It is interesting that you mention Thomas Paine. On the one hand Socrates might have regarded him as someone whose opinions in general should be considered, but his efforts, as an Englishman to become independent, would not have persuaded the law. We are servants of the city and its law, as Socrates speaking for it, demands.

As you point out, not all cities and all laws are the same. But Socrates said he found no fault with the Athenian laws of marriage or the education he received. (50-e) And yet, Socrates own teachings were deemed contrary to those of the city.

I wonder if our present condition is one where we cannot distinguish the regimes so clearly. — Paine

Our democratic republic is by design a mixed regime. In practice there is always the danger of it becoming something else. This raises the question of whether when the city and its laws devolve what allegiance do we still owe to it?

This is your argument? It has so many holes in it I'll just allow it to collapse under its own weight.

... no matter how hard you spin it. — NOS4A2

Your clumsy rhetorical tactics may appeal to your fellow Trumpsters, but have no persuasive power.

Accuse the other guy of doing what you are doing. Even with the spin you put on it, it is a clear, straight forward brag about him sexual molesting women.

no evidence for any sexual assault, — NOS4A2

And yet based on the evidence presented the court concluded there was sexual assault.

Many people did not find this at all surprising since he bragged about sexually assaulting women.

And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything ... Grab ’em by the pussy. You can do anything.

Are you claiming that sexual assault is not wrongdoing?

Whatever else you think counts as wrongdoing does not erase the wrongdoing he did.

Typical childish Trump defense. Trying to put the blame elsewhere, trying to steer the issue away from what Trump did, and pretending that any accusations against him are for political reasons.

He was not found guilty of the crime of sexual assault. — NOS4A2

In a prior post you claimed:

One can spend days looking through indictments, criticisms, and books for any wrongdoing ... — NOS4A2

He was found liable for sexual assault. That is wrongdoing.

Being found guilty of a crime is not the same thing.

Sexual assault is a crime. No one has been found guilty of it. End of story. — NOS4A2

The jury found in her favor. He sexually assaulted her. He was not found guilty because it was not a criminal case, not because no crime had been committed.

Only because Trump didn’t show for the trial, not that he actually assaulted anyone. Liability isn’t guilt. — NOS4A2

You really should attempt to know the facts before making such claims. It was a civil trial not a criminal trial. Whether or not he showed up for the trial is immaterial to the determination that he assaulted her.

A party is liable when they are held legally responsible for something. Unlike in criminal cases, where a defendant could be found guilty, a defendant in a civil case risks only liability.

Civil law

And if this is the case, do you think that justice between you and us is on an equal basis, and that you are justified in retaliating against anything we set about doing to you?

(50e)

This is straight out of Aristophanes' Clouds, where Pheidippides beats his father Strepsiades. (1330) Here persuasion and coercion are comically joined.

Is the distinction always clear? If I can persuade you by making the weaker argument stronger, isn't that a form of coercion? Note how the song of the law, as I think you pointed out, demands submission.

Descartes was just confused on this point. — Sam26

Someone does seem to be confused. Taking things out of context can often lead to confusion.

But this thread is not the place to discuss Descartes. To do so reasonable and responsibly would require reading him carefully, but since you are not a fan, that is not likely to happen.

And of course "...I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim," so I'm not sure of your point. — Sam26

The point is, it does not reach into the issue of consciousness itself. What is at issue here is not what is at issue for Descartes.

My point is that in terms of what I can know ... — Sam26

The point is, it is not a matter of what I can and cannot know.

There is no internal language-game ... — Sam26

Right, quite the opposite, Descartes' is a daring political language-game addressed to those who are capable of thinking for themselves. It is rhetorical. How can he call into question the authority of the Church and "the philosopher" without suffering the same fate as Galileo? He does this by pretending to call everything into question. His meditations are not internal or private. After all, he is writing to be read. It is from beginning to end public.

Trump brags that he grabs them by the pussy. Surely he would not lie.

The distinction between regimes raises problems for Socrates' song. The city and laws ask:

... do you think any city can exist and not be overthrown when its just enactments have no force and are rendered ineffective by private citizens, and set at naught?”

(50b)

The key phrase here is "just enactment". Here he ignores the distinction between just and unjust cities and laws. He states that he refuses to play the part of the rhetorician who:

... might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme.

(50b)

but does take the part of the rhetorician in his defense of the city and its laws. Like the rhetorician his concern does not seem to be with the truth but with being persuasive. He even asks Crito:

Are the laws speaking the truth, or not?

(51c)

The best argument here is not the one that is true but the one that will persuade him to be obedient to the law. A noble lie may be preferable to the truth.

That leaves open the question of whether this should be the case in all regimes, even the most unjust. Should judgments always stand supreme? Is the fact that the city can be overthrown if the laws are not obeyed sufficient reason to obey?

This is important to understand. It reaches into the issue of consciousness itself, and it's why Descartes is wrong about "I think, therefore I am." There is no such conclusion to be drawn. I simply think. — Sam26

Although it makes no sense to say that I am in pain but I do not know it or I am not conscious that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim. I think you are reaching into the wrong issue.

Something that does not think cannot be deceived, and only something that can think can doubt. I cannot be deceived about or doubt that I exist unless I am a thing that thinks.

@frank started a thread a few months ago https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14302/descartes-reading-group/p1 . What Descartes means by thinking and the significance of his claim were discussed. From the Second Meditation:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

The Greek term νόμος, from which we get the term 'norm', means custom, law, and also song (νόμος).

Socrates sings the song of the law. A nomos nomos, a song of songs, in which the law lays claim to us.

Where did I hear that argument? — frank

For those interested in where, Socrates presents this image in the Republic 488a in support of his argument that the philosophers should rule.

For the sake of the argument I am going to put aside the historical question and treat Plato's Socrates as the same man who defends Athenian democracy in the Crito and criticizes democracy elsewhere.

With this in mind, we can conclude that Socrates is not persuaded by this argument. In the argument he makes in the Crito he is silent on the fact that Athens is a democracy. It is the laws of the city that he must answer to (50a). Although not mentioned by name, the Athenian lawgiver the "wise Solon", stand above the multitude as one capable of doing great things, and thus as one to be heeded.

Solon was no longer alive and could not address Socrates, but the wise laws he established can. The question arises as to the status of those laws and their administration. In more general terms the question is whether the claims Socrates makes on behalf of the laws hold up to critical examination.

I think Socrates gives us reason to think they don't. I will address some of them, but first, if this is right, if the city and the laws are not as just as he makes them out to be, why does he think it is still his duty to obey them?

And if we have no better arguments to offer at the moment, then rest assured, I shall not go along with your plan …

46c

Crito is not able to give a better argument for why Socrates should not comply with the court's decision. Can we?

In fact, one should either not beget children at all, or else face the difficulties of rearing and educating them.

(45d)

This should be compared to what, in Socrates words, the city claims regarding education and rearing. It may seem like a minor point but it has direct bearing on the question of what his responsibility to the city is based on the claim of what it is responsible for.

We could go round and round again and again, but I won't.

Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour. — RussellA

One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain.

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour. — RussellA

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that:

...if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

(293)

When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain.

As noted in my full quote (now underlined): — Amity

It bears repeating and underlying. It will come up again. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of philosophy then and now relies on knowing how to navigate through the dangers.

Who are those 'best people'? The wise? — Amity

I think Socrates might say, those who wish to be wise and live toward that end through thoughtfulness and moderation.

Are they more likely than the popular majority to carry out the greatest good? How much influence do they have? (philosophers?) — Amity

Neither the philosopher nor the people are able to carry out the greatest good, but only the philosopher takes seriously the question of what the greatest good is.

As what we are doing makes evident, Plato continues to have a great deal of influence. Some might say that this is to the detriment of philosophy, but others see it as a way for philosophy to once again find its way.

Don't the majority also have a sense of morality and justice? — Amity

They have opinions and assume they are right and true.

Ah, but wait...is this teaching is only for those already deemed 'the best'...? — Amity

It is a self-selective process. Most have no interest or patience to work through the arguments, and so, if they do have this interest and are of moderate temperament will match with my suggestion above about who the best people might be.

Crito shouldn't be concerned with the opinions of others. — Amity

But given what has happened to Socrates, he should be. Crito makes this point:

But, Socrates, surely you can see that it is indeed necessary to care about popular opinion? The very situation we are now in demonstrates that, if someone is discredited in their eyes, the multitude can do harm, not only on the smallest of scales, but well-nigh the greatest harm of all.

(44d)

Socrates' concerns lie elsewhere:

I really wish the multitude were able to do the greatest harm, Crito, so that they might also be able to do the greatest good, and all would be well. As it is, they are not able to do either, for they cannot make someone either wise or foolish, and they do whatever occurs to them.

@frank Perhaps we can see here one way in which Plato's views differ from Socrates'. Since Socrates did not write his influence was more limited than Plato's. Plato did not simply write, he wrote in a way that heeded Crito's warning to care about the opinion of the many. He did this in two connected ways. He presents a salutary teaching that even though it did not make one wise it helped shape the opinions of the many. He also left some things unsaid that

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration

(44c)

might discern through careful reading and interpretation.

In this way Plato mitigates against Socrates concern that the written word does not take into consideration who it is addressing and so cannot say what is most appropriate for different readers to hear.

Socrates sought to benefit his friends without harming others. Plato wrote for posterity.

Interesting, then, we can ask about whether he lives up to his name. — Amity

He accepts Socrates' speech on behalf of the city without question. But it does raise questions.

... at my age ...

Note Crito's response. He does have some capacity for discernment:

But, Socrates, other men of your age have been overtaken by similar misfortunes, yet their age does not free them from being troubled over their predicament.

(43c)

Commentators have speculated as to why Socrates did not defend himself at trial. One common explanation has to do with his advanced age.

We can see from the beginning of the dialog that the concept of individuality is in clear view — frank

Speaking on behalf of the city Socrates raises the problem of the relationship between the city and the family as well. I will hold off saying more until we look at that speech more closely.

... it seems perfectly reasonable to Crito and his friends that Socrates should reject the judgement and run. — frank

This is complicated by the fact that he was given the opportunity to do go under the law but rejected that option.

The irony refers to the consequences of your interpretation. I read the following:

If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then
other people very often know if I’m in pain. (PI 246)

as a statement of fact. As we normally use the word "know" it does not mean that I cannot be misled or mistaken. Whether it is the pre-linguistic behavior of a baby or the verbal expression of pain, doing nothing and pleading ignorance won't hold water.

one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak. — frank

For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws. He simply accepts these arguments. This is uncharacteristic. Taking the part of the city and says:

...you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. (50c)

but now he is silent. Two reasons for this might be, first, that he has deliberately avoided politics and so chose not take part in the making and changing of laws, and second, he is not a rhetorician.

...a rhetorician, might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme. (50b)

Socrates' civic mindedness is evident, but he is not speaking in his own name, and this leaves open the question of the extent to which his own opinions coincide with that of city.

There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. — frank

Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.

The second statement was intended to be ironic. Skepticism in the service of negligence.

Yes, this is how I am doing it.

How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour? — RussellA

The baby has been crying nonstop. Her fists are clenched, she cannot settle down, her breathing is not normal, and her facial expression is the same as it was that time I accidentally dropped her, and that time her brother hit her. But I try to ignore this. I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain. I try feeding her but she won't eat. I change her diaper but that does not help.

It gets to the point where I can no longer ignore the crying. I call a friend who suggests I look online for signs that a baby is in pain. The description of a child in pain closely matches the behavior of my child, but I think: "How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour?" I concludes you can't. I cannot know the baby is in pain so do nothing. She'll stop eventually.

I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.

Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier.

As part of a dive into normativity — frank

Perhaps you know that the name Crito comes from the Greek meaning "discern" or "judge". (This is noted in West's translation.)

Like pick a translation you like and set pace? — frank

.

I prefer the West translation from Four Texts on Socrates, but I cannot vouch for the security of any PDF copies of this translation.

David Horan's new translation of the dialogues might be a good choice. It has the advantage of being available free online.

In the general introduction he says:

I believe that I unconsciously adopted a method that Friedrich Schleiermacher describes in his great essay On the Different Methods of Translating. Here he subordinates the common designation of translations as being either “faithful” translations or “free” translations to a division that is more relevant to philosophic works. He writes:

“Either the translator leaves the writer in peace as much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as possible and moves the writer toward him.”[1]

If I were to attempt to capture the overall aspiration of these translations, I would say that they aim to move the reader toward Plato rather than leaving the reader in peace and adjusting the writings of Plato, and his associated language, to conform with modern expectations.

I don't know what you have in mind in terms of moderating, but I look forward to participating.

I don't know where you are trying to go with any of this.

the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language. — RussellA

I may use language to refer to pain, but neither the experience of pain nor the expression of pain depend on language.

"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game — RussellA

Pain and the word "pain" are not the same. We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. Her being in pain does not depend on a language game. It makes no sense to say that she is in pain but doesn't know it.

a modern reworking/revival of Gnostic mythos. — Tom Storm

Do you remember any of the parallels he drew?

I think of him as:

the Orange Messiah. — Fooloso4

In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". — RussellA

As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain.

If I don't know if I am in pain then perhaps I should take an aspirin just in case. But then again, I might not be in pain so perhaps I don't need an aspirin after all.

PI 246.

This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"?

'Senses' is a term with two senses.

Trumpsters would like for this to be a case about free speech but it is not.

I’m just asking why you and Jack Smith don’t think it is the same. — NOS4A2

Just asking rather than answering my questions.

Jim Jordan and Rudy Giuliani did not storm the Capital. Neither did Trump.

My toothpaste fights cavities. In doing so it does not do what Jim Jordan, or Rudy Giuliani, or the insurrectionist mob did. Again, context matters.