But there are many beliefs the truth of which is not determinable. — Janus

I think this not knowing is part of Socrates "human wisdom".

I don't see the problem with saying that you know you have hands, or that you know any of the things that can be directly seen to be the case. — Janus

I don't think Wittgenstein does either, when said in appropriate circumstances. Proof against radical skepticism is not such a circumstance.

OC 1. If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest.

It is not that Wittgenstein thinks that Moore does not know it is a hand, it is that he misuses the word, as if it corresponds to a mental state that guarantees that what he knows must be true because he knows it. It is this that is not granted.

I know that, what's your point? — Sam26

He does not agree with your claim that hinges are not epistemological because:

An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26

But since you said you were moving on I left it there.

I read Pritchard's paper on Hinge Epistemology. The first thing to be noted, as can be seen in the title, is that he regards hinges as epistemological.

And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. — Sam26

That depends on what is being claimed. If someone were to say that they believe in God, I cannot prove them wrong. If, however, they claim that like Abraham God commands him to sacrifice his son then their belief in God and what God commands would need justification.

239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain
circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves
the contrary. And so if Moore said "I know that this is wine and not blood", Catholics would
contradict him.

If a priest takes transubstantiated wine and attempts to donate it to a blood bank, whether his belief is true or false is in question.

243. One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I know" relates to a
possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light,
assuming that he is convinced of it.
But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his
assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.

The believer will insist that the wine has truly become blood. When chemical analysis confirms that it is wine the believer will reject the science. This is something he will say he knows. Something beyond scientific understanding. What we might regard as compelling ground may be something he thinks needs to be corrected by the word of God. There are deeper truths, he might say, that science is blind to.

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

So, where does this leave us? As far as I can tell, at an impasse. Such beliefs are not simple arational they are irrational.

This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself. — Richard B

In his Notebooks 1914-1916 he says:

The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life.

To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.

To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.

However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense dependent,
and what we are dependent on we can call God.

In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world-which is independent of our will.

I can make myself independent of fate.

There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.

I agree with the significance of Part ll and that Wittgenstein goes far beyond the analyzing the use of words. What I am wondering about is the idea of taking philosophy in new and interesting directions. There are scattered comments about him seeing his work as preparatory for what others will do.

I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. … Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV, 36)

Plato opposes 'might makes right' with 'the stronger argument'. I think he was well aware of the ways in which power in one form or another dominates. The power is in Plato's hands. Thrasymachus says whatever Plato wants him to say. He is in this respect powerless and silenced.

The Republic opens with an exchange that points to the question of persuasion. Socrates is prevented from leaving the Peiraeus by Polemarchus:

“Well,” said he, “do you see how many of us there are?”

“Of course I do.”

“Then,” said he, “you should either grow stronger than all of these men, or stay here.”

“Is there not another option?” said I. “Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?”

“And would you be able to persuade us,” said he, “if we were not listening to you?”

“Not at all,” replied Glaucon.

Force and argument are very different means of persuasion. The former leaves little or no room for deliberation and reasoned argument. With regard to the politics of the soul Polemarchus' elderly father
Cephalus illustrates the problem. As a young man he was ruled by pleasure:

It is like escaping from a raving and savage slave master.’

(329c)

He is concerned with what will happen to him when he dies. He worries about the injustice he has done. His concern with justice is entirely selfish. Cephalus relies on another means of persuasion, the power of money.

The discussion will center on how justice benefits oneself. This condition is accepted from the beginning, before Thrasymachus says a word. Socrates task will be to persuade those who will listen that justice benefits the one who is just. This is also what Thrasymachus claims.

Thrasymachus trades on persuasion as power. His power is a pale imitation of the power of the man of action he hopes to persuade to listen to him and from whom he will be paid. The man of action, however, often has a low opinion of talk. Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of conducting the argument unfairly. (340d) If might makes right then what does being unfair have to do with it? For all his talk of power he is weak and dependent on others to buy what he is selling.

In the background of the discussion of friends and enemies is the fact that Thrasymachus regards Socrates as his enemy. Socrates does for free what Thrasymachus charges money for. By the end of the discussion Socrates has disarmed Thrasymachus and made him gentle. (354a) He has gotten him to agree:

"In that case, will a soul ever carry out its own functions well, Thrasymachus, when deprived of its own particular excellence, or is that impossible?”

“It is impossible.”

“So, of necessity a bad soul exercises rule and care badly, and a good soul does all this well.”

“Of necessity.”

“Did we not agree that excellence of soul is justice, and badness is injustice?”

“Yes, we agreed.”

“Then the just soul, and the just man, will live well, while the unjust man will live badly.”

“So it appears,” said he, “according to your argument.”

“But someone who lives well is blessed and happy, while someone who does not is the opposite.”

“Of course.”

“In that case, the just person is happy, while the unjust is wretched.”

“Let it be so,” said he.

“But there is no profit in being wretched, but in being happy there is.”

“Of course.”

“Then, blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.”

“Well, Socrates, let this be your feast for the festival of Bendis.”

(354a)

It is good to hear you say that. Thanks!

On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. — Richard B

Wittgenstein did not write books. He writes aphoristically. I think a good many of them are finished.

a continuation of what he had started. — Richard B

What do you think that is?

This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions. — Richard B

Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

I find that interesting and have quoted it many times, but I have no sense of what those possibilities are.

Do you think he put as much effort in his words as you are in interpreting them? — schopenhauer1

Absolutely! He was a very careful and thoughtful writer.

Is it even in some way "right" to over-interpret any one human's words to this extent? — schopenhauer1

How does someone know when something is "over-interpreted"?

I think there are interpretations that are wrong, but sometimes they might lead to interesting discussions.

Do you think the onus of understanding is on the author or the reader? — schopenhauer1

There are some weak authors and some weak readers. Sometimes weak readers blame the author for what they cannot do.

If not the author, then can I write a post, and make you figure it out if you don't understand it? — schopenhauer1

Many years ago, when in school, I would offer get comments that my writing was "cryptic". I did not take this as a negative since many of the authors I liked were cryptic. I eventually came to see things differently. What occurred to me was that one needs to earn the right to have others figure out what you are saying. I have not earned that right. I now try to say things clearly.

With regard to your many questions, what I said above serves well for my response:

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

The same can be said with regard to some other others as well.

there is one philosopher that stumped even Plato — Shawn

That is a surprising comment! I think Socrates handled him quite well.

Regardless, do you believe that Thrasymachus has not been held in esteem by philosophers? — Shawn

These is for some an admiration, but I don't think that he has generally regarded as a philosopher.

Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new.

I would also like to point out that what is at issue extends beyond us. There are others reading, thinking, and in some cases commenting. I invite them to not move on just yet if they, like me, continue to be puzzled, and continue to find new things each time we read the text and what others say. To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing.

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. — Sam26

It is as stated in 12: that "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. Stated impersonally, if someone knows something then it is true.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. — Sam26

What he says is that "life shows that I know or am certain". At 8 he states that:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two. — Sam26

If I sit in the chair it is objectively certain that there is a chair. My sitting in it is all the justification that is required. But the requirement for justification is out of place. This does not mean that it is not an epistemological use of 'know'. It means that you are imposing the very requirements on the term 'know' that Wittgenstein is arguing against. If there are two different ways in which the term is used, it is the difference between the way it is ordinarily used and the mistaken sense in which it is used to mean that one who knows can't be wrong. There is no mental state of knowing that guarantees its correctness.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed. — Sam26

The same is the case with all his writings except the Tractatus.

I don't know Quine so can't comment on the comparison.



613 is interesting. First, he says he is justified in knowing that the water will boil. If it doesn't he assumes there will be an explanation, some factor he is unaware of. It does not threaten his picture of the world. The whole of physics has not come into question. But if this is not N.N. then everything is plunged into chaos. If this is not his old friend then everything he knows becomes uncertain.

447 seems to challenge 651 regarding the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. But is my certainty that this is a hand the result of empirical observation?

125. If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking.
If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what?
(Who decides what stands fast?)

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. — Janus

The top part of the lower section of Plato's divided line is pistis. The Greek term can be translated as belief, trust, persuasion, confidence, and as in the NT faith. In other words, what is not doubted. That is not to say what is indubitable. The philosopher raises doubts about things that are ordinarily not doubted. His concern is the truth of things. The move from opinion to knowledge is by way of doubt or skepticism (skeptis - to inquire). There is, however, also knowledge of the arts (techne) and Socrates own knowledge of Eros, from which his knowledge of ignorance arises.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state?

12. - For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew".

When Moore says he knows he has hands, this does not refute the skeptic.

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Wittgenstein is not denying that Moore knows he has hands. He is rejecting Moore's misuse of the term.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

I might also tell a friend to move his hand. No question arises as to whether he has a hand or whether he knows he has a hand. He knows he has a hand. I know he has a hand. But this will not satisfy the radical skeptic.

Further, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.

Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact.

This is a non-epistemological use ... — Sam26

I don't agree.

260. I would like to reserve the expression "I know" for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic exchange.

He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use ... An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims.

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change. — Sam26

I was responding to your statement that:

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

A claim about hinge beliefs and a claim about some hinge beliefs are two different things. You also said:

It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. — Sam26

Does this mean that it is the role of some hinges but not others?

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. — Sam26

While a philosopher's epistemological considerations may involve sophisticated language games knowing and doubting need not.

You don't seem to be following my position carefully. — Sam26

Perhaps not. You stated that:

Knowing and doubting come much later — Sam26

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course.

You say:

So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. — Sam26

I do not know what "knowing and doubting epistemologically" means. Knowing or doubting and such things as criteria and justification for knowing or doubting are two different things.

And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations. — Sam26

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table

I do not think Wittgenstein regards knowing and doubting as sophisticated language games. Both knowing and doubting in their nascent forms are primitive.

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

41. ... But "I know where you touched my arm" is right.

160. The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.

354. Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second.

510 .. It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.

These examples of looking, sitting, feeling, believing, acting are all "non-linguistic".

113. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.
I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this expe-
rience “noticing an aspect”.
114. Its causes are of interest to psychologists.
115. We are interested in the concept and its place among the concepts of experience. — Philosophy of Psychology - a Fragment

Noticing or seeing aspects is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy that often goes unnoticed. This is related to "concepts of experience".

111. Two uses of the word “see”.
The one: “What do you see there?” - “I see this” (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: “I see a likeness in these two faces” - let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself.
What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight.

He goes on to say at 116:

But we can also see the illustration now as one thing, now as another. - So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.

The idea of seeing something according to an interpretation blurs the line between seeing and thinking. "Now I see it" can mean, "Now I understand". Seeing is not limited to passive reception, it involves both perception and conception.

254. The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination.
In other words, the concept ‘Now I see it as . . .’ is related to ‘Now I am imagining that’.
Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one does perceive something in so hearing it.

The focus on propositions can occlude the importance of seeing for both the early and latter Wittgenstein. Seeing connections involves making connections and seeing things from the right perspective. This is what Wittgenstein calls an übersichtliche Darstellung. a surveyable representation, (alternatively translated as perspicuous representation):

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

(PI 122)

For Wittgenstein philosophy is not the "view from nowhere":

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) (Culture and Value)

I think it's a good question, but maybe it isn't, I don't know. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is, it makes philosophy impersonal. Some think this is as it should be, but I don't think Wittgenstein is one of them. In a letter to Rush Rhees he says:

My own problems appear in what I write in philosophy. What good does all my talent do me, if, at heart, I am unhappy? What help is it to me to solve philosophical problems, if I cannot settle the chief, most important thing?

In the Tractatus he says:

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

When in the Tractatus he talks about "my world" he is not talking about the problem of other minds. The world as it is for me is the world as I experience it. My life. As he says:

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

(6.43)

This seems obvious, unless someone wishes to claim that when Wittgenstein criticizes philosophy he is at the same time criticizing himself? — Leontiskos

In the preface to the PI Wittgenstein says:

Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas. Then it suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old ideas and the
new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my older way of thinking.

For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book.

So, yes. He is at the same time criticizing himself.

"To examine why philosophy wants X," is to intentionally step outside of philosophy and into psychology (or else anthropology). It is to say, "I am no longer doing the thing that philosophy does." — Leontiskos

When does one step outside of philosophy into psychology? What in earlier editions of the PI was called "Part II" is in the revised 4th edition called "Philosophy of Psychology". Is he here no longer doing philosophy? Or is he not doing psychology?

Plato made no such distinction.

I think the questions of what philosophy wants and why it wants this or that are misguided. Philosophy is an activity. These questions are analogous to asking what baseball wants and why.

Distinctions between disciplines are not hard and fast. Rather than maintain these distinctions there has been a move toward cross-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary practices - philosophy of science, neurophilosophy, and so on.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says:

Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science.

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology (4.1121)

Is there anywhere in the later works where he makes such a distinction?

In any case, one need not step outside philosophy to ask about philosophy. When Wittgenstein reflections on what we do and want and expect when we are doing philosophy he is asking this from within his philosophical practice.

Witt is solving a problem for many philosophers, that simply wasn't there to begin with, EXCEPT for certain ones demanding various forms of rigorous world-to-word standards.. And those seem to be squarely aimed at the analytics, if anyone at all. — schopenhauer1

Wittgenstein quotes Augustine:
“quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. (PI 89)

"What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asksme; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.”

This is a question philosophers and scientists still grapple with today.

You responded before I could add:

We often find expressions, as we often do here, that ask for the essence of religion or morality or the self or consciousness. — Fooloso4

I have claimed the primary focus in the PI is to examine why philosophy wants certainty (“purity”), and, even more, to learn something about ourselves in the process. — Antony Nickles

Isn't this an example of "totalizing"?

107. The more closely we examine actual language, the greater becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not something I had discovered: it was a requirement.)

Certainty and the crystalline purity of logic are two different but related things.

This distinction is clearest in the almost uniformly misinterpreted PI #109. “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” It is not that language is the “means” of our bewitchment, so we just need to get clear about language in order not to be bewitched. Language is the means of “battling”; looking at our expressions is the method by which we battle. — Antony Nickles

It is our understanding (Verstandes) not our intelligence that is bewitched. The Revised 4th Edition makes this correction.

At the root of that misunderstanding is the relation of names and objects.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects a sentences are combinations of such names. —– In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

(PI 1)

Language lacks the precision and exactness that the philosopher expects and demands of it. It is not language itself but this misunderstanding of how language works, this particular picture of language, that is what has bewitched philosophers, including the early Wittgenstein.

For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. And then we may indeed imagine naming to be some remarkable mental act, as it were the baptism of an object. And we can also say the word “this” to the object, as it were address the object as “this” a a strange use of this word, which perhaps occurs only when philosophizing.

(PI 38)

When Socrates asks: "What is 'x'" he is looking for what everything that is 'x' has in common that distinguishes it from all else. It is in response to such demands and expectations of language that Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-games.

The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

(PI 23)

Added:

The bewitchment of language runs deep. It is found in the search for universals and essences. Language is both the means of bewitchment and the means by which it can be overcome. Simply looking at our expressions is not sufficient. We often find expressions, as we often do here, that ask for the essence of religion or morality or the self or consciousness.

Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96? — Sam26

Yes. This means, in part, that some things that had previously functioned as hinges no longer do, and some that now function as hinges may in time no longer be hinges. When he says that some propositions are exempt from doubt I don't think he means that hinges are atemporal or universal.

Don't play coy here. — schopenhauer1

Does the irony of all this escape you? Wittgenstein is not to blame for your asshole tendencies. Across multiple threads I have attempted to discuss Wittgenstein with you as I understand him. In response you have called me a "fanboy" and other things including now accusing me of playing coy.

Before we go on, what makes you think that I believe the inherited background is fixed and immutable? — Sam26

If it is not then it will be from time to time subject to doubt. What had held fast as a hinge no longer does and will no longer be regarded as true.

.

I would think a philosophical position would be more than simply having the acceptance of one's social circle.. — schopenhauer1

A part is not the whole. I think you know this. In any case, this put him at odds with his "social circle".

What makes them then have "sense" in language? — schopenhauer1

The contention is that they don't. When people talk about God there is no one thing that they are all referring to. No one thing they all mean.

Does he think a philosopher like Kant is a valid form of thinking about reality or not — schopenhauer1

I think he might be following Kant with regard to making room for metaphysics as a matter of practice, of how you live.

This I disagree with, i.e., what hinge propositions are according to Wittgenstein (at least it seems like a general consensus), are those basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology). — Sam26

Isn't the proposition that the earth revolves around the sun one of the basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology)?

The one example of a hinge given in OC is:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

It is true, but its truth is not in question. It has been given the stamp of incontestability.

The term hinge appears two more times:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

I think that at the root of our disagreement is with regard to our inherited background. I do not think it is fixed and immutable. Our inherited background is the history of a form of life. Our inherited background is not the same as the inherited background of someone living one hundred or one thousand years ago, or someone living in an isolated tribe.

except for certain people who deem it so (Russell, Mach, Vienna Circle, etc.). — schopenhauer1

Those are the people he is addressing, the people he is engaged with.

That is really subjective. — schopenhauer1

Right. Unlike the facts of natural science.

The bigger point from this is, much of philosophy relies on the basis of thought, which goes beyond what can be proven empirical. — schopenhauer1

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein distinguishes between philosophy and natural science. Philosophy is not about the facts of the world.

Plato cannot answer this question with mere words, which are relational and thus always point to relative goods — Count Timothy von Icarus

The same point has been made about terms such as reason, from the Latin ratio. It is a comparison of one thing to another. If the Good is singular then it cannot be grasped by comparison. At best what you have is a likeness - the Good is like this or not like that.

Plato then, sees philosophy as a transformational process. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think he sees philosophy as a type of poiesis. Myths and images are a part of this process. Socrates proposes banning the poets from the just city, but this is not to ban poetry. The philosophers are the poets, the image makers, the puppet-makers whose images cast their shadows on the cave wall.

I think this is one way in which Plato and Wittgenstein differ. Wittgenstein is not a maker of images of a transcendent reality. Perhaps he thought there were already enough of those.

So, while I agree we are never free from hypothesis as long as we are in discursive mode, I think we can be free in non-discursive modes. This freedom may not be of much use for discursive philosophy, but it certainly has its role in the arts and in self-cultivation. — Janus

Yes. Good point. Within the realm of opinion there are some that are better to hold than others. Some desires and goals that are higher than others.

Sure, and I can use the term a different way.. — schopenhauer1

I don't know if you miss the point or are just being argumentative. If a term is used in more than one way then if we are to understand an author we must understand how they are using particular terms. This is not something unique to Wittgenstein. That is why some editions and discussions of a philosopher's work includes a glossary.

Why would it do "much harm"? — schopenhauer1

It can lead to confusion or nihilism.

But the bigger question, and the one that's more important is why non-scientific/empirical kinds of questions cannot be true or false. — schopenhauer1

You might argue that it is either true or false that God or the Good exists. Are you able to determine and demonstrate to the satisfaction of others whether it is true or false?

I am by no means an expert on Wittgenstein, but given the attitude of his adherents this strikes me as doubtful. — Leontiskos

There have now been several generations of Wittgenstein scholars and several different ways in which he has been read and understood. In addition, he has gained the attention of artists and poets.

The other day, in one of these threads, I had a disagreement with @Leontiskos about an author's responsibility for how they might be misunderstood. This is a great example.

By what authority can you limit sense versus nonsense? What standards... — schopenhauer1

Propositions, as he uses the term, are about the facts of the world, the facts of natural science. They are either true or false. If something cannot be determined to be either true or false, as he thinks is the case with ethics/aesthetics, then it does no good and potentially much harm to treat it as if it were a linguistic or propositional problem.

Stuff relating to language — schopenhauer1

The concept of forms of life extends beyond language. That is the point.

Yeah, and so I look to anthropology for those answers — schopenhauer1

Answers to what questions?

What does this even "mean"? — schopenhauer1

For example, questions about God, questions about the good and beauty,

What does language need protecting from? — schopenhauer1

It is not a matter of what language needing protection from but of what is off limits when language is restricted to facts. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein holds to this restriction, but this means that ethics and aesthetics are not propositional problems. They are experiential not linguistic.

The idea is that certain beliefs arise based on our inherited background of reality. These beliefs (hinge propositions) are not generally justified or true. — Sam26

The "belief" that I have hands does not arise from an inherited background but from the activities of using our hands. Sticking them in my mouth, grasping things, and so on.

Hinge propositions are regarded as true, but the question of their truth does not usually arise, except for some philosophers or when we can no longer hold to propositions such as, the sun revolves around the earth.