I agree. The fundamental point of the rejection of the Tractatus is that W. had sublimed the logic of language (PI 38, PI 89). That there is a general form of a proposition is based on assumptions regarding the fixed logical structure that underlies language (and the world).

I took another look at this this morning.

In the preface the problem is to draw a limit, but the problem at 4.114 it is to set a limit. Drawing a limit here means to go as far as thought can go, but one can set a limit at some point before the end. The limit he sets is at the point where thoughts loose their clarity:

The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts …
Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred. — T 4.112

There is still the problem of the limits of logic/world and:

Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically. — T 303

So do you think that the Tractatus asserts that a limit to thought can be drawn, or should we take what he says in the preface, that the limit can only be drawn in language (and not in thought)? — Pussycat

This is a difficult problem. As we progress there is more to be said, but the question cannot be adequately addressed without discussing large sections of the text.

A few general questions and observations:

He says we cannot draw a limit to thought because this would require that we find both sides of the limit thinkable. If both sides are thinkable then there is no limit. But doesn’t the same hold for language, the expression of thought? Wouldn’t one have to say the unsayable, speak nonsense? Is nonsense thinkable? Is nonsense illogical?

Why would he he say that the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought only to immediately correct himself? Why not just say a limit to the expression of thought or the limit of language? Is there a clear distinction between thought and its expression? Do we think first and then express what has been thought?

At 4.114 he says:

It [philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be though by working outwards through what can be thought. — T 4.114

Is he saying that a limit to thought can be established after all?

A logical picture of facts is a thought. — T 3

This is the second step in W.’s attempt to draw the limits of thoughts. The first was made at 2.225:

There is no picture which is a priori true. — T 2.225

In the Investigations W. says:

So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language. — PI §65

I am going to let myself off and skip over most of his discussion of propositions, the details of which do not bring into sharper focus the picture of the Tractatus I am drawing.

In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. — T 3.1

Recall from the preface:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts … It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn. — T Preface

What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.
A propositional sign is a fact. — T 3.14

Although W.’s concern will be primarily linguistic the elements of a propositional sign need not [edited to include 'not'] be words:

The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition. — T 3.1431

The proposition, the book is on the table can be expressed by putting a book on a table or an object that represents the book on an object that represents a table.

In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. — T 3.2

The elements are names:

I call such elements ‘simple signs’ ... 3.201


The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. 3.202


A name means an object ... 3.203


The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign. 3.21

In a proposition a name is the representative of an object. 3.22


Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are. 3.221 — T

Using the spatial object analogy, a picture of what is the case, the facts regarding what objects in a room, we can use a dollhouse as a model to express the fact that there is a chair next to the desk and a book on the desk. We can also use C for chair, B for book, and D for desk and arrange them in such a way to represent the fact that the a chair next to the desk and a book on the desk. Or we can use the names chair, desk, book and the relations “on” and “next to”.

One point that needs clarification: the names used in propositions and the things named are not the elemental names and elemental objects. Chairs and desks are not elementary. They can be broken down into parts. They are complex or configured or compound names and objects.

Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning. — T 3.3

A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents—by the existence of the proposition with a sense. — T 3.4

The demarcation of logical space is essential to the limits of thought and language.

A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought. — T 3.5

When the sign for chair, desk, and book are arranged in their proper relations we have a logical picture of the room.

A thought must be logical and to be true it must be an accurate picture or representation of the world, of what is the case, of the facts.

I mean, two pages of self-congratulatory fake 'eureka' to arrive at the basic standard Hacker and Baker interpretation of a single aphorism which I can only presume (from the level of implied scholarship) that everyone has already read. So what was the point? I just don't get it. — Isaac

What drew me to Wittgenstein was the fact that there was so little agreement as to what he meant. He was an interpretative challenge. The following points to what is at issue.

In an early draft of the foreword to Philosophical Remarks:

The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. For if a book has been written for just a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the foreword is written just for those who understand the book.

Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest. — Culture and Value 7-8

Secondary literature is just that, secondary. I read Hacker and Baker when I first wrestled with Wittgenstein. I did not find them helpful and found much that I disagreed with. If I struggle with the text only to arrive where Hacker and Baker or anyone else has already been then so be it.

Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.
It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.
He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers—and spirit itself will stink. — Thus Spoke Zarathustra,

I have been working on a more detailed reading of §58. Trying to make some of the connections clearer:

"I want to restrict the term 'name’ to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.—Thus one cannot say 'Red exists', because if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all." — PI §58

If we want to understand §58 we first need to understand the assumptions that inform the opening statement. A name according to this view signifies an element of reality (§59). The elements of reality, simples, are not things that exist but that out of which what exists is constructed. (§50). Just as the world is constructed logically from the combination of simples, language is constructed logically from the combination of names, which picture or represent simples. The name ‘red’ signifies just such a simple. If there were no red there would be no things that exist that are red and no statements about red.

—Better: If "X exists" is meant simply to say: "X" has a meaning,—then it is not a proposition which treats of X, but a proposition about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word "X". — PI §58

W. is rejecting the Tractarian logical connection between the world and language, the connection between names and simple elements.

It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red in saying that the words "Red exists" do not yield a sense. Namely that red does exist 'in its own right'. The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word "indestructible". — PI §58

It looks as though the rejection of the statement “Red exists” entails a metaphysical statement, an affirmation of the independence of red from things that exist. In addition, an affirmation that red is one of the timeless, indestructible, simple objects. But W. wants to dispel these metaphysical assumptions.

But what we really want is simply to take "Red exists" as the statement: the word "red" has a meaning. Or perhaps better: "Red does not exist" as " 'Red' has no meaning". — PI §58

We know what ‘red’ means. If red did not exist it would have no meaning. We might say that a square circle does not exist, but this is to say that a square circle has no meaning.

Only we do not want to say that that expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be saying if it meant anything. But that it contradicts itself in the attempt to say it—just because red exists 'in its own right'. — PI §58

If red exists in its own right then the rejection of the combination of the name/element and exists is contradictory. Again, §50 shows the underlying assumptions that led to the rejection of the existence or being of elements:

What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being); just as when everything that we call "destruction" lies in the separation of elements, it makes no sense to speak of the destruction of an element. — PI §50

Whereas the only contradiction lies in something like this: the proposition looks as if it were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about the use of the word "red”. — PI §58

Once the simple/complex and name/object relations are rejected, the distinction between existence of "red" and meaning or use of "red" are disentangled.

In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object. — PI §58

There is nothing problematic about saying that red exists or that things exist that are red. As to what has that color but is not a physical object perhaps he is referring to pigments or light. There is a collection “Remarks on Colour”, but I don’t know how much light it will shed on the current sections of the PI.

Wittgenstein never names the simple objects, he merely assumes they must exist. Plato's Forms on the other hand are the Forms of what W. would call complexes - Beauty, Justice, Good.



Thank you. I will.

Wittgenstein says:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) — Culture and Value 16

I think the collection of remarks in Culture and Value is the most accessible way to get a sense of what he is up to. The way on sees things can change by the way one looks at them. To this end he often uses several different examples. The parenthetical remark about one's expectations is important. We typically see what we expect to see or what we want thing to be or provide us.

I would add Nietzsche. Some of the Existentialist philosophers might be added to the list as well.

Wittgenstein's style is too aphoristic to yield to interpretation simply by the terms of the section alone. — Isaac

I agree. If you read my comments you will see that I have been making connections with earlier sections as well as with the Tractatus. I have held off making connections with later sections since they have not been discussed, with the exception of a general comment about not confusing paradigms, which are said to be an instrument of language, with something private, something in the memory because this relates to the later discussion of a private language.

I'm specifically arguing against a strict section-by-section exegesis of terminology, — Isaac

I think we are in agreement on this. The details do not come into proper focus until the larger picture is seen. From too close a painting may look like blobs of paint, from too far away the details are lost. But this does not mean that there is one correct perspective. Seeing blobs of paint is not the problem and may be of value, but if all one sees are blobs of paint then one missed the big picture.

The big picture with regard to the sections under discussion is the rejection of Tractarian objects and analysis of simples and compounds. From my first post:

As has been mentioned, Wittgenstein’s discussion should be viewed against the background of the Tractatus. The basic assumptions of the Tractatus is that there are simple objects and simple names that correspond to them. Underlying the relations between simple objects and simple names is a logical scaffolding that determines how they can be combined. In the PI he rejects each of these assumptions - simple objects, simple names, and the underlying logic of relations.

Instead of a transcendental, invariant logic that underlying both language and the world it pictures he is now investigating rules - rules of games and rules of language games. Rules do not exist independently of the game of which they are the rules. There are no rules for rules - that is, no rules that allow or disallow what can be a rule of a game, and no rules for how rules are to be followed. Games do not simply follow rules they can create rules as the game is being played. Language is not simply a rule following activity, it is also a rule making activity, an activity determined by the activities we are involved in. — Fooloso4

In some ways, but the object/form is quite different than either the Platonic Forms or the idea of matter and form.

At the risk of stating the obvious I would like to draw attention to 1.13:

The facts in logical space are the world. — T 1.13

The underlying structure of the world is logical rather than physical. Its substance is some unnamed, unidentified objects. This is deeply problematic and W. does not deal with it. Perhaps at this stage he was unaware of the problem. In any case, we can put that aside in order to get a clearer view of the picture of reality he is drawing. More on this picture at the end of 2.

Objects are simple. — T 2.02

Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. — T 2.021

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced. — T 2.0231

It [substance] is form and content. — T 2.025

Space, time, colour (being coloured) are forms of objects. — T 2.0251

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable. — T 2.0271

In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. — T 2.031

Here we have the ontology of the Tractatus. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of combination, it is by the combination or configuration of objects that material properties are produced. It is by combination that facts are produced.


At 2.1 there is a shift from the substance and structure of world to what we can say about it:

We picture facts to ourselves. — T 2.1

As with the facts themselves, a picture of the facts is in logical space. The elements of the picture correspond to the elements of the facts. — T 2.13

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality. — T 2.18

There is no picture which is a priori true. — T 2.225

A logical picture of reality is not necessarily a true picture of reality. The picture must be compared to reality. (2.223) But how is this picture to be compared to reality? Where do we find these simple objects? They are by their nature not things that can be seen or found. Their existence seems to be determined a priori.

Note the deliberately vague 'kinds of statement', not a complete list, not an ordered and categorised index, just a reminder of the kinds of statements.

At 91 he warns against thinking that there is something 'hidden' in the ordinary expression which analysis can reveal.

At 93 he specifically references the plight of the person who thinks that propositions are something queer as being caused by the forms that we use in expressing ourselves that "stand in his way" — Isaac

Isn't what you are doing here exegetic?

It is, to a great extent, about vagueness, the blurred boundaries of a concept, the inexactness of a definition. — Isaac

Isn't that something that becomes clear through from a careful reading of the text?

If you're going to pay such close attention to the words used, then at least do so without prejudice. — Isaac

I agree. It is not a question of determining a precise meaning of a word but of eliminating misunderstandings of what he means when he uses the word. This is exactly what you are doing when you point to modal expressions. A careful reading of the text does not commit one to " trying to fit [what is vague] into an exact logical category". Ramsey also warns against: "laziness and wooliness".
`

It was you who mentioned schools:

But, HOW can God be considered an extended thing since most philosophical schools deny that God could have a body. And no physical substance means no extension, right? — SapereAude

The Tractatus is an austerely beautiful and simple work. One would do well to read it instead of reading about it. To that end I will be following and perhaps contributing.

The passages in the book are meant to be largely aphoristic. The 'answer', such as there is one, is not in the actual text, we're not going to understand it better by a closer exegesis. The 'answer' is what the text points to, not what it actually says. — Isaac

I don’t think we can forgo a careful reading, an “exegesis”, of the text. The aphoristic nature of his writing does not preclude but demands just such a reading. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding as to what it is that Wittgenstein is pointing to. One of the most striking features of Wittgenstein’s work is how little agreement there is to what he is saying.

I do not think Wittgenstein intends to point to answers. So, what is he pointing to? The reader:

I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right. — Culture and Value 18

His work is within the therapeutic tradition of philosophy:

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more a working on oneself. On one's interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.) — Culture and Value,16

But, nowadays some doctors are actively trying to hasten death through assisted suicide. How do they do it? — Wallows

The Hippocratic Oath says: "Do no harm". Which is the greater harm, prolonging suffering or hastening death?

But, HOW can God be considered an extended thing since most philosophical schools deny that God could have a body. And no physical substance means no extension, right? — SapereAude

For Spinoza God and Nature are the same. They are all inclusive terms. It is not that God has a body but that extension is an attribute of God.

Spinoza cannot be understood as long as one conceives of God according to the "schools".

§60 picks up on §46 and §47, the problem of simples and composites.

But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'. — PI 47

"Further analysed" in §60 returns to the same point. A broom maker might regard a broom as a brush and stick since he may combine various kinds of brushes and sticks. To a physicist brush and stick is no more an analysis than broom. Wittgenstein’s concern is not, of course, with brooms but with the idea of a fundamental analysis, of absolute simples:

Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractates LogicoPhilosophicus] were such primary elements. — PI §46

There is a sense in which further analysis distorts our thinking. We do not understand a broom by analysis but by sweeping the floor. We do not understand a chair by analysis but by sitting on it.

I wish to get a basic broad understanding of philosophy — Drek

This can mean different things. It might mean an introduction to the major philosophers. It should be stressed that this is just an introduction. It may be informative but it will not give you a basic understanding of any of them.

Another approach is through topics or "problems of philosophy" - ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and so on. This is often done by either reading or a discussion of representative texts or by an author's view of where things stand.

The approach that I favor is to begin with a single text, reading it carefully and discussing it, preferably with at least one person who knows the text well. I think Plato is a good place to start for several reasons.

In the preface to his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says one of the few things that all philosophers might agree on:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. — PI Preface

For some philosophy is a way of life, what Socrates calls the examined life.

↪Fooloso4 Sure, a memory-image is not a paradigm, happy to accept that. Hardly bears on the substance of the discussion, but okay. — StreetlightX

The reason I am pushing this is that it has bearing on the problem of a private language and related issues.

In §56, samples and memory-images both function to undergird a certain type of language-game, and the similarity Witty draws there is that both can 'fade', and that this fading has the same consequences for the kind of language-game under discussion. Just under half the discussion there is devoted to drawing out this similarity: — StreetlightX

I did not delete it intentionally. I'm not sure what happened. I changed a couple of minor grammatical errors but must not have hit post. I retrieved the word file I had it on and re-posted from that. There were a few things in the original post that I did not have on file so what is there now is not exactly the same.

When you say that "there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image", this seems quite straightforwardly wrong, insofar as §56 and §57 both go out of their way - in fact it seems to me to be the very point of both discussions - to establish some rather clear equivalences: — StreetlightX

He defines a paradigm as follows:

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — PI §56

If you did not know what ‘red’ means I cannot point to something in my memory that would serve as an example or to something in your memory. Nor could you find it by searching your memory images. I might say: Do you remember that wagon you used to have? You might say in response that you remember the wagon and it was blue. Did you forget the correct name of the colors or is your memory image not accurate or did you have another wagon that was blue?

In §56, samples and memory-images both function to undergird a certain type of language-game, and the similarity Witty draws there is that both can 'fade', and that this fading has the same consequences for the kind of language-game under discussion. Just under half the discussion there is devoted to drawing out this similarity: — StreetlightX

In the middle of §56 he asks:

But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right? — PI §56

When it comes to the length of a meter we appeal to a physical standard. Memory could result in various lengths and so cannot be the paradigm for a meter.

Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepia which is there kept hermetically sealed.

A memory cannot be a standard. A standard must be public. It must be something that all of us can use.
— PI §50

In §57, the comparison is even more straightforward, insofar as Witty spells out in so many words that the forgetting the color is "comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language" - this being the conclusion and thus the major lesson of §57. — StreetlightX

He does not say we lost the paradigm but that the situation is comparable with losing a paradigm. It is comparable because the name of the color has lost its meaning. The name does not mean anything as long as we cannot make the connection between the name and the color. But the difference is, we can still consult an example of the color, that is, a paradigm. The paradigm is not lost because there are still examples of things that are red that can be pointed to and agreed upon as red.

§56: "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies?". — StreetlightX

Is this possible? Can there be a name of a color for which no sample exists? How can we know what color is being named without a sample that is part of our language?

Similarly, when I speak of a memory-image serving as a paradigm, one should read this as 'in the role of a paradigm', where, moreover, I use 'paradigm' interchangeably with 'sample'. Especially since I read §56 as insisting on the similarity/equivalence of role that the memory-image and a 'real life' sample/paradigm play in the kind of language-game under discussion. — StreetlightX

My point is that there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image. The memory image is dependent on something that was seen in the world. Paradigms must be public, shared.

As a general point though, it's worth pointing out how odd it is to say that things 'stand for' words. — StreetlightX

It is not that things stand for words but that the thing is the bearer of the name. When used as a paradigm, an example or sample, it shows what the name, in this case, ‘red’ means.

It's also not the case that paradigms 'show the meaning of a name': a paradigm exhibits nothing but itself - one can look at a color sample all day and it will not 'show' its name — StreetlightX

You are right, I cannot derive the name 'red' by by staring at the sample. If, however, I say “bluorange” I can show you what the name blueorange means by pointing to the sample. The sample shows what the name means. The name is a label. The sample shows what it labels.

Eh, I don't think you're paying enough attention to the fact that a paradigm is a role that something occupies in a particular language-game, and not an actual object or thing. — StreetlightX

W. is discussing both the function of a paradigm in language and what can serve in that function. What can serve in that function is often an actual object or thing. It is important to see why a memory-image cannot serve in that role.

Seems like a lot of people have a Master's in philosophy or more, but can anyone give me some laymen books in order to argue and defend my beliefs? Intellectual self-defense? — Drek

Your interest seems to be the development of rhetorical skills. Philosophy, as I understand it, involves the radical questioning of one’s beliefs, not a defense of them. Or, to put it differently, it is an examination of those beliefs in order to see how well they can be defended in response to questions and criticism.

This is, however, not without problems. An argument is not necessarily true because one is able to provide a strong defense or weak because one is not able to. The line between philosophy and sophistry is not always clear. So, one must be honest with him or her self: do you seek the truth or merely to defend your beliefs? A related question is who it is that you wish to defend them to and against?

§56: "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies?". — StreetlightX

Is this possible? Can there be a name of a color for which no sample exists? How can we know what color is being named without a sample that is part of our language?

Similarly, when I speak of a memory-image serving as a paradigm, one should read this as 'in the role of a paradigm', where, moreover, I use 'paradigm' interchangeably with 'sample'. Especially since I read §56 as insisting on the similarity/equivalence of role that the memory-image and a 'real life' sample/paradigm play in the kind of language-game under discussion. — StreetlightX

My point is that there is no equivalence between a paradigm and a memory image. The memory image is dependent on something that was seen in the world, something that is remembered. Paradigms must be public, shared.

As a general point though, it's worth pointing out how odd it is to say that things 'stand for' words. — StreetlightX

The sample is a bearer of the name. When used as a paradigm it shows what the name, in this case, ‘red’ means. The name 'red' does not stand for the paradigm, the paradigm is merely an example of the name. The name 'red' stands for or represents whatever is that color.

It's also not the case that paradigms 'show the meaning of a name': a paradigm exhibits nothing but itself - one can look at a color sample all day and it will not 'show' its name — StreetlightX

You are right, I cannot derive the name by staring at the sample. If, however, I refer to “bluorange” I can show you what the name blueorange means by pointing to the sample. The sample shows what the name means. The name is a label. The sample shows what it is a label for.

it is our use of language and the incorporation of the sample in that use that will show the name of a sample. — StreetlightX

Eliminate all samples, all paradigms or examples, and our use of language cannot show what ‘red’ or ‘bluorange’ means.

An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — PI §55

In §55, Witty examined two roles that names could play in a language-game. One in which the name was associated with a paradigm — StreetlightX

A color sample is a means of representation (§50). It is a bearer of the name. It shows the meaning of the name. (§40) It serves as a paradigm. (§55)

Can a memory serve as a paradigm? There is an obvious sense in which it can’t. If someone does not know what ‘red’ means I cannot show them by pointing to something in my memory. It is also obvious that if I don’t know or can’t remember what ‘red’ means I cannot show myself by pointing to something in my memory. If, however, I know what ‘red’ means I do not need a paradigm.

I think this is the direction you are going in when you say:

he's beginning his attempt to undermine any necessary role of 'memory-images' in the use of a name. — StreetlightX

if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work. — StreetlightX

I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name.

We do not use "red" to name something that is red, we use it to name the colour of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I said was that

Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. — Fooloso4

It is not the thing that is red that is named red, a wagon or a barn, for example, but red names the color of the wagon or barn. If I was asked to show someone something that is red I could show them the wagon or the barn. If they understand the language game they know I referring to the color of the wagon or the barn and not to the wagon or barn itself.

Now we have the metaphysical problem of accounting for the existence of this thing — Metaphysician Undercover

§58 brings into question the idea that there is a metaphysical problem:

The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word "indestructible". — PI §58

We no more have to account for red than for anything and everything else. Why would 'red' be a metaphysical problem and not the existence of wagons and barns and the kid in the wagon and the cow in the barn?

I don't see how you can say that. The problem, and apparent paradox, is with the supposition "meaning is use". We use the name "red" as if there is something, an element of reality or something like that, which is named as "red". Unless we reject "meaning is use", we cannot reject the "elemental analysis" unless we find some other thing, something other than an element of reality, which "red" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t see that as paradoxical. As I understand it, what he is rejecting is the idea of “an element of reality”. Red refers to a color, that is how we use the name. We do not need the metaphysical framework of elements and complexes to use the word ‘red’ to name something that is red.

His use of the term 'element' should not be confused with the atomic elements in the periodic table.

The discussion of the problem saying “X exists” where ‘X’ is a name needs to be seen in context:

For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess ... — PI §49

What does it mean to say that we can attribute neither being nor non-being to elements?—One might say: if everything that we call "being" and "non-being" consists in the existence and non-existence of connexions between elements, it makes no sense to speak of an element's being (non-being) … — PI §50

The issue is both linguistic and ontological. Names are the linguistic elements out of which descriptions are constructed. Names also label ontological elements. What can be said is said via the connection of linguistic elements, names. What exists exists via the connections between ontological elements, the building blocks of existence.

Wittgenstein rejects this kind of elemental analysis into simples and composites.

The restriction in §58 of the combination ‘X exists’ is based on the above assumptions. It amounts to saying that a name, the element out of which statements are made is a statement. §59 is the other half of the problem. If a name signifies an element of reality, it would mean that an element, that out of which what reality or what exists is constructed is real or exists.

The seeming paradox disappears when the elemental analysis into simples and composites is rejected.

Socrates says the he speaks differently to different men depending on their needs.
— Fooloso4

That's interesting.
I like that image.
It seems to be very like how current 'talking' therapies work.
No set answers but examining self and beliefs as in CBT ?
Cognitive stuff.... — Amity

Socrates called himself a physician of the soul. The first psychologist?

If one held to the latter point of view, how would that be expressed using the logic that only one or another thing can be true at the same time? — Valentinus

I am not sure I understand your question. I don’t think that either depiction is intended to be an accurate depiction of actual souls.

If this is right then the notion of reason ruling the soul should not be taken at face value. The idea that the soul is ruled by reason is a noble lie.

The erotic nature of the soul should not be overlooked or minimized. The philosophical soul that desires wisdom is the most immoderately erotic.

“In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object.” §58

This seems pretty obvious, so why the convoluted prelude about some unidentified speaker wanting to restrict the term 'name’ to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'? Why not? What is the problem? It seems to have to do with ‘names’ rather than any particular thing that is names such as red:

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes." (§59)

The two assumptions are connected - the elements of reality are not things that exist they are the elements that are the basis of what exists. This is a reference to the Tractatus’ view of analysis, the simple objects and names out of which the facts of the world and propositions are constructed. But this “particular picture” is now rejected. It is based on seeing the component parts of something composite, he uses the example of a chair, remaining unchanged when the chair is destroyed. Red is just such a component.

I am questioning whether Plato is able to "transcend" that and has some insight into "what's really going on."

Using the analogy of the cave, he is a puppet-maker, an opinion-maker, an image-maker. His images include the cave, the shadows, and the reality that transcends our ignorance.

The need to find an understanding of justice that is truly beneficial to a person is the only way to counter this form of instruction and way of life. — Valentinus

That is the challenge as it is put to him, but how well did it work out for Socrates? Is it only in the just city that does not exist anywhere that justice is truly beneficial to the person who is always just? If justice is understood as the proper balance and harmony of the soul, that is, as the health of the soul, then just as physical health is preferable to illness, the health of the psyche too is preferable. But is that the case when dealing with people who are unjust?

This prefaces a discussion of the soul's nature that also uses "parts", namely, the analogy of the winged chariot made up of charioteer and two steeds — Valentinus

The two depictions of the soul in the Republic and the Phaedrus do not match up. Different stories for different occasions. Socrates says the he speaks differently to different men depending on their needs.

I am in agreement with you except that I do not think Plato is claiming that he, or more precisely his Socrates since Plato is never speaks in the dialogues, does know “intuitively” or in any other way what justice is. One definition of justice that is agreed to is that it is minding your own business. And this should be understood as a just response to the Athenian jury that sentenced him.

In the Republic Socrates does not claim to know what justice itself is. He creates a myth of transcendent knowledge, of noesis, but in doing so points in the other direction to remind us that we are squarely within the realm of opinion; and as a matter of opinion questions of justice remain inconclusive. This is what Socrates famous “second sailing” is about. We do not have in our sights the things themselves, in this case justice itself, and so must take refuge in speech. We must rely on dialectic, on argument to reach conclusions that always fall short of knowledge and so must remain open to further consideration.

With regard to zero, I do not know what Heidegger actually said or what they context was, but he may be referring to the Greek concept of aristmos. Jacob Klein, who was a student of Heidegger, did an important work on this: Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra”. For the Greeks the first number is two. One is the unit of the count, the thing that is being counted. Without an identifiable one or unit we cannot say how many. Zero was introduced to the West by the Italian mathematician Fibonacci along with the rest of the Arabic numerals.

The Greek concept of number has ontological significance including the problem of the One and the many, atomism, and Plato’s Forms.

Thrasymachus also claimed that the powerful are always the last word about what is just. — Valentinus

I don’t see how this shows that the premise of the Republic is how to not be overwhelmed by bad things.

Glaucon's desire to have that point contested is why anything after the first book happened. — Valentinus

Right. The way he poses the problem is interesting. It seems as though he is familiar with Socrates notion of Forms:

"For I desire to hear what each is and what power it has all alone by itself when it is in the soul" (358b)

The immortality thing is an important argument that may or may not be connected to the other arguments. — Valentinus

My point about that this particular argument for immortality is that it is based on a soul without parts. The tripartite soul of the Republic has three parts.

In addition, it puts bodily desires in the soul, but this is problematic considering what is said about the soul’s release from the body. If desire is in the soul rather than the body then there is no escape from bodily desire. We are tied to the body whether we have a body or not.

All I can do is repeat. If you do not know which colour "greige" refers to, but you know that it refers to a colour, then the name is not meaningless to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you do not know what greige is then saying "the color greige" tells you that it is a color. In this case greige tells you nothing at all, it is the word color that tells you everything you know about greige. If you were not told that greige is a color merely saying "greige" is meaningless.

But it doesn't make sense to say that if a word is useless for some particular purpose it is therefore meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if you did not know that greige was a color then greige would be meaningless.

When in reality the word does have meaning to that person because the person knows that it refers to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is only when the word "color" is added to greige that you know it is a color. If you did not know what greige was and I said paint the walls greige you might assume that was the color but you might assume it was some kind of technique.

I am going to hold off commenting further until the discuss moves forward.

No, "we forget which colour this is the name of" says that we forget the colour, not that we forget the name. — Metaphysician Undercover

The name is, in the example I used, “greige”. If you forget which color greige is the name of you do not necessarily forget the color. You may remember the color of the foyer but not remember or know that the name of the color is “greige”.

Not necessarily, because you might still remember that "greige" refers to a colour, but just not remember what colour it is. In this case, the loss of meaning of "greige" would not be complete, or absolute. The word would still have some meaning, it is understood to refer to a colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, if someone asked you to paint the room greige and you just grabbed a can of paint and painted the room whatever color that happened to be do you think they would be satisfied because, after all, it is a color? If you don’t know what color to paint then the name greige is meaningless. Perhaps not in an absolute sense, you may already know that greige is a color or figure it out because every paint is some color, but meaningless in the sense that you do not know what to do with it.

OK, but notice that when the colour swatch is lost, the name of the colour still has some meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that the name was known only that there was a swatch.

The existence of a paradigm (physical or remembered example) is not necessary for a name to have meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is true. The issue is making the connection between the name and the thing named. A paradigm is a way of doing that. If you cannot make the connection the name is meaningless. Knowing that it is a color is meaningless for the purpose of painting or picking out a fabric or whatever else you might do with a specific color if you don’t know what color it is.

Right, the meaning of a word is determined by its use. Is this something distinct from "a paradigm"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A paradigm may be an example of how the word is used. This is what we find in dictionaries. In general we do not need paradigms for the words we commonly use. If we are unfamiliar with the word, however, a paradigm will help us make the connection.

If so, then this would mean that the idea that the meaning of a word is determined by a paradigm can't be right. — Metaphysician Undercover

The paradigm is an example of what it is that corresponds to the name (§55).

The premise of the Republic is how to not be overwhelmed by bad things. — Valentinus

What support do you have for that? The premise as stated is to defend justice against the argument put forward by Thrasymachus that whatever is beneficial to you.

If there is a more accurate Platonic view of the soul, what is that? — Valentinus

The short answer is, no. There is no accurate view of the soul at all. What it is and what happens to it at death remains a mystery.

In the Phaedo Socrates makes the argument that what is composed of parts can be destroyed, and so, if the soul is immortal it cannot be composed of parts. Other arguments are put forth in the Phaedo to persuade his friends that the soul is immortal but they all fail. One argument is that Soul is imperishable, but this proves to be problematic for the soul of the individual and self-identity.

Yeah, if you've been harmed, you know damn well what is right or wrong. — Drek

Just to be clear, it was not the experience of suffering harm but of doing harm! As in, it takes one to know one.

I do agree with your point though.