Yes, classically, substance/ousia refers to true reality. What I mean is that for Spinoza, there is one substance, and what we see as things are its "modes." Another way of saying this is that the things of experience are "made of" his one substance. That makes it a kind of stuff. So, while his language is not materialistic, his way of thinking about reality is. — Dfpolis

I don't read Spinoza's idea of substance as an idea of "stuff" in any sense. His way of thinking is not materialist or idealist in my view but, if anything (neutral) monist as he understands both matter (extensa) and mind (cogitans) as attributes of something more fundamental ("substance", "nature" or "god"). These attributes are also understood as just the two attributes out of infinitely many, that we can apprehend.

Beginning with what we can imagine and ending with reality is fundamentally unsound.

Also, "appearances" is poorly defined here. It can mean what we see, or how we see it. What we see does not depend on us in the way you seem to be thinking -- or at least you need to be more specific about what you mean. How we receive it, the qualia of perception, does depend on us. — Dfpolis

I don't know what you mean by saying that beginning with what we can imagine is unsound. All thought begins with what we can imagine. Also, we don't "end with reality"; what could that mean? We count things as real in contrast to fictional or imaginary. We are able to imagine that there could be, or ought ot be, an absolute reality, but we cannot say what that is.

"Appearances" as I used it just denotes that we know things only as they appear. This is incontrovertible phenomenological fact. I have not said that what we see depends on us in any intentional sense, but it does depend on our nature, on how we are constituted, and over that we have no control, which means that our nature does not depend on us in any intentional sense.

I'm not sure what you mean "how we receive it" depending on us. Perhaps how we interpret things depends on us to some degree, on culture, on genetics; is that what you mean? I don't agree if you mean it depends on us in some libertarian free will sense. We cannot even decide what we will be convinced by; we are either convinced or not.

Putting aside that matter does not organize itself (the laws of nature do), — Dfpolis

That is your supposition not a fact. It ignores the work being done on self-organization. It is understandable that you want to put it aside.

this does nothing to explain human intentional acts, such as awareness of contents. — Dfpolis

Human beings have the capacity to act intentionally. Just as we have the capacity to see and speak and think. And desire and want and move toward those things to obtain them.

When that is considered, it is still done so using Cartesian categories. That is where dualism comes in. — Dfpolis

It may be that when you consider it you do so using Cartesian categories, but the capacity to act intentionally does not entail dualism.

It is a technical term with no good English equivalent. — Dfpolis

Material works pretty well.

We experience everything through its action on us.When we see a red apple it is because it has acted to scatter red light into our eyes, and sufficient light triggers a neuron and so on until the action has changed our brain state. — Dfpolis

Whatever your theory is of how we experience apples, there is little or no disagreement that there is an apple on the counter. We can see it. We can pick it up. We can eat it.

The same thing (hypothetically) happens if God acts to keep us in existence — Dfpolis

Unlike the apple your theological claims, as you said: are

... based on reason applied to experience. — Dfpolis

A story about God is not sufficient evidence of God.

That is the framework for Aristotle's and Aquinas's arguments. — Dfpolis

Some scholars, both ancient and modern understand the importance of how to read Aristotle. The contemporary scholar David Bolotin quotes Alfarabi.

Whoever inquires into Aristotle’s sciences, peruses his books, and takes pains with them will not miss the many modes of concealment, blinding and complicating in his approach, despite his apparent intention to explain and clarify.
(Alfarabi, Harmonization (unpublished translation by Miriam Galston,
quoted by Bolotin in Approach to Aristotle’s Physics, 6)

Reprinted in the appendix to Arthur M. Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines"https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/melzer_appendix.pdf

I don't read Spinoza's idea of substance as an idea of "stuff" in any sense. His way of thinking is not materialist or idealist in my view but, if anything (neutral) monist as he understands both matter (extensa) and mind (cogitans) as attributes of something more fundamental ("substance", "nature" or "god"). These attributes are also understood as just the two attributes out of infinitely many, that we can apprehend. — Janus

But isn't this just saying that the one substance has the potential to be any of the things we experience? And what has the potential to take on various forms is matter. In my mind, that makes his substance a kind of matter, not in the Cartesian sense of being extended, but in the Aristotelian sense of having the potential to be formed -- which is what taking a new "mode" is.

I don't know what you mean by saying that beginning with what we can imagine is unsound. All thought begins with what we can imagine. — Janus

Many thoughts begin with imagination. Knowledge begins with experience.

Also, we don't "end with reality"; what could that mean? — Janus

The notion of reality comes from experience. You can try to extend it to mean something other than what we experience, as Kant tries to do, but there is no justification for that. So, to say "what we experience is not real" is an abuse of language, as "real" means like the things we experience.

The things we experience are present to us because of the identity of action and passion. A acting on B is identically B being acted upon by A. Thus, an apple modifying/informing my neural state is my neural state being modified by an apple. The result is a kind of shared existence.

When we start with sensory experience, we start with the shared existence of some aspect of reality. Even a delusion is an aspect of reality, namely some neural malfunction. So, if we stick with experience based premises and proceed with valid logic, the results will apply to reality.

We are able to imagine that there could be, or ought ot be, an absolute reality, but we cannot say what that is. — Janus

I see no difference between "absolute" reality and plain old reality. The term "absolute" adds no definable information here. We certainly do not have omniscience, but omniscience is a ridiculous standard for human knowledge. Instead, we have projections of reality -- and that in two ways. The first is dynamic: objects project their power into us by the identity of action and passion.

The second is information theoretic. Mathematically, a projection is a dimensionally diminished map. For example, one projection of a house is the front elevation. It tells us about the house, but leaves much information behind. So, we add side and rear elevations, floor plans, etc. Each adds to our knowledge of the house, but no finite number of projections will exhaust what we can learn of it.

So it is with human knowledge. When we sense an object, we learn that, of all the ways it could act, it can act in the way it is acting on us. We know something of what it is, but very little. When we experience it in different ways, say using a microscope or x-rays, we learn more, for each experience gives us a new projection. A more classical way of saying this is that objects have many notes of intelligibility, many aspects that can be known, and new experiences actualize new notes of intelligibility.

So, we can say what reality is, but not completely -- it is something that can act on us in the way it does act on us. As a result, human knowledge is about how reality interacts with humans. We have to remain open to the possibility that it can do much more than that.

"Appearances" as I used it just denotes that we know things only as they appear. — Janus

But, they can only "appear" as they act -- and those actions flow out of their Aristotelian form (eidos) which is their "first actuality" or intrinsic operational capability. That means that sensory experience is inseparable from reality. Things appear to us because appearance is exactly objective reality informing us.

I have not said that what we see depends on us in any intentional sense, but it does depend on our nature, on how we are constituted, and over that we have no control, which means that our nature does not depend on us in any intentional sense. — Janus

I agree with most of this. Knowing is a subject-object relation, and so determined by the nature of both subject and object. But it is absurd to imagine that we could know without subject limitations, so that our knowledge, or any knowledge, is subject-free.

Still, I do think that, to a degree, we can form our nature. Intentions lead to repeated actions and repeated actions lead to habits that are incarnated in neural net structures -- changing our nature.

I'm not sure what you mean "how we receive it" depending on us. — Janus

I mean that the physical basis of red in an apple may be an absorption spectrum, but how we receive red is by experiencing a certain quale -- a contingent form of awareness.

Perhaps how we interpret things depends on us to some degree, on culture, on genetics; is that what you mean? — Janus

That comes later, in judgement. First, we experience without classifying, then we make classifying judgements, projecting experience into our conceptual space. That space reflects past experience including culture. I see an elephant. Is it an African elephant or a sign of intoxication?

I don't agree if you mean it depends on us in some libertarian free will sense. We cannot even decide what we will be convinced by; we are either convinced or not. — Janus

That is not what I meant, but I do not agree. We can and do decide what to attend to. And it is what we choose to attend to that sways us.

Yes, it is an activity, and it can change but it is not always changing. — Dfpolis

Wait, what kind of activity is not always a change? I think activity is always a change, whether it's change of place, or change of some quality. Activity as motion, necessarily implies change.

Becoming is not incompatible with being. At each stage, what is becoming is what it is. — Dfpolis

I explained to you why becoming is incompatible with being, and this is directly from Aristotle. Plato initially outlined this problem in The Theaetetus I believe it was. Aristotle demonstrated it in a way similar to what I expressed.

Yes, at each stage of becoming, the thing is what it is, but as Aristotle demonstrated, "becoming" as change is what occurs between each stage. It must be, or else there is an infinite number of stages between each stage. So it is impossible that becoming can be described by states of being at various stages, because this would require an infinity of stages for even the smallest degree of change.

Citation? The Law of Identity is "Whatever is, is and whatever is not, is not." So, you are making up your own law. Please state what you think it is. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what Aristotle denies. Metaphysics BK 4, Ch 8, 1012b,5-8 "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means." See below for context.

A good representation of the law of identity is found in Metaphysics Bk7, Ch 6.

Each thing itself. then, and its essence are one and the same in no accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.
...
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one ad the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. — 1031b-1032a

No, the self-identity of a changing being is based on organic continuity. I do not have the same description I did when I was conceived, but I have organically developed developed from that zygote into the person I am today. — Dfpolis

I haven't the vaguest idea of what "organic continuity" means. It's not Aristotelian and it seems that it is actually you who is making up your own laws. How would you account for the temporal continuity of changing inorganic things like rocks? Surely the rock remains the same rock, despite despite a change in location, or chipping and other changes which occur to it.

It is not that we have different being, but a different kind of being. "Kind" is a conceptual reality, based on the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time. — Dfpolis

You seem to be incapable, or unwilling to grasp the fact that "becoming" is what occurs between points in time, and therefore cannot be accurately described as "the being in progress at each point in time". This issue is fundamental to an understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics. As Aristotle demonstrated, if understanding becoming was a matter of grasping "the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time", then "becoming" would be completely unintelligible as requiring understanding "the being in progress" at an infinite number of points in time, just to be able to understand even the most simple case of becoming.

That intelligibility does not become an actual "kind" unless the agent intellect actualizes it, and forms a universal concept by prescinding from individuating notes of intelligibility. So, while we have an infinite number of potential kinds, we only have as many actual kinds as the agent intellect is able to generate. — Dfpolis

This does not resolve the problem, nor is it Aristotle's recommendation.

Suppose there is assumed to be an actual number of different states of being inherent within each instance of change. So there would be an actual number of stages each consisting of a different kind of being at each stage. What Aristotle pointed out is that "change" is what occurs between each instance of existence of a different kind of being.

So, saying that at t1 there was X type of being, and at t2 there was Y type of being, does not explain the intermediary change which occurred, which is known as how X became Y, because this is what happened between t1 and t2. If we posit Z type of being as the intermediary stage, we face an infinite regress. If we say as you are proposing, that there is a limited number of actual stages, then we are right back to the very same problem as we have at the beginning which Aristotle was addressing. We need to account for what happens between each of the stages, as this is when change, or becoming occurs, how one stage becomes the next. Clearly, what you propose is not what Aristotle proposed, because this proposal produces the very problem which he proceeded toward finding a solution for.

Citation? His solution was to point out an equivocation. — Dfpolis

There is a number of places where Aristotle demonstrated the necessity of violation of the law of excluded middle. I think the most famous is in "Categories" where he talks about the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow.

What I believe is the best demonstration is in Metaphysics. One place is Bk 4. First, in Ch 3 he explains why the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to, as the most self-evident principle of all. Then, in Ch 5 he explains Protagorean relativity theory, and the problem involved with understanding "change". If different people perceive the same changing thing in different ways, and the truth about a thing is according to how it is perceived, then the same thing is at the same time both "so and not so". Because of this problem, it appears like many people, believed that there could be no true or false statements made about change, so some concluded that change is impossible.

The real problem Aristotle said, is that these people attribute "truth", "that which is", as being identical with the sensible world, and the sensible world is always changing. This view blossomed into the extreme position of Heraclitus, who said you could not make a true statement about anything, and finally Cratylus who criticized even Heraclitus for assuming it to be true that you cannot step in the same river twice, claiming you could not even step in it once, because "the same river" makes no sense at all. So Aristotle's conclusion is something like 'that which appears is not necessarily the truth', because the same thing may both appear to be and not be in the same way at the same time, depending on perspective.

In Ch 7 he proceeds in a discussion of the law of excluded middle. First he shows that the argument that "there must be an intermediary between all contradictories", in the same sense that grey is intermediary between black and white, leads to infinite regress, just like I've explained. This is not a problem of ambiguity, but a problem of insisting that change can be described by intermediary states of being. It is a fundamental problem of that way of speaking. It produces sophistic, or "eristical" arguments which men will concede to because they cannot refute them.

The solution is discussed in Ch 8. What is required is that the intermediary which is change, be undefined. Attempts to define it produce the infinite regress. Therefore the law of excluded middle applies only to defined terms, not to appearances as observed. 1012b,5-8: "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means."

It is Aristotle's definition. I just accepted it. — Dfpolis

But Aristotle had two definitions of substance, primary and secondary, and you simply dismiss secondary substance as derivative. However, in his Metaphysics the substance of a self-subsistent, separate thing, is equated with the thing's essence, following Plato's Timaeus. This is not derivative, but prior.

Metaphysics Bk 5 Ch 8. " It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (A) the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a 'this' is also separable --and of this nature is the shape or form of every thing"

This does not follow. In Aristotle's view I am the same substance I was the moment I qualified as a rational animal. What need is there for another substance? — Dfpolis

As Aristotle demonstrated, and I explained above, this view you state here, cannot account for the reality of change. If we accept as true, that you are always the same substance, just having a different form at different times, then we can never understand the reality of changes which occur to you. The changes are necessarily something distinct from, and cannot be described as, substance which is a your form or essence. And since your form is constantly changing, then your identity must be something other than your substance because this constantly changes. But, change is just as much a real part of you as identity is, therefore "substance" also has the definition of matter with form. Now we have two "substances". So, as Aristotle demonstrated, change is real, actual, and substantial, but consisting of "substance" in the sense of a logical necessity but there is also "substance" in the sense of a combination of matter and form, and that is of a physical, or sensible necessity, to account for the reality of appearances. And it must be allowed, that appearances defy the law of excluded middle.

Not by Aristotle's definition. He knows that things undergo accidental changes and remain the same substance. — Dfpolis

That's exactly why we need to accept the reality of something other than "substance", as per the way you apply the term. However, when we start to understand this "something other", it becomes very clear that it is no less substantial, by the very definition you employ to call the other thing 'substance". So now there is a need for two distinct substances, both fitting the definition you propose, but each being very different from the other.

That is your supposition not a fact. It ignores the work being done on self-organization. It is understandable that you want to put it aside. — Fooloso4

The work being done on "self"-organization does not falsify the existence of actual laws of nature. it applies them. It is on the basis of the laws discovered today that we explain the origin and evolution of the universe and the evolution of life. If you reject them, you reject the foundations of cosmology, physics and chemistry.

Is it not a fact that the laws we have discovered can explain past physical processes and predict future ones? Did they not predict yesterday's eclipse?

Human beings have the capacity to act intentionally. Just as we have the capacity to see and speak and think. And desire and want and move toward those things to obtain them. — Fooloso4

Agreed. That is not in question. The questions are: (1) how can intentional acts have physical effects? and (2) how can physical operations, such as sensing, elicit intentional states such as consciousness of what is sensed?

It may be that when you consider it you do so using Cartesian categories, but the capacity to act intentionally does not entail dualism. — Fooloso4

We agree, but when you start with a Cartesian conceptual space, answering (1) and (2) seems impossible. This leads many to become metaphysical naturalists and try to reduce intentional operations to physical operations.

Material works pretty well. — Fooloso4

No it does not, because "matter" does not mean potential, not actual, which hyle does. When we hear "matter" we think actual stuff.

Whatever your theory is of how we experience apples, there is little or no disagreement that there is an apple on the counter. We can see it. We can pick it up. We can eat it. — Fooloso4

I agree. The question is how do we know that there is an apple on the counter, because if we understand that, we can understand how we might know that there is a God. In that quest, understanding the identity of action and passion is essential.

Unlike the apple your theological claims, as you said: are
... based on reason applied to experience. — Dfpolis
A story about God is not sufficient evidence of God. — Fooloso4

Little Women is a story. Showing that electric charge is quantized requires reason applied to experience. They are not the same.

-- and yes, it takes time and effort to understand Aristotle.

be all of that as it may, the manner in which relation, or interaction, or whatever you want to call it still needs to be explained. And I am not a dualist. I am simply pointing out that changing one form of substance ontology for another or calling it "relating" instead of "interacting" explains nothing.

And I certainly look forward to your putting this centuries old issue to rest once and for all. Good luck with that.

The work being done on "self"-organization does not falsify the existence of actual laws of nature. it applies them. It is on the basis of the laws discovered today that we explain the origin and evolution of the universe and the evolution of life. — Dfpolis

This is not uncontroversial. https://iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/:

Laws of Nature
Laws of Nature are to be distinguished both from Scientific Laws and from Natural Laws. Neither Natural Laws, as invoked in legal or ethical theories, nor Scientific Laws, which some researchers consider to be scientists’ attempts to state or approximate the Laws of Nature, will be discussed in this article. Instead, it explores issues in contemporary metaphysics.

Within metaphysics, there are two competing theories of Laws of Nature. On one account, the Regularity Theory, Laws of Nature are statements of the uniformities or regularities in the world; they are mere descriptions of the way the world is. On the other account, the Necessitarian Theory, Laws of Nature are the “principles” which govern the natural phenomena of the world. That is, the natural world “obeys” the Laws of Nature. This seemingly innocuous difference marks one of the most profound gulfs within contemporary philosophy, and has quite unexpected, and wide-ranging, implications.

Some of these implications involve accidental truths, false existentials, the correspondence theory of truth, and the concept of free will. Perhaps the most important implication of each theory is whether the universe is a cosmic coincidence or driven by specific, eternal laws of nature. Each side takes a different stance on each of these issues, and to adopt either theory is to give up one or more strong beliefs about the nature of the world.

If you reject them, you reject the foundations of cosmology, physics and chemistry. — Dfpolis

No, you simply conceive of the foundations of cosmology, physics, and chemistry differently.

The work being done on "self"-organization does not falsify the existence of actual laws of nature. — Dfpolis

Non sequitur.

it applies them. — Dfpolis

Nature does not "apply" its laws.

We agree, but when you start with a Cartesian conceptual space, answering (1) and (2) seems impossible. — Dfpolis

It seems as though you want to hang on Cartesian categories in order to refute them.

Material works pretty well.
— Fooloso4
No it does not, because "matter" does not mean potential, not actual, which hyle does. When we hear "matter" we think actual stuff. — Dfpolis

Material does not work because "matter" ... ?

The question is how do we know that there is an apple on the counter, because if we understand that, we can understand how we might know that there is a God. — Dfpolis

How does my dog know that there is an apple on the counter? She sees it. She smells it. She attempts to grab it and eat it. The question does not arise for my dog and does not ordinarily arise for human beings either who are not confused by philosophical conundrums.

Little Women is a story. Showing that electric charge is quantized requires reason applied to experience. They are not the same. — Dfpolis

Yes, there are different kinds of stories, including different stories about the laws of nature. @wonderer1 notes two different stories of the laws of nature. You and I discussed this in a previous thread. You dismiss the idea that the laws of nature are descriptive rather than prescriptive because it is problematic for the larger story of God you want to tell.

Wait, what kind of activity is not always a change? I think activity is always a change, whether it's change of place, or change of some quality. Activity as motion, necessarily implies change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Contemplating fixed content requires no change once it has begun.

I explained to you why becoming is incompatible with being, and this is directly from Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

You told me what you think. You did not cite Aristotle and you did not lead me to reject being during change.

So it is impossible that becoming can be described by states of being at various stages, because this would require an infinity of stages for even the smallest degree of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

I already answered this. Describing is a mental act and there is not an actually infinite number of such acts, only a potentially infinite number.

This is exactly what Aristotle denies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle is giving dialectic advice, stating that the best starting point for arguing against nonsensical claims is a definition, not stating a metaphysical principle, in the quotation you cite.

A good representation of the law of identity is found in Metaphysics Bk7, Ch 6. — Metaphysician Undercover

To say that a thing is identical with its essence (which btw is false) is not to say anything about what happens over the course of time, which is what you are talking about. Essences only define what a being could do if it existed. So, as Aquinas saw, we need actual existence in addition to essences.

I haven't the vaguest idea of what "organic continuity" means. It's not Aristotelian and it seems that it is actually you who is making up your own laws. — Metaphysician Undercover

Organic continuity is continuity that maintains unity, as when an organism is transformed over the course of its life. For example, when a caterpillar, which is not a butterfly, becomes a butterfly.

As for Aristotle, I think he was a true genius, perhaps the most brilliant person in history. Still, he was a finite, historical human being -- not the final word on reality.

How would you account for the temporal continuity of changing inorganic things like rocks? — Metaphysician Undercover

By the operation of the same laws of nature that account for the physical processes of organisms.

Surely the rock remains the same rock, despite despite a change in location, or chipping and other changes which occur to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

When does a chip become a fracture into two rocks? It depends on how we define "the same rock." Rocks do not have the same kind of unity organisms do. Organisms have immanent (self-perfecting) activity. Rocks don't.

You seem to be incapable, or unwilling to grasp the fact that "becoming" is what occurs between points in time, — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept that, but there is also being at each point in the process.

This issue is fundamental to an understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense!

f understanding becoming was a matter of grasping "the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time", then "becoming" would be completely unintelligible as requiring understanding "the being in progress" at an infinite number of points in time, just to be able to understand even the most simple case of becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are missing the point. Becoming is the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency. What you are missing is that there is no bare potency. Potency is always an aspect of informed being.

This does not resolve the problem, nor is it Aristotle's recommendation. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you say.

So, saying that at t1 there was X type of being, and at t2 there was Y type of being, does not explain the intermediary change which occurred — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I did not say it did. I said the actualization of potential does.

If we say as you are proposing, that there is a limited number of actual stages — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that. I said the number of kinds was always finite.

we face an infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

A continuum is not a regress. There is typically one efficient cause, and one potential being actualized, for the whole transformation. What do you see as a regress?

Your mental ability to divide one process does not make it many processes, it just means that you cane use a different mental representation of one and the same process.

I — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the most famous is in "Categories" where he talks about the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have to realize that the laws of logic are based on the laws of being. There cannot both be a sea battle and not be a sea battle, but given that there is not yet a reality to conform to, "there will be sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false. Since it is neither true nor false, the rules applying to truth and falsity do not apply.

If different people perceive the same changing thing in different ways, and the truth about a thing is according to how it is perceived, then the same thing is at the same time both "so and not so". — Metaphysician Undercover

Not quite. Conceiving the same reality in different ways is a form of equivocation. When we are using different meanings for the same (nominal) concept, the same formal proposition can be true and false, not because the reality is indeterminate, but because we are not thinking the same things about it.

However, in his Metaphysics the substance of a self-subsistent, separate thing, is equated with the thing's essence, following Plato's Timaeus. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Plato's theory, sensible things are like images in a mirror and have no more an essence than a reflection does.

I am not a dualist. I am simply pointing out that changing one form of substance ontology for another or calling it "relating" instead of "interacting" explains nothing. — Arne

Right! But, one makes an explanation possible, and the other does not. Abandoning dualism is only removing an obstacle, not an explanation.

The reason for this is that the solution lies in understanding the relation between the intentional and the physical, and that relation is not a form of interaction, which it must be if you start with a Cartesian conceptual space.

And I certainly look forward to your putting this centuries old issue to rest once and for all. — Arne

Thank you. Message me with your email and I will send you a draft of "How the Agent Intellect Works" to comment on. I will be submitting it for publication around the end of the month.

This is not uncontroversial. — wonderer1

I know.

Each side takes a different stance on each of these issues, and to adopt either theory is to give up one or more strong beliefs about the nature of the world.

Not quite.

Since descriptions that are not grounded in reality are fictions, we need to accept that the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of aspects of nature. Otherwise, physics is a form of fiction. You can call these aspects of nature "regularities," but traditionally, they have been called "the Laws of Nature." The difference would be whether the "regularities" are essential or coincidental. If you say they are essential, then there is no operational difference between saying that there are always regularities in physical processes and saying that physical processes obey the laws of Nature. If you say that they are mere coincidences, they we have no reason to expect them to new observations. The fact that they do apply in general says that they are essential.

Some of these implications involve accidental truths, false existentials, the correspondence theory of truth, and the concept of free will. Perhaps the most important implication of each theory is whether the universe is a cosmic coincidence or driven by specific, eternal laws of nature. Each side takes a different stance on each of these issues, and to adopt either theory is to give up one or more strong beliefs about the nature of the world.

This is a non sequitur, as additional assumptions are required for such implications. I hold that there are laws that guide the time development of physical systems, and that we have approximate descriptions of them. I also see that physics is based on what I call the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science, which attends to the objects observed rather than the subject observing. Yet, these are inseparable, for all knowledge requires a knowing subject and known objects. By fixing on the object and prescinding from the subject, natural science is left bereft of the concepts and data required to explain subjective operations, including consciousness and willing. Thus, the experiential footprint from which the laws of physics are derived is mindless matter. We must expect, then, that extending the experiential foundation to subjective operations may lead to the refinement of our present physics. In other words, our understanding of mindless matter cannot be expected to apply unchanged to conscious beings.

it applies them. — Dfpolis
Nature does not "apply" its laws. — Fooloso4

I said the work on "self"-organization apples the laws, not nature.

How does my dog know that there is an apple on the counter? — Fooloso4

It doesn't. It behaves in response to it.

he question does not arise for my dog and does not ordinarily arise for human beings either who are not confused by philosophical conundrums. — Fooloso4

There is no need for you to participate in philosophical discussion. If you find it confusing, ignore it.

You dismiss the idea that the laws of nature are descriptive rather than prescriptive because it is problematic for the larger story of God you want to tell. — Fooloso4

No. I dismiss it because I am a physicist, and descriptions that do not describe reality are fictions.

...physics is based on what I call the Fundamental Abstraction of natural science, which attends to the objects observed rather than the subject observing. Yet, these are inseparable, for all knowledge requires a knowing subject and known objects. By fixing on the object and prescinding from the subject, natural science is left bereft of the concepts and data required to explain subjective operations, including consciousness and willing. Thus, the experiential footprint from which the laws of physics are derived is mindless matter. — Dfpolis

:up: I think the motivation for questioning the existence of 'natural law' is because even though science assumes the regularities of nature designated as lawful, it can't explain them.

And what has the potential to take on various forms is matter. In my mind, that makes his substance a kind of matter, — Dfpolis

For Spinoza substance can take the various forms of matter and of mind, matter is the attribute or mode of extension and mind is the various attributes or modes of thought or affect.

Many thoughts begin with imagination. Knowledge begins with experience. — Dfpolis

Knowledge results from interpreting what is experienced; and I count interpreting as one aspect of imagination. Peirce calls it abductive reasoning.

The notion of reality comes from experience. You can try to extend it to mean something other than what we experience, as Kant tries to do, but there is no justification for that. So, to say "what we experience is not real" is an abuse of language, as "real" means like the things we experience. — Dfpolis

I agree the notion of reality comes from experience. Further thought about this situation leads to the distinction between what is real as experienced and what is real in itself, absent any experience. So, I don't take Kant to be saying that what we experience is not real, rather it is one limited aspect of the real.

I see no difference between "absolute" reality and plain old reality. The term "absolute" adds no definable information here — Dfpolis

The "absolute' signifies what is real despite or in addition to what we or any cognitive being experiences. Some things are unknowable to us. We cannot experience what animals experience, for example, we cannot know how things appear to them, so there is an aspect of reality which is effectively closed off to us. If we grant that things exist independently of our experiencing them and that our experiencing does not exhaust the reality of the things we do experience, then the distinction holds.

That is not what I meant, but I do not agree. We can and do decide what to attend to. And it is what we choose to attend to that sways us. — Dfpolis

There are two objections to the idea of radical libertarian free will. First, if we accept that our actions and thoughts are determined by neural activity of which we have no awareness and over which we have no control, then libertarian free will is impossible. Second when we choose, we do not choose to choose and choose to choose to choose and so on, but at a certain moment a choice arises, and we act or attend or whatever. There seems to be no way to make sense of the idea of libertarian free will.

I think the motivation for questioning the existence of 'natural law' is because even though science assumes the regularities of nature designated as lawful, it can't explain them. — Wayfarer

Yes, they demand a metaphysical explanation just as the foundations of mathematics demand a meta-mathematical investigation.

Yes, they demand a metaphysical explanation just as the foundations of mathematics demand a meta-mathematical investigation. — Dfpolis

The problem is that there is no way to determine whether the so-called 'laws of nature' are merely descriptive of the invariant ways that nature manifests itself to us, or whether they stand as somehow real transcendent principles of nature. The latter idea seems to be hard to coherently articulate, just as the idea of Plato's transcendent forms is.

I said the work on "self"-organization apples the laws, not nature. — Dfpolis

Again, this means one thing if the laws of nature are prescriptive and another if they are descriptive.

A clear definition of self-organization:

Self-organization is a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-level components of the system. Moreover, the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed using only local information, without reference to the global pattern. In short, the pattern is an emergent property of the system, rather than a property imposed on the system by an external ordering influence.

How does my dog know that there is an apple on the counter?
— Fooloso4
It doesn't. It behaves in response to it. — Dfpolis

If the dog attempts to reach the apple and attempts to reach it where it is and not elsewhere then its behavior indicates that she knows it is there.

There is no need for you to participate in philosophical discussion. — Dfpolis

A dismissive and condescending comment. The dog knows where the apple is because she can see it and smell it. It is as simple as that. Theological mystification is the kind of thing philosophy attempts to clear up.

No. I dismiss it because I am a physicist, and descriptions that do not describe reality are fictions. — Dfpolis

Descriptive laws of nature are descriptions. Those who think that the laws of nature are prescriptive do not deny the truth of the uniformities or regularities of the descriptions of the Regulatory Theory. You say as much:

we need to accept that the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of aspects of nature — Dfpolis

For Spinoza substance can take the various forms of matter and of mind, matter is the attribute or mode of extension and mind is the various attributes or modes of thought or affect. — Janus

That does not change the the potential nature of his substance -- which means that from an Aristotelian perspective, it is a kind of matter, though not the normal kind.

Knowledge results from interpreting what is experienced; and I count interpreting as one aspect of imagination. Peirce calls it abductive reasoning. — Janus

There are at least two kinds of knowledge: knowledge as acquaintance (Russell's "knowledge of things"), and propositional knowledge. Abductive reasoning is one of a number of ways to justify a belief, not knowledge in the strict sense.

Knowledge as acquaintance can justify propositional knowledge in the following way: I see that the same percept that elicits a category concept <A> also elicits a property concept <B>. That justifies the proposition: "This A is B," e.g. "This apple is red." If I see that any instance of <A> will also be able to elicit <B>, then "All A is B" is justified, e.g. "All humans are animals."

So, I don't take Kant to be saying that what we experience is not real, rather it is one limited aspect of the real. — Janus

We more or less agree, except that Kant believed that reality (noumena) is not knowable, because our mind adds content to it, such as the forms of space and time.

The "absolute' signifies what is real despite or in addition to what we or any cognitive being experiences — Janus

Only if you start by thinking plain old reality is only what we experience, which is not the common understanding. Let's say it adds emphasis.

We cannot experience what animals experience, for example, we cannot know how things appear to them, so there is an aspect of reality which is effectively closed off to us. — Janus

Yes, we can never be another subject or kind of subject. Whether animals experience or merely respond is a different question.

There are two objections to the idea of radical libertarian free will. First, if we accept that our actions and thoughts are determined by neural activity of which we have no awareness and over which we have no control, then libertarian free will is impossible. — Janus

Yes, not A precludes A. So what?

There is no reason to think that neural processes are completely determined by physics. If they were, consciousness would be epiphenomenal. If it were epiphenomenal, we could not speak of it any more than Galileo could speak of the moons of Jupiter if those moons did not modify his brain state. So, the very fact that we can speak of consciousness shows that it modifies our brain state, and that means that physics alone is inadequate to determine our brain state. This is because consciousness is intentional in Brentano's sense, and physics has no intentional effects.

Second when we choose, we do not choose to choose and choose to choose to choose and so on, but at a certain moment a choice arises, and we act or attend or whatever. — Janus

There is no reason to suppose that such a recess exists. What happens is that we attend to experience, and sometimes the data stream calls for a choice. So, we do not decide to make a choice, although we can choose not to decide and so drift. We are called upon to respond and must choose how. This can happen because what we value is threatened and that requires an action. Nor is our choice determined by some prior utility, because we are the source of value and decide what to value more and what less.

The problem is that there is no way to determine whether the so-called 'laws of nature' are merely descriptive of the invariant ways that nature manifests itself to us, or whether they stand as somehow real overarching metaphysical principles of nature. The latter idea seems to be hard to coherently articulate, just as Plato's forms are. — Janus

Is there a real difference? If they are invariant, they are necessary. It is irrational to suppose that processes have invariant ways of acting without there being a reason for their doing so that might justly be called a principle.

It is not hard to articulate the nature of the laws. As my committed intention to go to the store is about my arrival at the store, so the laws of nature are about the succession of states that they determine. Thus, they satisfy Brentano's definition of intentionality. So we can see that they are intentional realities. This does not mean that all physical systems have minds, but it does imply that there is a source of intentionality.

In my paper "Mind of Randomness in Evolution," I offer an independent argument for the intentional nature of the laws, based on the concept of logical propagators.

If the laws are intentional, then it is easy to see how human intentions can perturb them.

If the dog attempts to reach the apple and attempts to reach it where it is and not elsewhere then its behavior indicates that she knows it is there. — Fooloso4

Only in behavioralist terms. It is not evidence that your dog is subjectively aware of what it is doing.

— Fooloso4

Theological mystification is the kind of thing philosophy attempts to clear up. — Fooloso4

My account of consciousness has no theological premises.

Descriptive laws of nature are descriptions. Those who think that the laws of nature are prescriptive do not deny the truth of the uniformities or regularities of the descriptions of the Regulatory Theory. You say as much:
we need to accept that the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of aspects of nature — Fooloso4

Yes, and we call those aspect "the Laws of Nature."

Only in behavioralist terms. It is not evidence that your dog is subjectively aware of what it is doing. — Dfpolis

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-82309-x
https://phys.org/news/2021-02-dogs-body-awareness-consequences-actions.html

My account of consciousness has no theological premises. — Dfpolis

You said:

The question is how do we know that there is an apple on the counter, because if we understand that, we can understand how we might know that there is a God. — Dfpolis

Yes, and we call those aspect "the Laws of Nature." — Dfpolis

We do. The question is whether the laws of nature are descriptive or prescriptive. "Approximate descriptions" do not tell us how things must be, only approximately how they are. This is quite different from your claim that:

In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis

and:

God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak. — Dfpolis

Is there a real difference? If they are invariant, they are necessary. It is irrational to suppose that processes have invariant ways of acting without there being a reason for their doing so that might justly be called a principle. — Dfpolis

They have been observed to be invariant, but it does not follow that they are necessary;
as implausible as it might sound there is no logical reason they might not change.

That does not change the the potential nature of his substance -- which means that from an Aristotelian perspective, it is a kind of matter, though not the normal kind. — Dfpolis

I guess that's one way of framing it, but I doubt it is what Spinoza had in mind.

There are at least two kinds of knowledge: knowledge as acquaintance (Russell's "knowledge of things"), and propositional knowledge. Abductive reasoning is one of a number of ways to justify a belief, not knowledge in the strict sense. — Dfpolis

I agree there are different kinds of knowledge. In relation to knowledge as acquaintance, I'd say that we become acquainted with things by learning to understand them and I think this process of coming to understanding involves imagination. Also, I understand abductive reasoning to be more about conjecturing. imagining possible hypotheses, then it is about justifying beliefs.

We more or less agree, except that Kant believed that reality (noumena) is not knowable, because our mind adds content to it, such as the forms of space and time. — Dfpolis

As I understand him, Kant believes that empirical reality, appearances or phenomena are knowable. The in itself is unknowable by definition. For me it's hard to escape the conclusion that the empirical is a manifestation of the in itself, and real as such, but it does not exhaust reality, only the reality available to us.

There is no reason to think that neural processes are completely determined by physics. — Dfpolis

The point is that if neural processes determine thought and action, which seems to me highly plausible, then there can be no libertarian free will, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or indeterministic. And we have no way of knowing which is true, in any case.

There is no reason to suppose that such a recess exists. — Dfpolis

My point was precisely that no such recess exists. Choices are made because we feel compelled to go one way or the other at the moments of decision, and we don't really know what determines that. It is hard to believe that there is some non-physical entity which is the person, and which stands outside of the causal order of nature. I find the idea impossible to make coherent sense of. I don't flat out deny it could be the case, but if it is it seems to be incomprehensible. All that said I certainly feel free to choose, when there are no external constraints on my acting in accordance with my own nature, my desires and/or beliefs. But I don't see myself as some entity outside of the greater nature that has produced that personal nature with its desires and thoughts.

My account of consciousness has no theological premises. — Dfpolis
You said:
The question is how do we know that there is an apple on the counter, because if we understand that, we can understand how we might know that there is a God. — Dfpolis — Fooloso4

Indeed. That is not a theological premise. A premise is a starting point, not a conclusion. I am happy to say that the most uncontroversial starting points can be used to deduce God's existence, but that does not make them theological in the sense of being faith-based.

Approximate descriptions" do not tell us how things must be, only approximately how they are. This is quite different from your claim that:
In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis — Fooloso4

You seem confused. I said the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of the actual Laws of Nature that guide the evolution of physical systems. It is the laws of nature that I said were intentional realities.

and:
God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak. — Dfpolis — Fooloso4

A conclusion, not a premise. The premise is that physics has found that systems develop in determinate ways.

A premise is a starting point, not a conclusion. I am happy to say that the most uncontroversial starting points can be used to deduce God's existence, but that does not make them theological in the sense of being faith-based. — Dfpolis

Why think a mind is something that can exist without an information processing substrate to supervene upon? I.e. why think that a belief that God is metaphysically possible is not faith based?

Since descriptions that are not grounded in reality are fictions, we need to accept that the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of aspects of nature. Otherwise, physics is a form of fiction. You can call these aspects of nature "regularities," but traditionally, they have been called "the Laws of Nature." — Dfpolis

One problem I see with the Laws metaphor is related to whether or not there are real physical properties of things. Does an electron have charge, spin, and mass, or do laws dictate the behaviors of things such that electrons having charge spin and mass is only an illusion.

My working hypothesis is that subatomic particles actually have properties that determine how they interact, and to add Laws on top would be overdetermination. The notion of Laws of Physics seems to fit better with the notion that we exist within a simulation rather than within a physical world.

They have been observed to be invariant, but it does not follow that they are necessary;
as implausible as it might sound there is no logical reason they might not change. — Janus

Yes, you are right. Logically, they could change. Physically (in other words from a scientific perspective), they do not change and are the basis for the concept of physical, vs. logical, necessity. For example, if you step off a cliff, it is physically, but not logically, necessary that you will fall.

Thus, physical necessity is based on how nature works, not on how we describe it. It was as physically necessary that you would fall in paleolithic times as it is in the era of general relativity. What this shows is that there is a difference between the laws of being, on which classical logic is based, and those of nature. So, the laws of nature are contingent, and thus require a sustaining cause.

I guess that's one way of framing it, but I doubt it is what Spinoza had in mind. — Janus

I am almost positive it was not. My point is that after Descartes, many Europeans developed materialistic thought patterns, not that they became materialists. Augustine was a dualist, but he would never have said that the soul is thinking stuff (res).

I agree there are different kinds of knowledge. In relation to knowledge as acquaintance, I'd say that we become acquainted with things by learning to understand them and I think this process of coming to understanding involves imagination. — Janus

I am asked "Do you know that strange object?" I say "Yes," because I have seen it, not because I understand it. That is not to say that I don't try to understand what I see, but that I know it with the first flash of awareness.

I understand abductive reasoning to be more about conjecturing. imagining possible hypotheses, then it is about justifying beliefs. — Janus

Perhaps. My correspondents often use "the best explanation" for justification.

As I understand him, Kant believes that empirical reality, appearances or phenomena are knowable. — Janus

As I understand Kant, he does not believe that phenomena are real. They are just how things appear (very like Plato's "shadows"). His noumena are real, but they are not accessible.

For me it's hard to escape the conclusion that the empirical is a manifestation of the in itself, and real as such, but it does not exhaust reality, only the reality available to us. — Janus

I think we agree. I would add that phenomena are the contingent forms of knowing. It is like Kant wants to know reality, but not employ the means of knowing reality. When we employ the means, which are phenomena, what we know is the ding an sich (thing in itself), but not exhaustively.

The point is that if neural processes determine thought and action, which seems to me highly plausible, then there can be no libertarian free will, regardless of whether physics is deterministic or indeterministic. And we have no way of knowing which is true, in any case. — Janus

I find it entirely implausible that "neural processes [completely] determine thought and action.

I agree in my current paper that neural representation and processing is essential to conscious, rational thought. So, that is not the issue. The issue is whether neural processes are sufficient to explain experience. You can find many ways of showing they are not in my "The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction." So, I will not give them all here

Your argument only works if neural processes can be reduced to purely physical processes. If they have a partial dependence on intentional processes, our thoughts and actions would be partially determined by prior thoughts and not by prior physical states alone. This dependence must exist.

Physics has no intentional effects. Its dynamics only tells us how prior physical states evolve into later physical states. Since physical states lack intentionality (they are not about anything beyond themselves as knowing, hoping and willing are), we will never be able to reduce intentional operations to physical operations.

Similarly, the computational theory of mind fails because computations produce quantities, not intentions. Computational "logic" does not involve thought, but the manipulation of physical states representing 0 and 1.

This would not rebut your claim if consciousness were epiphenomenal. It is not. If it were, it would have no neural effects. If it had no neural effects we could not form the neural precursors of written or oral descriptions of consciousness, just as Galileo could not describe the moons of Jupiter if they could not modify his brain state. So, consciousness, and indeed all describable intentional states and operations, have neural effects.

In sum, physical operations cannot produce intentional effects, but intentional operations can produce physical effects. So, your premise is false.

... regardless of whether physics is deterministic or indeterministic. And we have no way of knowing which is true, in any case. — Janus

We have no way of proving a theory in a hypothetico-deductive science. We can show that there is no need to invoke indeterminism to explain present data.

Choices are made because we feel compelled to go one way or the other at the moments of decision, and we don't really know what determines that. — Janus

Of course we do. Biological (in a large sense) drives. There are situations that call for a response. We can respond automatically, or thoughtfully. If the thoughtful response is not the automatic response, our mind has taken control. How can you deny that thought makes the difference?

It is hard to believe that there is some non-physical entity which is the person, and which stands outside of the causal order of nature. — Janus

Exactly!!!!! You see how you framed this? (1) You assumed the person is a non-physcal entity. I deny that. (2) You assumed that events are not caused. I deny that. (3) You assumed that it is outside the order of nature. I deny that as well. This is framing the problem in terms of Cartesian concepts, even though you are not a Cartesian dualist. It is the conceptual space into which you have projected the problem, rather than the facts, that leads to your conclusion.

But I don't see myself as some entity outside of the greater nature that has produced that personal nature with its desires and thoughts. — Janus

Neither do I. We are natural beings, but natural beings who can act both physically and intentionally. Why would anyone want to deny that it is natural for humans to be intentional as well as physical?

Why think a mind is something that can exist without an information processing substrate to supervene upon? — wonderer1

I almost agreed. The problem is "supervene" instead of "depend." "Supervene" is a weasel word used to avoid discussing causal relations. Like correlation, it avoids, rather than addresses the dynamics.

I have no problem saying that rational thought depends on the neural representation and processing of data. Aristotle and Aquinas both insisted that thought depended on physical representations (their phantasms).

I.e. why think that a belief that God is metaphysically possible is not faith based? — wonderer1

Because I have read Aristotle, who was not a member of any faith I know, as well as ibn Sina and Aquinas, who were. Their proofs are sound: based on true premises and valid logic.

One problem I see with the Laws metaphor is related to whether or not there are real physical properties of things. Does an electron have charge, spin, and mass, or do laws dictate the behaviors of things such that electrons having charge spin and mass is only an illusion. — wonderer1

When things act on us in a particular way, which is what an appearance is, it shows that they can act in that way. That gives us a partial knowledge of their operational capabilities, traditionally called their "essence."

My working hypothesis is that subatomic particles actually have properties that determine how they interact, and to add Laws on top would be overdetermination. — wonderer1

The difference between the laws and properties is that properties are possessed at each instance of time without reference to other instants, while the laws say how systems will evolve over the course of time.

The notion of Laws of Physics seems to fit better with the notion that we exist within a simulation rather than within a physical world. — wonderer1

I fail to see how.

That is not a theological premise. A premise is a starting point, not a conclusion. I am happy to say that the most uncontroversial starting points can be used to deduce God's existence, but that does not make them theological in the sense of being faith-based. — Dfpolis

Mincing words. God is a premise that underlies your claim, which is not an argument, that:

if we understand that [how we know there is an apple on the counter], we can understand how we might know that there is a God. — Fooloso4

You can develop an argument which leads to the conclusion that there is a God, but without the prior belief that there is a God there would be no reason to develop such an argument. Without the belief that there is a God, you would not make the claim that:

God has a creative intent. — Dfpolis

Any argument you make that leads to the conclusion that there is a God, follows from your belief that there is a God.

I said the Laws of Physics are approximate descriptions of the actual Laws of Nature that guide the evolution of physical systems. — Dfpolis

What is the distinction you are making? Is the distinction is between what is actually going on (laws of nature) and what we think is going on (laws of science)? In that case, when talking about what is going on we are talking about what we think is going on. This would hold as much for your claims about God's intent as it does for scientific laws.

A conclusion, not a premise. — Dfpolis

Again, God's intent is a hidden and unstated premise that underlies the arguments you make that are designed to lead to your intended conclusion. If you object to the term premise here call it a belief.

Mincing words. God is a premise that underlies your claim, which is not an argument, that: — Fooloso4

This warrant no further response

I almost agreed. The problem is "supervene" instead of "depend." "Supervene" is a weasel word used to avoid discussing causal relations. Like correlation, it avoids, rather than addresses the dynamics. — Dfpolis

"Supervene" is a pragmatic word for considering things from a more simplistic but useful view. For example I can usefully discuss the workings of logic gates without concerning myself with whether the logic gates are instantiated with transistors and resistors, or vacuum tubes, or relays. Logic gates don't exist without some sort of physical substrate to supervene upon, but there are contexts where consideration of the substrate details is relatively unimportant.

It simply isn't feasible for us to discuss the physical behavior of a whole brain at the level of particle physics. So talking in terms of supervenient properties is simply a pragmatic necessity

I have no problem saying that rational thought depends on the neural representation and processing of data. Aristotle and Aquinas both insisted that thought depended on physical representations (their phantasms). — Dfpolis

The question is, will you be consistent and agree that the mind of a god has an isomorphic dependency?

Furthermore, will you recognize that a god dependent on some sort of information processing substrate is not in itself an unmoved mover?