Your translation is slightly different than mine — 013zen

I am using Joe Sachs. From his introduction

For convenience I sometimes copy and paste from the online translation from Perseus:

Perhaps it will be clearer if we take the opinions which we hold about the wise man.

Those opinions, as he goes on to discuss, vary. They cannot all be his opinions. We should not take any of them to be his opinion in more than a tentative and preliminary way, subject to further consideration.

The problem of universals is taken up in book VII, Chapter 13. What is universal is not some additional thing separate and independent of those things that come under it. The central question of the Metaphysics is the question of being, or ousia. Being is not a universal.

Again, thinghood [ousia] is what not attributed to any underlying thing, but the universal is always attributed to some underlying thing.

(1038b)

In other words, what is first is not a universal.

But then it what sense can we call some person wise, as Aristotle does? — 013zen

We have, then, such and so many accepted opinions about wisdom and those who are wise. Now of these, the knowing of all things must belong to the one who has most of all the universal knowledge, since he knows in a certain way all the things that come under it; and these are just about the most difficult things for human beings to know, those that are most universal, since they are furthest away from the senses.

(982a 20)

It should be noted that he does not simply say that this is what wisdom is, but "of these" that is,the accepted opinions about wisdom. We might ask:

Why he does not just tell us what wisdom is? Does he know? Is he wise? Can we know if he or anyone else is wise if we are not?

it's wise to not be too cocky about your all-knowingness. — Gnomon

I think in the case of Socrates there is a great deal more to it. It is not enough to acknowledge that you are ignorant. Human wisdom means to know how best to live while being ignorant of what is best.

I reckoned as I was going that I am wiser than this man, for it is likely that neither of us knows anything noble and good, but he thinks he knows something, when he does not know, while I do not actually know.

(Apology 21d)

Ari did seem to assume the existence of some kind of supernatural beings, — Gnomon

I cannot say whether or not he assumed that there are supernatural beings, but it is clear not only that many believe and others speak and write about them.

But to me his "unmoved mover" sounds more like an abstract Nature-God than the Judeo deity — Gnomon

His is not the God of the Bible.Talk about Aristotle's unmoved mover usually assumes a single entity, but Aristotle says:

But whether one must set down one or more than one such independent thing, and hut ow many, must not go unnoticed...

(Book Xll, Chapter 8)

In order to set down how many he looks to the heavens and finds that there are many independent things. That is, things not dependent on any other.

But also admits to limits — Gnomon

Yes. My argument is that those limits are determined by our experience, particularly our lack of experience of the source of the whole.

Both of those paragons of sagacity also paradoxically expressed doubt about their own wisdom — Gnomon

Such doubt is an essential element of their wisdom.

Wisdom seems to require childish curiosity constrained by adult skepticism. — Gnomon

Yeah, something like that.

One question on the link to note 3: where does Socrates say he knows nothing? I think it is a misquotation but would be glad to be shown that I am wrong.

I think his reasoning is fairly straightforward ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't. I think his reasoning is dialectical and aporetic. The attentive reader is not led to conclusions but to questions and problems without answers.

I think the beliefs of someone who is an adherent of a philosopher will be indebted to that philosopher, and therefore the philosopher will be to some extent responsible for those beliefs. — Leontiskos

To what extent? I do not think that Plato, for example, is responsible for the varied and contradictory ways is which he has been read over the centuries.

Wittgenstein too has been read and understood in different ways. Looking at the trends in interpreting him one thing that becomes evident is how much the education and concerns of the interpreter are read into their interpretation.

If the intent is to understand an author, then we should not impose rules and expectations on how they are to be read. Different authors write differently and should not all be read in the same way.

Shouldn't he? — Leontiskos

In my opinion he should not. An author does not maintain control over how his words are understood or used by others. In order to counteract this we can examine what the author is saying and discuss how he is to be understood. Some, however, object to this. Here specifically with regard to Wittgenstein while others are spared.

But, with some caveats, the answer to the bolded is "yes." There are many ways to live a good, flourishing life, but the life of contemplation is highest and most divine. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is the life of contemplation one that is suitable or even desirable for all men? However attractive this might appear to be to would be philosophers, it is not the telos of all men. Even for those who do desire such a life, it is not clear that the desire to know is satisfied by contemplation.

The contemplative life requires either self-sufficiency or having someone else do the work in order to afford your leisure. Human beings, unlike the gods, are not self-sufficient.If the good man requires a proper education and training, then some form of community and legislation must be in place. From
the height of the contemplative life Aristotle moves, as the philosopher in the Republic must, back to the necessities and demands of city/cave.

In the Phaedrus, Plato discusses the soul’s journey and the role of divine madness in achieving true insight and wisdom. — Wayfarer

In the Phaedrus Socrates says:

I think it would be a big step, Phaedrus, to call him ‘wise’ because this is appropriate only for a god. The title ‘lover of wisdom’ or something of that sort would suit him better and would be more modest.

(278d)

and:

But the person who realises that in a written discourse on any topic there must be a great deal that is playful ...

(277e)

But, knowledge of first principles and causes, Aristotle says are most knowable. — 013zen

It might appear as if he is saying that these are things that we can know. That we can be wise. But we are not wise. We do not know these first principles and causes. Perhaps the gods do.

Wittgenstenians — Leontiskos

Wittgenstein, of course, should not be faulted for what Wittgensteinians say and do. This happens to every thinker who has a large following.

The reliance on technical language is a wide spread problem. Many think that this is what academic writers should do, and is copied by others who talk about these things.

Imo his whole philosophy is a linguistic sidetrack. — kindred

Wittgenstein was not responsible for the linguistic turn in philosophy.

Recent scholarship has begun to pay more attention to his discussion of seeing. In his later work the saying/showing distinction is not as clear as it may appear to have been in the Tractatus. We do, however, find in the Tractatus a comment about two ways of seeing a cube. (5.5423)

Interesting comment on one sense of divine, but he is talking about divine beings.

It seems like Wittgenstein's work is inherently resistant to interaction with the rest of philosophy. Thoughts? — Leontiskos

There is aspect to this that I agree with. He says very little about the history of philosophy. Some claim he had little knowledge of it. Plato is an interesting exception. He did, however, converse with a group of friends, many of them students, and addressed some of their philosophical concerns in his writings.

This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.
— Fooloso4

But, you're right given the historical evidence. — 013zen

Speculation about first things is not knowledge. The reason is simple. We have no experience of the beginning or origins. Knowledge begins with the senses, aided by memory in some animals, and by art and reasoning in the case of human beings. Knowledge and art result from experience. (981a)

Democratus' was more right — 013zen

Democritus gave a more plausible account of material causes but Aristotle's inquiry extends to the good of each thing and the whole of nature. (982b) A full account should not only address the good of each thing and the whole, but it should be good, that is, beneficial to human beings. Even if the account fails to satisfy the former it can aim to satisfy the latter.

Aristotle points out that knowledge of such things is not productive, and concludes:

All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better.

(983a)

Between these statements he questions whether such knowledge is appropriate for human beings. It is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it is knowledge of the divine as cause and knowledge that a god alone or most of all would have. Above the entryway to the temple of Apollo are inscribed the words "know thyself". One way in which this was understood is that man should know his place. He is not a god and does not possess knowledge of the gods in the double sense of knowing the gods and knowing what the gods know. Knowledge of the source and cause of the whole is not something that human beings possess. We do not even know if the divine is a cause or if the divine knows the cause.This should be kept in mind when Aristotle turns to theology.

He begins by noting the desire to know. This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.

I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". — 013zen

Where he does not make a distinction must be looked at in light of where he does. The text hangs together as a whole.

Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. — 013zen

How are we to understand this? Clearly the world does not literally cease to exist. Wittgenstein is dead. The world has not ceased to exist. There is more to this than can be seen by focusing on a part to the exclusion of the whole.

I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking. — 013zen

It does not supplant what is said, it attempts to explain it in light of what else is said, that is, with regard to its place in the whole of the text. It is not as if he is rejecting what he said previously about the world being the totality of facts.

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.

(5.641)

That "the world is my world" means that the world of the metaphysical subject ends when the metaphysical subject does. My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits. It comes to an end.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

(5.632)

It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in the world, but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it, to experience it, to live it.

Did you read the moral subjectivism section? — Bob Ross

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

[This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.]

This is a good example of the problem I have been pointing to. It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined./quote]

It goes beyond being careful. This is the sentence that follows it:
— Bob Ross

Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.”

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. — Bob Ross

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem.

Moral subjectivism is standardly ... — Bob Ross

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

All three terms [Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and “irrealism”] are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better.

It goes on to say that it is:

unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

... this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism). — Bob Ross

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:

In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. — Bob Ross

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism. The article cites some of them that can be found in the literature. The first is under the heading of "Old Fashioned Subjectivism and Relativism, which according to the article are:

... invariably about the attitudes of a certain individual or a group.

An attitude is not a proposition, but can be expressed as a proposition. Using an example from the text, if my attitude is that eating meat is wrong, it is my attitude toward eating meat that makes it wrong. This is not some grand, universal, apodictic moral claim that must be either true or false for all human beings for all time. Attitudes toward such things change. This change should be acknowledged as a condition under which moral claims are made and discussed rather than a defect to be remedied by attempting to universalize such claims.

Under "New Wave Subjectivism and Relativism" he says:

... the proposition invariably expressed by a given moral sentence does not have an absolute truth value, full stop or in and of itself. Rather, the key idea is that the proposition can be only true relative to a context of assessment.

In other words, moral propositions do not stand on their own in some world of eternal verities.

I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (: — Bob Ross

I think it clear that you are not sufficiently acquainted with the literature and will not, as you admit here, do the research to become better informed. What I cited should be enough to show that there are terminological differences. They cannot be waved away. Once again, what this means is that you cannot start with your preferred definitions and proceed from there as if what these terms mean is settled and moral discourse is an analysis of these settled terms.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position — Bob Ross

You just said it! The problem is that moral subjectivism is not a specific position.

Here is a current overview of the literature.

Here different types of moral subjectivism are listed.

There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.). — Bob Ross

Your attempt to clarify compounds the problem by dragging in additional contested terminology.

What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

What I am conveying and what you take it to mean are not the same. I am not denying moral subjectivism. I am questioning the value of the terminology. I reject claims that morality is objective. The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

a proper analysis — Bob Ross

I agree with the importance of a proper analysis. For you this means an analysis of concepts. For me it is first and foremost an analysis of deeds and the practice of the examined life.

You cannot analyze X if you do not have an idea about what X is. — Bob Ross

As I see it, moral deliberation has its roots in the world of opinion, in the world at large rather than in the cloistered world of concept formation and analysis shaped by argumentative strategies.

Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely. — 013zen

The facts of the world are the facts of reality, the world and reality are the same. There are not my facts or your facts, they are the facts. They remain as they are when I die. They do not cease to be.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also the relationship between the "I' and the world.

Here is a long post on Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism and "my world",







.

Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best — Bob Ross

What I am denying is that thinking constricted by select definition of terms leads to what is true at best. Rather than appeal to a definition we should determine what someone means when they use a term. It is foolish and wrongheaded to insist that what someone means is not what they say they mean but rather what you found in a definition.

Everything starts with concepts: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross

Morality is rooted in our immediate visceral response to what happens to us or others. My suffering does not begin with the concept of suffering. I do not need to form a concept to know that it is bad. Most of us are capable of empathy and do not first develop or appeal to a concept of empathy in order to be able to empathize. We do not need a concept of care in order to care. We do not need a concept of something mattering in order for something to matter to us.

... while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts. — 013zen

The world and reality are not distinguished by the existence or non-existence of negative facts.

The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and
the same reality.

(4.0621)

If 'p' exists in the world then 'not p' does not. If If 'p' exists in reality then 'not p' does not. That 'not p' does not exist is a negative fact. It is true that 'not p' does not exist.

How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? — 013zen

They do not differ with regard to the facts of the world. In both cases the facts remain the same.

The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen

He makes a distinction between the world and my world. It should be obvious that when someone dies the world does not end. People die every day and the world goes on. The discussion of the happy man is part of his discussion of ethics and aesthetics. They are not found in the world.

I was obviously using the example of 2+2=4 because Bob Ross had already been using it, not because I think ethics is the same as mathematics. — Leontiskos

Am I wrong to assume you are using it because you agree with it?

You say:

The rather obvious point of that post is that ethical claims are about ethical truths, not beliefs (or beliefs about ethical truths). — Leontiskos

This is a belief about ethical claims. While it is clear that the truth of 2+2=4 can be demonstrated, it is not clear that an ethical proposition can be demonstrated to be true. So in what way are they of the same type?

1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism). — Bob Ross

Moral judgments can be stated in propositional form, but this does not mean that they are propositions. We do not regard something as right or wrong or good or bad as the result of propositional acceptance or analysis.

You are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Moral philosophy should not begin with some set of contested definitions.

Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief.
— Fooloso4

'Never said it was. — Leontiskos

What you said is:

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. — Leontiskos

By the latter you are referring to what you call "type 1" propositions and give 2+2=4 as the paradigm example. You go on to say:

I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter ... — Leontiskos

The latter being these type 1 propositions. If ethical reasoning concerns and pertains to type 1 propositions then ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning.

That ethical reasoning is "type 1" reasoning is your belief not an established and uncontested truth.

In another post from today you say:

I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because ... — Leontiskos

Evidently you are unaware and uninformed about the current literature. You will find not only a rejection of moral objectivism, but that the concept of reason itself is once again changing. See, for example, the work of Richard Bernstein or Joseph Margolis.

Leontiskos: The activity of ethical reasoning is X; the subjectivist is not doing X; therefore the subjectivist is not engaged in ethics. — Leontiskos

Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief. It is shared by some but rejected by others. The term 'subjectivism' is used in different ways. To pick one from Wikipedia and treat it as if this is the only thing that those who defend some form of subjectivism must mean goes against the idea of free and open inquiry and discussion.

The irony is that you use own beliefs regarding morality to argue that morality is not about beliefs.

Prove to me, via ethical reasoning, that abortion is wrong. More generally, how is anything proved to be wrong? — Leontiskos

After responding to this several times it now looks as if you are no longer arguing in good faith. I have not asked you to prove that abortion is wrong or right. Abortion is a clear example of what is at issue, namely, the claim that ethics like mathematics is objective. The unresolved moral controversies surrounding abortion clearly demonstrates that ethical deliberation is not like adding 2 plus 2.

If you really think that I am asking you to prove anything then you have not understood what I am saying. Moral problems are not like mathematical problems. They are not subject to proof.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

(2.06)

To state the obvious, non-existing states of affairs do not exist. Reality does not contain non-existing facts.

2.06 includes the parenthetical remark:

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

also:

The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.

(2.05)

If we could know the totality of states of affairs we would thereby also know those states of affairs that do not exist, that is, any state of affairs that contradicts those states of affairs that do exist.

Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:

"The total reality is the world" (2.063). — 013zen

Compare this to:

The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

(2.04)

The purpose is, at least in part, to exclude ethical and aesthetic propositions from what is the case. They do not refer to how things are in the world. They do not depict reality.

In logical space, however, I can picture the process of making a pizza, without it actually obtaining in reality. — 013zen

In your imagination you can make this pizza, but this pizza does not exist in the world. It is not real.

Like, you're seemingly outright conflating the world and reality, — 013zen

In order to conflate them there must be some pertinent distinction that is not understood. I do not see how or where Wittgenstein makes such a distinction. It is a distinction you impose on the text.

When he says:

Reality is compared with propositions.

(4.05)

he is talking about the propositions of natural science, that is, propositions about the world. Propositions about what is the case. Facts.

If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment. — Leontiskos

I don't know if you are trying to avoid addressing the problems raised by declaring them out of bounds or if you are simply unable to see what is at issue. What is at issue is the claim that moral subjectism (sic) is internally inconsistent. In support of that claim you say:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

but when I question what it means to be binding you complain it is a derailment.

You claim that:

The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). — Leontiskos

and:

When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1) — Leontiskos

The type 1 proposition you cite is: 2+2=4. If ethics and more generally philosophy is concerned with this type of proposition then the problem of agreement with some propositions of this type such as 2+2=4 and disagreement with others of this type such as abortion needs to be explained. Once again, what is at issue is not abortion but the lack of agreement regarding moral propositions. When I point to this problem you complain it is a derailment.

You say "the epistemology of moral obligation" is a derailment and yet you ask:

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos

If we are inquiring into whether something is right or wrong then the question of how we know that something is right or wrong is not a derailment. If it is of the indisputable, demonstrable, objective type 1 then it is not a derailment to point out that moral propositions are not true to type.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think — Moliere

I took the tone of the thread to be serious. I find any serious attempt to think about ethics in terms of the construction and assault on categories comical.

I am reminded of Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy:

The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.

(The Act of Creation)

And, for good measure, from Wittgenstein:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.

(CV, p. 47)

As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos

What I am questioning is the claim that some as yet unspecified set of obligations are binding. I am also asking how it is determined that these moral propositions are objective and true?

To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos

To not say more is to skirt the issue at hand. If you are claiming that there are objective moral truths then you must not simply assert that they exist, but provide and defend at least some of them.

Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos

There are significant differences that render the comparison problematic and questionable.
There is a generally accepted distinction between killing and murder. Murder is by definition wrong, killing is not. There are cases where killing is regarded as acceptable.

The point is not to argue the morality of abortion but rather to point to the fact that it is arguable moral issue. Rational people are unable to agree. That should not be the case with propositions that are objectively true.

... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos

The relation between morality or ethics and political philosophy is important but is not what I am aiming at.

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

Should the moral proposition, 'you must not abort a fetus but carry it to term' be binding? What makes this proposition either true or false? By what moral authority can this be determined and by what force is it made binding?

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think.

I think that within these constraints there is still some degree of play and freedom. There are from time to time those who are able to see beyond the limits of their time. Those who are not products of their time but who influence how those who follow will see and think.

they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes — ENOAH

I don't think so. I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated but not thereby determined.

That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space? — 013zen

The facts are in the world.(1.13) A picture of the facts is in the world. The picture represents a possible situation (2.202) What is represented, however, may not be in the world.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.

(6.375)

That it is possible to picture the world is a logical possibility.

What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Put differently, thought too is in logical space.

A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects are their relations are merely accidental. — 013zen

The structure of a fact is not accidental. That some facts exist and others do not is accidental.

In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determines the world. — 013zen

If I want to eat, a picture is not going to do the job. You do not make up a pizza from pictures of dough and cheese. This seems so obvious that I think you must mean something else, but I can't figure out what that is.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen

I am reminded of something Wittgenstein said:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight

[CV, p. 47].

Shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk. The language used by philosophers make it difficult to think.