility and application of a priori cognitions and the necessary, dedicated, conditions for them.

Ok. Thanks for that.

I rather position transcendent in opposition to immanent rather than transcendental, that’s all.

Whatever the things are in-themselves is entirely impossible to know. — Bob Ross

While this is in accord with Kantian T.I., there is nothing implied therein having to do with negative knowledge. “Impossible to know”, or, knowledge not possible to obtain, with respect to thing-in-themselves, merely highlights human sensory limitation and says nothing whatsoever about the cognitive aspect of the overall human intellectual system. It is absurd to expect a system to make a determination on something that was never given to it.

Another way to put it, is that I have only negative knowledge of X by negation and never positive knowledge. — Bob Ross

Under the assumption X is some empirical condition, and negative knowledge regarding X is obtained according to judgements such as, “I know X’s are not this or that”, such judgements are “….inane and senseless; that is, they are in reality purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous…”(A709/B737). You cannot say anything about, nor legitimately claim any kind or degree of knowledge for, that for which nothing is given with which to form a judgement.

So…..upon sufficient reflection, you might find that rather than having negative knowledge of X, there is only positive knowledge of yourself, re: you know there is something you cannot know, from which follows, that forcing the former at the expense of the latter is what the A/B quote is meant to indicate.

Anyway….just sayin’. One interpretation of “the original view” in relation to another. Although, given the high pagination of the quote and your admission of “starting” to embrace the source, you must be forgiven for not being familiar with the intent of it, and how it tends to correct this one point of your personal interpretation.

Cool.

All I’m saying is for the guy that thinks up….conceives……a thing, then for him to be presented with an argument implying he didn’t think it, might cause him to seriously reject the argument.

Invoking square circles in juxtaposition to the topic here, is a categorical error, in that both squares and circles are established knowledge regarding classes of objects in general, such that the combining of them leads to a contradiction. For that which is not established knowledge, on the other hand, the contradiction may still arise, but not necessarily, depending on the conceptions being combined. In the case of p-zombies, the conception itself combines other conceptions, if not actually deemed knowledge, at least do not contradict each other, from which follows the conception itself is not invalid as the conception of square circles would necessarily be. Which is to say….it cannot be said the guy didn’t really conceive it, or, which is the same thing, there is no strong argument for the inconceivability of the very thing the guy conceived. I mean….the guy can bend a listener’s ear for days about that thing, so for him to be told he didn’t conceive it, or what he conceived wasn’t really what he thought it to be, says more about the listener than the guy.

Maybe a compromise. Maybe the strong argument should be against the rationality of the conception of p-zombies, rather than the conceivability thereof. It must be the case there is no argument strong enough to negate the conceivability of them, insofar as they reside in the domain of discourse, where the inconceivable is never found.