my prejudices are not as uncommon as it might seem — Banno

Nope, hardly uncommon. Everybody’s got ‘em, maybe not so overtly….you know…contrarian.

Your prejudices are showing.

Two cents. Or in this case….. kronenthalers.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition….

Because the topic is an objector’s misunderstanding of a “Kantian demonstration”, and without an intrinsic dualism the demonstration wouldn’t be Kantian at all, there are exactly two “impossibly deep levels of presupposition” with respect to empirical conditions, the first being the treatment of space and time concerned with intuitions, and the second being the categories concerned with conceptions.

…..and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Them being the concepts as we normally use them, as we usually use them is in regard to the whole of the empirical world, the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect being the difficulty with which transcendental idealism always contends.

All that reduces to….the original disposition of the intellect is mere observation, from which arises the assumptions of the inborn, re: non-critical, realism, that the empirical world is in space and time.

Transcendental realism says it is, but, of course, it is not, and by which the untaintedness of transcendental idealism is justified. And THAT, is what Kantian transcendental philosophy, in the form of speculative pure reason, proves, given the validity of those aforementioned presuppositions.

As stated, Magee didn’t say, so I took the liberty. Hope you don’t mind.

I didn’t forget or ignore; just couldn’t come up with anything more to say.

Been real, all the same.

‘Til next time…..

….the thing that's 'out there'. It seems something of an odd pastime of philosophers to start fiddling with that. — Isaac

Logical thing to do, from their point of view, when fiddling with the ‘in here’ couldn’t be improved.

Mostly, we're grateful. — Isaac

I can….errr….‘see’ how that is likely true.

You know…the currently fashionable talk at the table. Linked herein some time ago by somebody. And, fortuitously enough, upon reconciliation of the ambiguity over the word “see” and other assorted and sundry “perceptual verbs”, the Bad Argument disappears. Still, as we all know only too well, only to be replaced with another one.

What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder? — Isaac

Dunno about “these people”, but lil’ ol’ me…..go back to that picture on pg 4. See that word “tree beside the object? At the same time, notice the first condition of visual experience in Searle’s list? See where the picture says tree, but #1 says object?

In Searle’s list, object becomes tree at #3, and in the picture it can be a tree only after Searle’s #3, but without that condition, which is not even implied by the picture, it is the case that it should have been object on the left, at instance of perception, and never a tree. Nevertheless, the picture correctly represents the initial conditions for visual experience, demonstrating the presentation of an object directly to the system, according to physical law.
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Other oddities from indirect realists here….. — Isaac

Ehhhh….that’s just conflicts in domain of discourse. Over-extended physicalist reductionism adds nothing to the human physiological act of perceiving, such that without it knowledge of objects is impossible. Our intellect, in its empirical manifestations, concerns itself initially with the output of sensory devices rather than their input, and it shouldn’t be contentious that our intellect works indirectly with, and is necessarily conditioned by, the real in accordance with its own methodology, whatever that may in fact be.

Ya know, something I wondered about, given our conversations, fly on the wall kinda thing….are you and your colleagues appalled at the extent to which humans can’t find agreement among themselves on the most fundamental human considerations? To be honest, I might guess you guys just figure we all like to bark at the moon, confident in the pretension that it is listening.

Anything that is the “mechanics of human vision” is itself the perceiving…… — NOS4A2

The mechanics of any human sensory device makes the perceiving possible, being necessary but not sufficient for it, in accordance with their design alone.

…..and not the perceived. — NOS4A2

Obviously, hence trivially correct.

If indirect realism accepts this it is redundant. — NOS4A2

Redundancy is moot, insofar as the proper indirect realist accepts as given, that the mechanics is neither the perceiving nor the perceived. The former belongs strictly to agency, the latter belongs strictly to that which affects agency.

If sensation is removed, as output of sensory devices, and all else being undisturbed, is it rational to say perceiving remains intact?

Which tree do we perceive? And who is perceiving that tree? — NOS4A2

All that picture does is demonstrate the mechanics of human vision, from which the answer to that question is impossible, insofar as both forms of realism must accept that physiology.

Remove the word “tree”, then ask where and when the warrant for putting anything in its place, comes from.

Now let the games begin.

The particular is never conceptualized. — Metaphysician Undercover

No? Then what is? And what of the notion that all thoughts are singular and succession, which implies any thought is itself a particular instance of it? All conceptions are thought, so…..

The same sensation is not the consideration. Obviously, time conditions all of them, in that sensation now is not the sensation before or later. It is still logical that a sensation now is of the same thing as the sensation is of that thing at a later time. The mind doesn’t worry about the relative time of the thing itself, only the time at which we are affected by it.

Ehhhhh….Wittgenstein. I don’t care what he says. The bee sting I experienced last year is for all intents and purposes precisely the same experience I will have next time. How else to know it as caused by a bee?
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You might call the senses information collecting tools. — Metaphysician Undercover

You might, I would not. I would limit the senses to information transferring devices, the information already residing in the things perceived. There isn’t any information collected per se, it is, rather, merely that which the mind employs as the instantiation of its methods.

Compromise: if we say my transferring is your collecting, I might still be inclined to grant intuition is the collecting tool, in that the matter of an object from which sensation proper arises, is represented as an empirical intuition. Dunno if that works for you.
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The information is received as formal, but it consists of forms created by something other than the mind which receives it, so the meaning inherent within must be interpreted — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so what something other than the mind creates forms? And if the information contains inherent meaning within it, what does understanding do? How is this not precisely the materialist doctrine writ large?
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And the mind receiving creates its own meaning according to what it knows in its interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, the mind abstracts meaning inherent within forms received as information, according to what it knows. But once again….what if the mind doesn’t know? Why would the mind create its own meaning, if there is already meaning inherent in the forms? Although, I’m beginning to see where your notion that judgement being the source of error, as I hold it to be, is not the case. I’m not sure it is legitimate to permit the mind to misinterpret, that is, mistake the meaning inherent in forms with the meaning it creates for itself.
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So the act of abstraction which occurs in the feeling of a sensation as per you example of a tickle, is an act of creation within the receiving mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. In Plato, this is “knowledge that” there is something affecting the sensory apparatus. But it is not “knowledge of” the particular object. As such, it is merely one of a general class of possibilities. The mind knows immediately what some causes of the sensation is not, but not yet as to what it is.

The mind classifies the information received, according to conceptions which it already has, and creates what appears to you as a conception of that particular instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

This works for objects received more than once. In other words, objects known to the mind as experience, re: according to conceptions which it already has. Once more, the question remains as to conceptions the mind does not have, in which case it would seem the mind couldn’t create a conception of that particular instance. Consider the alternative, wherein the mind classifies in accordance with conceptions it already has…..how is it determinable that none of them represent the forms inherent in the information it received? I don’t think ol’ Mother would imbue the human intellect with so inefficient a methodology, which requires it so eliminate all that doesn’t apply, only to find out nothing it already has, does.

But it is really just a particular instance of categorization, whereby the essentials are determined and a representation of a particular is produced. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. This is better, in that conceptualization is really categorization, in which the essentials are determined. Now, the mind can certainly interpret the information contained in forms in accordance with categories it already has, and the categories are themselves conceptions, but of a very specific gender and origin. But no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category. Th essentials determined by categorization, are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowing what an object may be in general, not properties for determining what it is in particular.

When you come into the room and see a chair, where there was a similar chair yesterday, you tend to think it is the same chair. — Metaphysician Undercover

Long before Wittgenstein, critical metaphysics established that tendency is unwarranted. Conventionally, perhaps, through lackadaisical thinking endorsed by herd mentality. Simply put, it’s just easier to say it’s the same chair because it’s too complicated to explain why it might not be, or indeed, isn’t.
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The form of the sensed object inheres within the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The primary, and probably irreconcilable, difference in our respective theories. The form resides in the mind. Sensation contributes nothing but the physical matter of the object affecting the senses.

What is a priori in the mind is some structure of universals by which the mind categorizes incoming information. — Metaphysician Undercover

YEA!!! Agreement!! Categorizes. What do you think this means? What is happening when categorizing occurs?

So the form of the thing which the mind knows is fundamentally different from the form which inheres within the thing itself, as a representation produced from placing the information within the conceptual structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. The thing the mind knows as representation of sensation, is phenomenon, which is the matter of the object, arranged according to the form provided by the mind a priori, kinda like placing information within a conceptual structure.

There is no problem with "first instances" so long as we maintain the reality of the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, and makes the first instance possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is certainly still a problem, in that the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, the categorizing conceptual structure, and any instance at all, doesn’t have anything to do with the determination of what that thing is, only that knowing what it is, is possible from them.

Fair, but doesn’t answer the question.

The categorization of the particular according to an already held conceptual structure, isn’t the same as conceptualizing the particular sensation. So that structure isn’t how conceptualization works, but is merely the necessary criteria by which it is possible.

I would say the limitations on sensibility are physiological, and not the mind’s inherent capacity to apprehend that which is presented to it. This relates directly to the question above, insofar as there doesn’t seem to be a limit on our conceptualizing practices. The most rampant, uncontrolled faculty in human cognition, is imagination, after all, right? In fact, it is the case understanding does synthesize conceptual representations into the objects of sense that do not belong to it, re: optical illusion.

There may indeed be more information in sensation than is transferred to the mind, but such information would be irrelevant to the process of determining what an object is, insofar as understanding uses only whatever information is given to it, as phenomenon.

This is why the Aristotelian description was that the mind abstracts the form of the thing, through the means of the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abstracts….from what? The thing itself? This presupposes the form is already contained in the sensation, and that the senses have some sort of self-contained deductive power. I usually resort to the ol’ tickle on the back of your neck scenario to refute such description. A tickle is a sensation, and if the form of the thing which causes the tickle is abstracted from it, it would seem we would know immediately what causes the tickle. But we do not. In fact, it is the case we sometimes sense a tickle not caused by any object at all.

There is a form belonging to any sensed object which becomes known as a certain thing, but it is not abstracted through sense, but resides a priori in the mind. This also relates to the question as to what do you do in the case of first instances.

Again….lots of what you say I agree with, but I can’t see an answer to the original question in it.

Kantian Stargazer. — Tom Storm

Useless trivia. Kant authored the precursor to currently accepted nebula dynamics. Theory of the Heavens, 1755.

Ok. So…best cast overall? Any favorite?

Is something is truly unfamiliar to us are we blind to it? — Tom Storm

In keeping with the scenario, in which perception presents to the reasoning mind, it is then contradictory to deny the presentation, so we couldn’t say we’re blind to it.

True story and case in point: So….I’m a stargazer, with all that implies. Local weather guy informs that at a certain time in a certain region of the night sky, I will experience first-hand….all else considered as given….what he has second-handedly represented for me in a mere snapshot, along with a brief strictly appearance-related description.

Next….I didn’t understand the snapshot representation properly, in that to me it looked like a time sequenced composite of a traversing single object, and all the description did was confirm the snapshot.

Now…..at the appointed time, and with the correct spatial orientation, I saw a string of pinpoint lights, musta been a hundred of ‘em, all in perfect linear succession, all at the same velocity, going my right to left, for six minutes.

I mean…can you even imagine the fascination of this experience, it having no antecedent conceptual representation whatsoever? As you say, an occasion of the truly unfamiliar? Pinpoints of light? Seen plenty of ‘em. This particular one here at this time of year, over there at that time of year? Been there, done that. A singular point moving at speed? Yep, first for me being Telstar, if I remember right. Noisey singular pinpoints a speed? Ehhh…big ol’ jet airliner. Big deal. None of which is sufficient to grant me immediate knowledge of what I saw this time. In fact, not only did I not know what I saw, I couldn’t even image something fitting the observation, such that I could guess what I saw. But still, there’s no possibility for being blind to it.

Anyway….I looked it up, updated my knowledge base, none the worse for wear. Damned if it wasn’t Elon Musk’s SpaceLink. Truth be told, I didn’t know there was such a thing in the first place.

One of those guess you had to be there moments? Despite that, hopefully you grasp the relevance.

Yeah, they weren’t that impressive.

Best cast overall…..LOTR series? Not counting old westerns and war epics.

Many favorites is a contradiction.

“A Few Good Men” for its content in general, the final courtroom scene in particular for the justification of it, and the ending for the subliminal ramifications because of it.

Outstanding critique. Well-thought, and asks pertinent questions, not all of which have answers.

Before itemizing responses, lemme ask ya, when considering this:

So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..what happens in the very first instance of a perception or an idea in a particular human cognitive system? By first instance I mean the very first observation of something in Nature, or the very first flash of a possibility a priori? The implicit ramification being of course, there is no experience on which to draw, therefore there is nothing in memory, re: consciousness, therefore the representation by already present conceptions is quite impossible.

Combine that scenario with the obviousness that everything whatsoever, is or was a first instance to some human intelligence. There is nothing in general known today that wasn’t first learned by someone, mostly long ago, but true nonetheless, and there is nothing known by an individual that didn’t begin with the not knowing of it.

What are you to do, when perception presents to your reasoning mind something for which it has no conceptual representations already?

Dunno about that. Maybe it’s just me. Got this thing about pigeonholes, donchaknow.

I wanna be in the canonical column, strike the anglo tag, and continental column, strike the existential/phenomenological tag.

Does that work?

Pretty good explanatory nutshell, right there.

“Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous.

But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

Generally, perhaps. Critically, I would think not. Humans are a naturally inquisition lot, which reduces inevitably to the capacity to ask themselves questions for which there is no readily apparent answer. As soon as that happens, the quest for why not requires examination of that by which we do get answers to our questions, in order to find both, what the demarcation is, and, why there is one.

And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed.
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How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is.

There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is.
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And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things? — Metaphysician Undercover

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
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I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts — Metaphysician Undercover

In the words of The Right Honorable Professor Old Guy…..understanding does not intuit, intuition does not think. Regarding things…intuition without conception is empty, conceptions without intuition is blind.

Sustainable in application? Dunno, but it is necessary in speculative metaphysics, which is itself always in consideration of whether it is sustainable in application or not.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it more the case we’ve been jumping around all over the place, initially talking about judgement in and of itself, whether it is false or dismissible, then bringing in “things”, then adding in will with its moral implications or not, whether judgement is this kind for this or that kind for that…..on and on and on.

Partly, too, is our posts are so long and involved, important stuff gets laid waste. I know I go back, and notice I should have commented on something.

Another is the speculative nature of metaphysics and human intelligence itself. Nobody knows what’s going on between the ears, which is license to theorize any way we wish, as long as it makes some kind of sense to somebody. As much as I spout this shit, I’d never declare with absolute certainty this method is the true rendition of it, and therefore he who denies it is missing the boat.

Anyway. Once more, into the breach…..
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You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things
— Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience.

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it.

Regarding things of sense, real spacetime objects, on the other hand, in the perception of them, one of the numbers in the arithmetic operation will be a conception, and the other number will be an intuition, in which case imagination is synthesizing a conception with a representation of the thing being perceived, which is a phenomenon. This method is a posteriori, from which is experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t.

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.)
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Relating conceptions IS the judging. Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I made a mistake there, for which I beg forgiveness. We were at the beginning of this conversation, not yet having delved deeply enough to arrive at the subtleties. So saying, relating conceptions is imagination; the relation is judgement, perhaps clarified with the above. Sorry about that.

As for making judgement on things, I would hold with the notion we only make judgements on representations of things, whether those be phenomena regarding experience, or conceptions regarding mere thought of possible experience, or thought for which no experience is ever possible. These latter two is where reason performs its best, exerts its greatest authority, in that it will inform, given prior judgements, that current judgement just won’t work, if it contradicts either experience in the case of real objects, or logic in the case of the possibility of experience.

So it is from this, that reason is the faculty of principles. Understanding regulates conceptions according to rules; reason legislates understanding according to principles. From which follows, because judgement in part of understanding, and because rules have far less power than principles, insofar as rules presuppose their principles, judgement is the source of error in the human reasoning process.
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Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. — Metaphysician Undercover

I might take some fault here as well. You said….

…if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things…. — Metaphysician Undercover

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time.
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Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we’re in the domain of sensibility, where we before in the domain of understanding. Human dualism, donchaknow.

What does it even mean to “enter the mind”?

To be continued?

…..philosophical dialectic practices.
— Mww

…..dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Two different, unrelated things.
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You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things — Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite.
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In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible.

Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh my. A priori speculative metaphysics to a posteriori physical activity.

It (judgement) allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself?

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction.

And don’t bother with the power of freedom in the domain of the beautiful or the sublime, insofar as these are nonetheless subjective conditions in themselves, and while certainly hinged on aesthetic judgements, cannot be concerned with errors in general, those being empirically right/wrong with respect to knowledge, or transcendentally good/bad with respect to morality.

I grant moral philosophy is more important than knowledge philosophy, insofar as in the former the subject is his own fundamental causality, which implies some relative control, whereas in the latter, Mother is the fundamental causality, which makes explicit the subject has no control whatsoever. Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices.

I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

……exactly what I said, with which you were quick to disagree.
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The act of relating two conception together, will cause a relation between them, in the mind. But it does not necessarily cause a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Never said it did. Just as relating is not relation, so too is the cause of a relation not the judgement of it.

So, I believe that the cause of the conclusion, judgement, comes from something other than the act of considering the possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the mini-treatise preceding this conclusion, and following from your argument just above it, there is not much with which to take exception. Pretty much conforms to what I’ve been saying. I might counter-argue that conclusions can follow immediately from the considering. The only way for there not to be a judgement at all, neither in affirmation nor negation of the considering, is if that which was under consideration wasn’t even imaginable in the first place. Hence the principle…that of which the imagination is impossible the object cannot be conceived. Or, if you prefer, the conception of the unimaginable is empty.
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Your use of "necessary" and "necessarily" here indicate that you are determinist, and this is either the result of, or the cause of your refusal to separate reasoning from judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dunno about determinist, but my use of those terms certainly label me as holding with the laws of logical thought, insofar as the term “necessary” is a condition of any law, merely indicating the invocation of its negation, amounts to at least a contradiction and at most an impossibility.

Let me take a look at your proposition here. A collection of conceptions is necessary for cognition, and it is what results from cognition. You ought to recognize that this is a vicious circle of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is patently obvious, so why did you think it was anywhere part of my proposition?

If a collection of cognitions is the effect of cognition….. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn’t….

……then how could the initial collection of conceptions come into existence….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Theoretically, by the effect of being imagined…..

Suppose we have existing separate conceptions, not yet related so as to form a collection. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine. Those are presupposed, insofar as a collection of them is impossible without its constitutive parts.

And let's say that there is an act required to "synthesize" these conceptions to make them a collection, a whole. You'd be inclined to say that this is cognition. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would not.

So we need another name for the act which causes the synthesis. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and I’ve already stated the name of that other act.

We need an act which supports, or causes the existence of the parts, and another distinct type of act, which supports or causes the unification of the parts as a whole. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we do. What we have not yet addressed, is the act which causes the existence of the parts. But we have considered the part that unifies, or, as was stated, synthesizes, re: imagination.

You notice that at the base level of cognition there is needed a different type of act, intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I do notice, but only in relation to cognition of objects. We are not authorized by that, to say this is base level of cognition in general.

I am arguing that at the highest level of cognition, judgement, there is also the need for a different type of act. — Metaphysician Undercover

To which I adamantly object: the highest level of cognition is not judgement. The source of all human cognitive error, insofar as such error is in fact error in the relation of conceptions to each other, judgement, cannot be the highest level to which cognition can attain, from which follows the possibility of error far outweighs the possibility of correct thinking.

The highest level of cognition, is reason. Reason here the faculty, not the condition by which rational intelligences are distinguished from that which does not possess it. Reason the faculty subjects judgement, and thereby the cognitions given from them, to principles, by which the immediate judgement is regarded as conflicting or sustaining their antecedents. It is here phrases like, “I knew that” and “Now I know that”, hold as, or become, truths.

So it is that understanding is the faculty of rules, reason the faculty of principles, which are the necessary ground for laws.
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Are you talking about changing my mind because I recognize that I made a mistaken judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not just you. Me and everybody else as well.

Did I misunderstand your question? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I was thinking you might substitute your arguments into my parentheticals. In other words, the words I write that you perceive are my (some perceived object) for you, which, because you disagree, can’t be what you think for yourself, my “___” (a cognized known object) for you, and you disagree because the object common to both of us…the words….is missing some property you would give the words, a determinant of relative intentionality, or has properties I gave to them you think don’t belong, a determinant of relative meaning.

If more confusing than purposeful…just forget it. Sometimes I get ahead of myself, and indeed, sometimes beyond. (Sigh)
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It is you who is playing a silly language game here. — Metaphysician Undercover

HA!!!! Yeah….everybody that speaks involves himself in language games. I let my abject abhorrence of analytic philosophy impinge on my transcendental nature; I only meant to try making it clear when we say stuff like we do this or that, the manifested doing has no personal pronouns connected to it. If, as you say, we think in images….kudos on that, by the way…..it is absurd to then demand that images themselves invoke personal pronouns. Recognition of this removes the Cartesian theater from being a mere oversimplication, as you claim, but eliminates it altogether.

Just agreeing that your statement was itself an argument, a reason indirectly supporting the persuasiveness of treatise itself.

were you persuaded? — Tom Storm

Oh HELL no……but I mighta been if I hadn’t already been exposed to greater persuasions.

How is that not an argument? — Wayfarer

Argument: a series of reasons meant to persuade, usually in the form of a treatise or doctrine supporting an opening observation or logical premise.

“…. “The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness….”

And with that…….we’re off to 450-odd pages of persuasions.

Don't we relate conceptions to each other, without necessarily making a judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

That kind of thinking is where the notion of Cartesian theater, or the dreaded homunculus, comes from. The relation of conceptions just IS judgement. WE don’t relate; there just is a systemic process in which that happens. Beware of….and refrain from, at all costs….those abysmally stupid language games.

Note the rela-TION of conceptions is not the relat-ING of them. Relating, which is the subsuming of a manifold of minor conceptions as schema of a greater, technically, a synthesis, is done by imagination; judgement merely signifies the relative belonging of them in the collection, one to another.

So it is that, under the auspices of this particular theory, because no cognition of a thing is at all possible from a singular, stand-alone conception, a synthesis of a collection of conceptions is itself necessary for cognition and all which follows from it, and because the synthesis is necessary, the judgement follows from it necessarily. So, no, there is no relating of conceptions without judgement signifying the relation.

Sidebar: there is a caveat here regarding the cognition of things, but for the sake of simplicity, it shall be overlooked, re: intuition. For the mere thinking of things, the synthesis of conceptions holds by itself, and judgement works the same way for both.

Think about it. Has it ever occurred to you that, say, this thing (a perceived object) can’t be “__” (a cognized known object) because it’s missing some property (a conception) already understood (judged) as belonging to (synthesized with other conceptions) that certain “__”?

No, I would not agree with that at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rhetorical question, because that is precisely what you did right there, which would be readily apparent to you, when you examine what and how your disagreement came about.

If I understand you….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you do, well enough.

I think this is just an avoidance of the question…. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you do not.

So when "knowledge" is conceived in the way I propose, suspending judgement reduces to preventing the production of knowledge, not to not knowing what is known. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, but you’re in a different systemic time. In the time I used, re: “with respect to cognitions…”, which makes explicit the conceptions have already been related to each other, which means judging has already been accomplished, satisfying the conditions necessary for knowledge. I’m saying it is stupid to grant the possibility of suspending a judgement that’s already happened, which implies the possibility that something has become known.

By saying phenomena do not provide knowledge limits your claim to the faculty of sensibility, insofar as all your talking about is phenomena, and in this regard you are correct. I, on the other hand, have progressed methodologically far downstream from sensibility, from which follows that phenomena have already been addressed in the methodological timeframe. Cognitions, of course, belonging to understanding, along with the business of relating conceptions to each other.

When we think about things, that's what we're doing, relating concepts to each other, and from this we may make a judgement about the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s not all we’re doing. Relating conceptions IS the judging. And we don’t make a judgement about a thing; we cognize a thing, from the relation of conceptions thought as belonging to it. And, need I remind you, we’re talking about things here, real spacetime objects….you know, the things not in our heads (sigh)…..represented as phenomena, which in the thinking process, requires something else from understanding not yet considered.
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It appears to me (you’re) forcing a separation between thoughts and feelings, but then allowing the feelings into the mind as phenomena, which might ground the knowing in some kind of necessity. Is that what's going on here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Separation, yes. Allowing….no. That which enters the mind as phenomena is that physical thing which represents how that feeling is to be understood. I’d hoped to make it clear feelings per se are not cognitions, and that being the case, combined with the necessity of cognitions for knowledge, it should follow that there is no knowledge in feelings as such. We can certainly say we know we are are affected in some way by them, which informs us of their occasion, this actually being more a change in our subjective condition than predication for knowledge as such. The knowledge as such, then, reserved for the cause of the feeling rather than the feeling itself.
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With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will….
— Mww

I do not see how you can separate a rationally grounded system from an empirically grounded system, in the way that you do. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you don’t see the distinction in empirically grounded and rationally grounded systems as I promote it, you must favor some other antagonistic dichotomous system, or, see the same dichotomy but promote it in a different way. Which would be……what?

If you separate the phenomena, images, or whatever you want to call it, from the intellect….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps you don’t see the way of my separation because I separate as you stated right there, but, of course, that’s not at all my way. All I ever separated from the intellect is aesthetic judgement, and the will as autonomous causality.

……to provide an outside grounding, making the phenomena necessarily known, then it cannot get into the mind in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could say “empirically grounded” equates roughly to “outside grounding”, but it does not follow from that, that phenomena are necessarily known. Which is kinda silly in itself, insofar as if phenomena are necessarily known, why invent a complete theoretical knowledge system in humans, of which phenomena are the mere occasion for its instantiation?

If it's in the mind, then it's just part of a rationally grounded system. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it’s in the mind, it is a part of a rationally conditioned system. Again, we’re talking about things….you know, real spacetime objects not in the head (sigh)…..which makes them the ground of the system. That with which the system is immediately concerned and without which the system has nothing immediate to do.

In a rationally grounded system, there are no real spacetime objects under immediate consideration, eliminating the faculty of sensibility, hence phenomena, from the methodological process.

An empirically grounded system, the governance of which is Nature, requires the cooperation of sensibility and reason, the culmination being knowledge a posteriori; a rationally grounded system, the governance of which is logic, requires only reason in cooperation with itself, re: non-contradiction, the culmination being knowledge a priori.

That separation seems pretty straightforward, does it not?
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All judgement does in thought of things…
— Mww

So you can't dismiss judgements about things, as judgement, because judgements only relate concepts to each other — Metaphysician Undercover

These two statements do not say the same thing. I certainly can dismiss judgement about things, because judgement isn’t about things. It’s about the relation of conceptions, and conceptions have nothing to do with things, but only with the representations of things as they are thought.

Furthermore, if you recall, I said judgement cannot be dismissed (I actually said suspended) at all, under the assumption they are properly employed in the first place.
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Fun is a feeling. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nahhhh, it isn’t. Pleasure is the feeling, fun is merely the relative qualitative measure of it. Would you agree that every quality of feeling is reducible to one or the other of only two of them?

If the domain of representations corresponds to 'the phenomenal realm', then the nature of the knowing subject corresponds to 'being in itself' — Wayfarer

If that is to be the case, it arises from a non-Kantian theory, insofar as conceptions are also representations, but with respect to their origin and use in understanding, have nothing to do with the phenomenal realm of sensibility.

Sorry….I don’t know how to relate the knowing subject/being in itself to representation/phenomenal realm. I agree the self can never be a phenomenon, but we are still allowed to think that which represents the process of thinking, which, obviously, gets us into all kindsa trouble.

The link was interesting, made some good points and some I could leave be, so thanks for that. You have a highly commendable habit of coming up with the good stuff.

If everybody agrees the nature of human intelligence is representational, what would be used to examine the “inner nature” of representations?

What sense does it make to ask if representations have a nature, if to find out what it is, if the only possible way to understand what it is, is by means of the very thing being asked about?

But would you class judgement as part of the reasoning process? Suppose reasoning is the feeling which causes a volition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn’t accept that reason is a causal feeling. At bottom, thinking is the reasoning process, and we do not think our feelings. While thinking is an innate human ability, the constituent objects of which aggregate over time to reflect the condition of the intellect, feeling is an innate human quality reflecting on the condition of the subject itself, the constituent objects of which subsist in themselves as wholes. The former reduces to experience, the latter reduces to conscience.

…..if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things, would a conclusion (judgement) come about naturally as part of the reasoning process… — Metaphysician Undercover

I take things here to mean represented by phenomena. Real spacetime objects. A conclusion with respect to a thought about things would come about naturally, but it wouldn’t be a judgement. All judgement does in thought of things, is relate concepts to each other, this being the discursive kind as opposed to the aesthetic, the relation itself called a cognition. Reason concludes whether the immediate judgement conflicts with antecedent judgements, hence determines the truth of the relation.

If one wishes to assign a feeling to this empirical system of things, he would use statements like…this does or doesn’t feel right, which represents a conflict in logic. In the case of aesthetic judgements, in a rational system of feelings, he would use statements like, this does or doesn’t feel good, which represents a conflict in subjective, re: personal, principles.

……or is there a separate act of will required which constitutes the judgement or conclusion? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is not a separate act of will in the thinking about things, no, insofar as the will does not concern itself with phenomena. Nevertheless, in the act of willing, the mind does reason to conclusions, does employ judgement, the major distinction being, the objects upon which it is concerned regarding such willing, are of its own creation, as opposed to objects of Nature’s creation. This is an entirely separate philosophy, though, and has no business being mingled with worldly considerations.

But if a separate act of willing is required then one might suspend judgement even in the cases of logical necessity. And I wonder if this is possible — Metaphysician Undercover

I submit it is impossible to suspend any judgement, it being a necessary constituent of any logical system. If it is merely a premise in a logical system, to suspend a premise is to destroy the system, which contradicts the employment of it for the suspension.

With respect to cognitions in an empirically grounded logical system employed by the understanding, to suspend judgement reduces to denying the very knowledge phenomena provide, which reduces to not knowing what is known, which is absurd, the efforts to do so is called stupidity.

With respect to volitions in a rationally grounded logical system employed by the will, to suspend judgement is not to deny the volition, which would lead to the same absurdity, but to deny the rationality of it, which is certainly possible, and even occasionally observable, but herein the efforts to do so, is called immorality.

The guy exhibiting stupidity elicits pity; he who exhibits immorality, elicits disgust. Ya know what’s ironic here? It is actually impossible to accuse ourselves of being stupid, in the pathological as opposed to the incidental sense, then proving it, but we can very easily accuse ourselves of being immoral and very easily prove it. Why? Because it is impossible to know why I might be stupid…..if I knew why I couldn’t be stupid….but it is easy to will the proper moral volition, then completely and utterly disregard it. In addition, with respect to the subject himself, there is no feeling per se in being stupid, but there is always a feeling necessarily conjoined with being moral with its complementary feeling in being immoral.
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account for the reality of the separation between judging and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are already separated; it is the separation between will and judgement I contest. Besides, we don’t act on a judgement, we act on a volition, which is what the will determines and judgement directs. Still, we do judge the act itself, post hoc, that is, after its manifestation in the world, but in such case, the judgement has been transposed into a discursive judgement insofar as we then understand hence cognize, some certain effect we ourselves have caused. Pretty simple really: we judge in one way for the throwing or the not throwing of the switch, we judge in a completely different way when we witness the results of the switch having been thrown or not thrown.
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the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance.
— Mww

It does pertain though. It's related as cause to effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely related to cause and effect. But….how? What is it and from whence does it arise? Your aforementioned loophole.
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The purpose of a will is to cause an end.
— Mww

I think I have to disagree with this characterization of "will". I think that what is caused by the will is the means to the end, not the end itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhhh….depends at which point one is examining the system. If he thinks an end is the act, then will could be the means, insofar as will does not cause an act. If he thinks an end is the determination of how to act, but not the act itself, then will can be said to cause such determination. The former causality of will as means is a volition, the latter causality of will as cause proper, is an imperative.

Havin’ fun yet?

Judgement (…) is an instance of willing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it more correct to say judgement depends on, or follows from, an instance of willing, but one is not the other. An instance of willing is the immediate determination of an act, therein called a volition, in accordance with a feeling; to judge is to relate the correspondence of the volition to the feeling that caused it.

But there appears to be some sort of loop hole which allows for a type of random action, exempt from the laws of natural order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ahhhh….possibly the greatest source of abhorrence in metaphysical practices, in which the warrant for a principle which is both entirely sufficient in itself and absolutely necessary as a merely logical terminus, yet completely unavailable to empirical justification, must be given a place in a sub-system of the human condition. It is here your loophole makes its appearance, as the very epitome of abstract rationality.

It’s abhorrent because to be useful it must be accepted as legitimate, and hardly anybody wants to merely accept anything carte blanche. Made worse by the stipulation that the thing requiring mere acceptance is never allowed to pertain to the system granting the acceptance. It’s the same as…conceiving a thing, but prohibiting that conception from acting on or even within the system that conceived it. How absurd is that!!!! Can you walk without moving your foot???

Who was that guy that said…metaphysical statements are neither true or false, they just don’t make sense.

So….I have no reservations that you know the name of that loophole. Acceptance of it, of course, is another matter.
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I still haven't really freed the will from the need for an end, and the need for a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I submit you won’t, for the will needs an end, which represents the human being’s inevitable feeling for a need to act or respond to an act, which is very far from objectively consummating it. (“…if you choose not to decide you still have made a choice…”)

The purpose of a will is to cause an end. It is the end itself that is judged, the willing of it be what it may. The secondary question would then be….what end does the will purpose itself toward, but the primary question must remain…how is the agent in possession of such a will informed as to does or does not the end he wills satisfy the need he feels. And TA-DAAAA!!!, there’s where your preference to…..

….completely remove will from the intellect — Metaphysician Undercover

….meets its authority, but…..

I think will ought to be separated from judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

….is contestable on theoretical grounds, insofar as will remains connected to judgement of a certain kind, itself removed from the intellect as well.

But we’ve wandered afield from Socrates and Platonic forms.

judgement it appears sometimes to be associated with reason, as logic forces judgement, and sometimes it appears to be associated with will — Metaphysician Undercover

On the first, agreed, that judgement being called discursive, that is, its objects, whether phenomena or mere ideas, are logically constructed in association with pure reason but in accordance with a particular cognition.

On the second, however, I think I’d go with judgement associated with desire rather than will, in which case the judgement is aesthetic, in association with practical reason, but in accordance with a particular feeling, or perhaps more accurately, in accordance to some arbitrary degree of a general feeling. As has been hinted elsewhere herein, account must be made for necessarily different causalities corresponding to these thoroughly incongruent kinds of objects.

Aquinas shows a similar issue, will he says, is generally subservient to reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ehhh….I’m reluctant to let the will be subservient to anything within the human condition. If there is any way whatsoever, in which the subject has even the slightest modicum of self-control, in which he is the arbiter of his own circumstance, only restrained by natural limitations, then there must be a means for it, and if that means is called will, so be it. It’s as simple and certainly as plausible as….we might think we can talk and swallow at the same time, only to find out we cannot, an altogether empirical determination, but we can always think a thing within our limitations we might do, then find out we can either cause or not cause the doing of it, which is a rational rather than empirical determination.
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I think I would prefer to completely remove will from the intellect — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe parts of it, but not altogether, I don’t think. I’d be ok with moving will from, say, intuition or even understanding, but there are non-empirical judgements, and as dedicated as that kind of judgement may be to mere feelings in the form of desires, inclinations, persuasions and so on, there must be a way to determine which object is sufficient to cause an act by the subject because of them, or determine a range of objects sufficient to explain them if the subject is acted upon, which, either way, is the purview of reason in its practical employment which we must admit as being a part of the intellect.

More agreement than not, overall, methinks.

….false judgement is shown to be impossible. But this conclusion is derived from the premise that knowledge is true judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgement. All-important, hardly comprehensible. As in other things, the ancients didn’t attribute to judgement its due, while on the other hand, subsequent philosophies may just as well have made theoretical expositions regarding it, damn near incomprehensible.

At the very least, seriously complicated. Like…what is it, are there different kinds, from different sources, relating, and related to, different conditions. Is it its own faculty, or is it part of another.

All that being said, I’ve come to reject JTB as inadequate, and “knowledge as true judgement” as misplaced functionality. Which, of course, are themselves merely judgements of mine, which in turn suggests I should know how I came by them. (Sigh)

Anyway, thanks for the input.

Kudos. You guys sure seem to know your way around Greek thought.

I appreciate the lesson.

Outstanding synopsis, and thank you for it. I can actually follow all that, and even if I don’t quite agree with it, it makes its own kinda sense. I’d even go so far as to say, for its time, both those guys thought deeper into the human condition than any one else ever has, at least those present in the historical record. That being said….I’m going to allow myself to take exception to Plato’s notion of “the good”, preferring to relegate the idea to the irreducible ground for a specific moral philosophy.
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Sidebar: I would like to say there are no false judgements. Regarding….

the arguments where "false judgement" is shown to be impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..what was the conclusion? Are they, or are they not, possible?

Can you see the issue lurking behind these controversies? — Wayfarer

I recognize a few from my own opinion, as in…..

….abstract objects independent of human thought, is a contradiction;
….mathematical objects exist, that is, are found in the world, iff a suitable intelligence puts them there;
….mathematical relations are “out there”, that is, empirical cause/effect relations describable only by numbers; truths, mathematical or otherwise, belong to that self-same suitable intelligence;
….truths are not confirmed by thinking about them; truths are determined by it, and the thinking is subsequently confirmed by empirical practices;
….“our best epistemic theories seem to deny that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible”, yet we have mathematical knowledge, which indicates the theory denying such objects, is hardly our best theory.

Very big iceberg indeed. Not so much the need to drop empiricism, but that much more needs be ceded to the thinking subject that is currently kept from him. Nothing whatsoever has any meaning without relation to a particular intelligence capable of being affected by it.

We love our empiricism for the simple reason that it is irrational to object to the lawful conditions which ground it. We love empiricism too much, insofar as the very idea of irrationality and even lawful conditions, are not themselves empirical determinations, which justifies the notion that empirical thought is not as great and grand as is pretended for it.

I simply meant that the natural numbers and such things as laws and principles, are real….. — Wayfarer

Ok. What makes that form of realism Platonic? I’m sure it must have something to do with forms, but I’m not up on Plato’s theory enough to grant them as real, in the same sense of real as, say, logical or transcendental objects. I don’t think a particular form as such is susceptible to definition, and I don’t see how forms themselves are conditioned by time. But I concede to being stuck in an Enlightenment rut, so……

Invented or discovered….hmmmm, that’s a tough one right there, even though I’d allow those listed, among others of like kind, to be real, insofar as they are certainly both susceptible to definition and conditioned by time. To be discovered is to be presupposed….can’t discover what wasn’t there…..so maybe the invention just is the conception that spontaneously belongs to that which is presupposed.

Dunno. Mind bender, to be sure.