I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. — Janus

The top part of the lower section of Plato's divided line is pistis. The Greek term can be translated as belief, trust, persuasion, confidence, and as in the NT faith. In other words, what is not doubted. That is not to say what is indubitable. The philosopher raises doubts about things that are ordinarily not doubted. His concern is the truth of things. The move from opinion to knowledge is by way of doubt or skepticism (skeptis - to inquire). There is, however, also knowledge of the arts (techne) and Socrates own knowledge of Eros, from which his knowledge of ignorance arises.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state?

12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".

When Moore says he knows he has hands, this does not refute the skeptic.

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Wittgenstein is not denying that Moore knows he has hands. He is rejecting Moore's misuse of the term.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

I might also tell a friend to move his hand. No question arises as to whether he has a hand or whether he knows he has a hand. He knows he has a hand. I know he has a hand. But this will not satisfy the radical skeptic.

Further, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.

Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact.

This is a non-epistemological use ... — Sam26

I don't agree.

260. I would like to reserve the expression "I know" for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use ... An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims.

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change. — Sam26

I was responding to your statement that:

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

A claim about hinge beliefs and a claim about some hinge beliefs are two different things. You also said:

It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. — Sam26

Does this mean that it is the role of some hinges but not others?

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. — Sam26

While a philosopher's epistemological considerations may involve sophisticated language games knowing and doubting need not.

You don't seem to be following my position carefully. — Sam26

Perhaps not. You stated that:

Knowing and doubting come much later — Sam26

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course.

You say:

So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. — Sam26

I do not know what "knowing and doubting epistemologically" means. Knowing or doubting and such things as criteria and justification for knowing or doubting are two different things.

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table

I do not think Wittgenstein regards knowing and doubting as sophisticated language games. Both knowing and doubting in their nascent forms are primitive.

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

41. ... But "I know where you touched my arm" is right.

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.

354. Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second.

510 .. It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.

These examples of looking, sitting, feeling, believing, acting are all "non-linguistic".

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.
I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this expe-
rience “noticing an aspect”.
114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience. — Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment

Noticing or seeing aspects is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy that often goes unnoticed. This is related to "concepts of experience".

111. Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

He goes on to say at 116:

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. - So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

The idea of seeing something according to an interpretation blurs the line between seeing and thinking. "Now I see it" can mean, "Now I understand". Seeing is not limited to passive reception, it involves both perception and conception.

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

The focus on propositions can occlude the importance of seeing for both the early and latter Wittgenstein. Seeing connections involves making connections and seeing things from the right perspective. This is what Wittgenstein calls an übersichtliche Darstellung. a surveyable representation, (alternatively translated as perspicuous representation):

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

For Wittgenstein philosophy is not the "view from nowhere":

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value)

I think it's a good question, but maybe it isn't, I don't know. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is, it makes philosophy impersonal. Some think this is as it should be, but I don't think Wittgenstein is one of them. In a letter to Rush Rhees he says:

My own problems appear in what I write in philosophy. What good does all my talent do me, if, at heart, I am unhappy? What help is it to me to solve philosophical problems, if I cannot settle the chief, most important thing?

In the Tractatus he says:

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

When in the Tractatus he talks about "my world" he is not talking about the problem of other minds. The world as it is for me is the world as I experience it. My life. As he says:

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

(6.43)

This seems obvious, unless someone wishes to claim that when Wittgenstein criticizes philosophy he is at the same time criticizing himself? — Leontiskos

In the preface to the PI Wittgenstein says:

Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas. Then it suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old ideas and the
new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my older way of thinking.

For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book.

So, yes. He is at the same time criticizing himself.

"To examine why philosophy wants X," is to intentionally step outside of philosophy and into psychology (or else anthropology). It is to say, "I am no longer doing the thing that philosophy does." — Leontiskos

When does one step outside of philosophy into psychology? What in earlier editions of the PI was called "Part II" is in the revised 4th edition called "Philosophy of Psychology". Is he here no longer doing philosophy? Or is he not doing psychology?

Plato made no such distinction.

I think the questions of what philosophy wants and why it wants this or that are misguided. Philosophy is an activity. These questions are analogous to asking what baseball wants and why.

Distinctions between disciplines are not hard and fast. Rather than maintain these distinctions there has been a move toward cross-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary practices - philosophy of science, neurophilosophy, and so on.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says:

Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science.

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology (4.1121)

Is there anywhere in the later works where he makes such a distinction?

In any case, one need not step outside philosophy to ask about philosophy. When Wittgenstein reflections on what we do and want and expect when we are doing philosophy he is asking this from within his philosophical practice.

Witt is solving a problem for many philosophers, that simply wasn't there to begin with, EXCEPT for certain ones demanding various forms of rigorous world-to-word standards.. And those seem to be squarely aimed at the analytics, if anyone at all. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein quotes Augustine:
“quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. (PI 89)

"What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asksme; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.”

This is a question philosophers and scientists still grapple with today.

You responded before I could add:

We often find expressions, as we often do here, that ask for the essence of religion or morality or the self or consciousness. — Fooloso4

I have claimed the primary focus in the PI is to examine why philosophy wants certainty (“purity”), and, even more, to learn something about ourselves in the process. — Antony Nickles

Isn't this an example of "totalizing"?

107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.)

Certainty and the crystalline purity of logic are two different but related things.

This distinction is clearest in the almost uniformly misinterpreted PI #109. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” It is not that language is the “means” of our bewitchment, so we just need to get clear about language in order not to be bewitched. Language is the means of “battling”; looking at our expressions is the method by which we battle. — Antony Nickles

It is our understanding (Verstandes) not our intelligence that is bewitched. The Revised 4th Edition makes this correction.

At the root of that misunderstanding is the relation of names and objects.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects a sentences are combinations of such names. —– In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

(PI 1)

Language lacks the precision and exactness that the philosopher expects and demands of it. It is not language itself but this misunderstanding of how language works, this particular picture of language, that is what has bewitched philosophers, including the early Wittgenstein.

For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word “this” to the object, as it were address the object as “this” a a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing.

(PI 38)

When Socrates asks: "What is 'x'" he is looking for what everything that is 'x' has in common that distinguishes it from all else. It is in response to such demands and expectations of language that Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-games.

The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

(PI 23)

Added:

The bewitchment of language runs deep. It is found in the search for universals and essences. Language is both the means of bewitchment and the means by which it can be overcome. Simply looking at our expressions is not sufficient. We often find expressions, as we often do here, that ask for the essence of religion or morality or the self or consciousness.

Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96? — Sam26

Yes. This means, in part, that some things that had previously functioned as hinges no longer do, and some that now function as hinges may in time no longer be hinges. When he says that some propositions are exempt from doubt I don't think he means that hinges are atemporal or universal.

Don't play coy here. — schopenhauer1

Does the irony of all this escape you? Wittgenstein is not to blame for your asshole tendencies. Across multiple threads I have attempted to discuss Wittgenstein with you as I understand him. In response you have called me a "fanboy" and other things including now accusing me of playing coy.

Before we go on, what makes you think that I believe the inherited background is fixed and immutable? — Sam26

If it is not then it will be from time to time subject to doubt. What had held fast as a hinge no longer does and will no longer be regarded as true.

.

I would think a philosophical position would be more than simply having the acceptance of one's social circle.. — schopenhauer1

A part is not the whole. I think you know this. In any case, this put him at odds with his "social circle".

What makes them then have "sense" in language? — schopenhauer1

The contention is that they don't. When people talk about God there is no one thing that they are all referring to. No one thing they all mean.

Does he think a philosopher like Kant is a valid form of thinking about reality or not — schopenhauer1

I think he might be following Kant with regard to making room for metaphysics as a matter of practice, of how you live.

This I disagree with, i.e., what hinge propositions are according to Wittgenstein (at least it seems like a general consensus), are those basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology). — Sam26

Isn't the proposition that the earth revolves around the sun one of the basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology)?

The one example of a hinge given in OC is:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

It is true, but its truth is not in question. It has been given the stamp of incontestability.

The term hinge appears two more times:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

I think that at the root of our disagreement is with regard to our inherited background. I do not think it is fixed and immutable. Our inherited background is the history of a form of life. Our inherited background is not the same as the inherited background of someone living one hundred or one thousand years ago, or someone living in an isolated tribe.

except for certain people who deem it so (Russell, Mach, Vienna Circle, etc.). — schopenhauer1

Those are the people he is addressing, the people he is engaged with.

That is really subjective. — schopenhauer1

Right. Unlike the facts of natural science.

The bigger point from this is, much of philosophy relies on the basis of thought, which goes beyond what can be proven empirical. — schopenhauer1

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein distinguishes between philosophy and natural science. Philosophy is not about the facts of the world.

Plato cannot answer this question with mere words, which are relational and thus always point to relative goods — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same point has been made about terms such as reason, from the Latin ratio. It is a comparison of one thing to another. If the Good is singular then it cannot be grasped by comparison. At best what you have is a likeness - the Good is like this or not like that.

Plato then, sees philosophy as a transformational process. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think he sees philosophy as a type of poiesis. Myths and images are a part of this process. Socrates proposes banning the poets from the just city, but this is not to ban poetry. The philosophers are the poets, the image makers, the puppet-makers whose images cast their shadows on the cave wall.

I think this is one way in which Plato and Wittgenstein differ. Wittgenstein is not a maker of images of a transcendent reality. Perhaps he thought there were already enough of those.

So, while I agree we are never free from hypothesis as long as we are in discursive mode, I think we can be free in non-discursive modes. This freedom may not be of much use for discursive philosophy, but it certainly has its role in the arts and in self-cultivation. — Janus

Yes. Good point. Within the realm of opinion there are some that are better to hold than others. Some desires and goals that are higher than others.

Sure, and I can use the term a different way.. — schopenhauer1

I don't know if you miss the point or are just being argumentative. If a term is used in more than one way then if we are to understand an author we must understand how they are using particular terms. This is not something unique to Wittgenstein. That is why some editions and discussions of a philosopher's work includes a glossary.

Why would it do "much harm"? — schopenhauer1

It can lead to confusion or nihilism.

But the bigger question, and the one that's more important is why non-scientific/empirical kinds of questions cannot be true or false. — schopenhauer1

You might argue that it is either true or false that God or the Good exists. Are you able to determine and demonstrate to the satisfaction of others whether it is true or false?

I am by no means an expert on Wittgenstein, but given the attitude of his adherents this strikes me as doubtful. — Leontiskos

There have now been several generations of Wittgenstein scholars and several different ways in which he has been read and understood. In addition, he has gained the attention of artists and poets.

The other day, in one of these threads, I had a disagreement with @Leontiskos about an author's responsibility for how they might be misunderstood. This is a great example.

By what authority can you limit sense versus nonsense? What standards... — schopenhauer1

Propositions, as he uses the term, are about the facts of the world, the facts of natural science. They are either true or false. If something cannot be determined to be either true or false, as he thinks is the case with ethics/aesthetics, then it does no good and potentially much harm to treat it as if it were a linguistic or propositional problem.

Stuff relating to language — schopenhauer1

The concept of forms of life extends beyond language. That is the point.

Yeah, and so I look to anthropology for those answers — schopenhauer1

Answers to what questions?

What does this even "mean"? — schopenhauer1

For example, questions about God, questions about the good and beauty,

What does language need protecting from? — schopenhauer1

It is not a matter of what language needing protection from but of what is off limits when language is restricted to facts. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein holds to this restriction, but this means that ethics and aesthetics are not propositional problems. They are experiential not linguistic.

The idea is that certain beliefs arise based on our inherited background of reality. These beliefs (hinge propositions) are not generally justified or true. — Sam26

The "belief" that I have hands does not arise from an inherited background but from the activities of using our hands. Sticking them in my mouth, grasping things, and so on.

Hinge propositions are regarded as true, but the question of their truth does not usually arise, except for some philosophers or when we can no longer hold to propositions such as, the sun revolves around the earth.

When the front door is shut tight, do you just look for bigger and bigger things to hit it with? — Srap Tasmaner

At the risk of raising the ire of Schopenhauer1 I will once again quote Wittgenstein:

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.

(Culture and Value)

Wittgenstein was hampered by his own need to appeal to the linguistic turn, thus relating everything to either "sense" vs. "nonsense" — schopenhauer1

One aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy was a response to prevailing assumptions, but there is more to the saying/showing distinction. In the Tractatus he follows what others said regarding facts and propositions, but by doing so he left open and guarded rather then forced closed the problems of life, beauty, and what is higher.

Although commentator's attention continued to focus on propositions, this reflects their own training and assumptions. As a result little attention was paid until recently on seeing and experiential aspects of his work.

"forms of life" — schopenhauer1

Forms of life have more to do with might be called his anthropological turn than with linguistics.

Wittgenstein's monologues — Leontiskos

His writings are not monologues. There is often if not always an interlocutor, even when the interlocutor is silent.

Wittgenstein possesses no authority to try to change us ... — Leontiskos

Authority? The fact is that many have acknowledged that Wittgenstein has changed them.

Having been deeply influenced by Plato, my first impression of Wittgenstein was similar to yours. It took me years of struggling to interpret him to change my mind. As with Plato it is a matter of participation, of engagement with the texts, of questioning and challenging, of sorting things one way or another.

In the Republic Socrates presents an inspiring image of dialectic:

Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole.

(511b)

We are, however, never free from hypotheses. We remain in the realm of opinion. We never attain knowledge of the beginning (arche) of the whole. Descartes attempts to build a science of the whole by beginning with something he is certain of. Hegel held that dialectic is the movement of thought that completes itself as the realization of the whole. Wittgenstein returns us to our place in the midst of things.

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

That is to say, in the midst of opinion.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

(T 4.112)

A philosophical problem always has the form: “I simply don’t know my way about".

(PI 123)

We begin from where we are. As Socrates says:

... we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us

(Republic 394d).

I prefer toothpicks to floss. Is that the right understanding of the metaphor? Or is maieutic practice like the comfort of a silk cocoon? — Banno

I can think of none better than Socrates own 'midwife':

Now, my skill of midwifery is, in general, similar in character to theirs, but it differs by delivering men and not women, and by looking after their souls rather than their bodies when in labour. But the greatest thing about my skill is that it is able to test, in every respect, whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth an image and a lie, or something genuine and true.

Now, I do have this in common with the female midwives: I bring to birth no wisdom. And many people reproach me for this, since I ask questions of others while I myself proclaim nothing about anything, because I have no wisdom. Their reproach is true, but the reason is that the god compels me to act as a midwife and has prevented me from giving birth.

So of course, I myself am not at all wise nor have I any invention that is born of my own soul. However, it is different for those who associate with me. Some of them also appear quite ignorant at first, but as our relationship proceeds, all whom the god allows, progress to a wonderful degree. Such is their own belief and that of others, and it is obvious that they have never learned anything from me; rather, they have discovered, from themselves, much that is beautiful and have brought it to birth. However, both I and the god are responsible for the delivery. The proof is that over the years, many who were ignorant of this regarded themselves as responsible, despised me, and went away sooner than they should, persuaded either by themselves or by others. But once they had left me, they miscarried whatever remained within them through bad company, and destroyed whatever fruits I had delivered from them, through improper care. Placing more value on images and lies than upon the truth, they ended up being regarded as ignorant, both by themselves and by everyone else.

(Theaetetus 150b-e)

One difference is that Wittgenstein's writing leads less to aporia than to a change in gestalt, a reconsidering of the way in which something is to be understood. — Banno

Good point.

Aporia, however, is not simply the end point. Aporia can compel us to go back and rethink things and to come regard them differently.

Stupefying someone with a bunch of questions to show we should question our assumptions is a beginning…[/quote]

In some cases one must first become aware that their assumptions are questionable in order to begin questioning them. For others, however, the questioning begins within. For the philosopher compelled by inquiry, the questioning does not end.

You didn’t quire my last part… — schopenhauer1

I might have if I knew how to quire.

I want to say that there is something about the experience of reading Wittgenstein, and thinking along with him, that is reminiscent of how it feels to read Plato. The excitement of exploration. It's quite rare. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes! That has been my experience as well.

Amounts to the same thing. — schopenhauer1

Going by what you said, it is not. Maieutics is not a matter of honing a set of skills through exercise. Maieutics is a matter of inquiry not solving problems with definitive answers as with math. Where such inquiry will lead is open ended.

Plato for example took to constructing an answer. — schopenhauer1

As fundamental to his dialogical way of doing philosophy, these hypotheses do not put an end to questioning. They lead to and guide further questioning.

Ok, so what are you pointing out? — schopenhauer1

It is in the title - Wittgenstein is a Socratic philosopher.

my argument still stands — schopenhauer1

Your argument? A couple of misguided and unsubstantiated claims is not an argument.

just replace it with Maieutics — schopenhauer1

If mental floss is a mental exercise then it cannot be replaced by maieutics. Maieutics is not a mental exercise. It is a mode of inquiry, not preparation for "constructing proofs".

Presumably you are making a point about Socrates and Wittgenstein contra other philosophers ... — schopenhauer1

I have not addressed the extent to which they differ from other philosophers.

There is mental floss and there is philosophy. — schopenhauer1

If by mental floss you mean maieutics, then it is an essential part of what Socratic philosophy is.

Mental floss can be part of philosophy, but in the way that doing math exercises helps strengthen your math abilities. — schopenhauer1

Maieutics is not about mental exercises. It is about critical examination of beliefs, assumptions, opinions, and claims. Questioning takes priority over answers.

We don't know exactly what Socrates positions are, because we cannot easily split Plato from Socrates. — schopenhauer1

Right. That is why I said:

Plato's Socrates — Fooloso4

How do we know that Socrates was JUST a dialectic mystic, and didn't have substantial positions on the questions? — schopenhauer1

I don't know what is implied by "JUST". Dialectical thinking takes as its starting point substantial positions. I do not know and have not claimed that Socrates was a mystic. Plato's Socrates does make extensive use of mythology and images of transcedence, but he distinguishes between mythos and logos. At the limits of logos he often turns to mythos, but I think he does so because myths are salutary, not because they reveal the truth of the matter.