I was claiming that the materialist position can only hypothesize the existence of objectively correct perception, not inanimate ontology.
— simeonz

The view that there is only perception, with nothing behind it, is one of the strange garden paths that Kant found. It's a misreading, from what I understand, but Mww would be able to tell us more. — Banno

If “only perception with nothing behind it” is meant to indicate the non-cognitive aspect of perception, then that is indeed Kant’s primary metaphysical consideration with respect to empirical knowledge acquisition. Accordingly, perception is nothing but the passive receptivity from which physical sensations arise; they are necessary for, but never enter into, this particular speculative epistemology. Perception tells us an object is present to sensibility, but not what the object is. I think what baffles the non-Kantian, and thereby turns him away from the theory, is why it should be that even a known object must still run the full gamut of reason, when it doesn’t seem necessary or productive to think about that which we’ve already learned.

I’m guessing the misreading follows from the alternate thesis that objects actually do tell us what they are, merely from being presented to us. This methodology seems to be entirely sufficient for extant experiences, but finer theorizing shows contradictions and absurdities will always arise from it. This is not to say Kant got our human knowledge acquisition system right, but only that a purely materialist position stands no chance at all of getting it right, if it grounds itself in experience alone.
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All language is ever meant to do is translate subjective activity into exchangeable representations.
— Mww

A neat statement of the myth. Translation occurs between languages, so if translation is the correct model, then there must be a subjective language to be translated into English. — Banno

Half is categorical error, half misses the point. If you’re interested enough, I’ll lay it out.

Still, it confuses the issue to say subjectively inventing words necessitates a subjective language. It could, re: Lewis Carroll, Lisa Gerrard, but it isn’t necessarily the case that it does.

we do things with word as we use them — Banno

Absolutely; uncontested. The invention of words is never in itself sufficient for intelligible communication. Words nonetheless need their own ontological legitimacy. Most folks don’t care about the origin of words, having learned them by rote, but never consider what each single word actually does.

the meaning is not private, but constructed and shared in that very use — Banno

This suggests we always understand each other. But we don’t, which implies what I mean in expressing something does not relate to what you think I mean when you hear it. It follows that either I’m using the wrong words which explains why you don’t understand me, or, I’m using the same word you would use but I assign a meaning to that word with which you do not find meaningful in the same way, which is just as valid an explanation. Mutual understanding is merely common meaning, but each meaning given by each understanding from individual systems, is itself necessarily private.

Another accountability must be reckoned, in that one of us may legitimately use a word from a common language, for which the other does not even know the meaning.

Superfluous philosophical nonsense for Everydayman? Ehhhhh....perhaps. Probably. OK, fine.....yes. But certainly not mythical.

Kantian never yields any results, proves anything, — Snakes Alive

Under the assumption a Kantian follows Kant text closely, and given that there are 16 uses of “proves” in CPR, of which three are negative and the rest affirmative, it would seem quite the case that the Kantian does in fact prove something. Perhaps you mean to say, the Kantian never proves anything to your satisfaction. Which is fine, you’re far from alone in that regard. Outnumbered, I might say, but not alone.

The Kantian is no better, in thinking that the nature of the mind, or whatever it might be, can be unlocked in the same way. — Snakes Alive

The Kantian knows nature of the mind certainly cannot be unlocked in the same way as the nature of the world, so who is the Kantian no better than, by granting that division?

It's not clear why one would think that the methods of philosophy can unlock general features of the universe — Snakes Alive

It is clear enough to he who thinks there is a necessary commonality between the methods and the unlocking. Perhaps it is that the methods of philosophy are not themselves sufficient for unlocking the features of the universe, but they are necessary for a human to determine how to unlock them. Method informs how to think; thinking informs how too unlock.

It wouldn’t be clear for those who don’t examine their own thinking, which becomes evident in the clarity of fishing catches fish, insofar as the average hook-wetter never stops to think that its absolutely necessary to go fishing in order to catch fish, resolutely confident in the ends, without considering the means. We are reminded of this principle by lottery purveyors when they say, “you can win if you don’t play”.

It’s your thread, so you get to set the parameters. Perhaps you’ll evoke some interest.

Close enough. “what their own strength shall furnish...” absent all else, I can adapt to the domain which he must answer to.

Hobbes doesn’t get the credit he should, methinks.

Nice find.

....all that, and upon finding out what morality is, one might also find another domain to which “getting away with” has power.

We also have thoughts of objects we’ve never seen, but are still possible to see.

To ask if thoughts are emergent properties of brains is the same as to ask if ice is an emergent property of water. If ice is just some condition water can exhibit, does that make ice a property? Even if ice is a condition of a certain combination of elements, can ice then be said to be a property of the elements? Can ice be a property of a certain atomic number?

While brains may be necessary for thoughts, and it may be true thoughts emerge from brains, it does not follow that thoughts are properties of brains.

Guess it depends on how one wishes to classify property.

Language is not as tidy as we might like it to be. — Janus

Pretty much, yeah. Nothing inherently wrong with our conceptual model, nor the representational expressions for it. All language is ever meant to do is translate subjective activity into exchangeable representations. The problem only occurs for those suffering from the notion that the human system primarily operates on representations, and then operates on representations of representations iff the objects of the system given fait accompli, are then communicated. And we all know, don’t we?...that if we don’t like something, it must be wrong, right?

Agreed on your aesthetic response. That which we consider intrinsically private is thereby ineffable, but the representations of it, constructed a priori, as the only possible human means for creating objects which subsequently become perceptions to others, can be shared in a mutual exchange. But the one is not the other, nor can it ever be, for if such were the case, it would be impossible to explain why we are not immediately equipped with language, rather than merely the innate capacity to create and use it.

Which brings us to the cradle. There is nothing about the cradle, as a stand-alone empirical object or as an accurate depiction thereof, that cannot be perceived, and that which can be perceived can be named, and anything that is named can be shared by language. What cannot be shared amongst individual members using some common cognitive system, is the operation of the procedural components of that system which each member uses to relate his perception of some object to the name he gives to it, and by which his knowledge of it is possible.

I mean....how obvious can it be, that we never cognize or know our own thinking as it operates, but only cognize and know what is thought about. I can tell you all about that which I understanding, that of which I may or may not judge, and even what form the judgement takes, but I don’t even know how my faculties arise, where they came from, or even if they are in fact necessarily the case, so I’m not going to be able to communicate anything about them as they are in themselves, but only as I think them to be.

So....you’re correct, in that language is not as tidy as we might like it to be, but I would add it is our own fault that it isn’t, and for that, I would say it is our aesthetic response alone, that is sufficient causality. And that, for the simple reason that aesthetic response, in its common and ordinary iteration, is not predicated solely on logic, as are, theoretically, the remaining cognitive components.

I'm not keen on explaining Kant's errors again here. — Banno

Now THAT I might find interesting. Direct me to it? To read, not to argue, promise.

this type of change in perspective is not reached through argument but in you being able to see for yourself what I am (and Witt is) describing. — Antony Nickles

I do see it; I find it, the description, insufficient. It is like describing the construction of a house, but beginning from the second floor.

The word "concept" here is used as a "term" by Witt with a specific use, not anything like a conception or an idea. — Antony Nickles

Which is the same as re-defining a term. As we all know.....one can make anything stick by simply changing extant definitions to fit what’s being said. If Witt has something new to say, he should use terms specific to the novelty.
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you still feel the need to hang on to the feeling that we "all know the same stuff differently". — Antony Nickles

It isn’t a feeling, it’s an empirical reality. One may know an iceberg as a floating chunk of ice, another may know an iceberg as a broken piece of glacier.

we can't be said to "know" our phone number in different ways — Antony Nickles

Correct, only insofar as the knowledge acquisition system is consistent across the species in general. That does nothing to prohibit the validity of me coming to know my phone number under different conditions within the system, from you coming to know yours within the same kind of system. Rote memorization vs. intrinsic pattern recognition. Extrinsic similarity. Hell.....why not mere hypnosis? For PIN’s or license plates....sheer invention.

However, OLP is addressing the issues that are skipped over that only philosophy can still bring to light--self-knowledge through understanding our responsibilities and the implications we are subject to...... — Antony Nickles

Subject to implies empirical psychology or social/linguistic anthropology. Fancy words for “group-think”. Speculative epistemological metaphysics is the doctrine used to bring to light....not skip over.....understanding the implications of that which we are each the subject of.

House description...second story start; house description...foundation start.
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Part of what Witt is trying to show in unearthing our desire for certainty is to turn us around to see our real needs and desires. — Antony Nickles

Our desire for certainty is contained in reason itself; no need to unearth it, for it is manifest as a predicate of an intrinsic human condition.

To turn us around to see our real needs and desires presupposes we don’t already see them. Being both presumptuous, insofar as that which belongs to me necessarily, cannot but be apprehended by me, and self-contradictory, insofar as my intrinsic “desire for certainty” must already contain them. Furthermore, as “real” needs and desires, herein taken to indicate fundamental or characteristically personal as opposed to empirically determinable, they are not susceptible to experiential incursion, for they are derived from purely subjective causality. Which ultimately reduces to some form of moral philosophy anyway, which I wouldn’t think has anything whatsoever to do with OLP.
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If anything is individual, our interests are, and there is no argument to change that if someone just doesn't care — Antony Nickles

True enough, with the caveat that interest is predicated on, hence determinable by, sufficient reason, while care is merely some degree of relative quality an interest may invoke. I am interested enough in OLP, and by association, what you have to say about it, in accordance with the reasons claimed to be sufficient for it, without having any care whatsoever in adopting it or them.

There’s a French cooking show on tv I watched, that explained how to do this fancy-assed duck recipe that involves pressing out blood....yes, there’s a mechanical press designed specifically for that purpose.... to make the accompanying sauce. Interesting, even if only that it would take a Frenchman to dream up something so bizarre, probably to satisfy a bizarre French king, but trust me when I tell you I wouldn’t care to partake of it.

All in the name of nothing better to do.......

How can subjectivity be shared? — Banno

It can’t. Just as Montana doesn’t share its highway with Idaho, yet there is a highway common to each.

The "transcendental ego" merely names, without explaining... — Banno

In Enlightenment transcendental metaphysics, the transcendental ego both names and explains. It cannot, however, itself be explained from within the confines of the theory from which it is given. The treatise is rife with self-imposed limitations, those of which nothing can be said without invalidating the principles on which it is built. Or, which for all practical purposes carries the same weight, that which if said, would be nonsense, inasmuch as the theory does not grant the warrant for it.

Witt is correct in suggesting we not speak of what we don’t know. Still....

“....It (philosophy) must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought....”
(Tractus 4.114)

......the aforementioned self-imposed limits are exactly this, and the transcendental ego is its representation.

In passing.....

Wisdom.

Somebody asked me to "prove that epistemology is the only correct way of thinking".

What is my best way to respond to this? — Tommy Shiflett

“I wouldn’t know how.”

You gotta love the top comment in the combox — Wayfarer

.....and the name of the commenter.

I think what is happening is you are adamantly defending something you think I (or Witt) is trying to take away. — Antony Nickles

After a fashion, perhaps. If I succumb to the way Witt wants me to understand my language practice, he will have taken away the “framework” I have always understood language to entail. I don’t fear that, however, not because Witt’s argument isn’t justified, but only because it isn’t sufficient......

Witt is trying to allow the interlocutor the "picture" of meaning that they want--the philosophical theory that when we see a cube or say cube, there is an image in our mind (our meaning). — Antony Nickles

........the lack thereof demonstrated right there. My favored philosophical theory characterizing the image in my mind as the identifying representation of an object, has nothing to do with my meaning upon its subsequent use when I talk about it, or just me when I think about it. As such, my naming is nothing but a relation between the image and my conception of it by which it is known by me. Witt has generalized concepts as having optional characterizations which are then used by anybody, when parsimony suggests concept generation is as private as the mind that contains them.

We might be getting tripped up on Witt's term "concept", but, as I laid out above, the concept of, say, "knowing" has a number of different options in which it can be used (a skill, information, acknowledgement). And these don't "relate" to anything, they just are how we use the concept of knowing, how knowing is in our lives. — Antony Nickles

Tripped up indeed, in that “knowing” is not a concept, it is a mental activity, or part of a methodological procedure, as is “conceiving”, and understanding, judging, cognizing. Knowing information and knowing a skill, etc., are all relations between a particular knowledge system, and that which is presented to the system. From that, it is clear that “how knowing is in our lives” is nothing more than......hey, big deal....we know stuff. I mean, it is quite absurd to suggest that we DO NOT know stuff, so how important can it be to wonder how knowing is in our lives? And if the argument is that knowing has a number of different options in how it can be used, again....big deal. No matter how many options there are for its use, the end result is exactly the same. We know stuff. Thing is....we all know different stuff, and, we all know the same stuff differently. So even if how knowing is in our lives is a valid expression, it doesn’t say anything we didn’t already know.

Witt went backwards, as did all analytic language philosophers. It used to be that the fact we know things is given, and the quest was in how is knowledge possible. That fundamentalism evolved....probably because of its intrinsically speculative nature....into the broadening of how knowing things interactively affects us, and that broadening determinable, made possible, because the language we use to express how each of us are affected by different options for knowing, is right there in your face, thus being very far from speculative.

Hardly a satisfying philosophy, I must say.

Your common usage definition is fine.

Some philosophers concerned themselves with problems actually encountered in living and provided reasonable solutions to them, I think. — Ciceronianus the White

Absolutely; no quibble there. Ehhhh.....maybe one. Perhaps these problems and their solutions are the concern of psychologists.

What he is trying to demonstrate is that we use the options (publicly) available in a concept. — Antony Nickles

Yes, we do that. Isn’t it then a matter of what options are available in a concept? If the thought is that there is only one option available in a concept, that being its relation to something, what other options can there be? All that’s left is that to which a concept does not relate, or, a plethora of somethings to which a concept can relate.

So Witt's point is that the picturing of something is not "meaning" something exact, i.e., when we picture the cube are we "picturing" its squareness? its edges? that it's a prism? — Antony Nickles

I guess our differing notions of picturing are irreconcilable. I agree picturing something is not necessarily meaning something exact, but only indicating something exact. When we wish to communicate meaning, we then use the word belonging to the concept belonging to the picturing. If that is the case, we are never going to use the word prism when we mean cube.

So, yes, when we picture a cube we picture the manifold of its form, which immediately eliminates non-cube forms. Even if for the very first time ever picturing an object of nothing but right angles, even if there is no name for it, nothing without right angles is going to be pictured. It just makes no sense to me that we might bring up prisms when we mean to speak of cubes.

Nevertheless, I understand the finer points rely on less definitive conceptions. We in fact do make a mess of some concepts that have multiple relations, or multiple implications for singular relations....apologies, as you say.
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What Witt is trying to do in this section is grant the interlocutor the framework that they want (meaning as picturing) and still show how it can't account for how language works. — Antony Nickles

To say how language works I take to indicate mutually consistent understandings, language works if you understand what I say, and I understand what you say, and language isn’t working if we just look at each other with empty stares. That about right?

If so, then the framework I want is that in which such understandings are given. But there is no way I can promise you’ll understand me, from which follows that granting my framework is itself not sufficient to grant that language works, but still grants how it can work, if only we eventually agree on the meanings of the words being used. So my framework can account for how language works, even if sometimes it doesn’t, but we cannot say it never does, so the claim we cannot, is false. Or....I’m not right in what Witt is saying.

You tell me.

If you genuinely think all beliefs that are held for any reasons whatsoever are reasonable I don't know what else to to say. — Janus

The answer is in the negation of what you said: there is no belief whatsoever to be held, if there are no reasons whatsoever on which it is constructed, no reasons one thinks as belonging to or describing its object. All that on which reason can direct itself, is reasonable. All reducible to....the only belief unreasonable, is that belief the object of which reason cannot direct itself, which is, of course, to the one thinking, simply empty. Building up on that final reduction, what we......er, commonly....ordinarily.....consider an unreasonable belief, is actually merely an irrational one.

Yeah, well....tell an ordinary somebody something is unreasonable they might argue back. Tell an ordinary somebody something is irrational...they just look at you funny.

(Sigh)

Has any philosophy ever solved any problems? Far as I think about it, philosophy tries to explain something, and leaves it up to others to determine whether that explanation solves anything for them.

I solve my problems; philosophy just sets a proper stage for looking at them.

Common usage. I keep forgetting what constitutes philosophy these days.

You are correct in that regard, yes.

A self-contradictory belief cannot be considered reasonable by any standard. — Janus

How can a belief contradict itself? It isn’t the belief that is self-contradictory, it is the reasons for it, that are, because they conflict with each other or with some established condition, usually knowledge. The belief is still reasonable, if only to its holder whose reasons don’t conflict, just under illogical or irrational conditions from the point of view of someone who doesn’t because his reasons do conflict with the holders’.

You seems to be conflating 'having reasons' with 'reasonable'. — Janus

It’s good it only seems that way.

And here there will be certain things we can imagine and those we can't within the criteria of a cube because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. I investigate above what we imply when we say "I imagine" or "I see an image". — Antony Nickles

You know we can imagine anything we like, any time we like?
(“....Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition....” (B151))

It needs explaining why there are certain things we cannot imagine. Why is it we can imagine things about an object without knowing it, but we cannot imagine certain things even if we do know it?

because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. — Antony Nickles

Isn’t naming the source of words? And aren’t words the source of language? If so, practicing naming is not language, but is antecedent to it, and the supplement “language that goes with these activities”, is false. Language doesn't go with it; it comes after it.

We grew up with cubes, which is the same as saying we know them as certain things. This is not in itself enough to satisfy why we cannot imagine things about cubes, but only that such imaginings do not support the knowledge, or, as Witt says, they are not within the criteria of cubes.

We don’t care what a cube isn’t, we don’t usually waste cognitive effort imagining certain things about cubes that do not belong to them as they are known. We want to know how it is that an object becomes named “cube”. So we build a theory around an image we have, rather than imaginings we don’t need. That is what we imply when we say “I imagine” or “I see an image”. Which still isn’t technically correct, in that we don’t “see” the images we use to name objects, but what is implied remains true.
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No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate — Wittgenstein, PI

I’m guessing the part left off “Something that etc”, is “comes before the mind”, which transforms the quote into, “the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not show the existence of a something that comes before the mind”. Yet, it does exactly that, for otherwise it must be the case there is something named or nameable, that does not exist as coming before the mind, which is absurd.

Speaking of this picture-like something is an inclination, yes, but to speak of this picture-like something, as an act of language use, is never a mere inclination, it is a necessity, otherwise there is no verbal language use at all. And one doesn’t speak because he can find the appropriate word, for he can always be inclined to speak yet speak incoherently, which makes explicit he has not found the appropriate word, perhaps because there isn’t one. Nevertheless, if one is inclined to speak, and wishes to be understood, it is in response to this picture-like something for which there must already be a word representing it.

Finally, to speak of this picture-like something just because an appropriate word can be found, makes no allowance for the advent of new words which by definition can never be found in the manifold of extant words. In that event, without the appropriate word to be found, is it then given that one cannot speak at all? I think not. As such, new words are not found at all, but invented. And even if “one can find a word appropriate” indicates the capacity for word invention, there is still required the existence of the something picture-like with which the newly invented word relates, in order to appropriately speak of it. Recall my mention of quarks?

Was there anything else you edited, that I can make a mess of?

I must say I do not follow his objection - "Kant was right to insist that whether there is something in reality answering to a concept of mine cannot itself be part of my concept" - I gather it's to do with differentiating the actual world amongst possible worlds, but I don't see it. — Banno

Irrespective of the rest of the article, his objection parsed in that piece follows from the explicit Kantian methodology, wherein anything in reality is for us only phenomena, but conceptions arise spontaneously from the understanding, which has nothing to do with phenomena. Things in reality relate to my conceptions, in accordance with Kantian methodology, which could be said to be the same as answering to my conception, but such things are not contained in, nor part of, them, but nonetheless possibly presupposed by them.

It is good you don’t see some differentiating among worlds; no such implication is carried by that objection.
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As regards the article itself......it begins with “Is belief in God reasonable?”.....which of course it must be, for the question must have been thought, which makes explicit there were reasons for thinking it. Kenny didn’t ask whether belief in God was rational, or sustainable, or logical. Even a reason that doesn’t make sense, is refutable, or self-contradictory, is still a reason.

Dialectically familiar your analytical predispositions already, I will still offer that if one wishes to remain with Kant....which could be presumed as a chronological backdrop, insofar as A820/B848 is a section in CPR with the almost the same name as this thread, and covers the same general notions....one will find that belief is nothing but a judgement with subjective sufficiency but no objective sufficiency, which easily translates to....when I arrive at reasons to believe in God, then immediately the criteria for subjective sufficiency is met, hence my judgement for believing is reasonable.

So....what’s all the hoopla about anyway?

I’m working on it. This format makes long posts on different pages, hard to juxtaposition.

I would consider...... — Luke

.....to which you are quite entitled.

Nevertheless, I find nothing you’ve contributed to be sufficient diminution of the components in my adversus dialectica with Antony.

demonstrate that "one" needn't have only the meaning of "a single unit", as you asserted. — Luke

.....except those two, not three for one was repetitive, are precisely examples of a single unit.....one thing to pull, one joke not heard.

There may be demonstrations that successfully counter my assertion; those are not them.

That which is of final value is for all intents and purposes, perfect, or ideal, insofar as no more or other conditions are possible for changing its finality, without self-contradiction. The first consideration would then be, how did this unconditioned....ideality....perfection.....obtain? The second consideration would then be, what would cause such perfection to be necessary, which it must be if that which is unconditioned can never be contingent on anything that conditions it.

If it cannot be said how there is a perfect value, but only that a perfect value is given without regard to the considerations, then it is the case that if there is only one reason for valuing a perfect value, is because it is perfect, which a mere tautology. That is, the only singular reason for valuing a perfect thing, is its perfection.

To negate the tautology, either there is no final value, hence no intrinsic necessity, or there is no single reason to value that to which final value belongs, which immediately invokes the possibility for contingencies.

Rhetorical fun and games.....

The conscious mind can talk but it cant itch. — Ken Edwards

Yikes.

Sorry.....I can’t think of a profitable response to all that.

No.

So.....I get a postcard, and the message is in French, I can either drop it in the circular filing cabinet, or run down to the library and research a translation. Hmmm....lemme think on that a minute.

Ability does not imply interest.

I don’t know what that means.

MWW suggested that I might have it backwards and I think he is correct. — Ken Edwards

I only thought your basic contention, that all verbal thoughts must always be spoken, is backwards. Which I thought should be....all spoken must first be thought.

I now think speech itself is only one aspect of a complex gestalt. — Ken Edwards

Agreed.

Without a conscious mind there could be no speech....

Agreed.

.....Without speech there could be no conscious mind.....

Not agreed. Without the experience to prove it, I still think I should be fully capable of playing a decent game of chess, even after vocal chord removal surgery. Multiplication tables should still reside in consciousness, and Mona Lisa will still be butt-ugly.

........Without vocal chords there could be neither. — Ken Edwards

Double disagreed. Without vocal chords there wouldn’t be coherent speech but there could still be perfectly intelligible communication, which presupposes a conscious mind as the necessary means for it.
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The logical question that arises is: Where did the conscious mind come from? — Ken Edwards

It cannot be said where a thing comes from if it isn’t first known what it is. But knowing what a thing is doesn’t promise knowing where it comes from. It just may be, that asking where the conscious mind comes from, isn’t a logical question at all. Kant would say asking after the ontology of a purely transcendental object, is an exercise in irrationality, because one is then trying to locate something that can never be thought as phenomenon. But what did he know anyway. He’s ancient, right?
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Early man had more brain cells than any other animal on earth — Ken Edwards

Given all the known extinct animals, is there evidence of that claim? What about unknown extinct animals? Can’t just insist if they had more brain cells then humans they wouldn’t be extinct, can we?

Dunno about brain cells in general, but there is evidence that, against the metric of unit body weight, a shrew has more neural connections than a human, with unit body mass as the metric, an elephant has more neural connections than a human, and with unit brain mass as the metric, an orangutan has almost the same number of neural connections as a human, yet none of those species have taken themselves to Disneyland.

Only in humans, aye. Pro and con.

Hadn’t intended to get involved with this again, but you gave such a good presentation I figured I’d better contribute to the other side.

This is not Witt speaking, but his questioner — Antony Nickles

Doesn’t matter; it’s all part of a whole.

We are missing what comes right after this, which is essential: — Antony Nickles

You have a point....

“....A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection (...), it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions...” (Bxlvii)

........but is was #139 taken from another comment, thus subjected to rhetorical opinion in mine. Still, any arbitrary section subjected to dismemberment by a continental X-Acto knife, would miss the “comprehensive view”, provided only that there is one.
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We know what cubes are, we can picture one, even without it in front of me. But this does not dictate the use of the word cube; say, that it can only be used as the perception of what is pictured. — Antony Nickles

Without it in front of me and given extant experience of them, the picture in the mind is the a priori intuition of empirical cubes in general, yes;
No, the image.....the picture/that which is drawn before the mind......does not dictate the use of the word; such is the purview of judgement alone, from the philosopher’s point of view as a matter of interest, yet only intention from Everydayman’s point of view, as a matter of mere desire.
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Witt pauses ("Weeeeellllll"--see above) and asks us to imagine ("suppose", above) a use of the word cube like this and what would be implied. — Antony Nickles

I covered that implication, and it reduces to irrationality when done with serious intent, or merely idle fabrications if otherwise, both of which are anathema to knowledge.
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And here is the OLP methodology of imagining examples that would show us the place of picturing to the use of the word "cube" to try to understand if the word cube allows for only one use--the representation or meaning of the picture. — Antony Nickles

I covered that. Again, there is no logical reason to do any of that imagining, for it is known what a cube is, and because it is known as nothing other than a geometric figure, the objective cube can only be represented by one general intuition empirically and only one general conception a priori.
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And here the picture could be of anything. Basically, the picture doesn't matter in the process of using a word like "cube" (a label) to name a thing. — Antony Nickles

I covered that. I can think anything I want, provided only that I do not contradict myself. The word “cube” does name a single thing, and the word represents the conception of a single thing, and the conception immediately relates the perception of that single thing, as phenomenon, to the image of it, “drawn before the mind”. It follows necessarily that the picture does very much matter in the use of the word. Under the condition that the word is used correctly, of course. And if not, we’re right back to irrationality or idle fabrications. It matters very much; it is the apodeictic justification for NOT calling out the object prism with the word “cube”.
(Caveat: and I covered this as well, insofar as this only works for perception of already known objects. For unknown objects, we are not rationally prohibited from using examples of extant pictures in order to determine “a fit”, from which a name for the unknown object may follow.)
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And this is a different use of the word cube than the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object as picturing it, or see meaning a word as expressing the picture. — Antony Nickles

Perhaps, but the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object as picturing it, is an absolutely necessary ground for knowledge of the object, and meaning the word as expressing the picture, is how we communicate the validity of the knowledge. Neither of those epistemological necessities reside in OLP.
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He will say this "called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'." #140 — Antony Nickles

There are other processes, or, there is only one process used in other ways. Much the more parsimonious to subscribe to the latter than the former. It just makes sense that it is easier, e.g., to correct a mistake in one process, than to investigate more than one process in order to even determine which is responsible for the mistake.
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this is an investigation (it is an epistimology) to see how our concepts work differently, or similarly, and that there are different ways each can be used. — Antony Nickles

Why not just talk to somebody, see if he understands what you said? If he does, yours and his conceptions are congruent, if not, they’re not. No need for an investigation full of examples already present whenever folks communicate.
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What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — Wittgenstein PI

In ordinary language, application can be different, yes. Hearing the word “orange” can bring up the object “orange” without regard to its color, or, the word can bring up the a priori color “orange” without regard to its object, which are obviously non-congruent meanings of a common word. However, while the common word “orange” represents different conceptions, one of them was cognitively antecedent to the other, and serves as ground for it. I’m guessing the object named “orange” came first, and the color obtained its name merely from similarity.

Some applications cannot be different. Hearing the number one, for example, can never be applied in any other way than to an image of a single unit, hence must have the same meaning to everyone hearing the word.
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as one thing of many we can do--bring up a memory, even of a smell)? — Antony Nickles

Surely you realize it is impossible to intuit smells, which is the same as being impossible to bring up a memory of a smell. We only intuit objects that have a property from which smells arise, but we cannot bring the smell itself to our conscious attention. Same for all sensations except vision. Which is why the notion “image” in cognitive philosophy has so much theoretical power.

All this shows is that of the many things we are said to be able to do.....some of them we actually cannot.
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and because we can create representations of words. — Antony Nickles

I submit that words are the representations, words representation conceptions. We cannot speak in images or intuitions or conceptions, just as we cannot think in terms of the natural forces which govern the physiology of that by which thinking occurs. They all need translating into a method of communication, words being the basic units of that method we use as language. From this perspective, it is clear words are at the tail end of the system, and are not even necessary for the operation of the system, but only the objective manifestations of it.

More rhetorical opinion.....

If we’re wallowing in trivia, and if the whole thing is not at all even slightly reasonable, doesn't seem like fertile ground for important philosophical ramifications.

It would be fun to learn a puzzling fact about thinking, though.

Don’t get me wrong; I’m not saying there is no movement as shown by a detector. I don’t know anything about that, except what you just told me. But even if there is detectable movement, it doesn't change the rest of what I said. And just leaves me to ask......so what? Is this just a matter of interest to certain psychological/anthropological disciplines, or is there some benefit to mankind in knowing about it?

What did you think about my basic contention? That verbal thoughts must always be spoken? — Ken Edwards

I think your basic contention is mistaken. That which seems like internal vocalizing, is still merely thinking, and nothing I think requires speech. It is true, on the other hand, that what is spoken must first be thought. Therefore, I think your contention is mistaken because I think it is backwards.

I predict you don't think anything about it at all. — Ken Edwards

I wouldn’t normally, but you asked what I thought about something, which requires I think something, iff I intend to respond.

Was your mouth wide open? Were you reading at the same time? — Ken Edwards

Yes. No. I followed directions. Not much difference in thinking the words with my eyes closed and thinking them with my mouth open. I don’t think with either one, actually, so why would it matter what they’re doing when I’m thinking?

Do you notice an awkwardness in your thinking? — Ken Edwards

Not even a little.

Me, nine days ago:
Question: are images part and parcel of human mentality?

Witt, awhile ago:
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?

Philosophical jigsaw puzzle.

“...For understanding is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought....”
(A69/B94)

“....Isn’t it (what comes before our mind when we understand a word) something like a picture?....”
(P.I., 139)

Mind, understanding, thought, pictures.....all belong to human mentality. So it looks like images are indeed part and parcel of it. So obvious....dunno why it couldn’t just be admitted as given.
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So I hear the word “cube”, and what comes before my mind, say, something like a picture of a cube....
The perception is hearing, so that “picture” which has come before the mind cannot be some external, objective illustration; it is, therefore, because it is before the mind, it must have been drawn by the mind, and is a representation of this kind of perceptual sensation.
((“....extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind,...” (A20/B54))

And “before the mind” merely indicates presented to the mind, in this case by means of sensibility, rather than antecedent to the mind, for the consistency of the thesis requires the mind as the ontologically unconditioned, to which nothing having to do with its operation, can be antecedent.

.....but Witt allows the something that comes before the mind to immediately relate to the perception....I hear “cube”, I immediately image “something like a picture of”, a “cube”....
(“...say, the drawing of a cube...”)
(ibid 139)

Witt then asks, “In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”?...”
(ibid 139)

Witt says nothing about the speaker of the word, but only the receiver of it: “...your mind when you hear...”. It follows necessarily, that it is utterly irrelevant what the speaker meant by the word, it is irrelevant what his understandings are relative to the word, and it is irrelevant how his knowledge of the word relates to his use of it.

In addition, there is no indication of what it is to “use” the word “cube”. So far, all that’s been accomplished is to bring it “before the mind”, “your mind when you hear”.....which doesn’t carry the implication of being used for anything. Still, he says, “a use....”, which implies use in general. But we’re not talking about in general; we’re talking about “you mind when you hear”, which seems to indicate no use at all.

From the sensibility of the receiver, then, “the way this picture fits” cannot be otherwise than to immediately relate to the perception, for if it didn’t, there is no explanation for the drawing of THAT picture by my mind. This makes explicit I already knew what a cube is. According to Witt, I hear “cube”, I image “cube”. No in-between, no alternative possibilities. This is the fundamental flaw in this particular example, which is meant to characterize the entire philosophy, hence, by association, the fundamental flaw in the entire philosophy.

On the other hand, to then ask in what way the drawn image does not fit the perception, is an exercise in pure irrationality, insofar as it is necessarily a case of forcing my understanding into a contradiction with extant knowledge. It would seem quite inexplicable how to immediately relate the sound of the word “cube” to its only legitimate representation in “something like a picture, say, the drawing a “cube”, if I didn’t already have that image in my mind.

Which glaringly begs the question.....”if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.”....why in the hell would I ever point to a prism and say it’s a cube? Merely to indicate some disconnected, non-intuitive, use of a word? What legitimate reason is there to do that? It is patently absurd, for I could point to every singe thing available to my perception, and say it doesn’t fit the picture of “cube” that occurred to me upon hearing that particular word, on the one hand, and on the other, I must already know what a prism is in order name it as such and comprehend the use of that word “prism” I merely thought, doesn’t fit the picture of the word “cube” I perceived. From which follows the irrationality, expressed as....
((“....I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself...” (Bxxvii, a))
....and from that, it is clear Witt should never have qualified the example with, “say, the drawing of a cube”, and he should never have volunteered me into something I had no reason to do.

Now the kicker: up to this moment, it is me hearing and me picturing in my mind. At this point, after I have already understood the picture of “cube” that occurs to me before my mind, fitting with the prism to which I point, is a case of which “the use of the word does not fit the picture”, Witt chimes in and has the audacity to ask, “But doesn’t it fit?”, which implies there is a way it does fit and perhaps I should find it.

Witt finishes by saying, “I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.”

Errrrrr.....wha??? Where did he do that? I’ve already established in my mind the parameters by which a perception relates to its image, and given an example of how something else I point to wouldn’t “fit the picture”. Neither he nor I ever suggested how the picture of “cube” before my mind would fit with some different object to which I subsequently point.

All in all, this is a poor example of so-called OLP. Witt defeats himself by mandating that a word brings up an image immediately relating to it (which does happen under certain conditions), but doesn’t stipulate the mechanism for that relation (which is given in the historical literature), and what’s philosophically more disastrous, does not allow for the possibility that the perception and the image do not relate (which does happen under other than those certain conditions), except by means of some post hoc epistemologically invalid imaginings.

Rhetorical opinion.

A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true.
— creativesoul

And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement?
— Mww

Yes... I left the rest unspoken... — creativesoul

...and I surmise the unspoken part tacitly implies a plurality of subjects expressing the same statement. It remains, nonetheless, that for each subject, his statement can only be judged in accordance with one of the four logical possibilities intrinsic to a matrix with a pair of conceptions and their respective negations.
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Because some belief statements can be both uncertain and true, and certain but false, it only follows that certainty has nothing at all to do with truth. — creativesoul

Agreed, in principle, in that certainty is a quality and truth is merely a logical condition. But logical conditions are themselves predicated on a necessary quality, so it seems as if there exists a relation between them. I think the only way your assertion works, is to say my certainty has nothing to do with your truth, and vice versa.
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The attempt to create a dichotomy between belief and knowledge is asinine. It's akin to creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange. Knowledge is a kind of belief. — creativesoul

Attempt to create....agreed. But it doesn’t need any attempt, if it is an intrinsic condition of human cognition itself, in which case it isn’t asinine if it is given necessarily. After all, if it is the case that the human cognitive system is logical, relational and complementary.....there must be dichotomies by the very nature of the system. Or at least dualities. Theoretical as they may be.

Creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange is absurd, sure, such being reducible to mere experience. Doing that, between oranges, however, is not the same as creating a dichotomy between belief and knowledge.

I take issue with “knowledge is a kind of belief”, while not creating a dichotomy between them. I reject outright the logical validity of knowing and believing the same thing under the same conditions, which makes explicit, under those conditions, knowledge and belief do not share a kind between themselves, but do each partake of an antecedent kind common to both of them, and that is judgement. In other words, knowledge is a kind of judgement, belief is a kind of judgement, but that does not equate to knowledge is a kind of belief.

Minor point of contention on my part.....same as it ever was; I’m with you on most of your responses to Antony, regardless.