Again, the issue is ethics rather than metaphysics. — Banno

THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

By Immanuel Kant

1780

Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott

…..if ya can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em?

Still working on it. — Wayfarer

Looking at 74b, we can see the inkling of something new and different just beggin’ to be exposed. Socrates says stuff like…when we think……but leaves it at that. Kant steps in with a new notion of what is actually happening when we think, and the transcendental arguments are the necessary conditions that justify those speculative notions. It’s Aristotle’s logic in spades: if this is the case, which the LNC says it is, and that follows necessarily from this case, which the Law of Identity says it does, then the entire systemic procedure is only possible if this certain something is antecedent to all of it.

By delving deeper into the human cognitive system, examining it from a transcendental point of view, claimed to be the only way to determine that antecedent something, Kant both sustains and refutes arguments from imperfection. Refutes insofar as purely logical systems can be perfectly formed and thereby perfectly concluded, hence can be absolutely certain in themselves; sustained insofar as being metaphysical, there are no possible empirical proofs for those transcendental points of view, which a proper science must have, hence is imperfect.

The former, being perfect, allows trust in knowledge in general; the latter, being imperfect, allows amendments to particular knowledge without jeopardizing the system by which it is furnished. And that combination ends Hume’s radical skepticism forever.
(Until the next new thing comes along, and ends Kant’s transcendental philosophy forever)

We end up with, again in 74b, we don’t “think” as Plato says. We tacitly understand, and that purely a priori, herein a euphemism for subconsciously, re: behind the curtain of mere phenomena, those conceptions Socrates says we are born with, have knowledge of, and of which we think, none of which are the case in the pure a priori use of reason.

…..I’m still working on it.

'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments. — Wayfarer

Sure reads that way.

Any comments on the Argument from Imperfection? — Wayfarer

As in all logical dialectics, the Argument from Imperfections would stand undiminished, if not subsequently diminished by better initial premises. The bottom line holds nonetheless, even if wearing clothing other than robes, insofar as the ideal is the perfect, the unconditioned, which is unattainable by reason, from which follows all logical arguments are from imperfection and cannot rise to the objects representing the pure ideas of them.

74b: “…Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing?…”

This presupposes the two pieces seen, are already determined to be equal. But if it is the case we don’t ever see pieces as equal, but rather, only see two things relating to each other by degree of conceptual unity with the apodeitic pre-established form of one or the other of those two things, then the determination of equality does not rely on the condition of the pieces themselves, but in their relation to that pre-established form.

An abstract ideal, in this case equality which is indeed different than being equal. is not properly a knowledge but more an intellectual presupposition, later to be transformed into Aristotle’s categories, thus not technically derivable from instances of perception. Socrates says we are born with a manifold of them, which is at least logically sufficient to proclaim, but he also says we are born with them as knowledge, which would not be logically sufficient at all, depending on the definition of it on the one hand, and the manifestation of it, regardless of its definition, on the other.

Idle musings….

The problems of philosophy are reducible to the problem of reason:

“….. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.…”

Ehhh….I just found that cuz you asked.

I don’t think any rational thinker is going to discriminate against Descartes’ philosophy because of his anatomical science. Like hoeing a crooked row only to blame the dirt.
————-



Makes one wonder about the agenda residing in those that promote undocumented nonsense, resting assured somebody or other will take it for gospel.

it's even more unclear that Descartes philosophy is the reason we treat animals the way we do. — Moliere

Hell….maybe it’s just us. The way we are as a species.

Something I'd like to see is the connection between Cartesian philosophy and how we still treat animals. — Moliere

At the conclusion of this paper:

“….“Forget the pig is an animal. Treat him just like a machine in a factory. Schedule treatments like you would lubrication. Breeding season like the first step in an assembly line. And marketing like the delivery of finished goods….”

Although this admonition from an American pig farmer conflicts with our widespread belief that animals differ from inanimate objects, it is this type of Cartesian thinking that allows agribusiness corporations to offer low-cost animal foods to consumers. The corporate ownership of animals has had a devastating impact on animal welfare, particularly through factory farming….”
(https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2728&context=facpubs)

I was lucky enough to find a translation of the letter on the internet. — Moliere

Ahhhh….excellent. I gave you objections, you gave me letters. Tip of the pointy hat.

I guess it is established Descartes did vivisections in the spirit of anatomical science, but more than likely without the embellishments of the modern sensationalists.

Perhaps we shan’t quibble over the editing of supposedly verbatim correspondence in assuagement of delicate constitutions on the one hand, or, being informed of that which we don’t need to know, on the other, re: Bennet 2017 vs Letter to Plempius 1638.
—————

The early-modern philosophical question remains: given the intrinsic duality of mind and body necessarily conditioned by their respective substances, how to determine the substance of the mind, unless to eliminate the substance of the body; how to eliminate the substance of the body from substance of the mind, by determining exactly how the substance of the body performs, such that it is proven to have no effect on the performance of substance of the mind; how to determine exactly how the substance of the body performs, unless by observing it as it performs.

Where is the fault, exactly?

Cool. You’re a better keyword-er than I, I guess. Got a link?

Better than that….how can dissected individual parts go on beating.

Rarely do we get such a clear cut relationship in a historical document of a person's thought directly advocating something — Moliere

Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638

I’d be careful here. Try finding that historical document, which is in truth the only way to glean from it some personal thought. As far as I have been able to find, all we have is he said he said, but we don’t have what he himself said.

While it may be sufficient to accept as given that Descartes “practiced and advocated vivisection”, because some referenced letter apparently says so, and the historical record supports period-specific occasions in general, re: Boyle, Malabranche, the personal thought with respect to it resides in the context, which is not determinable from the claim alone.

Also, in letters to Mersenne, 1632, in following Vesalius 1629, he talks of dissection, which may or may not be the linguistic precursor to vivisection. If we grant he used the word as it stands today, we can say he didn’t do the latter, having instead admitted the former, and if he used the word as we use vivisection today, we still don’t have evidence of his personal thoughts regarding its ethical/moral implications. Scientifically, yes…it’s fine, animals don’t feel pain like humans, which is probably true. But that doesn’t say they don’t feel something which is pain to them, the truth of which science can never prove, and the implications of which he didn’t address.

Anyway…..fun to think about.

…..understanding the background to these disputes…. — Wayfarer

Be pretty hard wouldn’t it, when everything at university from which the disputes arose, was fundamentally predicated on what we now call classical philosophy but was standard at the time, on one hand, and good old fashion theology on the other. I think this matters, because we got Discourse, but we didn’t get Le Monde, simply out of fear of church reprisals, a la Galileo.

Rumor has it Le Monde had originally contained a treatise on animals, among others, which would probably have shed some horse’s-mouth, first person light on his attitude directly towards the worthiness of moral implications with respect to the treatment of them. So saying, I never once would have disagreed with your standing on animal abuse; I do have a different opinion nonetheless, over such implications, relative to our own civil and post-Enlightenment evolution.
————-

Quite what Descartes means by 'thought', (…) I have a rough idea — Wayfarer

As in Kant, I’ve found it best to go with the cut-and-dried definition, and that’s in First Principles, 1, 9.
For whatever that’s worth.

But it seems to me that Descartes' understanding of the mind or soul is too narrow. — Wayfarer

As for understanding mind….absolutely. As for soul….ehhhh, I’m not a soul kinda guy myself. In the world of pure metaphysical abstractions, I’m ok with drawing the line at mere consciousness.
———-

On Dennett: he’s accessible. Why bother researching moldy tomes when a video is right there. ‘Nuff said?

…..a lot more to be discovered. — Wayfarer

Perhaps not so much discovered, in that you may already know of it, but I’m thinking Part V “Discourse on Method of Rightly Conducting….”, prior to the paragraphs quoted in the link, might be entertaining for its gross inaccuracies, but I’m also thinking that in the time of its publication, and with respect to those few academics exposed to it, must have been absolutely fascinating. I mean….generation of animals spirits like very subtle winds….musta given them something to talk about over mead and mutton.

As to discoveries, I finally found the 3rd objection to the 6th Meditation, and reply, to the section on animal thought, in which we see the background for some of the early modern thinking that seldom, if ever, occurs to we post-moderns:

“…. As for dogs and apes: if I conceded that they have thought, that would imply that ·in this respect they resemble men·, not because in men as well as in animals there is no mind distinct from the body, but rather because in animals as well as men there is a mind distinct from the body. This was the view taken by the very Platonists whom my critics were taking as authorities a moment ago, as can be seen from their following the Pythagoreans in believing that a soul could move from one body to another….”
(https://homepages.uc.edu/~martinj/Rationalism/Descartes/Descartes%20-%20Objections%20VI%20and%20Replies.pdf)

Odd innit? We think in terms of space, time, quantum probabilities, while they think in terms of gods and older philosophers, which is merely a reflection on the state of empirical knowledge.

Not to be confused with, “…c’mon baby take a chance with us, meet me at the back of the blue bus…”

Ahhhh….those were the days.

Though generally even then they were treated as conscious entities - which Descartes denied….. — Bylaw

He denied reason and soul to animals, in “First Principles…..”, as distinguishing conditions. I find little support for the notion that animals were generally treated as conscious entities.

My sentiments as well.

The author of the SEP article on animal consciousness, re: “… It would be anachronistic to read ideas about consciousness from today back into the ancient literature.…”, seems to hold a similar inclination.

could novelty, a novelty inherent in the object itself, ever be considered to be a coherent aspect of aesthetic judgement — Janus

Whoa! That’s Ken Kesey/ Merry Pransters kinda heavy, right there, insofar as both pro and con are in the same query: con…novelty isn’t in the object at all; pro….novelty is certainly an object of judgement. Boys and girls woulda had a blast with that one, methinks, trippin’ down the highway.

Still, things change. The hippies then for the rights of free spirit, the woke dipshits now for the pathologically stupid over-sensitivity regarding Ms. Green M&M’s wearin’ thigh-high boots.

(Sigh)

As it is said, there's no accounting for taste. — Janus

And yet, all there ever is, with respect to quality, is aesthetic judgements. Which reduces to…..there’s no accounting for each other’s tastes. Which is probably what you meant.

a market that demands what it has become accustomed to — Janus

Gotta admit to that myself. Band comes along, love their music for three or four albums….then they change style.

For re-inventing, probably can’t top the Beatles. Drippy girly AM pop in ‘63 to FM album Sgt Pepper in ‘67….massive musical offset.

“…. One likes to believe in the freedom of music
But glittering prizes and endless compromises
Shatter the illusion of integrity…”
(Rush, Permanent Waves, 1980)

Admirable, to be sure.

I submit, it is only the two world wars and the Holocaust that reformed our empathetic conditioning to its present state with respect to us as humans. While additionally the Civil War changed Americans alone; the others changed everybody.

I think they were no more disconnected then we are, what with the present population endlessly fingering keyboards or joysticks on the one hand; on the other, the past population taking a bath once or twice a year.

Benefit of the doubt: what do you mean by disconnection from reality?

Bottom line…it wasn’t to the participants, which were legion in those days. Lots of literature on the doing, but hardly any on objecting to the doing.

Can’t use our moral compass to judge the righteousness of bygone eras. Well…actually we do, but, legitimately, only as comparison.

……he actually might have closer to an evil genius. — Wayfarer

Ehhhh….animals were generally treated differently in those days, so it’s consistent they would think of them as medical experiments. I mean, nobody got upset by spearing horses in battle just to get the rider on the ground to make it easier to bash his head in, so…..

Whether true or not, can you judge the philosopher/mathematician without judging the anatomist?

Ok; all good….

With Kant's categories he is so certain that we know what he's talking about that he says we already know what he's saying. — Moliere

….except for that. He was pretty certain we commoners hadn’t a clue what he was talking about, even though he says every one of us is doing what his theory suggests. But I see what you mean: after his explanation, we can say…oh hell yeah, that’s right!!!!

I think I'd say logic has changed considerably since Kant, and I'd say that it's for the better too. — Moliere

You wouldn’t be alone.

Modal logic is more specific than Kant's. — Moliere

Maybe; dunno. Specific in what way? As I said in another thread… one division containing two books containing five chapters containing eight sections containing 179 pages…..and an appendix. All as only one of two divisions in an rather thorough exposition of a very specific human logical functionality.

Can’t help but think the moderns have that exposition, as the ground of their own presuppositions. Likely, since Kripke actually begins this article with a reference to it.

But this isn’t the place for Kant himself, so…..

all of these things might have happened. They didn't, but they may have. — Banno

Nobody cares about what might have happened, when they are only affected by what does.

Recent modal logic gives us a way to deal with such suppositions. What you have proposed, does not. — Banno

Correct. Not much need to deal with might-have-beens. Psychologists excepted, but (sorry, Isaac) no proper philosopher cares about them anyway.

Logic has advanced somewhat since Kant. — Banno

Logic has changed. Whether it has advanced, is questionable. All the basic conceptions of modern modal logic are already contained in Kantian metaphysics, and have been classified as such since Aristotle.

Admit it, Good Sir: you’re grasping at straws. All the cool stuff has already been done, and you missed the boat.

Sure, it's actually in this room. But it might possibly have been in the other. — Banno

On logic…..

“…. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this (…) any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy…”

It is possible for there to be a lectern in another room. It is possible for a lectern to be anywhere. According to the example in question, “this very object, in the room it is in fact in, even at this very time” cannot possibly be in any other room.

Try as I might, some folks I just can’t help. Horse/water kinda thing, I guess.

Here he’s saying this lectern cannot have any material property other than the essential one it does
— Mww

I don't agree. (…) he might equally have used a material example such as that the lectern might have been painted pink or had his name engraved on it. — Banno

Of course, but these are not properties the lectern cannot have. They do not represent the properties the lectern must have such that to not have them the lectern wouldn’t be “this very object”. You’re talking about what it can have; he’s talking about what it cannot have. If space is a property it cannot have, THIS lectern cannot be in THAT room, for then it would be in two spaces simultaneously.

These are ways in which the properties of that very lectern may have been otherwise. — Banno

These are ways that very lectern’s properties are cumulative without contradiction. Add all the properties you like, but it’s still going to be made of wood, it’s still going to be in this room. As long as the subject making the statements is as well, which is tacitly understood to be the case.

Again, this odd interpretation has the result that when one says the lectern might have been in the other room, one is talking about a different lectern. — Banno

Actually, it’s a demonstration of the different “categories of truth”, and how it is his “wish to distinguish them”, beginning at the bottom of pg176. It isn’t about different lecterns; it’s about different ways of knowing about one lectern.

He says, “We can certainly talk about this very lectern and whether it can have certain properties which in fact it does not have. For example, it could have been in another room from the one it was in fact in, even at this very time, but it could not have been made from the very beginning from water frozen into ice”.

Here he’s saying this lectern cannot have any material property other than the essential one it does, but we can still talk about it as if space were one of its properties. Which is what we do when we say this lectern could have been in another room, but it couldn’t be made of ice.

One of the properties “which in fact it does not have”, regarding the lectern in particular and objects in general, is, of course, space. And, as hinted, so too is time a property objects in general cannot have.

Thus is the conflict incurred between Kripke’s “categories of truth” and Russell’s so-called “scope of description”, re: this/that modal distinctions, whereby a necessary identity statement regarding THIS thing, that THIS thing cannot be in THAT place on the one hand, in juxtaposition to the contradictory attribution of space and time as properties, on the other.

Logical statements are validated by themselves, but their proofs are in experience alone. It is far easier to prove THIS thing can be in THAT place and remain THIS thing, then to prove THIS thing in THAT place is not THIS thing.

Ahhh…ok.

Are you supposing that combining them has been attempted?

Yeah, I can see that. Change some terms here and there, but the basics would be pretty similar. Matter belongs to the object, form belongs to the subject, kinda thing, maybe?

Oh. Cool.

…what I think the traditional meaning of 'noumenal' refers to- (…). (I'm still investigating what becomes of 'form and substance' in Kant.) — Wayfarer

Are you attempting to relate the traditional meanings to form/substance in Kant? Connect them somehow? See how an investigation of the one would get you to the other?

As you said….no entrapment. Just curious.

Making my way (slowly) through the online editions — Wayfarer

FYI….the online Guyer/Wood has a fabulous 90-odd page translator introduction, also has standard pagination, but…..sadly….isn’t searchable. If some secondary literature references a A/B number, you can scroll to it, but with 700 pages…that’s potentially a lot of scrolling.

But the intro is worth the time, I think, even if it is technically a second-party interpretation.

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2017/09/kant-first-critique-cambridge-1m89prv.pdf

My notes on this: 'abstract' and 'intuitive' seems a very odd translation. I would have thought the distinction was between 'sensible' and 'rational' cognition, but I can't find the passage in Schopenhauer (if anyone has a precise reference I'd appreciate it.) — Wayfarer

Dunno about precise, but this contains the beginning notations referring to the words in your notes:

“…. But thus Kant brings thinking into the perception, and lays the foundation for the inextricable confusion of intuitive and abstract knowledge which I am now engaged in condemning. He allows the perception, taken by itself, to be without understanding, purely sensuous, and thus quite passive, and only through thinking (category of the understanding) does he allow an object to be apprehended: thus he brings thought into the perception. But then, again, the object of thinking is an individual real object; and in this way thinking loses its essential character of universality and abstraction, and instead of general conceptions receives individual things as its object: thus again he brings perception into thinking. From this springs the inextricable confusion referred to, and the consequences of this first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge….”
(WWR, 2, App., pg 35, 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, 1909)

And I’m not eccentric. I got the proper stamped, signed, coffee-stained release papers to prove it.

So the entry in Britannica under Noumenon is wrong — Wayfarer

I’m hardly qualified to criticize the contributors to an encyclopedia. I can say, without equivocation, that entry doesn’t reflect any of my understandings.

…..the capacity for acting as a moral agent—makes no sense unless a noumenal world is postulated in which freedom, God, and immortality abide.

Those are the three fundamental problems of pure reason, boiled down to the conceptions of the unconditioned, which pure reason seeks as its own nature demands, and never attains. There’s no need of a noumena world in which they abide, insofar as they already abide, at least as conceptions, in this world of human reason.
———-

Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena

“…. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena.…”

“…. We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions—not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition—and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone.…”

You be the judge.

I favor the B edition as well. I mean…spend a few years re-thinking something, best just go with that one. No sense in using what he thought better of, when talking about what he ended up thinking.

Guess that makes us a couple stubborn ol’ peas on either end of an overextended virtual pod, donnit?