Humans wonder naturally, nature of the intellectual beast. It is nevertheless a fine line between wonderment and confusion.

How a term is meant to be understood is by definition a definition. — Fooloso4

Objection noted, and agreeable in principle. A definition is the complete representation of the conception, which always arises spontaneously from the understanding alone. How I define a term is represented by how it is understood by me.

Problem is, of course, there is no promise of necessary congruency between a plurality of understandings, from which follows the possible disparity between definitions, i.e., complete representation, of the same conception. I rather think how a term is meant to be understood, is the explanation of it, integral with its propositional employment.

Minor point, far deeper into the weeds than necessary.
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we do not gain knowledge by analysis of definitions. — Fooloso4

Correct; knowledge is far more complicated than that.
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Can the mind/body distinction be made if sensory awareness is a matter of thought? — Fooloso4

How about......awareness of, e.g., pain, is an indubitable certainty, a product of mind, even if its cause is not, it being a product of body. Difference between aware of, and aware-ness of. I suppose there’s all kinds of ways to distinguish one from another, right?

Is it the same to define a term, as it is to declare how it is meant to be understood? Descartes tells us what he means by the use of a term, e.g., P.P 1,9, on “thought”, insofar as when he is thinking all these listed mental occurrences are predicates of it, but he didn’t really define it, per se, as did Kant with his “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”.

As well, in P.P. 1,10, he warns against over-complicating “items of knowledge”. Then it is the case that “logical definitions for very simple and self-evident matters” should be unnecessary, because these should be taken as the very principles upon which the treatise is grounded.

Still, I would agree P.P. may very well be a response to critics, in which he is clarifying his intended use of terms, or, “items of knowledge”, rather than setting definitions of them.

What did you have in mind with “exactly what some are doing here”?

Neither gods nor commodores shall cause me to fire on such abundant perspicuity.

Be all that as it may, it remains that it is humans doing the work, therefore it is impossible to get beyond the metaphysical/empirical dichotomy with respect to the core question, which is my sole raison d’etre in attendance.

I have been thinking that it is the core question which goes beyond the dichotomies of metaphysics vs empiricism — Jack Cummins

How can it go beyond that dichotomy, when the proposition that asks about it obtains its meaning from them? Given that understanding itself is metaphysical, and reality itself is empirical, it follows that bypassing either results in reality that is not understood, or, that which is understood is not reality. In effect, nullifying the core question.

On the other hand, if there is understanding of reality, in whichever form that obtains, then the response to the core question must contain both the elements of the dichotomy, thus the question, effectively, hasn’t transcended either of them.

Just sayin’......

I don't think you guys are still talking about how we perceive time. — god must be atheist

I’ll cop to that. I reject that we perceive time in the first place, so don’t bother with talking about how we do it.

That, and I reject that missiles nest. How absurd!!!!

Would changing the words to [neurons, (mental content)] be more understandable? — Mark Nyquist

Not in my case; I understand mental content as instantiated non-physical. And neurons are just neurons in any case.

It's just normally we wouldn't note the neurons being present, but to do rigorous philosophy, we should. — Mark Nyquist

True, we don’t normally consider neurons in rigorous philosophy; that’s the purview and professional domain of empirical scientists. There’s a reason for that, I think, insofar as humans do not...and perhaps do not even possess the ability...to think in terms of the very natural laws by which the brain operates. And if that’s the case, how does the explanatory gap ever close, between the physical operation of the brain and the appearance of us as apparent manifestations of the non-physical operation of the brain?

our mental process does have full input/output capabilities and this model accounts for those capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

That was never in doubt; the problem is in translation of one input type to a completely different output type. The type of input as energy, that translates to a type of output as motion, is quite comprehensible, but the type of input as energy that translates to a type of output as “fascination”, “anxiety”, “freedom”.......well, that just doesn’t work so well, does it.

Fun stuff.....

The statement in question...... — Fooloso4

I like the “Principles of Philosophy” exposition more. Simpler, with a follow up for what he means by “think”.

Could you explain how his outcome would have been different if he had? — frank

No, not with any legitimacy. I can philosophize all day long over it, but that would never be any more than making inferences based on my understandings, which are most likely not even be close to his. He had a different mindset and different authorities to answer to than I, after all.

Is the complaint that he hasn't executed a proper ontological proof? — frank

I don’t think Descartes meant to infer his own existence, with the predicate “...therefore I am”.

I don’t think Descartes needed an ontological proof for anything, insofar as his sole intent was to prove a distinction between mind and body. The method for proving a distinction does not need an ontological proof for its elements, as much as it needs validation of an absolute necessity of one of them. All he had to do was show how the doubting one set of conditions for a thing, was impossible for doubting some other set of conditions for some other thing. It follows that if doubt of that other thing is impossible, that other thing must be absolutely necessary. He then has no need to prove the existence of it, having already proven its necessity. So it is, that because “I think” is undoubtably, “I am” is given necessarily.

Another way to look at it is, logical consistency reduces the “I” that thinks, to be the very same “I” that is thinking. “I” think, therefore “I” am. As such, “I” isn’t proven to exist, only that it is simply proven, by its thinking.

I think Descartes’ mistake was not to eliminate the extension of “I am” to phenomenal existence. So in effect, I guess you could say he failed to provide an ontological proof for the impossibility of mind as such. And he failed at that, because, as aforementioned, he didn’t consider, or at least didn’t use, the categories, as did Kant, it being reasonable to assume he knew about them, at least in Aristotle-ian form.

As an aside, there is also a standing Kantian metaphysical argument, unknown and/or not recognized as valid by Descartes, that existence cannot be a predicate in a logical proposition. So, if “I think” is true, “I am” is given immediately because of it. I mean....how could it be that “I think” but “I am not”.

Subtleties indeed. As in Tonini, I’ll wager.

to found an absolute grounding in subjectivity for science , logic and math, not an empirical one. This is in the best tradition of continental philosophy: dig deep down beneath the assumptions of math and science to those truths that are indubitably true for all, everywhere, at all times. (...) That for me is the difference between psychology and philosophy. The former is a conventionalized, conservative derivative of the latter. — Joshs

Well said.

Why would Descartes need "Everything, which thinks, exists" to be true in order to infer his own existence from the fact that he's thinking? — frank

Ahhhhh....the subtleties of philosophical investigations.

What do you think “infer his own existence” to mean?

With respect to Kant at least, there’s no philosophical laughing, but there is a basic refutation.....

“...The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property of thought would constitute all beings necessarily. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained—because....”

....and I say basic because it occurs in a mere footnote to B422, and I say refutation, as shown by the “ -because...”, insofar it is only so in accordance with Kant’s philosophy, which employs a conceptual scheme Descartes didn’t, re: the categories.

On the other hand, Kant congratulates Descartes for not making the same absurd claims with his idealism in general, as Berkeley made with his, so.....it’s a wash. Praise on one hand, criticism on the other.

In general, if you think your brain has mental content, you need a philosophy that accounts for this and it needs to recognize content has both input and output capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

Yep. Sounds about right.

Or you could walk around with one of those new-dangled machines strapped to your head, with a platoon of geeky lab-coated pencil-pushers in tow, taking turns telling you what’s reallyreallyreally going on between your ears.

(See? Right there! Apple tastes good = 2.5uv in zone 5 of area 2 of region 3; 14 phosphate ions over 10nm cleft!!! TaaaaDaaaaaa!!!!)

In a stimulus-free situation we still experience time. This may be explained by internal changes in the brain...... — god must be atheist

Then it may be more proper to say it is those changes that is the experience, not time itself.

What is rhythm but an event in succession to a similar event in a uniform series of such events?

Unless we can find some physics stuff that equivocally ties time to some not purely theoretical, but real phenomenon, we are at liberty to say also that time does not exist, — god must be atheist

Gonna be a long time coming, I’m thinkin’. Finding that physical stuff.

I do not know if anyone read it but chose to remain silent. I hope so. — Fooloso4

I followed the text, and only your commentary on it, for which I offer respect. Silently.

I've looked epiphenomenalism and I don't like it. — Mark Nyquist

You’re a member of a rather large crowd.

It's a form of dualism were the physical brain supports an immaterial mind that has no output capabilities. — Mark Nyquist

There's a metaphysical argument which posits mind as a logical causality.

Dualism might have some general solution to time perception in the form of mind but I don't see any specific mechanism. — Mark Nyquist

Yeah.....unfortunate that speculative pure reason has declined in philosophical standing, despite the fact people still think. I at least, hold that reason is sufficient “specific mechanism” for “time perception”, as you call it.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, though? — Janus

Not necessarily, I suppose. Perhaps the brush I’m painting with is too broad. Just seems to me, that which is singular represents nothing other than itself. Pluralism, being a concept of its own, then stands as the condition for any of the -isms contained in it, but stands as representation of none of them.

Interesting topic, fun to play with, but not worth a real argument, to be sure. Knuckle down, drag out fight, I mean.

”Treat others as you would NOT like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller

That doesn’t seem to solve anything, when I elect to treat you as a big fat ugly slob simply because I wish not to be treated as such. Hell, I could just as well treat you like I would Ho Chi Minh, Alan Jackson, or Bugs Bunny for that matter. In other words, the mere negation of a rule is no less a rule, and if the affirmative of that rule is faulty, so too is its negation.
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My point is that if you're a big fat ugly slob then you're immoral toward yourself, and as such nobody is going to help you. — SpaceDweller

So the proper criteria for morality is...appearance? Attitude? I should think you’d be the epitome of immoral if you willfully fail to help me merely because I am judged as offensive to your sensibilities. It follows from that, that one should help that ubiquitous lil’ ol’ lady cross the busy street, so long as she doesn’t smell bad.

I’m inclined to say, on the other hand, if one is immoral, as opposed to merely committing a circumstantial error in judgement from ignorance or accident, no one can help him, for his disposition is given and hence the ground of his actions is already set.

Moral philosophy is a tough business, no doubt.

Are you a ham radio operator? — frank

Nahhh....long-time communications specialist in Uncle Sam’s Canoe Club, back when it was a whole lot more fun.....and risky.....being a hippie than a sailor. Culture clash writ large.

Antennas are fascinating. I’ve worked on transmitters from .25w UHF to 2Mw VLF, where inserting a fluorescent stick bulb in the radiation field lights it up. Makes the Boy Scout tour group all giddy in amazement.

Difference, indeed.

Morality: "Treat others as you would like others to treat you." — SpaceDweller

And you don’t see the inherent nonsense in that?

You may very well have no issue in treating me as a big fat ugly slob, under the assumption such is my wish regardless of how foolish it seems to you. But it is so much more offensive than foolish, that I shall treat you as a big fat ugly slob, when you reject the insinuation explicit in the treatment.

Morality is never in the treatment, but only and always in the reason for the treatment.

if time perception is (or is not) observable evidence that our brains actually use instantiated non-physicals? — Mark Nyquist

If I read that as....does the brain use a kind of instantiated non-physical evidence, such as time....then I would say, yes it does. Thing is, though, we do not perceive time, but only perceive one occurrence in relation to another, and that relation is what we call “time”.

But yes, it does seem as if the brain constructs of its own accord, that which we as functioning rational beings, think we need.

Knowledge of global warming had been around for decades before the world in general became interested. — frank

True enough; the observed changes in Nature became known as global warming, when the information contained by those changes became understood. Some are interested, but, e.g., The Great Pacific Garbage Patch, says, not enough.

I hesitate to agree the world in general is interested. Or, perhaps, interested enough to do anything significant about it. Some merely blame the cyclic nature of Nature herself, some say they can’t see it from their house, so neglect their due diligence.

Still, it is the case, that while a bucketful of ants won’t effect a scale, a dump truck full of them certainly will, all things considered.
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what is the mindset that pays attention to science? — frank

Hmmmm....good question. The mind that pays attention to science, is the mind that judges a validity in it? I mean, the microwave oven benefits me immensely, but it was a completely accidental discovery, hardly scientific, which suggests mere benefit can’t be the sole arbiter for paying attention to science. Maybe its products, but the discipline in itself.

How does the physical matter of neurons instantiate the non-physical content of future perception?

Sounds an awful lot like epiphenomenalism, doesn’t it? Also sounds an awful lot like a re-write of the “hard problem of consciousness”.

Interesting subject, nonetheless. Doesn’t have any good answers, but still interesting to think about, up to a point anyway.

All -isms are concerned only with the affirmation or negation of the essential root conception, right?
— Mww

Yes, but as Daemon points out below, the exception might be pluralism. — Janus

Maybe, but I would treat pluralism as a singular conception in itself. Pluralism is still different than the myriad of separate -isms contained in it. If pluralism was a pot, it matters not to it, that there is something, or there is nothing, in it.

I honestly don't understand what the difficulty is here. — James Riley

A hint, maybe: misplaced concreteness. The treatment of general conceptions, in this case, information, as an actual thing. Information, in and of itself, can never help anyone decide anything at all, but only that which the information is about, may. Information without the human cognition of its object, is empty.

People like to say....well, the information was always out there, just waiting or us to find it. Which is just the lazy over-simplification of why everything possible to know, isn’t.

These three questions do not interest me anywhere near as much as...... — Tom Storm

Same here. To “untie philosophical knots in our understanding” starts at home.

Is it the case that all isms are essentially nothing-but-isms? — Janus

I’m pretty much ok with that. All -isms are concerned only with the affirmation or negation of the essential root conception, right?

There seems to be a common will to fundamentalism, to foundationalism — Janus

The intrinsic human need for certainty on the one hand, and the lazy folks’ intrinsic wish to have decisions ready-made for them on the other. Hence.....everything from the Logical Laws of Thought to the Planck Constant to expiration dates on consumables. And of course, the Ten Commandments and variations thereof.

Yeah, well......as long as it’s only “ought to be”......

Science doesn’t correct itself. Scientists correct themselves and science follows.

What is the problem with seemings in Kant? — Manuel

The problem of seemings is in people generally, not Kant specifically. For Kantian idealism to deal with seemings, or, which for all intents and purposes is the same thing, feelings, takes a different approach than epistemology. That’s all I’m saying.

Cool. Thanks.

Having nothing better to do can be entertaining, at the very least. — Manuel

HA!!! True dat, amigo.

Yeah...the bane of idealism, even Kant’s: seemings. Can’t empirically prove ‘em, can’t rationally get rid of ‘em. Nature of the beast.

Just because we can’t prove doesn’t mean we can’t trust, and then have to doubt. Both radical skepticism and metaphysical reductionism have logical boundaries, after all.

that path of reductionism just leads to ever smaller relations of units of stuff. — Manuel

Smaller units of stuff implies empirical reductionism, right? For that reason, I stipulated metaphysical reductionism, which pertains to ever smaller units of conception. Prime example......A = A. The logical laws. In Aristotle and Kant, among others perhaps, there are also the categories. Gotta start somewhere and the irreducible offers the least possibility for contradiction.

It doesn't seem like a very coherent idea to doubt the given in such a manner that it is eventually denied. — Manuel

Absolutely. Pretty silly, ain’t it?

Galen looks too much like Art Garfunkel. Makes me think he’s going to sing. He also rejects free will, so there’s two strikes. Good quote, though. Quite apropos.

Well, ya know.....as with any theory, it all depends on one’s initial position. Used to be, pre-Enlightenment, either top-down, in that the external holds sway, or bottom-up, in that the internal holds sway, and one’s personal philosophy was taken from which was favored.

The Kantian paradigm shift occurred when the two were, not so much combined, as taken as equally necessary in their own right, which served to, for all practical purposes, dismiss both Hume-ian top-down empiricism (all are things in themselves) and Berkeley-ian bottom-up subjectivism (none are things in themselves).

The missing ground for the possibility of that equality, was the theoretical/logical proof for the validity of pure a priori cognitions, as the only means for humans to bridge the gap between what is known, and what is merely thought, for both are inarguably resident in the human rational system.
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what I believe to be true based on things I've read and thought about myself — Manuel

All well and good; it is the way of the common understanding, which is just about everybody. Metaphysical reductionism asks, nonetheless.....if a thing is true why merely believe it, and, if a mere belief, on what ground can it be true, this first brought to light, of course, by the Socratic dialogues and dialectical arguments in general. Usually partaken by those with nothing better to do. (Grin)

(Insert thanks, appreciate it thingy here)

denies that we can possess cognition of things as they are in themselves, i.e. things as they are independently of how we experience them through our cognitive faculties."

Yes, he is! — counterpunch

So that’s your notion of what constitutes subjectivism, such that Kant is a proponent of it? Are we then to say any rational being is a subjectivist? Apparently, then, any being in possession of cognitive faculties is subjectivist? Much to broad a brush, to apply a lumpy paint, methinks.

This is actually what he said, as opposed to what somebody else said he said:

“....It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of empirical idealism **, which, while admitting the reality of space, denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it, and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion. (...)

Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in space, and all changes in time—as represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form of that intuition which we call external, and, without objects in space, no empirical representation could be given us, we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper self, as it exists in itself—not the transcendental subject—but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us, unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy—although both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws....”
(** re: Berkeley and his dogmatic subjectivism)

Will a subjectivist, as you mean it, grant “the objects of external intuition (....) are real”? And that we “ought to regard extended bodies...as real”?

Correct me if I’m wrong, but if subjectivism absolutely requires a phenomenal subject, and such phenomenal subject “cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing”, then what is it that makes Kant a subjectivist?

If you must attribute to Kant some -ist that he does not himself endorse, perhaps “cognitive representationalist” might better suit the need.

Why would we assume a limit for human experience? — frank

Because we are forced to admit the impossible. In the human cognitive system, for every conception, the negation of it is given immediately. It follows that because some experiences are possible, there are necessarily some experiences that are impossible. Given a speculative theory in which the possibility of experience of objects is predicated on space and time, that which is not so predicated, or not known to be so predicated in accordance with that same theory, will be impossible as an experience.

“....It is a matter of indifference, whether I say, "I may in the progress of experience discover stars, at a hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now visible," or, "Stars at this distance may be met in space, although no one has, or ever will discover them."....”

That there is no limit to human thought a priori is not to be aligned with the limit for experience, which is itself never merely a priori, but only conditioned by it.
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Do you know much about the IIT theory of consciousness? — frank

No, can’t say I do. From my well-worn armchair, consciousness doesn’t warrant a theory of its own, it being already a constituent of pure reason, which has an established theory. I’d be interested in having a nutshell thrown my way, if you’re so inclined.

Kant is subjectivist. — counterpunch

No, he is not, at least insofar as he undermines the objective. He undermines pure reason’s, and thereby the transcendental subject’s, proclivity for over-estimating the objective. He doesn’t limit the objective, he only exposes the human limit for understanding it.

In reality, we see the world as it really is. — counterpunch

Correct, but we don’t care about what we see, as much we wish to be certain about our knowledge of what we see. It makes no difference to us what’s out there, we care only about how it relates to us.

So the idea is that we're sort of projecting an environment for the things we encounter. — frank

Exactly, and of which there are but two members of such “environment”......space and time.

The Kantian “an sich” of the full “ding an sich“, is that which is not ever encountered by us. “In itself” makes explicit “not us”, and it is quite obvious we can say nothing of that of which we are necessarily excluded.
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It's that we don't apparently learn that, for instance, physical objects have spacial and temporal extension. — frank

Correct. We cannot say whether or not space and time are properties of objects. But of course, the common metaphysical rejoinder is, that they are. To which Kant argues, if such is the case, in order for us to experience anything whatsoever, we are forced to grant “....two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real...”, an absurdity.
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The argument for the thing-in-itself is about apriori knowledge. — frank

No, it isn’t. It is about the limit of human experience, or, which is the same thing, a posteriori knowledge. The purpose of the first critique is to expose the natural excesses of pure reason, and to set the proper boundaries for it, in accordance with a particular speculative theory.
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Kant is a prime example of philosophy confirming the position of the Church - that science is suspect of heresy; — counterpunch

This is catastrophically false. Or, in the interest of proper dialectic, I have no familiarity with anything Kantian that sustains such an assertion, and would certainly appreciate citations in support of it. While it is the case Kant belonged to a religious civil society, and his benefactor was indeed a religious individual, Kant himself had no such overt inclinations, at least as witnessed in his metaphysics and most certainly not in his moral philosophy.

The church may well have thought science to be suspect of heresy; Kant, on the other hand, was a Newtonian first, and an era-specific theoretical “natural philosopher” in his own right, second, re: nebula theory, plate tectonics, refutation of absolute space and time, so can hardly be said to confirm science as heretical.

Sapere aude.