Hmmm. I guess my view would be that I don’t have one? I can’t make positive judgements with respect to spiritual states or higher consciousness, insofar as I have no idea what either of them might be like, so their relation to noumena would be impossible for me to describe.

On the other hand, given what I understand of noumena, irrespective of spiritual states and higher consciousness, there is no possibility of accessing noumena at all. Even so, that is not to say they are impossible, from which follows access to them is not impossible, from which follows given sufficient means, they might actually be accessible. Just…you know…not by humans, iff humans really do have the type of intelligence that informs both of the origin of them, and of the impossibility of access to them because of it.

Still, even if we don’t actually have the type of intelligence from which noumena as we think of them originate, that in itself is not sufficient reason for permitting spiritual states and higher consciousness to have access to them. Even those would have to be in some form of intelligence so different from ours we still wouldn’t have access, insofar as we wouldn’t understand how some other intelligence works.

The whole point of the critique of pure reason: overloading the system beyond its legitimate bounds will never get us where we want to go.
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Interesting what Chuck says. Thanks.

if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says….
— Mww

I don’t think he does. — Wayfarer

Ok, good to know.

Will is not a noumenon in the Kantian sense, nor an object behind appearances, but what is disclosed in immediate self-awareness prior to representation — Wayfarer

And this is what Kastrup says? Or what Kastrup says Schopenhauer says? I’d agree will is not noumena, but would argue S says will is that thing-in-itself impossible NOT to know. Which is fine for him to say, but it is still in direct conflict with Kant. Be that as it may, of course; the thread title doesn’t implicate Kant anyway.

As a matter of interest, though, I wonder how will, being that which is disclosed in immediate self-awareness prior to representation, connects itself to “world”. As in….World as Will and Representation, 1844.

Are you rejecting the existence of other consciousnesses or just the idea that they have any actual connection with yours, as distinct from merely a similar constitution to yours? — Janus

I have no warrant for rejecting the validity, or indeed even the constitution, of resident consciousness in other human subjects, but I am perfectly within my justifications for denying, a priori, if there should be such consciousness in other subjects, the influence of it beyond its own range.

The point was, that the universality principle which holds for each and every instance of a particular, re: human subjective consciousness, is not the universality principle which holds for each and every possible objective condition in general. In other words, the universality of consciousness is one thing, but universal consciousness is quite another. The former the negation of which is contradictory, the latter the affirmation of which is impossible. All of which reduces to….it’s fine to say everyone has his own consciousness, but the possibility of such truth cannot stand as sufficient ground for saying consciousness is universal.
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Kastrup follows Schopenhauer in saying that we do know something of the noumenon in that we are instances of it….. — Janus

This is why I let three pages here go by without commenting: I don’t know Kastrup at all, so I have no reason to think he follows Schopenhauer. But I do know Schopenhauer, and he doesn’t so much favor the knowledge of noumena as he does the knowledge of the Kantian ding an sich. So if Kastrup says Schopenhauer says we know something of the noumena because we are instances of it, he is in utter and complete conflict with Kant, who was the originator of the modern version of both noumena and ding an sich, and possibly in some conflict with Schopenhauer in that the latter only concerns himself with the fact Kant disavows any possible knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which Schopenhauer argues we certainly do, iff the thing-in-itself is represented as will, which has nothing to do with noumena in the Kantian sense at all.

And here, of course, is what you were talking about with that alternative turn of phrase. Kastrup and Schopenhauer apparently both treat noumena differently than Kant, and maybe ever differently than each other. But regardless of all that, it amazes me to no end, how it is even possible to suggest we are instances of noumena in the first place, without, first, representing the concept outside its original definition, and second, accepting the newly represented concept as having some sufficient form of additional explanatory power.
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….in that we know ourselves both form the outside, as manifest entities and form the inside via introspection. — Janus

So the argument for sufficient explanatory power resides in the notion we know ourselves in two different forms of ourselves. Which is true enough, insofar as we know ourselves as both subject and object. But these are different kinds of knowledge, re: empirical/a priori, originating under different conditions, re: theoretical/speculative, and are not connected in any way with each other except transcendentally, for the belonging of both to a single consciousness.

None of which is sufficient reason to suggest we humans are instances of noumena, insofar as the very notion of noumena in its original Enlightenment sense, has no possibility of ever having an object subsumed under the conception of it.

Again, I’m not familiar with the preemptive conditions necessary in Kastrup, that facilitates the suggestion of a possibility in his philosophy that has been established as impossible in its predecessor.
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So, experiences are of things not appearances? And experiences are not appearances but experiences of what appears? Language gets tricky in these kinds of matters. — Janus

Yes, language is tricky, but here I think it’s more a matter of systemic procedure. In short, though, no, experience is not of things or of appearances; experience is of representations of appearances, and appearances are the effect of things on sensibility. You could get away with saying experience is of phenomena, which is a representation of that which caused sensation, sensation being whatever affect the appearance of a thing has. Technically, in theoretical constructions, more is required for experience than mere phenomena, but it isn’t really wrong to begin with it. It’s like…you can’t get to the conclusion of a scientific theory from mere observation, and you can’t get to the conclusion of a hypothetical judgement with only a major premise.

And, correct, experiences are not appearances; one is the temporally/methodically opposed extreme of the other. For human intelligence in its empirical domain, there is nothing for it before the not-known of appearance, and there is nothing for it after the known of experience.

The correspondence of the unknown appearance, to the known experience, through representation, depends exclusively on relations prescribed by the system itself (however metaphysically speculative that may be) and therein resides the commonality between various instances of that system in separate human subjects. It never was the contribution of the thing; it was the contribution of the system to which the thing (“…the undetermined object of empirical intuition….”) is given, which is functionally identical for all otherwise rationally-capable humans.

If an object is as round for you as it is for me, it does not follow it is round because of the object, which may only possibly be the case, but because your system and my system are so much alike yours tells you the object is round and mine tells me the object is round, which is necessarily the case. It is impossible to determine roundness from the object alone, but can only be determined from the effect the object has. We are supported in this, for the roundness of objects for us with our intelligence, does not necessarily hold for forms of intelligence in which roundness is impossible for us to be acquainted. If the object was indeed round in itself, and the same object was given to any other kind of intelligence it would necessarily be round for that intelligence as well as our own, which is something impossible for us to know.

Things that don’t appear to sensibility cannot be known by means of the system, but can be inferred from within the system;
Things that are inferred from within the system may never be given as appearances to the system, hence may never be known by means of the system, but that is NOT to deny their existence;
Things that are inferred may never be appearances, hence may never be known by means of the system, and that IS to deny their reality.

Inference implies the proper use of logic. But human intelligence is prone to mere thought, which is a use of logic in form but not necessarily in accordance with rules of proper inference. In other words, as I’m sure you’re aware, we can think whatever we want. Carrying these threads out to their conclusion is found the absurdity of proclaiming humans as instances of noumena, or asserting the roundness of things to a fish, unless the rules themselves are changed. And if the rules change, that which the rules governed must also change….so how in the HELL would the idea that humans are instances of noumena ever have been formed in the first place?
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I'm on board with the idea that we have two modes of attention and understanding. — Janus

I’m with you. I’ve always been a proponent of the intrinsic human dualistic nature, so would you also admit to being one? Maybe you’re of the opinion that being on board with an idea, isn’t the same as being a proponent of what the idea suggests. Or maybe being dualistic in some aspects of human nature is not to be dualistic in toto. What say you?

I’m also with you…or him anyway…regarding the instrumental nature of left hemisphere, but I’m not so sure about it being the causal condition of all that bad stuff.

But then…there’s today’s major headline…..(shrug)

….whatever other tasks you may have set yourself…. — Janus

I thought about applying some pure reason to this universal consciousness idea, but….turns out…it’s too much like aspens communicating with each other: cool idea but without any possibility of obtaining certainty. And without that possibility, it is then commonly called a waste of time, makes no difference whether true or not, which is synonymous with being irrelevant.

The common rejoinder then becomes…yeah, but it’s fun to play with, right? But no, it isn’t, if it follows that your consciousness has anything whatsoever, in any way, shape or form, to do with mine, which seems plausible given its ground as a universal condition. I summarily reject your consciousness as having anything at all to do with mine, simple as that. Easy to see that if I reject yours, I must also reject anyone else’s, which is to reject every instance of it except my own, which just is to reject the universality of it.
(BOOM!!!)

Or, how about this: is it just me or is there a teeth-grinding contradiction in “extrinsic appearance of inner experience”? Have we not yet come to grips with the certainty that no experience is ever of appearances on the one hand, and no experience is itself an appearance, on the other?

Even the thread title implies an inconsistency, in that the strictly metaphysical doctrine of idealism as such concerns itself only with the internal machinations of human subjects, for which, regarding the being of external things in general, there is not the least import. Descartes may be forgiven for labeling internal machinations/external things in general as different substances, with its accompanying ontological implications, as long as he is credited as first to demonstrate the necessity for there being such a difference in the first place, and in which ontology as such falls aside.
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….disagreement often hinges on an alternative turn of phase or two. — Janus

True enough, for folks like us. On higher levels, alternative turns of phrase lead to completely different philosophies, in which case the philosopher’s alternative conceptualizations revert to the Everydayman philosophiser accepting them, which then very well could be his mere misunderstanding.

Like, me, and, universal consciousness. Extrinsic appearance.

And those thinking Kant a phenomenologist. (Sigh)

The world as perceived…. — Janus

…the world (as perceived), is presupposed, and from such temporal antecedence….

…..is obviously not independent of the perceivers. — Janus

….the independence of it with respect to perceivers, is given necessarily. That which wasn’t already there (and is so for whatever reason and in whatever manner), cannot be something there (merely from its effect on some form of sensibility).

The world as perceived not independent of perceivers, is far too close to tautological meaninglessness, insofar as perception is not independent of perceivers.

The world (…) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (…) is independent of perceivers….is false;
The world (perceived) is independent of perceivers….is true;
The perceived (world) is independent of perceivers….is false.

On the other hand, insofar as that which is perceived necessarily exists given its effect on sensibility, to then grant such existence is obviously not independent of perceivers, says far too much with respect to both perceiver and perceived, for the simple reason existence has nothing to do with perception, but is only the necessary condition for its possibility. Whatever the relation between existence as such, and the form of its manifestation in things, which just is that necessary condition, occurs further intellectually/rationally downstream than mere sensation.

Is time just some overblown metaphysical concept, or is it something which seldom receives proper attention.
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But it seems obvious there is a "contribution" to what is perceived from a perceiver-independent reality that ensures the possibility of a shared world among perceivers. — Janus

…from a perceiver-independent reality contradicts the obviously not independent of the perceivers.

The contribution to what is perceived, just is whatever is perceived. But it does not follow, given sufficient distinctions in species-specific intellectual capacities, worldly contributions to perceptions of one species have any apodeitic commonality with worldly contributions of another, for granting such certainty is tantamount to equating rational intellect with mere instinct.
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I had a JRT, I was her one and only human her entire life. For 18 years she was a job-dog, a hiking partner, a pillow thief. Every once in awhile, when I said something to her, she’d tilt her head in that oh-so-cute sorta way, and it occurred to me…she’s wondering what I meant. Only after a few of those, I began to think maybe she was wondering….WTF am I supposed to do that??? There’s no way to tell, from a mere tilt of the head, whether the confusion it suggested belonged to her because of her, or to her because of me. The point being, not the confusion, which may not have even been, but the possibility of correcting it, which may not have even been necessary.

Some nature show tells me aspen trees, given their interconnectedness, correspond according to a root system. Then I try to imagine trees talking to each other, and I get nothing. But I cannot say they don’t talk to each other, only that I can’t imagine how they do. Or, they really don’t and some other natural condition gives that appearance. I mean, a chemical injected in one tree showed up in another, miles away. If I deny anthropomorphism, trees are just trees and anything that connected will interact naturally, I’m not any part of it and therefore shouldn’t get all prophetic over it.

My New Year’s resolution…don’t bug so much.

Wish me luck?

….without any self-reflective conceptualization such as "I have an itch". — Janus

Pretty much what I’m saying: there’s nothing cognizable in a sensation alone, so nothing to do with its cause or its resolution. Pure reflex of course being irrelevant.

I was agreeing with Sellars’ thesis that empirical knowledge of things is not possible from sensation alone, but still favoring the notion that knowledge THAT there is a thing, is a non-contradictory, hence completely rational idea.

A sensation just is. — Esse Quam Videri

Right, hence my meaning in saying to know of having it is superfluous. In response to your to have it and know you have it are two different things.

The point never was the sensation to begin with, but the thing I know that is necessarily its cause.

It’s so easy to get lost in the minutia.

….having a tickle and knowing that you're having a tickle are two different things. — Esse Quam Videri

I don’t need to know there is a sensation beyond having one. The given sensation makes the knowing of it superfluous.

The recognition that it can't be denied is itself a reasoned judgment, not an immediate content of sensory experience. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, for sensation is not the immediate content of sensory experience, but merely the occasion for its possibility.

The proof sensation cannot be denied is determinable from the change in the condition of the affected subject from the time before to the time of each and every such occasion. This is an aesthetic judgement, from which the subject cognizes nothing at all, not a reasoned, re: discursive one, from which a possible cognition always follows.

In order to know that there are things one must have grasped concepts such as "thing" and "existence" and made a judgment on the basis of those concepts. — Esse Quam Videri

In order to know what things are one must conceptually represent them to himself and judge accordingly. This is knowledge of.

One has no need of conceptual context for mere appearances to sensibility. One can have (the sensation of) a tickle on the back of his neck without the slightest clue as to its cause, antecedent experience not necessarily any help except to inform of what the cause is not, but not what it is.

To know that there is a thing, some as yet undetermined something, is merely the impossibility of its denial that isn’t self-contradictory. It is said to be given for the simple reason the perceiver, insofar as he is affected by it, cannot be its cause.

Sellars is correct as far as empirical knowledge mediated by discursive judgement is concerned, of course. Knowledge that there is a thing, is not that.

Ehhhh….I don’t do psychology. I’m happy just knowing stuff, and while I think of myself as a knowing subject, that is not to say I know myself. But I seriously doubt the full complement of my intellectual capacity is available to my conscious awareness, metaphysical theories aside, and I’m certain I know nothing at all about the manner in which my brain presents a subject from itself that doesn’t have itself recognizable in it. (Sigh)

In terms of moral disposition, which is where I think most like to say they know themselves, I would admit to only this, I do know what I should do, I do know I hope to do what I should, but to know I will do what I should is not given from any of that.

Oh damn. Sorry. Not sure what I’d change, but thanks for correcting me.

Again, I’d agree self-awareness is intrinsic to every conscious act. I maintain, on the other hand, there are acts of the intellect of which the subject is none the wiser.

Some would argue that awareness of things is knowledge that there are things. Plato, Russell, that I am familiar with. In juxtaposition to knowledge of things.

In order to know I must do a lot more than understand.

In order to understand I must think.

What is it for you to inquire? How would you describe it?

This is a whole ‘nuther argument.

I might agree that understanding and all are acts of the intellect, and the subject to which they belong is conscious of his participation in some of them. But that’s not the same as saying consciousness is approximating itself when it “manifestly does” the same thing.

So, yes, I think there's a great deal of continuity from Plato>Aristotle>Kant….. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it’s kinda hard to make certain just how much Aristotle is in Kant, beyond the general conditions. He does credit the categories to Aristotle, but doesn’t for the intrinsic duality of human intelligence. I’m wondering if Aristotle didn’t go that far himself, which would explain why he didn’t get the credit, at least for the idea on which the theory as subsequently built.

Anyway….thanks.

Ousia is closer to “being” or “what-it-is-to-be.” — Wayfarer

As you know, Kant was the chair of metaphysics and logic, and had great respect for Aristotle, using logical syllogism as ground for his critical program. Do you see any similarity to, or perhaps a continuation of, the earlier, in the later?

“…..The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which therefore endures while everything else changes….” (A144/B183)

I see consciousness as inherently reflexive. — Esse Quam Videri

That’s you talking, not the system in which consciousness is a consequence.

It can (and manifestly does) use experience, understanding and reason to appropriate itself as experiencer, understander and reasoner. — Esse Quam Videri

If I am the experiencer, understander and reasoner, what am “I” doing while consciousness is, for all intents and purposes, making of itself a copy of me?

Even if it be allowed to consciousness that it uses, say, understanding, it cannot do so in the approximation of itself as an understander, for it is the understander which stands in consciousness of its thinking, from which follows consciousness, in approximating itself as a thinker, is conscious of itself being conscious of its thoughts, which is absurd.

If perchance then the same scenario holds for experiencing and reasoning, the whole proposal falls apart.

Consciousness is a consequence of faculties, having no pretensions of being one.

Or so it seems……

a proper understanding of the empirical depends on a proper understanding of the transcendental — Esse Quam Videri

…proper understanding of the origin and use of the transcendental. Transcendental is a condition representing the possible determination of the particular iff the general is given.

That space is a general intuition, is a transcendental proposition; that things have their own spaces, is an empirical one.

I am approaching it differently — Esse Quam Videri

As did Schopenhauer; nothing wrong with it, as long as it remains true to its name. Wouldn’t be fair or right to call it transcendental philosophy when approached differently enough to falsify its tenets.

I’d agree Kant’s account is epistemic, but not sure about “prior to the empirical”. And I don’t know in what sense any of Kant’s account is ontological, re: “… The proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine must give
way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding…” (A247/B303).

I think what you are describing here is idea that the system in operation is, in some sense, “overabundant” with respect to the system in the talk of it…. — Esse Quam Videri

Actually, I was going for the opposite. The system in operation is just that; the talk of the system is over and above, or in addition to, the operation itself. I mean…the system never talks to itself, isn’t trying to understand itself; it is just that which understands, and is necessarily presupposed by the talk of it.

I would sooner just admit to the intrinsic circularity of the human intellectual system, regardless of its name. To use reason in describing what reason is or does, and all the other speculatively derived faculties and conditions as well, is the epitome of circular reasoning, but at the same time, is in all cases unavoidable, for otherwise, as you say, inquires would cease.

The warning to guard against it, and the method for it, is in the text, but the elimination of “in-excess” thinking and rational constructs generally, is impossible. Search for the unconditioned and all that jazz.

This is why Kant took pains to emphasize his method was strictly grounded in tripartite logical syllogism, in which the truth in the premises grants the truth in the conclusion. He never says his system is in fact the operative human system, which he would never admit to knowing in the first place, but only the “if this then that” construct.

I can sorta see the “object-in-itself” is in excess of the “object-for-consciousness”, but they are certainly very different from each other.

…..some readings of Kant seem to leave us completely separated from an unknowable reality. — Wayfarer

We have to be completely separated from the unknowable, don’t we? An unknowable reality is a contradiction in terms, technically, but still, we have to be separated from the unknowable simply by the limitations of our system of knowing. But that’s fine; we aren’t seeking the unknowable anyway. We want to know what’s given to us, not what isn’t.

….the 'unknowability of existence' is a fundamental philosophical virtue…. — Wayfarer

Many things exist; there is no such thing as existence. Nothing whatsoever is added to the conception of a thing, by including existence in its predicate.

The rejoinder often in the form…is existence a property of a thing, or a condition for the possibility of a thing? It is neither, if it is actually a category, and categories are that which grounds the very possibility of experience of things in general. Theoretically.

Dunno about virtue, though. Not sure about its philosophical significance.

The purpose of transcendental philosophy should be to give an account of the structure of subjectivity, not the content, whereas the question of mind-dependence is a question that should be asked at the level of content, not structure. — Esse Quam Videri

The structure of subjectivity goes beyond the purview of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in that the structure of subjectivity must include pure practical reason, re: moral philosophy, which transcendental philosophy does not address. Ref: A15/B29

Transcendental philosophy has for its object the structure and bounds of pure speculative reason, all its content already having been abstracted, and the critique of it is that by which understanding obtains the rules for its proper concerns, re: the possibility for and validity of pure a priori synthetic cognitions in relation to empirical conditions.
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Kant gives you the “participatory” part, but it’s at the expense of the “knowing” part. — Esse Quam Videri

Might this be separating the system in the talk of it, from the system in the operation of it? The system in and of itself, regardless of the talk about it, is both participatory and knowing. The system doesn’t have subjects and objects; the talk of it merely reifies some speculative content into comprehensible expressions, of which the modus operandi doesn’t have and therefore of which it makes no use.

Bottom line is we don’t know how we know stuff, but we’re at a complete loss if we then say we really don’t know anything. As soon as we say we know we are obliged to say how we know, in which is found the necessity that the part that participates in knowing, and knowing which is participated in, are the same.

In Kant then is found that the participatory part is the prescription for the knowing part, hence cannot really be said the one is at the expense of the other.

If I’ve understood you close enough, that is.

Ok. Thanks.

What the mind already knows about the object is the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, in that the object in its entirety is the experience. When the perception is already determined as, e.g., basketball, as far as the human intellect is concerned, the totality of conceptions subsumed under the general are included in the experience whether or not consciousness registers them. Such being the case, what is not known about the thing is not in-itself, but can be nonetheless cognized as an inference to a possible experience, insofar as the logical object of those inferences is necessarily contained in the thing experienced.

What the mind doesn't know about the object is the object as it is in-itself. — Esse Quam Videri

Given the above, it is clear this is not the case, under the assumption the object the mind knows of, is the same object the mind may not know all of. It is absurd to suppose the dark side of the moon, at those times in which there was no experience of it, there was only the dark-side-of-the-moon-in-itself.

What the mind doesn’t know about a thing doesn’t necessarily indicate a thing-in-itself. It is entirely possible the mind doesn’t know about a thing because there’s no thing to know about.

THAT the mind doesn’t know OF the object, is just what it means for the object to be as it is in itself.

Therefore, the object as it is in-itself is in excess of the object as it is for-consciousness. — Esse Quam Videri

In a sense, yes. But these merely represent time differentials between the thing in itself and the same thing for-consciousness. Wordplay: in-itself vs in-us; in-itself vs for-consciousness. In-itself as a thing vs thing given to us as appearance vs thing represented in us as phenomenon.

Furthermore, the act of asking a question presupposes that what the mind doesn't yet know about the object (the in-itself) is knowable because, again, otherwise it wouldn't ask the question. — Esse Quam Videri

Agreed, in principle, with the caveat that part of the thing the mind asks about is not any part of the thing in itself. By definition, the mind cannot even ask about the thing-in-itself, but is perfectly within its cognitive purview to ask about things merely possible for-consciousness, to use your term.

Still, there are myriad instances of asking questions even about things the mind thinks, but for which the mind already knows the experience is impossible. One of the more familiar instances being….what is it like to be a bat. Again, in your terms, what is known is a bat; what is asked is what it is like to be a bat-in-itself, from which what is proposed as being knowable, is actually not.

Therefore, the act of asking a question about an object presupposes that the object as it is in-itself is knowable. — Esse Quam Videri

The act of asking a question about an object presupposes the possibility of an answer relative to the object asked about. The object asked about is the object or possible object for-consciousness, not the object as it is in itself.

If it is the case the perception of a thing is the perception of a whole, it makes sense that the thing-in-itself of which there is no perception includes the whole of that thing-in-itself. From which follows the possibility of knowing all of the one, but the impossibility of knowing anything at all in part or in whole about the other, while at the same time granting necessary existence relative to a perceiver, of both.
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On the other hand…..

There is a kind of in-itself-ness of things for which there is experience. It is not irrational to allow knowledge of the basketball itself to not include knowledge of the air contained inside its spatial boundaries. Or that the knowledge of the exterior spherical surface material does not grant knowledge of the interior spherical surface material. But it is understood a priori, first, that there must be those, and, second, there is no need, and indeed it would be superfluous, to cognize such distinction necessarily, in order for the experience of the thing as a whole to reside in consciousness without self-contradiction.

But it doesn’t serve any useful purpose to suppose the air in the basketball is some thing in itself. Or even the microscopic things of which there isn’t any direct experience at all. Which makes sense, because all that stuff each has its own name, whether directly experienced or not, which presupposes it is some thing already known or inferred logically by the same mind that comprehends the necessity of all the constituency of the thing as a whole experience.
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Noumena exist. The transcendental subject exists. However, their existence is inferred rather than experienced. — Esse Quam Videri

That which is inferred is a strictly logical construct. Existence is a category, and all categories and their subsumed conceptions have reference only to things of experience, and never to merely logical inferences. An existence is empirically given, an inference is only logically valid. Under these conditions, it cannot be said noumena exist, but it can be said it is impossible to know they do not.

Noumena are no more than that which understanding thinks, understanding thinks only in concepts, therefore noumena are no more than concepts. Concepts do not exist, they are no more than valid thoughts, valid meaning they do not contradict anything in the thinking of them. They would certainly contradict experience if it were possible for that which is no more than a mere thought, to be an experience. I mean…if that were the case, everybody could buy a unicorn.

The transcendental subject is not even a concept or a thought of understanding. It belongs to pure reason alone, as an apodeitic principle thus is even further from existence than a mere thought.

In Kantian dualism is the irreducible necessity that if this is this, it cannot ever be that. If existence is this, nothing that does not have this can exist. If inference is that, nothing that does not have that can be an inference. Existence is not inference; inference is not existence. Irreducible necessity meaning one can’t be a dualist for one thing but not another. If he is a dualist he is so in toto and cannot rationally oscillate between being one for this and not one for that.

Of course, if one doesn’t consider himself a proper Kantian dualist, he’s at liberty to mess it up any way he sees fit (grin)

Yours are interesting arguments; I only comment in reference to the claimed source material, your interpretations of it, or conjunction with it, be what they may.

Do you believe there’s such a thing as pure reason? — Tom Storm

Ehhhhh…..I’m sure there’s an abundance of abstraction, from the physical mechanisms of the brain to those conditions which facilitate an explanation for something every human ever, is only seeming to do. If it were ever to occur to me the goings-on between my ears wasn’t a general range of mental constructs, I wouldn’t be able to say a damn thing about what is going on.

I mean….even if I had a completely determined physical explanation for my abject hatred for the taste of Lima beans, isn’t it still me that hates that taste? What kind of explanation is really worth entertaining, that says neural pathways, or ion potentials, hate Lima beans?

So, yes, there is that which is called pure reason, even if only within a speculative non-physical explanation for physical conditions. And the kind of pure reason it is, depends on the domain of the philosophy that uses it. For experience it is pure theoretical reason; for which experience is impossible it is pure speculative reason; for moral philosophy having to do with the will it is pure practical reason.

The critical human is going to explain things to himself, whether or not there’s sufficient proofs for what he claims. It’s just what he does.
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….internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.
— Mww

I'm not sure I understand this sentence. — Tom Storm

It’s the simple representation of how a subject feels about that stuff of which he is the sole determinant factor. Which is the irreducible condition of Kantian moral philosophy: the proper moral agent will do what he’s already determined must be done, whether he feels good about doing it or not. That’s the subject’s condition because of himself: he feels like shit for what he did at the same time it’s he alone, that determined what was to be done. Or he feels great, depends…..

Is that Camus in the background, firing up a Gauloises? — Paine

“…. One must imagine Sisyphus happy….”

Because the reference is Kant……

The matter of pure reason is interesting. — Tom Storm

For his relation to moral philosophy, care needs be taken for which pure reason matters.

I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. — Tom Storm

…entirely a priori, but not necessarily understanding.

I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning — Tom Storm

Experience is irrelevant, for to be entirely a priori simply means “not independently of this or that experience, but absolutely independently of all experience…” (B3). The role of affect holds, but not as the senses are affected because of real objects, but the internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.

…..a sound morality is a form of rationalism. — Tom Storm

“Sound” indicates a logical condition. Moral philosophy doesn’t incorporate logic in the same way as transcendental philosophy, these being distinct and altogether of far different origin and manifestation. It may be more appropriate to consider the form of rationalism for the latter as sound, but with respect to the former, it is properly considered “lawful”.

But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense. — Tom Storm

Agreed, and for me, the something that seems like common sense is in fact the intermingling of anthropology, ethics, or cultural normativity, with moral philosophy proper. The rather vast difference between the plurality of human engagements, and singularity of the human condition which determines the variety of responses to them, mistakes the effect for the cause.

I am also open to idealism, but I don't see how this is a particularly useful view. — Tom Storm

For that which belongs to a human for the simple reason it is irrevocably a necessary condition, any explanation for it must be a form of idealism, iff idealism is that by which the internal machinations of humans in general, whatever they may be, is susceptible to exposition in a rational doctrine. Still, a rational doctrine of what it is to be moral, which is always metaphysical, is not always reflected in its exhibitions, insofar as the mere behavior of the subject not always accords with his own metaphysical doctrine.

morality is best understood beyond preconceptions, homilies and slogans, by looking inward through self-reflection — Tom Storm

If morality is a necessary human condition, there’s no need to look for it. All the moral subject does with his philosophy, which just is the looking in some form or another, is come to grips with himself when he’s failed.

Anyway…..interesting topic, even if I got no interest in relativism or anti-foundationalism. I like to keep my -isms irreducible.

….a definition of normal, and a one liner universal philosophical definition. — Copernicus

For that being of sufficient intelligence, “normal” is that in the negation of which, is irrational.

More opinion. Like a snake that can go a few days without eating, a sloth that can go a few days without taking a trip to the “bathroom”, so too has it been a few days since I inserted myself without being bidden.

To those who say: Phenomena….how things appear.
I say: Phenomena…..representation of things that have already appeared.
….how things appear is unintelligible in that there is no distinction in it from whether the “how” of the thing is its cause, or, the “how” of the thing it is its effect;
….that things appear indicates only a presence to the senses provided by some thing’s matter, matter alone, as the necessary occassion for, but cannot provide in itself, phenomena;
….phenomena cannot be how things appear.

To those who say: We can only have genuine knowledge and truth about the phenomenal world.
I say: We can only have empirical knowledge of representations of things of the world, and there is no universal criteria for empirical truths.
….phenomenal world is unintelligible; world is external, phenomena are internal; there is no such thing as a phenomenal world; the totality of all possible things is world; the totality of all possible phenomena is consciousness;
….all knowledge is genuine knowledge but nevertheless contingent; only mathematical truths are so necessarily, hence universally genuine, the distinction resides solely in relations to time;
….that this or that about a thing is true is not sufficient criteria for universal truth with respect to every possible thing;
…we cannot have genuine knowledge nor truths about the phenomenal, except those related to a priori mathematical construction which subsequently become things of sense.

To those who say: Kant would never question the veracity of Newtonian physics…
I say: In Kant 1786, if not direct questioning, then at least expressing concern over the lack of metaphysical ground for its justification, from which is deduced the impossibility of annexing absolute space and time to empirical domains on the one hand, and the synthetic a priori judgements necessary for the employment of mathematical constructs sufficient to explain those domains on the other.
….it isn’t the veracity in question; its the lack of proper justification, that is.

To those who say: Kant's view of TRUTH as a correspondence with phenomenal reality…
I say: have mistaken Kant’s view of truth, insofar as that which is true is nothing but a judgement in which the relations of the conceptions contained in it logically correspond to each other, in which case there is nothing therein related to phenomena, re: sensibility, but only to understanding or reason;
….that this or that is or is not true, has correspondence to reality, but this or that being A truth is not Kant’s view of TRUTH itself;
….the truth of any judgement resides in its form irrespective of its content; that which in a judgement is or is not true is the relations of its content. A judgement of correct form remains true or false depending on the relation of its content, but a judgement having incorrect form is a paralogism, in which the judgement is illusory, which is neither true nor false no matter the relations of its content;
….Kant view of TRUTH is not correspondence to phenomena or reality, and from which is found the answer to the question “what is truth”, supposed as being “the accordance with cognition with its object”, is wrong, such answer being exactly that “… which forces logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art…”.

To those who say: phenomena already imply subjectivity (…) and the physical already presupposes form…
I say: there is no consciousness in the origin of phenomena, therefore it is not an implication of subjectivity (…) the physical already presupposes matter.
….that the pure intuitions necessary for the synthesis which originate phenomena belong to a subject makes explicit they do not belong to that which provides the occasion for the synthesis of phenomena, or, which is the same thing, the appearance of the thing to the senses subsequently intuited as some undetermined thing;
….under the presumption that subjectivity relates to the capacity of a rational intelligence for its conscious activities, and given that the origin of phenomena are not within the conscious activity of a rational intelligence, it follows as a matter of course that subjectivity does not relate to phenomena, but only the use of them in a subsequent conscious activity, which is transcendentally represented by “I think”;
….phenomena imply a subject to which the employment of them has a purpose in a system. Subjectivity, then, with respect to phenomenon, indicates what purpose the phenomenon is thought to have.
….the representation “I think” already implies subjectivity.
—————-

….the designation of human sensory devices as physiology makes explicit they are susceptible only to the effects of physical conditions. The only property that can belong to all that is physical, is its extension into what is called space. The only extendable in space is matter. Therefore, the physical presupposes that by which it is extendable; the physical, then, with respect to human sensuous receptivity, presupposes matter.
….the shape matter assumes, is not its form by which it is intuited, but merely denotes a limit to its extension.

To those who say: Kant (…) is ultimately solving problems that only arise out of choices made by the likes of Descartes and Locke.
I say: he and all his predecessors….and everybody else…were imbued with the same cognitive system, whatever that may actually be. If it is the case such system is described sufficiently by his transcendental idealism, then it follows that Kant is ultimately solving problems that arise out of any improper use of that system.
….he incidentally solved specific problems, he may even be said to have been inspired by the occassion of certain metaphysical determinations, but is on record as stating his solutions obtain in all otherwise rationally equipped subjects that “…rise to the height of speculation…”, who are not necessarily anything like his peer group except in that way.
….while his philosophy is directed at the scholastically inclined, it pertains to even “those of common understanding”. They just don’t realize it, and may not care even if they did.

I just had a sandwich, I just put the seat down, so all done opinion-ating for a few days.

1957

…..truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality…. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction, p133

1787
“….The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object”, is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition. (…) Now a universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found.…”

Questions of this or that truth, or that this or that is or is not true, is hardly the same question asked of truth itself.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
————-

Reason has no authority as such, re: invariance according to law; it is one of two definitive conditions of being human, alongside and likely subservient to, morality. While it may be the source of pure principles a priori in some speculative metaphysical theories, the necessity for its employment always relates to pure rational thought alone, experience be what it may.
—————-

Experience doesn’t show the case of anything. It is merely that representation of the fullest account of the systemic functionality relative to a particular intellect. Each member of the system shows the case for that function of which it is the condition; experience, having no function in itself, being its termination. And then to posit that experience shows the case that the system has run its course, and that some relevant determination results from it, becomes trivially tautological.
—————-

Metaphysics was never meant to be a convenience. But it remains curious that metaphysical science disavows the integration of hypotheticals in its prescriptions for empirical knowledge, which just is its fullest account, yet, the expression of those prescriptions, insofar as all of them are grounded in transcendental speculation, must always be mere opinion. And what is an opinion if not subjectively convenient.

Yeah, well, you know…I’m that much in agreement with your general philosophical presentation, if I didn’t pick a nit once in awhile, I wouldn’t have anything to say. And while being a yankeevirgobabyboomer makes the background a pleasurable enough position to hold, every now and then I think it’s ok to raise my hand.

Awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real…..

….is real presupposes some real as given;
….our sense of what is real just indicates real in this or that way, predicated on one or more of five physiologies affected by the given;
….we construe our sense of what is real, insofar as the given is real in this or that way, by intuiting the manifold inherent in the sensation given from the real;
….the way we construe our sense of what is real, then, must be found in the intuition, as a function of it alone, and that necessarily under a set of conditions entirely distinct from the mere affected physiology;
—————-

….. is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments.

Awareness that the way we construe, is always in accordance with our metaphysical commitments, or the speculative theoretical method by which consciousness of our sense of the real, or consciousness of which sense of the real becomes manifest in us, is deemed both possible and sufficient for that which follows from it.

Awareness of the way we construe our sense of the real, is understanding, which always accords with our prior conditioning, whether in affirmation or negation of some relevant aspect of it, and is reflected in judgement.

Awareness of the construal itself, our manifest sense of the real, that description of the relation between the given and the subject in which it is cognized, is that by which he himself determines what his knowledge of the given real, will be.

As my ol’ buddy Paul Harvey used to say….now you know the rrreessstttt of the story: how to put the subject back into the scientific picture, where he’s always been on the one hand, and overlooked on the other.

…..an awareness that the way that we construe our sense of what is real is always in accordance with our prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments. — Wayfarer

I might be inclined to suggest the way we construe….interpret….our sense of what is real, is always in accordance with the sensation the real provides, which in turn is always mandated by the physiology of the sensory apparatuses. This is sensibility writ large.

The relation to prior conditioning or metaphysical commitments, of immediate sensation of the real, is construed post hoc ergo propter hoc as new or old in the subject interpreting, insofar as “prior conditioning” equates to, or represents, experience. This is understanding writ large, and within it judgement specifically.

But I understand you to have a broader view of the real than the above permits; a sympathetic metaphysical commitment, then, which favors less stringent judgements for those conceptions subsumed under the general “real” in compliance with the LNC, becomes nonetheless viable.

Metaphysical commitments. Like anyone could get along without one, huh???

The real world object (rock, tree...) exists irrespective of our ever having perceived it…
— Relativist

This is the whole point at issue. — Wayfarer

The real world object (the named, experienced representation)….

One of these things is not like the other.

Everydayman could care less iff it occurred to him to ask himself about it; the philosopher wants to know because he does.

The point should have been but never was, not whether a thing exists, but the myriad of necessary principles detailing that intelligence alone is entirely insufficient causality for the naturally occurring things that do.

Oh how they laugh at speculative metaphysics the contents of which can never be empirically rendered, but just love the waveform collapse even though restricted to the very same criterion. The former is merely logical, the latter is merely mathematical, yet both represent that of which the observation will always be missing from the very thing explained by them.

They insist the brain causes human consciousness, but human consciousness is not an observation the brain permits. Human observation causes waveform collapse, but waveform collapse is not what the human observes. Odd, innit? The human intellect immerses itself into the less explainable in its attempts to explain.

And then, it is found the continuous existence of a thing, if determinable by my mere belief in temporal consistency, is catastrophically insufficient reason for anything at all having to do with empirical conditions. Constant conjunction has been relegated to the back-burner for centuries, after all, not that it ever should have been otherwise. How would I ever be able to justify the closing of my eyes momentarily, as different in principle from having my eyes open continuously but the thing in question not in its field? Shades of that stupid cup-in-the-dishwasher scenario, made popular by less critical methods.

That I believe a thing remains after I’ve closed my eyes is the weakest possible justification for it doing so, insofar as the construction of such belief is grounded in the mere contingency of its possibility, re: there can only be a belief in the continuance of an existence iff there has been an antecedent experience of it. Such experience is then ground for the presupposing the thing as object of the belief, in which case, the logical conclusion is not that the thing continues to exist, but the contradiction involved in the possibility that it does not.

….leaving it at that sounds good to me.

….reference is made to an intuition we do not possess but can imagine as possible. — Paine

Yes, the intellectual intuition. Understanding is that faculty for which no other kind than the discursive could even be imagined, and no other at all could we possess and remain of human intelligence.

Yep. Still, for those objects in general, which I think Kant wants understood as “objects of reason” derived from cosmological ideas, the questions regarding their constitution, which just is what they are, are better left unasked. Reason is always at liberty to present a question, but it not necessarily obliged to pursue it.

Caveat: the higher pagination is tough on me. Layer upon layer, hard to assimilate into a system, as he wants us to do.

There‘s a two-year-old CPR thread on here, in “Categories - Reading Groups”, with 600+ posts.

Oh. Sorry.

A reason to reject the empiricist view that I learn about space and time from experience….(…). I can't imagine a chair that doesn't possess those properties. — frank

The problem is two-fold. First, CPR goes to great lengths to show that thinking is wrong, and second, doesn’t go to hardly any length at all to show why it matters that much to be that wrong.

That an object possesses the properties of space and time just is the empiricist view Kant himself found reason to reject.

Why is it, do you think, that the thing you learn about empirically through the senses, and the thing representing it that you merely remember, are close enough to each other that, as a rule, the rememberance doesn’t confuse you? Better yet, why is it you don’t have to learn what a thing is, each and every time you perceive it?

The point being, even if speculative theoretical metaphysics can’t answer those questions, it is in fact reason itself that presents them, and the critique of reason is only that cautionary tale for how NOT to bother with some of that which reason asks. Or, as The Man says, to “guard against” those “transcendental illusory” cognitions.

“…. For if one regards space and time as properties that, as far as their possibility is concerned, must be encountered in things in themselves, and reflects on the absurdities in which one then becomes entangled, because two infinite things that are neither substances nor anything really inhering in substances must nevertheless be something existing, indeed the necessary condition of the existence of all things, which also remain even if all existing things are removed; then one cannot well-blame the
good Berkeley if he demotes bodies to mere illusion; indeed even our own existence, which would be made dependent in such a way on the self-subsisting reality of a non-entity such as time, would be transformed along with this into mere illusion; an absurdity of which no one has yet allowed himself to be guilty….” (B71)

If you’ve any serious interest, I highly recommend at least the translator’s intro, CPR, Guyer/Wood, Cambridge Press, 1998…

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2017/09/kant-first-critique-cambridge-1m89prv.pdf

….a ~100-odd page altogether outstanding synopsis, including originally unpublished footnotes, and other cool stuff. While it may be true there’s some subjectivity involved with the language translation differences, that’s going to be the case no matter who’s translating German to English.

While the intro alone is worth spending some time with, the text itself remains the typical Kantian grammatical morass of paragraph-sized sentences, and the like. Genius at work, donchaknow.

B344-5 in Guyer/Wood, is understanding warning sensibility not to exceed its purpose, which it would be doing if it treated the object understanding thinks of its own accord, a noumenon or a transcendental object, as the cause of what sensibility takes as an appearance. The warning because such object, the one merely thought, can never be an appearance.

Reference ibid Bxxvii.

We’re good.

Both may be thought "transcendentally" but are not identical. — Paine

Of course they are not identical, never said they were, and never should have been thought to imply they were. That they have common source can be described as both belonging to the realm…or faculty, or domain or some such…..of understanding. No big deal.

Your exposé of the transcendental object, while quite good, has nothing to do with what I said.

Hey now. It worked for me, and I’m richer, smarter and immeasurably better looking.

You are stipulating a tendentious definition of real…. — Janus

Yeah, I’ll own that. All that is real are the schemata of “reality”, just as are all things the schemata of “world”. Postmodern/current philosophy does nothing for me, so there’s no positive reason to update myself from such….tendeneity? Is that a word? If it wasn’t, it is now.

That which exists but is not perceived is only understood as having to be real, via inference. That which is perceived necessarily exists and is known to be real, via experience.

The necessary existence of the thing-in-itself, and the perceived thing of the thing-in-itself, is simply a matter of the time of the one relative to an observer and the time of the other relative to the same observer. At this time it is a thing existing in-itself, at that time it is a thing existing as perceived and represented in him.
—————-

The major criteria for things being real, according to common usage, is that they exist…. — Janus

I understand that, and agree. To be real is to exist. But that’s not the contentious issue, that being, what is it to exist and be real, however idealistically contentious that may be?

That thing is red, just asks…what thing is red? A thing exists and is real, just asks…what thing exists and is real?

Hardly anyone asks what is it to exist and be real, but certain philosophers do, and seriously inquisitive regular folks might.

Simplest, most parsimonious, and altogether non-contradictory response, as far as we humans are concerned, is….a thing that exists and is real is that thing effecting the senses. That which doesn’t meet the criteria of effecting the senses can only be said to a possible thing, some thing conceived in thought, the reality of which is not addressed by the mere thought of its possibility.

BOOM!!!! Done deal, can’t argue that one bit without being stupid.
—————-

On OLP:

When doing philosophy as a subjective personality, or even philosophizing with respect to a given thesis objectively…are we allowed to use terminology any way we like?

As you say, there is no absolute fact of the matter as to the meaning of the terms we use in philosophy, generally, for which common usage would then be a proper guide, but there is, or can be, facts of the matter relative to terms used in particular philosophies. And if a guy deviates from such facts of the textual matter, e.g., “….by this I mean to say…”, or, “….in this is to be understood….”, he falsifies the very thesis he presents, and if he is a position to be teaching it, that deviation teaches sheer nonsense.

But I get your point. Phenomenon, say, means this for this guy, it means that for that guy. Whether they are using the term wrong depends on the source they acquire it from. No term in its use could possibly be wrong if he invents the term for a purpose, but it could be very wrong if he uses it in some sort of opposition to the source, not himself, he learned it from. He would have to prove the original was wrong, in order for his use not to be.

I picked phenomenon because some folks like to call Kant a phenomenologist, which of course he would never call himself, which makes explicit he was not. And he wouldn't call himself that because he already stated for the record what he thought of himself as being, and that wasn’t it. Whoever says that considers himself at liberty to say whatever he likes merely because he thinks it the case. One might say, here, OLP was his guide.