Heraclitus, now I recall, does expound the notion of the logos. How stupid of me! Trust me to remember important stuff! — Agent Smith

No need to remember it. It is right there in the quote:

Having harkened not to me but to the Word (Logos) it is wise to agree that all things are one. (B50)

the notion of justification that is considered is obviously inadequate — Ludwig V

What counts as justification depends on what the justification is of. In the case of the car it is seeing or showing that the car is still there. Plato's question is quite different. He is asking about knowledge of knowledge, what it means to know. Knowing where your car is hardly stands as an adequate exemplar of the scope of knowledge. Of utmost importance for Plato is self-knowledge. How does one justify that one possesses self-knowledge? What would count as justification of ethical knowledge?

I think a good case can be made for biological teleology at the level of organisms. Cell differentiation allows for one kind of stuff, a totipotent cell, to become other kinds of stuff, all the other cells that make up the organism. It is purposeful in the sense that it functions toward an end, the living organism.

How does the conclusion that the beauty of nature is biologically significant lead to a belief in the limits of reductionism? — Moliere

The beauty of nature is manifest in appearance. The appearance is no longer present in reduction to something else.

I sometimes wonder about the beautiful. — Moliere

It is wonderous! The Greek terms καλός and κάλλος mean not only beautiful but fine, good, and noble.

I think, at times, the beautiful can seduce us away from the just. — Moliere

In the Symposium the love of wisdom is erotic. It can seduce us. Although Plato distinguished between the just. beautiful, and good, they are closely related.

Plato plays on descriptions of Socrates as ugly and beautiful.

In an attempt to bring this back to the thread topic, we should consider whether the beauty of nature is biologically significant. If we conclude it is, and I think we should, we have good reason to think reductionism does not tell us the whole story.

Good point.

Unlike Christian eschatology where there is a beginning and end it time, for Heraclitus time does not play a significant role. The arche is not a point in time, it is not the beginning but, rather a cause or principle without beginning or end.

For John time is not the cause of what happens in time, God is.

I'd say we cannot know that the most basic stuff of the world is physical — Moliere

Rather than cannot know I would say we do not know. But methodologically reduction has been enormously successful. I take a pragmatic approach. We should not abandon reductionism, but we should be aware of its limits.

One reason I doubt any assertion about what reality fundamentally is is because people smarter than I have disagreed upon the subject. — Moliere

This seems sensible to me. I am suspicious of any claim about what reality fundamentally is .

I am attracted to what the Daodejing says about

... attaining extreme tenuousness (chapter 16).

When I first heard this saying I thought it was the exact opposite of what Western philosophy was about, but I eventually came to see that is may be similar to Socrates’ wisdom - knowledge of one’s ignorance. Knowing that one does not know.

In Plato's Laws the Athenian Stranger says:

I assert that what is serious (to spoudaion) must be treated seriously (spoudazein), and what is not serious should not, and that by nature god is worthy of a complete blessed seriousness, but that
what is human, as we said earlier, has been devised as a certain plaything (paignion) of god, and that
this is really the best thing about it. Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing
(paizonta) the most beautiful games (paidias)” (803c)

.

Whatever we make of this we should keep in mind that the Athenian Stranger is being playful. He is not simply advocating fun and games but beautiful games. And, of course, this raised the question of what a beautiful game is. And this in turn requires asking the question of what the beautiful is.

Of course. My hermeneutic preference is to first try and understand what an author is saying. In line with this to try and figure out what he is denying.

This dispute can be seen by comparing what he says with Heraclitus:

Having harkened not to me but to the Word (Logos) it is wise to agree that all things are one. (B50)

With talk of Logos what John says would have sounded familiar to an educated Greek or Roman, and perhaps to others as well.

With "in the beginning" what John says would have sounded familiar to a Jewish audience.

The key difference is a creator God who stands apart from His creation.

If John was aware of this difference he presents a brilliant rhetorical piece of writing. The word of God as opposed to the Word shifts the voice of authority.

It seems arche is very similar to God. — Agent Smith

I don't think that arche is an active principle in John 1. He says explicitly that the Logos was God. Note also that in the beginning God/Logos already was.

According to Kant a substance is the subject of predicates. Since a thing in itself cannot be known nothing can be predicated of it.

The OP seems confused — Janus

It looks that way to me.

but the OP also says that substance is just a word — Janus

He arrived at this by mentally deleting all the properties, and concludes that substance is just a word is wrong. He offers no other definitions.

You are presnting an Aristotelian understanding of substance. — Janus

Right, but it is an Aristotelian understanding that was presented in the OP.

In the passage from the Meno what must be held fast to are the images of Daedalus. But he goes on to say that this is an illustration of the nature of true opinion.

... while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul ...

There is a connection here with elenchus and Meno's complaint that Socrates is like a torpedo fish. Socrates questioning leaves his interlocutor numb and unable to answer. If one has knowledge, however, then it is held fast to and abides. The interlocutor is not made numb and is able to give an account, a logos. Where there is knowledge there is not forgetfulness, rather than becoming confused one recollects what is known.

And I'm not sure what the point of reduction is :D -- maybe, as Fooloso4 mentioned, I'm getting stuck on "reduction" too much. — Moliere

I think reductionism needs to be looked at from both ends - more complex things can be broken down into simpler components, but in order to understand complexes, attempting to reconstruct them from their components is not necessarily or always the best approach.

He was quite capable of presenting a different kind of logos which would have been less obviously unhelpful. — Ludwig V

Without the specifics of the account I can only speak in generalities. When you say he is capable do you mean Socrates or Theaetetus or Plato? If he was capable of presenting a different kind of logos then why didn't he? What is this different kind of logos? It should be noted that the problem of the logos of knowledge leads to the problem of knowledge of logos.

As I'm sure you know, mythos in ancient greek just means story, not necessarily false story. — Ludwig V

Yes, but in some cases, such as the myth of the metals is the Republic they are lies, even if noble lies. Myths are a mode of persuasion. In Plato's dialogues they are mostly salutary. It is not a question of true or false but of engendering good behavior. I do not think that Plato ever believed the myths but he did believe that believing them could be, for those in need of them, beneficial.

If he was not a saint it would seem sneaky.

While it is true that there are human capacities not shared with organisms with a lesser degree of order it does not follow that humans are designed in order to have these capacities.

There is another problem. Either your version of the design argument applies only to humans or organisms that are able

"to accomplish activities of a higher order," — Sam26

in which case only these things are designed or it applies to all things, in which case activities of a higher order does not apply.

There seems to be an equivocation in the use of the word 'purpose' between #1 and #2. In #1 something is designed for a purpose - the watch is designed to mark time. What is the purpose of the human body in #2 [added: for which it was designed]?

What I was trying to say about the use of a beginning in John is that it is different from how arche is used in the narratives about the primary elements. — Paine

It is also worth noting that what John says about the beginning is not what the story it alludes to says.

I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. — Ludwig V

Plato does not have a doctrine of reincarnation.Socrates tells some problematic myths. One problem is that if we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection of what was learned in a previous life then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But, on the other hand, if it was learned then it could not have been in that case that knowledge was recollected.

In the Phaedo the immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

“Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. “(84c)

His hint should not be overlooked. If you go through the argument sufficiently then its weakness becomes apparent.

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. — Ludwig V

An analysis of an account is itself an account, but the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. Perhaps @Paine can point to the passage from the dialogue.

Understood. The denial of atoms was intended to illustrate my point about terminology. The term atom is still being used, but it means something different than what Democritus meant. And now it is not only that atoms are divisible but that talk of particles is being rejected and replaced by fields.

if you advising me to adopt physicalism and reduction on the basis that it's the most likely story, and we cannot know more, so it's wise to accept this likely story? — Moliere

I am not advising you or anyone else who might be reading this to accept this or any other likely story. It may be that what is and has been going on may turn out to not be likely at all. I am approaching these questions speculatively and dialogically, but I don't expect much will come of it. The real work is being done elsewhere.

But I'm not sure where in this conversation the terminology has led me astray. — Moliere

Although I was responding to your post I was speaking in general terms. It is common in these discussions for someone to insist that ontology or reductionism or metaphysics means this or that, and will carry in their baggage.

I may have been misled by your mention of Kant. Kant on metaphysics and ontology leads to the kind of rabbit hole you are wisely trying to avoid.

There must be a university educated chief engineer ant who directs it all. — Tom Storm

That explains the tiny diplomas on the wall.

I think the architecture of ant colonies is instructive because it involves many ants doing specialized tasks. If it is intelligent design then which ant or ants is the designer?

The OP discusses if "substance" refers to an objective reality of not. — Art48

Given the definition of substance (there are others) that you cite:

Substance is the thing which has properties. — Art48

your question then is: is there a thing or are there things with properties?

You then ask:

If you mentally delete all the properties, what remains? — Art48

It is as if you take the thing and its properties to be two separate things, as if there could be things without properties and properties without things.

You go on to compound your confusion further when you say:

The difference is substance, which is what the real apple possesses and the imaginary apple does not. — Art48

The real apple does not possess substance, it is a substance. From one thing you have conjured up three: apple, properties, substance.

Person Gods appear to be products of imagination. Impersonal Gods seem to converge to a single God — Art48

The impersonal god is also a product of the imagination. It is because impersonal gods is a vague enough concept that to group together as if there is a convergence.

The underlying assumption here is that there must be "an absolute, ultimate ground of existence". It teeters on the problem of otherness. As if what is in not sufficient to be what is, as if it must rely on and be supported by something else.

@Tom Storm

His is certainly a Jewish perspective but Maimonides is a relative latecomer. He denies things that were fundamental parts of the ancestral religion, especially the parts about God's parts. The god(s) of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob was a corporal god, the kind of god apologists are so quick to deny. Maimonides' god is an attempt to create a philosophically acceptable god.

For an early history of this flesh and blood Levanite god:

God: An Anatomy
Stavrakopoulou, Francesca

From the Arche thread about likely stories.

Regarding terminology:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight. Wittgenstein, CV, p. 47].

I might say @180 Proof "atoms and the void" but there are no atoms.

The term ontology does not have an single agreed upon usage or definition . I mean that the most basic "stuff" of the world is physical. The term reductionist does not have a single agreed upon usage or definition either. As I am using the term in the sense that nothing else is posited as fundamental. All that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them.

Stumbling my way through I'll try this and see where it leads. Ontologically I am a reductionist. Life is not a fundamental, that is to say, life emerges from things that are not alive. Epistemologically, however, life is fundamental. We cannot understand life without beginning with things that are alive. We must work at it from both ends. The problem with reductionism is that it reduces things to something other than they are.

The thing I'd bring up is that "species" doesn't have a physics analogue. — Moliere

One of Darwin's major contributions was to replace the idea of 'kinds' with variations. Is the difference between biology and physics a difference in kind or variation? Put differently could an intelligence that far exceeds our own that has knowledge of physics but no knowledge of biology eventually develop that knowledge?

However we might answer that question it should be kept in mind that for us any reduction of biology to physics is made possible because of our knowledge of biology. I don't think we could arrive at knowledge and understanding of the wholes of biological beings with only the "parts" from physics.

[Corrections made]

The Theaetetus doesn't point to the inadequacy of the JTB, but only to the inadequacy of Plato's idea of an account or an explanation or a justification ... — Ludwig V

Can you be more specific? What is Plato's idea of an account? In what way is it inadequate? Is there an adequate idea of an account?

Theaetetus says:

Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by an account (logos) (201c)

Note the irony. Elsewhere Socrates tells the myth of recollection, but here in the dialogue about knowledge, where we might think we are most likely to find it, he is silent. Rather than recollection there is the problem of forgetting.

Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon lists several meanings, under IV:

The world or universe, from its perfect order and arrangement

Given the context of the discussion, my statement about cosmogony from Timaeus, I took it that this is what Wayfarer was referring to. But yes, more generally it means order.

We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank

Despite the success of reductionist science it can lead to blindness. The zoologist Adolf Portmann gives careful attention to the appearance of animals. A biology that does not observe living things is necessarily deficient. Could a reductionist approach ever lead to Portmann's consideration of the difference between the the appearance of the inside and outside of animals?

It's just that the discussion in Theaetetus is not of much help. — Banno

Not much help to what end? I think it helpful in pointing to the inadequacy of JTB. But if what one wants is a definition of knowledge that provides knowledge of what knowledge is then the dialogue is of no help. Unless, of course, one comes to see that knowledge is not transmitted in this way.

The definition only really has meaning with "You know that p" or "S/He knows that p", where the speaker is different from the knower. — Ludwig V

How does the speaker know that the knower knows? To answer that the speaker has JTB is to kick the can down the road.

One cannot discuss religion with them, for it cannot be real to them.

One can recognize the desire for transcendence without sharing it or attributing to it an ontological reality coextensive with that desire. There is a rhetorical ambiguity at work. What is it that cannot be real to them? The longing or a life other than our "natural life", a "a Higher Life"?

What is the precise meaning of 'cosmos' in Greek philosophy? — Wayfarer

The ordered whole.

Plato has Socrates ending the first discussion of Justified True Believe describing himself as a midwife to nothing but farts. Yet here we are two-and-a-half millennia later, still farting. — Banno

From another thread:

With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. The question is: what is knowledge? The first thing to be noted is that one must have knowledge in order to correctly say what knowledge is. The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

For a long time I assumed "wind egg" was a polite translation of fart, but a wind egg is an egg that is insufficient. Nothing is born of a wind egg.

Al is playing the cop for a fool, or a philosopher. — Banno

So, are you in agreement that it is only fools and philosophers who get tangled up in such problems of knowledge?

Let's hope Al is white. — Banno

Yes, that occured to me too.

He knows where he lives, but doesn't know whether his house is still there ... — Janus

If the house is not there then he does not live in a non-existent house.

he has very little reason to doubt that it is. — Janus

I agree. All of this reminds me of the problem of object permanence.

I do not think knowledge should be defined in terms of exceptions. We should consider the phrase: "To the best of my knowledge".