One implication is the rejection of "kinds" in favor of degrees of difference.

Question 1: Do you take the book? Why or why not? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. The cost is too high. There is nothing magical about a book that assures our ignorance. We already have such books.

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct mental image to the object? — Luke

How is the correction between the mental image and the object to be made? In the example of the Eiffel Tower I need to become aware that the mental image I have is the image of something else. Pointing to the object my mental image is an image of I might say: "See, this is the Eiffel Tower and my mental image looks just like it". Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem.

If the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, then there is a need to name the object. — Luke

In the example of the Eiffel Tower there is, but at PI 389 there is no confusion as to what object is being referred to, and so, no need to name it.

Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object. — Luke

It is not an intrinsic feature of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower that it is the image of "this" (the Eiffel Tower) and of nothing else.

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object. — Luke

That is what I said:

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. — Fooloso4

But what is at issue in not simply the name of the object. What is at issue is whether the mental image must be an image of "this".

Sentence 3 does not mention any names. Sentence 3 only makes an ostensive reference to this. — Luke

"This" refers to some object. At PI 389 there is only one object. There is no need to name it. The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up, but that the mental image I have is actually an image of something else, the Arc de Triomphe.

My mental image is not like its object. It is not an image of "this", that is, the Eiffel Tower.

Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object. — Luke

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. If I am told that this object I am standing in front of is the Eiffel Tower then I can see that my mental image was not what I thought it was. What I was picturing was not the Eiffel Tower.

Wittgenstein's interlocutor says:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing
else.

Your example shows why this is not true.

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, — Luke

Do you mean that when they see the Eiffel Tower they are actually seeing a mental image of the Eiffel Tower?

If they visit the stone arch they might think "Wow, so this is the Eiffel Tower". — Luke

And they would be mistaken. It is not the Eiffel Tower. The mistake can be corrected when the two objects are correctly identified.

If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.
— Fooloso4

Again (assuming normal mental functioning), there will not be any mismatch between their mental image(s) and the object(s) they see in front of them, so what is the mistake? — Luke

The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them. Before seeing them the mental image of the Eiffel Tower is a stone arch.


[Added: Years ago I visited my elementary school. It was much smaller than my mental image of it. I would have to kneel if I wanted to drink from the water fountain instead of having to stand on tip toes. The principle's office was just steps away from the first grade class, not the long endless walk it was when I was sent to the principle's office.]

Reason is able to apprehend the abstract ideal of "the best" and search for it. In this, it seeks to transcend what it currently is and become more in an outwards search. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is the desire of reason.

Are you saying the mental object is a teapot but that my mental image is not of a teapot? — Luke

I am saying that the mental object is not a teapot. It is an image of a teapot. The mental object and mental image are the same thing.

But you said that the mental image is not of the object? — Luke

It is not of the object if:

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower — Luke

No comparison can be made between their mental image and the object that their mental image is of. — Luke

They can make the comparison. We can't. If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness? — Luke

It shows that the mental image need not be more like the object than a physical picture.

On my reading, I think that my mental image is of this (imagined or real) object before my mind and of nothing else. I cannot possibly mistake the content of this mental image — Luke

The mental image is not of the object before your mind. The mental object is the object before your mind. The mental object is an image of the same object that the picture is. The claim is that the mental image is more like this object than the physical picture is.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object. — Luke

Of course it is! Both the mental image and the physical image are images of the same object. The interlocutor is claiming that the mental image is more like that object than the physical image is.

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of the Arc de Triomphe. — Luke

The same can be said of a mental picture. I might think my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower when it is actually a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe.

If you want to compare 2 and 3 "on an equal basis" then, in order to remain faithful to the rest of the text, this should be done from a public perspective, not from a private one. — Luke

But that is the point. It cannot be done from a public perspective.

From a public perspective, and in accordance with my argument above, this would make sentence 2 true: — Luke

It doesn't. If a group of people are standing in front of the Statue of Liberty, they will agree that it is the Statue of Liberty. If I take a photo of it it will be a photo of the Statue of Liberty. If someone sees that photo and thinks it is a photo of something else they would be wrong.

But it isn't only up to you, and others may interpret it as something other than what it is "supposed to represent". — Luke

This is why the comparison between a mental image and a physical image is misguided.

I don't see why sentences 2 and 3 should be compared "on an equal basis". — Luke

What is being compared is the likeness of the image to the object. In 2 that comparison can be made. In 3 it cannot.

In the case of 2 the image "I make" may be seen by others as a picture of something else. In the case of 3 no such ambiguity arises because no one else can see the image. If they could, the same ambiguity might arise. The mental image is not a superlikeness.

You seem to read sentence 2 as being from the private perspective and sentence 3 as being from the public perspective, — Luke

No!

How can sentence 3 make any sense if a mental image cannot be seen by anyone (from the public perspective)? — Luke

Now you are catching on.

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

If I draw a picture or take a photograph of X, it is not a picture of anything else. Whether someone thinks it is a picture of something else makes no difference. It is a picture of X.

Cannot see what? — Luke

The mental image.

A second person in involved in 2 but no one else can be involved in my mental image. If 2 and 3 are to be compared on an equal bases then a second person should not enter into the comparison.

Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it.

b) My mental image of X is an image of X.

What is the difference between a and b with regard to being an image of X?

it is an observable tendency.
— Wayfarer

I'd say it is more of a tendentious observation. — Janus

Clever turn (around) of phrase.

Agree it might be a generalisation, but it is an observable tendency. — Wayfarer

The point is, theology and religion do not have exclusive rights to the "domain of values".

Why would you think that (2) the physical image I draw of X may not be an image of X, but (3) the mental image I have of X must be an image of X?

There is no parity here. In the first case, the picture I draw of X may look to you like something else, but in the second, it cannot look to you like something else because you cannot see it.

the possibility of intentionality sans physicality — wonderer1

A fatal abstraction.

I certainly don't beleive in these and do not see how an idea of 'the good' can be more than a human construction which changes over time, however useful and beneficial such a construction might be. — Tom Storm

I think the quote from Nietzsche cited above speaks to this:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself "man," which means: the esteemer.
To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow
— Zarathustra, On the Thousand and One Goals

What matters is that things matter.

As soon as discussion turns to the qualitative dimension, the domain of values, then the response is 'Ah! You're talking religion.' — Wayfarer

That may be true in some cases but certainly not all. Above all, it should not be framed in terms of theism vs anti-theism.

For example on the thread Heidegger's Downfall I said the following:

[Stanley] Rosen said:

Nihilism is the concept of reason separated from the concept of the good.

...

Basic to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is the desire for and pursuit of the good. This must be understood at the most ordinary level, not as a theory but simply as what we want both for ourselves and those we care about. It is not only basic to their philosophy but basic to their understanding of who we are as human beings.

Phronesis, often translated as practical wisdom, is not simply a matter of reasoning toward
achieving ends, but of deliberation about good ends.

...

In more general terms, how severing reason from the good is nihilism can be seen in the ideal of objectivity and the sequestering of "value judgments". Political philosophy, for example, is shunned in favor of political science. The question of how best to live has no place in a science of politics whose concerns are structural and deal with power differentials.

In a thread on Nietzsche, How May Nietzsche's Idea of 'Superman' Be Understood ?, I said:

What is properly regarded as good or evil is historically contingent. At one historical stage the morality he sees as unhealthy was a means to man's self-overcoming, but it is no longer so.

This a a problem he addresses in "On the Use and Abuse of History" from Untimely Meditations. He addresses the problem of nihilism. Those who think he was a nihilist should read this. It is the reason the "child" is necessary for the three metamorphoses of the spirit in Zarathustra. If what is called "good" today was at some earlier time "bad" and may at some future time be called "bad", if, in other words, there is no universal, fixed and unchanging transcendent good and evil than this can lead to nihilism. Nihilism, the "sacred no" must be followed by a "sacred yes", but this is only possible if there is a kind of deliberate historical forgetfulness, a new innocence.

I also quoted the following in that thread:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself "man," which means: the esteemer.
To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow
— Zarathustra, On the Thousand and One Goals

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3
— Fooloso4 — Luke

As I have said, the three claims are part of the same argument. You can separate them as part of an analysis but you need to put them back together.

The claim at three is that it is an image of this. "This" is the object it is an image of. We cannot ignore the question of resemblance.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture
— Luke

Have I made that argument?
— Fooloso4

You have made that argument: — Luke

I should have been clearer. The picture and what it means are not the same. Whatever it might mean need not change if the picture is a mental rather than physical picture. If, however, I am talking about a picture, you might ask whether I mean a mental or a physical picture. Here the meaning of picture is different.

this is where faith comes in. — Janus

In Proverbs we are told that fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. It is both a starting point and a terminus. The Biblical God is a willful God.

There is another sense, which is what I think you have in mind. Perhaps you intentionally left open the question of whether one comes to know or only feels they know a higher truth.

In general I agree, it is not all or nothing. But we also need to consider what it is that one is said to be wise about. Aristotle says, for example,

... we consider that the master craftsmen in every profession are more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans

(Metaphysics, 981a)

He goes on to say:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom.

And to your point:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible

(982a)

Which, according to you, neither Aristotle nor anyone else has ever had! — Wayfarer

Yes, that is my position. It is possible that I am wrong, that I do not recognize wisdom because I am not wise. By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination?

It is also hard to believe that you are reading him with sympathy — Leontiskos

He is not speaking from on high, does not possess divine wisdom, and is not pronouncing revealed truths for us to accept and spread.

To read him sympathetically is read him as he reads others, that is carefully, critically, and not to regard him as an unquestionable authority.

Blessed are those who do God's work.

But the quote is from Plato, not Aristotle, and therefore it seems you have not given any evidence in favor of your claim. — Leontiskos

My claim is that:

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery. — Fooloso4

This is supported by reference to Plato. But if you are looking for specific reference in Aristotle by name:

Hence when someone said that there is Mind in nature, just as in animals, and that this is the cause of all order and arrangement, he seemed like a sane man in contrast with the haphazard statements of his predecessors. We know definitely that Anaxagoras adopted this view; but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with having stated it earlier. Those thinkers, then, who held this view assumed a principle in things which is the cause of beauty, and the sort of cause by which motion is communicated to things.

(Metaphysics 984b)

Aristotle complains about the modern mathematization of philosophy (Metaphysics, 992a33); — Leontiskos

What does this criticism have to do with the ability to give an apodictic reasoned argument leading to knowledge of the truth of first things?

he speaks specifically about the differing precisions of different sciences (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b12) — Leontiskos

The degree of precision is based on the subject matter. Are you saying that the science of first things necessarily lacks precision? In the paragraph cited he says:

... for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits.

What is the amount of exactness to be expected when the subject matter is first philosophy? However imprecise the reasoning must be, shouldn't it accomplish what you claim it does, that is, give us knowledge of the arche of all things?

and he even speaks about those who incessantly question authority and require demonstrations ad infinitum (Metaphysics, 1011a2). — Leontiskos

What he says at 1011a is:

they require a reason for things which have no reason, since the starting-point of a demonstration is not a matter of demonstration.

Surely if there is a line of reasoning leading to the arche of all things such reasoning would not be without reason. It may be unreasonable to expect to find it at the starting point but by the end it is reasonable that it must lead to knowledge of the source or arche of the whole.

Sorry, I should have made it clearer.

The quote is a continuation of the quote from the Phaedo. 97b I just edited it.

No, "thought thinking itself" in chapters 7 and 9 of Metaphysics 12. — Leontiskos

Yes, I know. That which thinks itself is Nous or Mind or Intellect.

In the Phaedo Socrates says:

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything.

(97b)

In the Apology he says the books of Anaxagoras are sold in the marketplace and can be bought for a drachma. (26d).

So, the idea of Mind as the arche was well known.

When at Metaphysics 1075a Aristotle says:

One must also consider in which of two ways the nature of the whole contains what is good and what is best ...

he is referring to Socrates criticism of what he finds in Anaxagoras. [Edit. Socrates] continues the quote above:

I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.

A divine mind is a premise or endoxa not a conclusion.

I would suggest that you try actually reading him. As in, beyond the first few sentences of the Metaphysics. — Leontiskos

I have. He does not provide such an argument.

You say:

Relevant here is Aristotle's distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known in itself. We only come to the latter through the former. — Leontiskos

and yet rather than proceeding from what is better known to us you jump ahead to what is unknown to us and treat it as if it is known.

You have not said what experience or reasoning is involved that leads us to knowledge of the truth of first things. You downplay experience and are unable to provide the reasoning that leads to this knowledge. If it were a matter of reasoning then, as is the case with mathematics, Aristotle could reach clear, definitive, undisputed, and necessary conclusions. But he does not, and neither has anyone else.

You keep wanting to change the discussion to talk about resemblance to an object — Luke

If I remember correctly, this discussion began with PI 389 and you have returned to it more than once. PI 389 is about the likeness of mental image vs a picture to an object.

When you say a mental image of X, X is the object that a mental image is an image of. When you say a mental image of ... there is something that it is an image of.

When you gave the example of mistaking a hat for a sandwich both a hat and a sandwich are objects.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture — Luke

Have I made that argument?

I responded that a mental image of X is equivalent to a picture ("before the mind") of X — Luke

Again, when you say a mental image of X there is some X that it is a mental image of.

My point was that the "picture" aspect of a mental picture is no different to the "picture" aspect of a physical picture, because whatever is the content of the mental image is equivalent to the content of the "picture before the mind". — Luke

I can't follow this argument.

I don't see what this has to do with his mental image. How do we verify that? — Luke

You draw or describe your mental image and what you draw or describe looks like or sounds like a sandwich. Based on this representation of your mental image they will tell you that you are mistaken, it is not a hat its a sandwich. You might protest and say "I know it's a hat because its my mental image of a hat". If you are then asked to get a hat and put it on will you put a sandwich on your head?

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image.
— Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?
— Fooloso4

Yes. — Luke

Isn't that because a mental picture is not a physical picture?

It is often difficult to determine whether it is worth it. Although where someone has entrenched beliefs and views they are not likely to change them, there may be some reading the thread who have not made up their mind and are willing to evaluate based on the text and arguments.

I don’t understand what it means for someone to mistake their mental image of a hat for a sandwich — Luke

Oliver Sacks' The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat might be of interest.

I don’t see how we could verify whether a mistake had been made. — Luke

If this person tried to eat a hat and we asked him why, we would know a mistake had been made.

Who’s to say? — Luke

Yes, that is the point!

I don’t believe he uses the word “picture” (unqualified) to refer to a mental image. — Luke

Do you mean he qualifies the mental picture by saying it is a mental picture?

Pierre Hadot's, whose interpretation varies considerably from yours, — Wayfarer

I have read Hadot and found it instructive. If I remember correctly, he had an early interest in mysticism but later moved away from Plotinus’ Neoplatonism. In any case, I have no experience of a transcendent reality and so for me, whether such exists or not, nothing turns or rests on it.

Knowledge of deep causes comes through experience, but mediated by a fair bit of reasoning. — Leontiskos

Experience of what? Does reasoning discover the truth of first things? Why doesn't he teach it to us? He does say that the sign of knowledge or ignorance is the ability to teach.

But the point here is that Aristotle's theological claims, such as the one about thought thinking itself, are conclusions and not premises. — Leontiskos

Mind was a well know and frequently discussed topic in the Academy and Lyceum. It is not as if it was a reasoned discovery.

The conclusion is that knowledge of deep causes comes through reasoning, not direct experience. — Leontiskos

So when of comes to deep causes you disagree with the first premise?

Therefore, if a mental image is of X, then the picture before one’s mind must also be of X — Luke

What follows from this tautology? We covered that pages ago.

If you mistake your hat for a sandwich, then your mental image of a hat is a picture of a sandwich? — Luke

I don't know. I would say that that this raises a problem. Wouldn't we say that if someone's mental image of a hat was a sandwich she would be mistaken?

Yes, but even though it changes, my mental picture of Zeus is still my mental picture of Zeus.
— Fooloso4

How has it changed? — Luke

It might change in various ways. Some features may become more prominent. Something left out or added. I think it might help to think of this in terms of memory. Our memory of things change.

Yes, we can distinguish between a mental image (picture before the mind) and a physical picture, but how is the word “picture” being used differently here? — Luke

If I say: "I was this picture" you might think I mean movie or photo or painting but would it cross your mind that I meant a mental image?

But none of the passages we have been discussing or have quoted uses “picture” as a verb. — Luke

Someone might do the research to see if he does.

there is really such a thing as the philosophical ascent — Wayfarer

I agree but I think we disagree as to how high we can ascend. I think we also agree that is not something we should argue about since neither of us knows

I think you conflate Plato and Aristotle in this way. — Leontiskos

No, not at all. I simply do not make what has become a common assumption, that Aristotle rejects Plato. We should give some thought to the significance of Aristotle staying in Plato's Academy for 20 years.

You are accustomed to reading Plato and then you apply the same hermeneutic to Aristotle ... — Leontiskos

I said specifically:

an art of reading Aristotle — Fooloso4

I agree they are very different.

your error of confusing a conclusion with a premise — Leontiskos

Here are the premises:

It is through experience that men acquire science and art.
No one has experience of the arche of the cosmos.

What is your conclusion?

Relevant here is Aristotle's distinction between what is better known to us and what is better known in itself. We only come to the latter through the former. — Leontiskos

A good way to proceed but when it comes to first philosophy do we come to the latter? How do you know?

The latter approach is apophatic - which ties in with your ‘philosophy between the lines’ thesis, as apophaticism gestures towards what can’t be simply stated in plain speech, knowing that any propositional formulation will miss the mark. — Wayfarer

Is the problem simply that we cannot say it or that we do not know? If as you say there is:

an awareness of the limitations of knowledge in exploring fundamental questions such as the nature of justice or the idea of the good. — Wayfarer

then it is not simply the latter but the former.

If, along with Aristotle

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible — Fooloso4

what suspicions or conclusions follow from an awareness of the limitations of knowledge in exploring fundamental questions? I think the answer is: human beings are not wise.

If you do not understand that Aristotle's art of writing requires an art of reading Aristotle, then we will not get very far. In large part that requires that we not read passively or expect him to tell us what is true and what to think. Like the good Socratic skeptic we must ask questions and make connections, look for contradictions and try to reconcile them.

Aristotle says:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible, without having knowledge of every one of them individually …
(982a)

How far is it possible to know all things? Aristotle says that:

... it is through experience that men acquire science and art ...
(981a) — Fooloso4

Do you think Aristotle is wise? What does that mean? Does he know all things? If not, how far is it possible to know things? What limits him and us?

He says that it is through experience that men acquire science and art. Does he or anyone else have experience of the arche of the cosmos?

I'll pause here to await your response.

But presumably your opinion has no textual warrant — Leontiskos

I think it is rather the case that this goes against your own opinion and what might be regarded as the standard interpretation.

The problem of what counts as textual warrant cannot be adequately addressed without acknowledgement of the practice of exoteric and esoteric writing. The distinction was once widely known and accepted, but from the 19th century forward has been, with few exceptions, ignored. Arthur Melzer 's Philosophy Between the Lines does a good job of helping to rectify this.

With regard to Aristotle, we might begin by acknowledging that his works are dialectical. We should not read him to simply presenting doctrines or to be rejecting Plato, but to be in dialogue with him. See, for example, Ronna Burger's Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics

This means that we cannot simply open a text, point to something, and claim that this is Aristotle's settled opinion of the matter. Or do you think that it is not an opinion but that he has knowledge of the arche or source or ultimate roots of the cosmos? That he is in possession of a divine science?

Earlier I posted this:

The contemporary scholar David Bolotin quotes Alfarabi.

Whoever inquires into Aristotle’s sciences, peruses his books, and takes pains with them will not miss the many modes of concealment, blinding and complicating in his approach, despite his apparent intention to explain and clarify.

(Alfarabi, Harmonization (unpublished translation by Miriam Galston,
quoted by Bolotin in Approach to Aristotle’s Physics, 6) — Fooloso4

In An Approach to Aristotle's Physics David Bolotin says:

Now to understand why Aristotle presented what he knew to be such and exaggerated picture of intelligibility of the natural world, we must consider the implications of the limitedness of the achievement of what he regarded as genuine natural science. For his denial that natural science can finally explain the given world - and in particular his acknowledgement that it cannot discover its ultimate roots - seems to leave him unable to exclude the alternative that this world might partly consist of, or otherwise owe its existence to, a mysterious and all-powerful god or gods. If there are such gods, as was suggested by Homer and Hesiod, among others, we cannot rely on what reason and normal experience indicate as to the limits of what beings can do and what can be done to them.

You of course disagree, but it is not the case that there is no textual, and I might add, scholarly warrant. For a detailed discussion available free online see Christopher Utter's dissertation .